Schwaben 1/7/16

[Desmond7]

I have been asked to put this article back on the forum. I took it down for some minor editing which has now been done. I would like to thank all those who e-mailed me off forum. You know who you are!

This one is for Ralph Whitehead. A helping hand to many and I'm proud to say he's my mate!

Here it goes ...

WHILE the main body of men from the Ballymena area fought in the subsidiary action north of the River Ancre, many local men also fought in the battalions engaged in the ‘main attack’ on the infamous Schwaben Redoubt.

This heavily fortified trench system was arguably the hard core of the German defence system. It was well equipped with machine guns and was backed up with close artillery support units.

Its defenders on July 1 had endured an unprecedented barrage for seven long days and nights. In fact, the British High Command sincerely believed that the weight of explosive which had fallen on the German lines would crush any opposition.

One commander had told his men they would walk across no-man’s land, occupy the enemy trenches and boil up some tea. He was not the only high ranking officer to believe that the work of the ‘big guns’ would make the offensive a low-cost operation.

It seems that the officers of the Ulster Division had serious doubts about the effectiveness of the bombardment and half an hour before ‘zero’, the assault battalions crept out into no-man’s land and took cover in a sunken road in front of the German trenches.

When the barrage moved off the German front line at precisely 7.30am, the Ulstermen rose up from their hiding place and charged at breakneck pace towards their objective.

General Sir Henry Rawlinson the architect of the assault feared that ‘Kitchener’s Army’ was not well trained enough to adopt the tactics of the ‘regular’ army and had given strict orders that battalions should move forward at a walking pace because he feared that the men would become disorganised without the strict control of their officers.

Sadly, the units which folowed these instructions were mown down in the first ten minutes of the attack.

But the Ulster Division’s wild charge caught the German defenders still sheltering in their dug-outs. It was literally a perfect assault - fast, powerful and ruthless. For a relatively low human cost, the Division had captured the German forward line, about 800 yards of front, at a single bound.

John Millar, from Paradise Avenue in Harryville, served with the 11th Royal Irish in the 108th Brigade, which attacked on the left front of the Division.

He described the momentum of the charge in a letter home to a friend in Ballymena:

“My cousin Sam was killed and we miss him very much, but God took him away where there is no pain or suffering. Doubtless you have heard of the big battle we were in on 1st July. I will never forget the charge we made that morning into the German trenches. Our fellows fell very rapidly and yet those of us who weren’t hit ran on across and soon put the Germans out of their trench at the point of the bayonet. And again we charged them in their third line and fourth line and succeeded in taking those lines but we had to retire later owing to no reinforcements coming up.

“Lots of Ballymena fellows fell, among them was Harry McIlroy who fell wounded at my side but I have since heard that he got back to hospital. I heard of several others of our battalion from Ballymena.”

Rifleman Millar’s brief account of the attack is typical of the soldier’s view of the battle. They charged, if they were lucky they made it into the German trenches and then fought until forced to pull back. No flowery descriptions for Millar, he seems hugely relieved just to be among the living.

His final paragraph merely hints at his feelings about the attack and the loss of so many friends.

He writes: "If I were to tell you about the awful scenes and sights which I saw you couldn’t read them for the horror of it. If only the people at home knew and realized what the boys out here are doing for them they wouldn’t be in the mood for holiday making." (1)

Another Ballymena soldier’s letter quoted in the Observer of July 21, 1916, provides further evidence of how effective the swift advance of the Ulstermen had been - and also how safe the German troops felt in their deep dug-outs despite the long-running British bombardment.

"When we entered the first line of trenches we took the Bosches by surprise. Many of those we caught had been in the act of shaving and we had them before they knew we were after them!"

If such common sense tactics had been applied by every unit in the offensive during the opening moment of the attack, the first day on the Somme could have been a fantastic success for the British army. Instead, to both the right and left of the Ulster Division, equally brave men climbed out of their trenches, formed up as if on an excercise and walked slowly towards the enemy lines.

German machine-gunners facing such units could barely believe what was happening before their very eyes. Then they opened fire.

It was hardly worth aiming, bullets swept the fields and scythed down thousands of men. In many cases German soldiers climbed up out of their trenches and fired from open positions at the oncoming ‘Englanders’. Incredibly, the waves of attackers kept marhing into this hellish fire, many with their heads bent forward as if walking into a hail storm.

