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Remembered Today:

BEF 1914 Reinforcement Chain and the Rule of 93


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Hello - I need your help.

I am trying to find evidence that might prove or disprove a theory which has a few elements:

Theory:

1. The standard number of ORs in a Line Infantry Reinforcement draft in the BEF in 1914 was 93 (or multiples thereof)

2. Small variances around this number are explained by men dropping out en route or small numbers of recovered sick and wounded being bolted onto a standard draft.

3. Drafts of Reinforcements significantly lower than 93 were in fact either small groups of recovered wounded, recovered sick or both. Occasionally these are described as such.

4. At some stage in 1914 the 'standard' draft of 93 (or multiples thereof) was abandoned as casualty rates outstripped the ability to reinforce fast enough - at this point everyone was sent as soon as they became available and the reinforcement chains became full of larger drafts - some in excess of 300 and much smaller drafts in the low tens.

5. Edit: The point at which the numbers begin to fragment might indicate a point in time when events overwhelm the system (loss rate exceeds replacement rate) and every last man - recovered wounded and recovered injured and remaining base details etc are thrown into the line.

Evidence:

1. War Establishment for an Infantry Battalion included a 1st Reinforcement of one Officer and 93 ORs : "1 + 93"....it is no surprise that....

2. Almost every BEF Infantry War Diary from the first 5 Divs records the arrival of the 1st Reinforcement of "1 + 93" on or around 5th Sep 1914. Variances are low single digits.

3. There is lots of evidence that the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th etc Reinforcements were made up of drafts of X Officers and 93. In most cases, where the drafts are numbers (3rd, 4th etc) the rule of 93 generally holds, however.....

4. Occasionally diary entries provide a qualifier on the small drafts: Black Watch on 22nd Nov 1914: 35 Reinforcements "mostly [recovered] wounded"

Counter Evidence:

1. Not all drafts subsequent to the 1st are multiples of 93. Some are fragments, but in almost every case they are not numbered 3rd, 4th, 5th etc....

2. Most of the small drafts are not described as being recovered wounded or sick or stragglers being 'recycled' (yes I hate that word too).

3. There is no documentary evidence by way of Army publication that proscribes the standard number in a reinforcement draft.

Examples. As we know, the standard of record keeping varied considerably. Some battalion diaries do not record a single reinforcement. Most battalions do record the arrival but rather frustratingly they are inconsistent in frequency and detail, often missing drafts. Some battalions kept meticulous records however very few are completely reliable. One complete record does not necessarily prove that all other battalions operated the same system. The 1st Bn Devonshire Regt War Diary for 1914 provides some useful clues for the theory:

7th Sep 1914:...... "..Draft of one Officer and 91 Other Ranks...joined..."

19th Sep 1914:....."2 Officers and 184 Other ranks (2nd and 3rd Reinforcements) joined the Battalion" Note 184/2=92

27th Sep 1914......"64 Other Ranks (1st * Reinforcements) joined the Battalion" * Note "1st" is unclear in the original diary.

2nd Nov 1914........"...and 140 Other Ranks (4th and 5th Reinforcements) joined the Battalion" Note "4th and 5th" is very clear

9th Nov 1914........" ...and 52 Other ranks (5th Reinforcement) joined the Battalion Note "5th" is very clear.

Interlude: the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reinforcements might provide evidence of the Rule of 93 BUT the reinforcement of 64 ORs on 27th Sep oddly seems to claim it is also the 1st Reinforcement. Aaaargh. Then we get back on track with the 4th and 5th - clearly spread over 2 dates; 140 plus 52 = 192 and 192 / 2 =96. My reading of this is the 4th Reinforcement of 93 and a large part of the 5th Reinforcement arrived on 2nd Nov and the remainder (with 6 recovered wounded/sick attached) arrived on 9th Nov 1914. Back to the diary....

