Nick Lloyd: Haig Didn't Really Change Until Aug. 1918

[aiwac]

Listened to the following interesting speech by Dr. Nick Lloyd. Lloyd argues that Haig was far too overenthusiastic, hoping for a decisive breakthrough (largely due to gas) and keeping to the offensive when it wasn't clear that they were achieving anything. More controversially, he argues that Somme and Third Ypres were effectively Loos write large - with better artillery and tactics at the lower level, and certainly more trained men, but with the same "but heads against the wall until it breaks" that took place at Loos, instead of shifting ground or attacking elsewhere (the 1918 Foch conception of hitting in one place then hitting in another).

I would be very interested to hear the opinions of the august forum on this.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Nick Lloyd's book on Loos (based on his Doctorate thesis) also correctly (IMHO) identifies Loos as essentially Haig's battle with very little input from French. Its a few years since I read the book but thats my recollection.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[aiwac]

He says so in the podcast as well. To be fair, I think many French commanders were also too sanguine about decisive breakthroughs in 1915.

We should also consider the background on the Eastern Front, with the Russians in very serious trouble due to the Gorlice-Tarnow breakthrough battles. People were probably panicked about Russia leaving the war after such a major blow and "limited" offensives wouldn't have been very comforting. I don't know if this had an effect on Haig, but it probably had an effect on the French putting so much pressure on the BEF to attack before it was ready. Russia was an important part of the coalition, too.

I also have to wonder whether Haig's desire for a breakthrough (at Loos or at Third Ypres) was the only real serious input he had on strategic affairs or even just generalship. I don't really have a dog in this fight, but Lloyd seemed a little too anti-revisionist. Was "switching fronts" when an attack exhausted itself a realistic - and effective - option in 1915-1917, as opposed to 1918 when the Allies attacked all along the front? I'm not sure.

[David Filsell]

Same old, same old.

[hazelclark]

Well, I am still trying to figure this all out, and as stated elsewhere, I am trying to understand the process of the war by reading everything I can get my hands on. This includes the old books by Repington and Conan Doyle. These books have the immediacy lacking in a lot of the newer works, and since written closer to the time, likely didn't have access to a lot of documentation now available. However, they did have the benefit of knowing the people involved and the general mood prevailing in the army. In the case of Repington, it almost sounds as though he is the "Deus ex machina". He knew everyone who was anyone and seemed to have huge influence.

I am only up to the battle of the Marne in Conan Doyle, but have been struck in both cases by the pro F.M. French sentiment. Repinton in particular thinks that French had a raw deal over Loos among other things.

Hazel C

[Terry_Reeves]

Whilst I accept that Dr Lloyd's thesis is dated 2005, and his podcast from Shrivenham is dated 2008 and was necessarily an abbreviated version of his thesis, much of what he said already been had been covered by others.

With regard to the use of gas, it was Sir John French who demanded retaliation after the German gas attack in April 1915. Facsimiles of the interchange between Roberts and Kitchener can be found at TNA. To be fair, the use of gas by the British was not originally seen as a war winning weapon, but the idea did grow. What Dr Lloyd did not mention is that the British army only had about 20 weeks to develop their response. The argument about wind direction is fine, what was not mentioned is that wind direction can also be localised and that obstructions such woods and hollows could play havoc with gas.

One final point. Whilst Haig, I would agree, let some battles go on too long, there is no mention of any alternative to the "butt head" thesis.

TR

[hazelclark]

Lloyd seems to be making the case that throughout his entire career on the Western Front, Haig was always trying for the "major breakthrough", and pursued that end regardless of the consequences in terms of casualties. Frequently though, it was proved that the "bite and hold" method of people like Plumer and Rawlinson was more effective in the long run and Haig found himself latterly agreeing to these tactics when his great "harooshes" didn't work. He justified his decisions at Loos by blaming the with holding of the reserves as the reason for the losses and lack of ultimate success. Must say I didn't realise how critical for success was the efficacy of gas in wiping out, or at least causing havoc with the Germans. I knew that using gas that day was a bit iffy because of the weather, but not that so much dependence had been put on it.

Sounds as though, for whatever myriad reasons there were, that communication, all the way down the line from French was a major problem and consensus didn't play much of a part. It seems that if one takes the position that attrition was necessary, it could have been more usefully gained?

Hazel C.

[phil andrade]

Did Nick Lloyd contradict himself ?

Alluding to the extreme casualties of 25th September 1915, he stated that the death rate per division was even higher than that of 1st July 1916. In his outline of the closing of the offensive, he mentioned that the division that attacked the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 13th October had a worse day than it was to suffer on the fist day of the Somme, and stated that this was unique. These two statements are irreconcilable. Maybe I've missed something.

As for Haig's culpability, I feel that he should have mentioned the experience of First Ypres. In this affair DH made an excellent account of himself, but - more importantly in regards to the theme here - he was left with the conviction that the Germans had come very close to winning there, and that their failure to exploit was crucially instructive.....perhaps he was determined to learn the lesson and not hold back, for fear of replicating that German failure.

