Battles of the Scarpe 1917

[John Holmes]

Hi,

I'm trying to trace the 3rd Division in the 1st & 3rd Battles of the Scarpe in April and May 1917 in particular the 8th King's Own and 13th King's (Liverpool). If any help available I'd be very grateful as I've been to our library and there doesn't seem to much about on this successful battle.

Regards

John

[Malcolm]

see this topic.

http://1914-1918.org/forum/index.php?showt...=0entry158639

Also 1st Gordon Highlanders in 3rd Division War Diary is at

http://www.thegordonhighlanders.co.uk/Pages/Diary.htm

Aye

Malcolm

Edited 7 October , 2004 by Malcolm

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi John

I have a couple of books and bits and peice on Battles of the Scarpe. The 7/K.S.L.I. were part of 3rd Div. but not same Brigade as 8th King's Own and 13th King's, so their history of the Battle does not mention them. I'll have a look at the books I have got but I am very busy at moment so it could be several days before I get around to it.

Annette

[John Holmes]

Malcolm,

thanks very much for that address of the Gordon Highlanders and Annette I am looking forward to your help with the 7th K.S.L.I.

Regards

John

[Northern Soul]

John,

I am in the process of typing out the exploits of the 8th King's Own during this period (using the Regimental History as a source). I have been doing it piecemeal so some further work is required but in the meantime here is some to be going on with; When I get it all typed up I'll email it to you.

Regards.

Andy.

The First Battle of the Scarpe.

Extract from “The King’s Own, The Story of a Royal Regiment, Volume III, 1914-1950,” by Colonel J. M. Cowper, pp 157-160.

On Easter Sunday, April 8, 8/King’s Own formed up in Arras in the snow before moving up to the assembly trenches. A shell burst in the middle of “B” Company, killing two officers and four other ranks and wounding one officer and twenty-two others. As the rest of the battalion had to move off and take over trenches from 1/Cameronians immediately south of the Arras-Cambrai road, Second-Lieutenant H. Young followed later with the survivors of “VB” Company, who joined the rest of the battalion after dark in the assembly trenches.

As 4th Division was the leap-frogging division of XVII Corps it was not required with the first wave and it was not until 5 a.m. on Easter Monday that it left the huts on the St. Pol-Arras road which it had occupied since the 6th. The area in which it assembled was by a prisoner-of-war cage, west of the village of Ste. Catherine, and hot meals and rum were issued as the men waited for the hour to move off. Morale was high when they left their camp; the noise of the guns was stupendous as the bombardment opened, which marked another stage in the growing intensity of artillery fire; then prisoners of war began to come in, who said that their first and second lines had been obliterated and that it had been virtually impossible to carry provisions to the men in the front line, who were almost without food or water when the attack was launched and completely demoralised by the hurricane of shells. If morale had been high at the beginning of the day it was immeasurably higher at 10.10 a.m. when, according to the programme, the battalion moved off along the left bank of the River Scarpe.

This river, on the other side of which 8/King’s Own was already in action, flows from west to east and divides the rolling downs of Vimy Ridge on the north from the high ground in the south round Monchy, Wancourt and the Hindenburg Line, all of which were in enemy hands. Typical of the rivers of Picardy and Artois, the stream flows slowly in a wide and deep bed, with secondary channels, marshes and even sheets of water attaining to the dignity of small lakes, spread over the rest of the generally wooded bed. The Germans still held their original three lines of defence as advanced positions, behind which work was in progress on the Drocourt-Quéant switch. This extension to the Hindenburg position ran northwards from Quéant to Drocourt, where quarries and slag-heaps linked it on to Lens. The design of this line was similar to that of the Siegfried position farther south, and it was intended to make observation from the ground as difficult as possible. Wherever it could be done, the main battle zone lay along the back slopes of ridges, not on the crests nor on the forward slopes. Sometimes as much as three or four miles in front of the main positions, strong outposts were constructed of which the garrisons were to fall back before a heavy attack after delaying it as much as possible by machine gun and rifle fire. The enemy hoped in this way to reduce the casualties from bombardment as the very front line would be lightly held and his main positions would have plenty of warning of an attack. As labour became available another system was completed in the rear zone which gave the whole position a depth of from six to eight thousand yards. In the Arras sector work on this zone had not begun.