26th Nov 1914......"and 123 Other ranks (6th Reinforcement) joined the Battalion" }

11th Dec 1914......"and 70 Other ranks (7th Reinforcement) joined the Battalion" } Note 123 plus 70 = 193 and 193/2= 96.5 i.e two drafts of 93 plus 7 odds and sods

18th Dec 1914......" joined the Battalion....and 130 Other ranks (8th Reinforcement)"

??th ??? 191?.......[no record of 9th Reinforcement]

13th Jan 1915........"and 75 Other Ranks (10th Reinforcement) joined the battalion"

Summary: Generally speaking the rhythm of reinforcements complies with the rule of 93...but....one can see from the above there are some elements that have really jarred with the theory. I fear I may be susceptible to confirmation bias - seeking evidence that supports the theory and discarding evidence that counters the theory. There are a number of similar examples I could show.

So, evidence, counter-evidence, conjecture etc. If anyone can shed some light on the above by providing examples and the sources, I would be grateful. I do not have a strong agenda to 'prove' anything. So far (to me at least) the weight of evidence suggests the Rule of 93 however it may just be a loose coincidence. I would be more than happy to have my theory disproved. I simply wish to better understand the complexities of reinforcing the BEF during an extra-ordinary (two words) period of the Great War.

Thanks in advance. MG

Any mistakes are mine. Doubtless full of typos. MG

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Martin if I have time tomorrow morn I will scan the relevant pp. from Field Service Regulations Part II 1909 admin but from memory it does not provide a magic number.

If not tomorrow it will be week later.

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1. The standard number of ORs in a Reinforcement draft in the BEF in 1914 was 93 (or multiples thereof)

A little bit later but multiples of in and around 93 were still happening - these were the first drafts received after going abroad in April 1915.

post-51028-0-07607000-1399495856_thumb.j

Craig

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Thanks gents. Any additional comments i.e your informed thoughts would be gratefully received; I have no idea if these provide supporting evidence or not without wading through a blizzard of data - particularly the Connaughts. Possibly the most esoteric story of 1914. Drained the SR and ER to support the Reg Battalions and were the first and only paired regular battalions to fold into one. Perhaps not representative of the BEF due to their extremely small recruiting base and low levels of Reserves

Your thoughts much preferred to referenced material.. MG

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War Establishment 1914

http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/914BQAK.PDF

Craig

Looking at the numbers in this link, suggests that 1 Officer + 93 OR's may not be an arbitrary number.

HQ has 61 rank & file; 4 Coys. have 40 Staff Sgts/Sgts + 828 rank & file = total of 929 other ranks; 10% would be 93 OR's, although the theoretical 4 Sgts + 89 rank & file does not quite match the stipulated 2 Sgts + 91 rank & file.

JMB

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Looking at the numbers in this link, suggests that 1 Officer + 93 OR's may not be an arbitrary number.

HQ has 61 rank & file; 4 Coys. have 40 Staff Sgts/Sgts + 828 rank & file = total of 929 other ranks; 10% would be 93 OR's, although the theoretical 4 Sgts + 89 rank & file does not quite match the stipulated 2 Sgts + 91 rank & file.

JMB

Thanks... We know for sure the 93 isn't an arbitrary number for the 1st Reinforcement - it is stated in the War Establishment. My question is whether 93 continues to be a standard number for subsequent reinforcement drafts. It looks like it is up to a point and at some stage the system breaks down.

One point I forgot to make (and will amend in the OP accordingly) is that(assuming the theory is correct) the point at which the numbers start to fragment might (and I stress might) be indicative of the point at which events overwhelm the system and every last man is being thrown into the line.

MG

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A little bit later but multiples of in and around 93 were still happening - these were the first drafts received after going abroad in April 1915.

attachicon.gifCapture.JPG

Craig

Craig - interesting. Thanks for sharing this. It would seem that at least 50% of the drafts (3 of 6 drafts or 60% by number) comply with the rule and two of those look like double drafts. What is particularly interesting is the dates - I had thought that if the theory held any water at some stage it was simply abandoned and reinforcements were fragmented. This might indicate that when the Army's recruits from Aug and Sep 1914 had been trained and the system was once again full of trained 'fully effective' men, there was some attempt to re-establish reinforcements in blocks of 93.