That said, I found the talk refreshing and engaging. Not " same old, same old..."

Phil (PJA)

[bmac]

I think the point he is making is that for every other Division involved on 1st July 1916 that day is the worst day of the war in terms of casualties. The exception is the 46th Division which lost more men at Hohenzollern redoubt on 13th October than at Gommecourt on 1st July. The point he makes when comparing 25th September to 1st July is that the average number of fatalities per Division on 25th September 1915 is greater than the average number of fatal casualties per division suffered on 1st July 1916 making the first day of Loos proportionately worse than the first day of the Somme. They are two different points.

[phil andrade]

Thanks for explaining that, Bill.

Unjustified quibble on my part.

Nick Lloyd gives an unremittingly dismal depiction of Loos, doesn't he ?

I'd always thought that the initial British success gave the Germans a nasty shock.

And I feel that Haig's conduct reflects well on his sense of Coalition duty.

But I like the way Dr. Lloyd has the courage of his convictions and stands up to the mantra that has become received wisdom of late.

Phil (PJA)

[bmac]

Whisper it quietly but I agree with almost everything he says.

[hazelclark]

I think the point he is making is that for every other Division involved on 1st July 1916 that day is the worst day of the war in terms of casualties. The exception is the 46th Division which lost more men at Hohenzollern redoubt on 13th October than at Gommecourt on 1st July. The point he makes when comparing 25th September to 1st July is that the average number of fatalities per Division on 25th September 1915 is greater than the average number of fatal casualties per division suffered on 1st July 1916 making the first day of Loos proportionately worse than the first day of the Somme. They are two different points.

That is how I read it also.

I also agree with what he is saying, but not, as yet, having read enough to counter those much better informed than I, someone will always dig up something to the contrary. Even Sheffield and Terraine alluded to the fact that it wasn't until later in 1918 that Haig showed to advantage, and I am still not convinced that it was his own doing. Haven't read that far!!

Hazel

[David Filsell]

Bite and hold of course was a tool which was designed to lead to a breakthrough, which was finally achieved!

[aiwac]

I think the Battle of Loos is a perfect example of the need for comparative discussion:

How were the French thinking in 1915? They launched more - and larger - offensives than the BEF. Were they hoping for a breakthrough? Attrition? 1918 style lateral pressure? Both the Germans and Russians aimed for a breakthrough in 1915 - the Russians with the siege and fall of Przemysl and the Germans with Gorlice-Tarnow. Was Haig really so wrong to hope for a breakthrough in the same style or are the cases not comparable?

The same goes for "high strategy". Lloyd complains about the lack of change in high strategy among the BEF generals or formal method for learning lessons on that score. But again - compared to whom? Doughty mentions debates among the French High Command about strategy but no formal institute/method or some such. Nor do the Germans seem to have been better at that, either. Think of the 1918 offensives, which combined many brilliant tactical innovations. But strategy? What did Luddendorf say when asked what the goal was? "First we punch a hole in their lines, as for the rest, we shall see." Erich von Manstein, he most certainly was not - and this was after four years of fighting, mind you.

I'd also comment on whether 1918-style lateral pressure would have worked as well prior to 1918, but I'll leave with this: Douglas Haig should be judged according to the methods and thought of his time, including generals in the Allied and Enemy armies - no more, no less. We do neither him nor anyone else justice by comparing them to some hypothetical demigod of war who was unfortunately unavailable outside of wargames and historians' books.

[hazelclark]

"Bite and hold", as you say, was ultimately intended to lead to a breakthrough. However, from what I understand at this point, when it was used, it seemed to have more immediate positive results. Haig, in my opinion, was more likely to have achieved his "breakthrough" by capitalising on the more modest initial achievements. 3rd Ypres is one battle that would likely have benefited from the approach that Plumer started off with at Messines, and then ended up with, after Gough had his turn attempting an advance on a wide front. I think that 3rd Ypres might have been more cost effective in terms of casualties had Plumer been left to get on with it. In any case, I think it went on longer than really necessary.

I do think that Haig is being judged according to his contemporaries, and the various revisionists and re-revisionists are all interpreting and re-interpreting data from the period. Admittedly, more information is now available, but a lot of it is subjective and open to interpretation. I certainly don't know who might have done a better job, but his was not the only name put forward.

Hazel

[aiwac]

"I do think that Haig is being judged according to his contemporaries, and the various revisionists and re-revisionists are all interpreting and re-interpreting data from the period."

Good to know.

[David Filsell]

Hazel

Agreed. The real breakthrough was the development by the British of all arms combat artillery, air, armour and infantry, in which much improved infantry techniques, Lewis guns and etc were all deployed. Haig had to use the material and men available. In 1918, after years of failure and - by everyone on virtually every front, it came together for Haig and other senior commanders.

[phil andrade]

Lloyd attributes so much to Haig's excessive optimism, and to his over enthusiastic endorsement of new technology - in this case, gas.