Between the sectors in which the two King’s Own battalions were engaged was the village of Monchy-Le Preux on a dominating spur south of the river. It outflanked the end of the Siegfried Line, completely blocking the eastern horizon from the outskirts of Arras, from the Bapaume road and even from the spurs running east from there. From Monchy the view across the Douai plain is endless and fierce battles raged for possession of this village. The actions on either side of it, though taking place at the same time, had little effect upon each other as the country was so broken that the troops frequently lost touch and had to cover their own flanks.

On the right 3rd Division went over the top at 5.30 a.m. The advance was led by 1/Gordon Highlanders, to whom the stricken ‘B’ Company of 8/King’s Own was attached. The rest of the battalion was in support. Three lines of enemy trenches were captured without difficulty. 10/Royal Welch Fusiliers passed through to capture the black line, and by 7.45 a.m. 76th Brigade reached this objective, which it consolidated while 9th Brigade went on to take the blue line, including a fortress known as the Harp, more formidable than any on the Somme, which was seized by a number of tanks. Battalion headquarters, 8/King’s Own, with ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, remained in the assembly trenches until noon, when they moved up to the Harp. Here they consolidated the position and made a roadway for cavalry. 8th Brigade was to pass through the 9th on the blue line to capture the brown, and the Gordon Highlanders and the King’s Own were placed at the disposal of 8th Brigade should they be required. They were called upon at 6.35 that evening. When 8th Brigade passed through the blue line, 2/Royal Scots pressed a little too far to the right and a gap developed on their left which the Gordon Highlanders and King’s Own were required to fill before the next attack, which was timed for 7 p.m. The King’s Own set out with no knowledge of the objective nor of the distance in the line, which turned out to be some three thousand yards. The Gordons were nine hundred yards nearer and reached the line in time to take part in the assault, but the King’s Own only got there in time to meet some scattered units of 8th Brigade and the Gordons returning to their trenches, having failed to attain the objective. Colonel Hunt then took over these troops and, with the King’s Own, spread them out along the line. Finding that his left flank was in the air, he swung it back to almost parallel to the Arras-Cambrai road. Here the battalion dug in all night making a good trench from which the assault on the brown line was launched next day. During this action the King’s Own was in support and returned to its own brigade as soon as it was successfully concluded.

On the left bank of the Scarpe, 1/King’s Own moved forward in rear of the advancing troops without mishap until it reached St. Laurent, formerly an advanced German strongpoint, where a shell fell on the last two platoons; two officers were killed and one wounded and there were forty other rank casualties. After passing through St. Laurent the King’s Own halted, rather ahead of schedule, behind the blue line which was being consolidated by units of 9th Division. Here for the first time the men saw tanks in action. The battalion was ahead of 10/Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the supports of 9th Division, who had to pass through to carry on the assault to the brown line. 1/King’s Own followed at 1.10 p.m. but once again moved too fast, coming up with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who were halted before Athies waiting for the barrage to lift. When they went on the King’s Own men moved into the village. Some shrapnel burst over them, but they suffered no casualties here nor on the way up. The battalion was now in artillery formation with three companies in line and one in close support. At 3.15 it crossed the brown line and now being the foremost troops advanced close under the barrage which crept steadily up the slope on the crest of which was situated the enemy’s fourth system. It consisted of two or three lines of carefully sited and well-constructed trenches which began near the river just west of Fampaux and ran in a north-easterly direction towards Gavrelle and Oppy. The slope of the ground up which the battalion was advancing gave the enemy an excellent field of fire. The was also a mass of barbed wire which was almost intact and, had it been properly defended, would have been impregnable. Fortunately the garrison appeared to have lost its nerve, and at 3.55 p.m. the German trench was entered with very little opposition. Some sixty or seventy prisoners were taken; twelve Germans were killed; seven guns were captured, two 8.2-inch howitzers, four 5.9-inch howitzers and one 77 mm gun, complete with ammunition. They were undamaged and all were later turned against the enemy.