MG

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I will add a caveat to my figures - the 8th DLI figures are almost certainly missing drafts as I haven't got the diary for this period. Although I should get a copy hopefully later this month.

Interestingly, the 6th DLI figure also starts to break down - the 1st draft received by them was made up of a group who had been in training in France since June 1915 whilst the next draft had been in France for about 3 days before reaching the Bn. After this point they seem to be rushing reinforcements through as and when they can.

As this stage the Bn was down to around 500 men, merged with the 8th DLI as a composite Bn, and there was a sudden rush to get them back up to strength after several months of relative lethargy. As soon as pressure was put on the system it again seems to be broken down (and the 6th Bn were not short of men in England),

Craig

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Looking at the numbers in this link, suggests that 1 Officer + 93 OR's may not be an arbitrary number.

HQ has 61 rank & file; 4 Coys. have 40 Staff Sgts/Sgts + 828 rank & file = total of 929 other ranks; 10% would be 93 OR's, although the theoretical 4 Sgts + 89 rank & file does not quite match the stipulated 2 Sgts + 91 rank & file.

JMB

It certainly isn't arbitrary - War Establishments specifically refer to a 10% First Reinforcement, and this applies to most types of unit, not just infantry. I don't think the smaller number of sergeants is a deal-breaker: it would make more sense to replace some sergeant casualties with corporals promoted within the unit, rather than importing potentially inexperienced sergeants.

As regards second and later reinforcements, it is not surprising that depots might be tasked with building up replacements in batches of 10% at a time. As we all now know, casualties in 1914 were much heavier than had been planned for in peacetime, but a target of "10% every three months" (say) might well have applied. I stress that this is guesswork on my part but it seem,s to make some kind of sense.

Ron

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The figure mentioned by Ron also appears in Field Service Regulations Part 2. FSRs also go on to say (for subsequent reinforcements):

"In the first year of a war, the following percentages of the troops in the field will be required in order to keep them up to war establishment:

80% for infantry

70% for cavalry and mounted infantry

60% for artillery

40% for engineers

30% for headquarters, admin services and departments

20% for headquarters, admin services and departments on the L of C"

TR

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Thanks gents. Any additional comments i.e your informed thoughts would be gratefully received; I have no idea if these provide supporting evidence or not without wading through a blizzard of data - particularly the Connaughts. Possibly the most esoteric story of 1914. Drained the SR and ER to support the Reg Battalions and were the first and only paired regular battalions to fold into one. Perhaps not representative of the BEF due to their extremely small recruiting base and low levels of Reserves

Your thoughts much preferred to referenced material.. MG

One gets the impression that the failure to re-establish the battalion after the debacle at le Grand Feyt might have been a sort of punishment? Contrast its fate with the Munsters after Etreux, for example.

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In case there is any doubt; Line Infantry Base Details taken from War Establishments 1914: 1st Reinforcement was one Officer, 2 Staff sergeants or sergeants and 91 Rank & File

post-55873-0-02559400-1399541919_thumb.j

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The figure mentioned by Ron also appears in Field Service Regulations Part 2. FSRs also go on to say (for subsequent reinforcements):

"In the first year of a war, the following percentages of the troops in the field will be required in order to keep them up to war establishment:

80% for infantry

70% for cavalry and mounted infantry

60% for artillery

40% for engineers

30% for headquarters, admin services and departments

20% for headquarters, admin services and departments on the L of C"

TR

And the actual casualty figures for the BEF Infantry in 1914 on an annualised basis were nearly double five times these expectations.

For the infantry alone, the first 64 Battalions, roughly 64,000 strong would expect to have 80% casualties in 12 months i.e 51,200. This implies for the 129 days of action in 1914, it might therefore expect 35% (calc 129/365days = 0.35) or roughly 18,000 casualties.