The 29th Division (nicknamed ‘The Incomparables’) and the 32nd Division, each of which contained ‘regular’ battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, fell in their droves. As a result, in the Thiepval sector, the Divisions on e ither side of the Ulstermen did not even reach the German barbed wire ... their inability to do so was to have a terrible effect on the jubilant Ulstermen who were now sending back the first prisoners and preparing for the next stage of their attack.

With the attack on either side firmly repulsed, the Germans now turned their fire on the second wave of Ulster Division troops as they crossed no-man’s land with the aim of passing through their comrades and taking the Schwaben Redoubt itself.

From the ruins of Thiepval village and various other strongpoints, machine gunners poured fire into the flanks of the exposed Ulstermen. This ‘enfilade’ fire in combination with the stout defence mounted by German soldiers in the Schwaben tore huge gaps in the ranks and slowed the advance for a time.

Author Martin Middlebrook commented in his definitive history of that day: "These Germans (in the redoubt) had not been caught in their dug outs like some of the front-line defenders. The Ulsters had to fight hard for the redoubt but their Irish spirit was roused; they had captured one German trench, they could capture the redoubt."

While this struggle was on-going, the Ulster Division’s ‘follow-through’ brigade, made up of the four Belfast battalions moved up for the attack on the German second line. They faced withering fire from three sides and an increasingly heavy German artillery barrage which plastered the open ground with shrapnel and high explosive.

One soldier compared the no-man’s land of the morning of July 1 with the scene he had become so familiar with in the past.

Writing home, he said: "While on sentry duty, how often had I looked out over that same piece of ground. How calm and peaceful it had looked then, how fresh and green with long grass blowing in the wind..

"Now not a green or level spot remained. Great jagged craters covered the smoking ground and in the blue sky above white, puffy clouds of shrapnel burst, spattering the earth with missiles."

It was at this point that one of the battle’s legendary events took place. Major George Gaffikin, a company commander with the 9th Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast Volunteers) could see that some of his men were shocked by the firestorm through which they would have to charge.

Middlebrook reported: "Gaffikin took off his orange sash, held it high for his men to see and roared ... ‘come on boys, no surrender!’ This action drew a whole crowd of men after him over no-man’s land."

Interestingly, Philip Orr, who performed an in-depth study of the Ulster Division’s actions on that day spoke to a veteran who angrily dismissed the above account as a ‘myth’.

Malcolm McKee, interviewed in the Belfast Telegraph of July 1966 when the battle’s fiftieth anniversary was marked, said: “What if Major Gaffikin waved an orange handerkerchief? It was our unit colour ... and even if he did shout about the ‘Twelfth of July’, who would have heard him?”

Whether or not Gaffikin waved a sash or not, the Belfast men did hurl themselves into the fray, but, instead of storming the German second line, they found themselves embroiled in the fight for the Schwaben.

This maze of tunnels, trenches and dug-outs was now the scene of some of the fiercest hand-to-hand fighting witnessed on the Western Front.

Men from at least six battalions were now bombing, bayonetting and blundering their way through the clouds of chalk dust and black smoke from explosions in this confined space.

Only junior officers had been allowed to take part in the attack and many of these men who could have provided cohesive orders for the men had been killed or wounded.

In fact, two lieutenant colonels had disobeyed direct orders and joined in the assault. One died early in the attack and the other was unable to make it to the Schwaben.

As a result, the fighting was a vicious close quarter melee, aptly described by one survivor as a ‘Belfast riot on Mount Vesuvious’ - a nice allegory which almost disguises the reality of what was going on. Belfast riots inevitably involved two mobs throwing cobblestones at each other - a deadly enough pursuit.

On the Schwaben, the cobblestones were hand grenades and one can only imagine the scene as bombs were hurled back and forth between defending Germans and attacking Ulstermen.

As a result, the Schwaben must have resembled the early stages of a volcanic eruption as the grenades exploded all around. Whole packs of grenades were tossed into the entrances of German

dug-outs. Others ‘posted’ Mills bombs down the dug-out stovepipes.

Interestingly, one of the bombers was a Kells man, who had moved to Glasgow before the war.

Bobby Campbell was one of a number of Ulstermen who had returned to fight with the men from their native land.

For whatever reason, he and many other Glasgow and west of Scotland men, found themselves with the 11th Btn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Donegal and Fermanagh Volunteers).

In his excellent study of the battalion in the Great War (Ballyshannon, Belcoo and Bertincourt) , Ex-Inniskilling Fusilier Bill Canning lists all those who lost their lives. Bobby Campbell was one of them.