A Damascene moment in later August 1915, and Haig becomes a proponent of the strategic breakthrough.

Isn't this too specific and restricted a view to take ? It's as if aspects of Haig have been isolated and used to explain the outcome of a particularly notorious battle.

The Germans were calling the tune. Entente generals didn't have the luxury of sitting back and contemplating what they were going to do next. Just as Haig was developing his enthusiasm for deploying the poison gas, the Germans were about to capture Warsaw.

Perhaps that impinged on Haig's sense of duty to the Coalition, and spurred him to countenance the grandiose objective. A sense of urgency was weighing on him.....with good reason, in my opinion.

Phil (PJA)

[hazelclark]

Yes David, I do see what you are saying. I learned a bit about that from Charles Messenger's book about Amiens, and I think the bit about "other senior commanders" is important. I felt that Haig was more receptive to alternate strategies in 1918 than previously.

Hazel

[David Filsell]

I promised myself never to get in another brawl with the butchers and bungles school. But fail again

So Haig, a blind believer in cavalry, dismissive of mg, who panicked on the retreat - all of which have been claimed - is now claimed over enthusiastic about technological development. That would include blind gun registering radio, tanks, air - to name but a few

- and of course the BEF needed a leader who was unenthusiastic?

As I said, same old same old. It's just another attempt to Find another stick to beat the man who led the army to victory.

I shall return to the pavilion.

[hazelclark]

Hindsight is always 20/20. Or so they say. I have no idea who might have done a better job, on the spot, at the time. As I said earlier, documents are interpreted and reinterpreted to "prove" or "disprove" just about anything, and however you choose to look at it, it is purely an academic exercise. You must admit that reading some of the really old stuff, better allows you to understand the shennanegans (sp?) going on at the time, together with giving a better feel for what people at the time really felt, which, in MY opinion, is what matters. The average person has no business trying to revisit battles of a hundred years ago other than for their own amusement. (or whatever)

In fact, the whole topic is not unlike a certain discussion taking place in Scotland as we speak. There are very bright people on both sides of the argument, who will bring you "proof" of their particular point of view.

Hazel

[SilverFox100]

Hindsight is always 20/20. Or so they say. I have no idea who might have done a better job, on the spot, at the time. As I said earlier, documents are interpreted and reinterpreted to "prove" or "disprove" just about anything, and however you choose to look at it, it is purely an academic exercise. You must admit that reading some of the really old stuff, better allows you to understand the shennanegans (sp?) going on at the time, together with giving a better feel for what people at the time really felt, which, in MY opinion, is what matters. The average person has no business trying to revisit battles of a hundred years ago other than for their own amusement. (or whatever)

In fact, the whole topic is not unlike a certain discussion taking place in Scotland as we speak. There are very bright people on both sides of the argument, who will bring you "proof" of their particular point of view.

Hazel

I agree with what you say here Hazel. Hindsight, at whatever distance or time past, is a wonderful thing and events as in the war are open to many interpretations, hence the amount of books available. Reading different authors about the same event, aligned to source material, war diaries etc., give an opportunity for one to come to ones own opinion, but that is exactly what it is, ones own opinion, not necessarily correct or wrong. All I know at this stage of my interest in WW1, is that it was one hell of a technological war the like of which had not been fought before and the Generals on all sides had to learn quickly how to fight it and some were better at it than others.

That's a fairly simplistic viewpoint I know, but when I have read a lot more books (sitting in my bookcase at present) and source material ( a fair amount on my computer and growing) I may have a far more detailed opinion, but it will still only be mine.

Regards. Mike

[hazelclark]

I agree with what you say here Hazel. Hindsight, at whatever distance or time past, is a wonderful thing and events as in the war are open to many interpretations, hence the amount of books available. Reading different authors about the same event, aligned to source material, war diaries etc., give an opportunity for one to come to ones own opinion, but that is exactly what it is, ones own opinion, not necessarily correct or wrong. All I know at this stage of my interest in WW1, is that it was one hell of a technological war the like of which had not been fought before and the Generals on all sides had to learn quickly how to fight it and some were better at it than others.

That's a fairly simplistic viewpoint I know, but when I have read a lot more books (sitting in my bookcase at present) and source material ( a fair amount on my computer and growing) I may have a far more detailed opinion, but it will still only be mine.

Regards. Mike

I'm with you on all of that. I keep thinking that I know what I feel about a certain situation, and then read something else which colours my original view. Fact is, one does get an impression, but it isn't written in stone and there are all kinds of nuances. That is why I am now attempting to work my way through the war, reading as many views as possible, including those written during and soon after. It is just as well I have four years to do it!!

Hazel

[phil andrade]

There is an orthodoxy developing about Haig.

It's no bad thing to see it challenged now and again.

Lloyd hasn't yet convinced me ; but his effort wins my respect.

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

Is that orthodoxy 1, 2 or 3 to which you refer? Butcher, bungler or effective CinC? No doubt there are other unorthodoxys could be considered too.