Killed for the first 64 battalions was 20,823 (CWGC data) and the killed-to-wounded ratio for 1914 was 1 to 4.7 (OH Med Services Cas & Stats) suggesting around 98,000 wounded. Total casualties around 118,000 or some 6.7 times more than expectations. While one could argue that most of the wounded eventually returned to duty, even if we factored in 40% of the wounded returning within a month (OH Med Services page 278 as the proxy) we still have casualty figures five times greater than expectations.

Which is one of the reasons why any planned organisation of the Reinforcement Drafts might have been shattered fairly early on... MG

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Field Service Regs Part II Admin is the authority. I have scanned and sent Martin the full chapter but no mention of subsequent drafts being the magic number.

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Field Service Regs Part II Admin is the authority. I have scanned and sent Martin the full chapter but no mention of subsequent drafts being the magic number.

Presumably it only ever mentions the first draft ?.

There's two separate possibilities - either there's an Army Order or regulation out their somewhere which states that drafts should be the magic 10% or it was simply a handy number that they were used to. It's just frustrating when you can't locate the proof one way or another.

Craig

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Yes, first draft specified. I have also checked Mobilisation Regs 1914, not a sausage. Not even a chipolata.

By 17th December it is quite clear that drafts for 1st RWF were no longer anywhere near the magic number. This was after three very large drafts had been sent forward to replace the severe losses of late October, with fewer than 90 men left standing.

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I have also checked Mobilisation Regs 1914, not a sausage. Not even a chipolata.

Was there a similar set of regs for covering the base depots and reserve/extra reserve battalions which may cover this ?.

Craig

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Field Service Regs Part II Admin is the authority. I have scanned and sent Martin the full chapter but no mention of subsequent drafts being the magic number.

Indeed...it is one of those areas where the local commanders needs and other local factors are the determining factor. It may simply be that because the first draft was 1 and 93 they packaged subsequent drafts in the same way and when things began to overwhelm the logistic chain it all changed. Here is the authority courtesy of Grumpy's kindness in sharing the knowledge.

The 10% figure which drives the 93 for the Infantry can be seen in relation to the 80% required/planned for in the first 12 months. The requirement to have 10-20% in theatre within 6 weeks is telling. When translated into hard numbers, they are multiples of 10% or 93.

Perhaps more interesting is the acknowledgement that after 6 months new recruits would start to be used as reinforcements. This is the first time I have seen this in an official document. It should be no surprise as we know Infantry recruit training was 6 months, but it is interesting. I suspect all these numbers fell out of Haldane's master plan from 1908 and the proportion of available Army Reservists to Regulars.

post-55873-0-47053500-1399549312_thumb.j

post-55873-0-63458700-1399549323_thumb.j

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Having the diaries for the 1st and 8 Seaforth, although I have not looked at the numbers of reinforcements in detail, I seem to recall that after Loos they received several hundred reinforcements in quick succession from the "Base". Also on March 29th 1916, they received one Officer and 62 or's from the Cromarty Depot. My grandfather,who was a career soldier, was an NCO who at this point seems to have switched horses from the 1st to the 8th. BN. If it would be of use to you I am prepared to go through and copy the numbers. However as is about 4a.m.here i think I will shortly go back to bed for a while so it would need to be tomorrow.

H

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Having the diaries for the 1st and 8 Seaforth, although I have not looked at the numbers of reinforcements in detail, I seem to recall that after Loos they received several hundred reinforcements in quick succession from the "Base". Also on March 29th 1916, they received one Officer and 62 or's from the Cromarty Depot. My grandfather,who was a career soldier, was an NCO who at this point seems to have switched horses from the 1st to the 8th. BN. If it would be of use to you I am prepared to go through and copy the numbers. However as is about 4a.m.here i think I will shortly go back to bed for a while so it would need to be tomorrow.

H

Hazel Thanks for the offer. I think it would be too much to ask. The focus is 1914 and early 1915 and to be honest I was surprised that any unit in 1915 managed to adhere to the 10% (93) guideline as Craig's post seems to illustrate. I have a database of 135 Infantry units who kept Reinforcement Records for the period in question. They all fragment at some stage and then most revert to the 'rule'. The more I think about it, when the system was bursting with Reservists and casualty expectations were low, sending drafts of 93 would seem sensible. The 20% within the first 6 weeks seems to have been achieved as the 2nd and 3rd Reinforcment drafts arrived within a month of the actions at Mons.