This is what the local newspaper had to say:-

The Ulster movement in the Maryhill Division of Glasgow has lost one of its foremost workers by the death in action of Lce. Cpl Robert A. Campbell, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers (Ulster Division). Decased, who was a native of Galdanagh, Kells, removed to Maryhill along with his parents a number of years ago. He took an active interest in furthering Ulster’s interests in Maryhill, and among the many Ulstermen in the district he was highly respected. He was one of the first members of the Glasgow UVF and had been with the Ulster Division since January 1915.

The deceased was a bomber and in the afternoon of 1st July while taking part in the offensive, he, along with many other good Irishmen, was killed. His parents who are well known in the Galdanagh District and who now reside at 14 Campbell Street, Maryhill, Glasgow have received a letter of sympathy from his officer, in which it is stated:-

“Bobbie was one of the best men I ever had. He was a fearless and upright soldier and I can assure you that everyone in the battalion will mourn his loss.”

Lce. Cpl. Campbell was also a member of both the local Orange and Masonic Lodges. His older brother, William, who is in the Cameron Highlanders, was wounded at Loos last year. He is now serving in Salonika. Aug 4 1916

The Schwaben Redoubt was now being attacked by elements of six battalions, from three different sides. The two companies of German infantry defending the redoubt put up a strong defense and the fighting was vicious. Hand grenades, rifles, bayonets and trench knives were used as the Irishmen moved deeper into the redoubt. By 8.48 A.M. the C Line and the Schwaben

Redoubt had been taken. RJW.

As bombs exploded, bayonet men rushed forward to secure the next few yards, killing stunned defenders as they had been well trained to do. But all the time, the casualties amongst the Ulstermen were mounting steadily - they were also running short of ammunition and especially grenades.

Water was also running out. Men in combat develop tremendous thirst and on this hot summer day the ability to re-hydrate sweat drained bodies was vital. Attacking troops carried their water in one bottle, hung from their belts - they were depending on re-supply for their next drink.

But by now it was virtually impossible for anyone to cross no-man’s land. The Ulstermen were firmly lodged in the German lines ... but they were on their own.

However, fighting spirit remained strong and with the Schwaben Redoubt finally under their control, the mixed units of the Division were drawn onwards towards another vital enemy strongpoint.

In German, this fort was known as Feste Stauben - the British knew it as ‘Stuff Redoubt’ and its capture would have been the crowning glory in an attack which had already surpassed all expectations.

Sadly, Stuff Redoubt was to prove a ‘bridge too far’ for the tiring Ulstermen. As they swept forwards, men were caught up in a whirlwind bombardment which shattered the attack and inflicted dozens more casualties.

For years, historians of the battle assumed that the speed of the 36th Division’s attack had carried the men right into the middle of a British artillery barrage.

The incident was even depicted as a scene in the famous sixties’ musical ‘Oh!What a lovely war’ ... in the movie, a group of Irish soldiers led by a grizzled sergeant are forced to take cover as shells blast around them.

"Those are our guns!" complains one soldier.

"Well get back and tell them they’re shooting at us!" orders the weary sergeant.

As the’runner’ sets off, the sergeant mutters: "And if the Germans shoot him .. I’ll kill him!"

However, , it now seems that the British gunners were blamed wrongly for this early case of ‘friendly fire’. An American researcher with a keen interest in the German soldiers defending this section of the line has drawn attention to recently discovered testimony which sheds new light on the famous incident.

Over recent years, Ralph Whitehead has examined the Schwaben defence in fine detail, unearthing remarkable eye-witness accounts and cross-checking these with official reports and maps depicting the area as it was in 1916.

He is now convinced that the Ulstermen were on the verge of an astonishing success when a unit of German artillery caught them in the open. He believes that most accounts of the British barrage ‘falling short’ were based on the account below.

"The German 2nd line was virtually undefended at this time. An unarmed artillery observation group from the 26th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment watched helplessly as the British soldiers approached their position located in Stuff Redoubt. One member of their group, Unteroffizier Felix Kircher, later recalled:

"We laid in our dugout and from time to time one of us went upstairs to watch the region. Suddenly, at 9 o’clock, an observer shouted down the dugout steps in an amazed voice: ‘Der Tommy ist da, kommt rauf!’ The Tommy is here, come up!

"We rushed up and saw a lot of khaki-clothed men with flat steel helmets. They were the first Englishmen we had seen so near, running up and down in front of our barbed wire, searching for a breach in it.

"Most of them were young boys just like us - about 20 years old. We were in a desperate position. Being artillery observers we had no weapons and no ammunition. Each moment we expected a raid with hand grenades. But nothing happened. Then the English artillery began to shoot at our trench, but the shells fell too short and exploded among their own people. We saw corpses whirling through the air and the survivors stormed back down the hill."