Looking across my spreadsheets for the Battalions in I and II Corps, there are very distinct bands of dates:

1st Reinforcements arrived in the first week of Sep with a high concentration (72%) around 5th Sep 1914

2nd Reinforcements arrived around 8th-10th Sep.

3rd Reinforcements arrived around 19th- 21st Sep

4th Reinforcements arrived around 22nd -28th Sep with some much later still

5th reinforcements arrived starting 13th October

...thereafter it becomes fragmented and particularly so in December 1914 when more than have the drafts arriving are in blocks ranging from 20-60 yet we still see examples of multiples of 93 with a few groups of around 180.

I was hoping to flush out some data from Base Depots, Brigade Admin diaries or div Admin diaries that might have maintained reinforcement tables (The Divs and Bdes at Gallipoli did this to some extent, particularly the New Army Divs which suggest Regular Army influence rather than the TF's more casual approach to record-keeping). Somewhere deep in the Archives will be pages and pages tabulating the arrival and departure of the reinforcements. It would be interesting to see the numbers in each draft sent from the Reserve Battalions, the numbers arriving at the Base Depots and the numbers sent from the Base Depots.

While researching this i have discovered a draft of the Gordon Highlanders did a month with the Seaforth Highlanders and a draft intended for the 2nd Bn Black Watch ending up with the 1st Bn Black Watch. Both incidents suggest large scope for Reinforcements to go adrift. I am also discovering more confirmation that the Reservists were graded right from the start and diaries noting the composition of the drafts - Army Reservists, Category D men, unfit men, men over 40, recovered wounded, the noted arrival of Special Reservists, the noted arrival of Kitchener men some time before their 6 months' training was up, and in one case a soldier in the KOYLI writing to an Officer back in the UK on 1st Jan 1915 saying 90% of the unit were Special Reservists. Also large proportions of drafts actually being sent back as unfit -quite late in the year. One battalion recorded having recieved over 800 Reinforcements by 22nd Nov some three months after landing.

"Capt Browne arrived with 1st Reinforcements of 94 plus 16 absentees." - 1st Bn East Yorks.

It was clearly very messy in 1914. What is also becoming clear is that there was no standard story - this was a very complex mosaic of many individual battalion experiences. I mentioned on another thread that the Retreat From Mons was a aggregation of lots of single battalion retreats, often with no knowledge or understanding of what was happening beyond the battalion. This is similar, it is an aggregation of many individual battalion reinforcement stories each with their own twists and turns. There are however a few common thematics that this thread hopes to fully explore.

MG

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Hi Martin,

in fact, thanks to a good friend, i may have those lists in either the Brigade or Division Diaries for those two Bns. I also have the "Separated Material", and I know that I have seen such documents somewhere. Anyway will have a look when I have a minute.

H

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Martin, well done. Just one thought to ruffle the pond.

I am not sure about the logic of: a draft intended for the 2nd Bn Black Watch ending up with the 1st Bn Black Watch. Both incidents suggest large scope for Reinforcements to go adrift.

Is there any evidence either as an instruction or as an observation that drafts from Reserve battalions were "for" a specific line unit?

Of course the matter only arises if/when more than one regular unit of the regiment is in the field, but my take [without evidence I can isolate] is that a draft under an officer ideally 93 O.R. was sent from the Reserve battalion, crossed the channel, went to a Base Depot, and was then sent [or split] to an Infantry Base Depot serving the Division in which the unit were serving. I used to think drafts were earmarked but now I am not at all sure.

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Whilst doing my 1914 books on Ypres I came across a comment (can't lay hands on it at the moment) by Kitchener in November about the available reserves for the BEF and the figure was disastrously low - somewhere less than 10,000 IIRC: this because, of course, at that stage there was no obligation for the territorials to serve overseas (not sure when that changed - someone on the Forum will doubtless spring in with that information.


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