Ralph Whitehead : "The accepted version is that the Ulstermen ended up in the British bombardment that had not advanced yet and if it were not for this friendly fire they could have advanced even further.

"What I found recently in my research gives an entirely different version, one that contradicts Martin Middlebrook among others. The error seems to have occurred from the acceptance of the memories of Felix Kircher (see above).

The records I have translated from the 26th Reserve Feld Artillerie Regiment that was attached to the 26th Reserve Division relates that the advancing Ulstermen were observed by the regimental commander Oberst Erlenbusch who ordered the 'Englishmen' to be annihilated. The heavy field howitzers from the 1st Battery Field Artillery Regiment 20 opened fire as well as field guns from the 3rd Battery 26th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battery 27th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment fired from various locations over open sights into the enemy

ranks. The survivors fled back toward the Schwaben Redoubt.

"The alleged friendly fire observed by Kircher was in fact the concentrated artillery fire of at least 10 German field guns and heavy howitzers."

It was the high water mark of the Ulster Division’s advance. Some fifty men were able to get into a section of the Stuff Redoubt but as German reinforcements could be seen arriving in large numbers, it must have been obvious to the forward troops that their position was precarious.

It was the high water mark of the Ulster Division’s advance. Some fifty men were able to get into the Stuff Redoubt but as German reinforcements could be seen arriving in large numbers, it must have been obvious to the forward troops that their position was precarious.

Nevetheless, they consolidated the section of the line they did hold, sharing out ammuntion or taking water and bullets from their dead comrades. Any German stick grenades were swiftly gathered up by the Ulstermen who found they could throw the potato mashers further than their standard ‘Mills’ bombs.

In the hours that followed, desperate little bombing matches and close quarter fighting took place. The Ulstermen fought hard and well, but the Germans were equal to the task .. and they had the reserves to accomplish their aims.

On the other hand, it was virtually impossible to cross no-man’s land and re-supply the dog-tired soldiers who had swept forward so strongly that morning.

Eventually, after hours of battle, those who could made their way back to the British lines.

Thus ended a day of horrific losses.

Thanks for off-forum replies.

Des

Edited 8 October , 2004 by Desmond7

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

The attached map shows the disposition of the German artillery batteries on the 26th Reserve Division front. The 3 batteries firing at the Ulstermen in the article listed above (brilliant in my opinion, but I am a bit too close to be non-partisan) are shown by yellow highlight. The guns near Grandcourt were two 10cm heavy field howitzers while the guns north of the Ancre and near Pozieres consisted of eight 7.7cm field guns. The red lines indicate where the fire would have converged in front of Feste Staufen where Felix Kircher was posted.

Nice job Des,

Ralph

[SPotter]

Des and Ralph,

Fantastic piece of work. Is there a book in the offing?

Regards

Steve

[Desmond7]

Many thanks spotter - hopefully soon.

Now Mr. Whitehead, you never cease to amaze me. What a great map!!!!

Des

[KIRKY]

Great struff, I have a couple of Death Plaques to 1/7/16 to 9th and 10th Royal Inniskillings and I have many times walked their last path with horror as you can only truly feel the desperation they must have felt going up the hill with fire coming from all around.

Well done, a great piece.

tony

[iain mchenry]

Des and Ralph,

An excellent article. I am very interested in the actions surrounding Thiepval and the Scwaben. Well done to you both.

Iain

[Desmond7]

Many thanks to all who've replied on and off forum. It's a helluva long post but I enjoy writing and where better to get first impressions? And also an example of cross-atlantic research 'pooling' working to good advantage.

RJW gave me a perspective from the other side of no-man's land which was truly invaluable. Top man.

More material has come to light and I'm thinking of the immediate aftermath stage. Work of SBs, state of British trenches etc. Also have an account from a mounted despatch rider who seems to have spent the entire day in the saddle taking message between various command posts further back.

Another line of enquiry - a report in the Times carries the line from a war. corr. that the performance of the 36th Div. had been praised highly ... "especially by the troops on their immediate left." That would seem to be the 29th Div.

Thus it would not impinge directly on the Schwaben but on 'my' boys in the 12th Royal irish and the 9th R.Ir. Fusiliers.

I've read all the jingoistic stuff about 'I wish I was an Ulsterman' etc but I would dearly love to see just how troops in the 29th did regard the performance. Or is this another case of making a big deal of a bad day for home consumption?

Cheers all

Des