Here 1/King’s Own went into brigade reserve as 2/Duke of Wellington’s passed through to capture Fampoux. They were unable to advance to the green line, but at 4.30 p.m. the King’s Own received the welcome news that the village was occupied and all was clear for cavalry. This was the longest advance made on any front that day, s distance of over three miles. In the centre the attack was strongly resisted and Monchy had not yet fallen, but on the whole the British troops had good reason to be pleased with the progress they had made. By nightfall nearly the whole of Vimy Ridge had been stormed and the Allies were firmly established in the German third system on both banks of the River Scarpe. Much greater success might have been achieved had heavy rain not rendered the ground so soft as to hinder movement, especially of batteries and transport. Several days of storms and falls of snow continued to hamper operations and impose great hardship on the troops.

It was not until midday on the 10th that the1st Battalion received orders to attack the town of Roeux that afternoon. There was, across the line of advance, a railway embankment, running from a bridge over the river on the right, but leaving on its left an unobstructed view of a German strong-point at the Chemical works. The plan was for one company to advance first, seize the railway bridge and afford cover for the other three to cross the embankment. For this purpose ‘A’ Company set out at 2.25 p.m., followed by the others five minutes later. The occupation of the bridge was accomplished, but not without loss. Three platoons established themselves along the embankment to the north of the bridge and one to the south, where an enemy machine gun prevented further advance. The casualties included Captain V. O. Todd , in command of the company, killed, and Second-Lieutenant S. T. Scott, who was so severely wounded that he died two days later. Then the other three companies moved up through Fampoux, but the moment they emerged from the village they came under such heavy machine-gun fire from the Chemical works that they go no farther. When a message was received at 2.40 to the effect that the cavalry would take over the advance, ‘A’ and ‘D’ Companies were instructed to hold their positions while ‘B’ and ‘C’ were withdrawn.

The cavalry advance guard arrived at 4.30 and sent out patrols, shortly after which their brigadier called at the infantry battalion headquarters to receive their reports, as well as those of his own patrols. While he was there the snow began to fall, and when the enemy counter-attacked, the cavalry dismounted to help drive him off. By this time it was getting dark, snow was falling heavily and the operation was abandoned. As O.C. Duke of Wellington’s Regiment was satisfied with his position at Fampoux, 1/King’s Own withdrew to the old German dug-outs in the line behind. SECTION MISSING - AWAITING TYPING.

The Battle of Arleux.

Extract from “The King’s Own, The Story of a Royal Regiment, Volume III, 1914-1950,” by Colonel J. M. Cowper, pp. 163-164.

When 8/King's Own returned to the line on April 23 it took over trenches in front of Monchy. The rest period had largely been spent in practising the attack in open warfare and advancing once more by the old method of short rushes. In spite of the heavy casualties there was a general feeling that the end was in sight, but a short time in the new sector was a complete disillusionment. The trenches were on the forward slope of the hill and plainly visible to the enemy, whose defences were cunningly concealed in the folds of the ground below. At this time this was acknowledged to be the most heavily shelled tactical feature of the whole front. Battalion headquarters was established in one of the cellars in the village while companies occupied shell holes rather than trenches, for nothing connected one post with another. The Royal Welch Fusiliers and the Gordon Highlanders both had to move their headquarters in to the King’s Own cellar as they could find no other shelter from enemy shelling.

For the entire two days of so-called quiet the enemy snipers and machine-gunners prevented movement by day, but by night everything possible was done to link up the shell holes. On the night of April 24/25 Captain J. S. Lyons reconnoitred one of these untrenched positions and supervised the digging of a good defensive line in spite of a heavy enemy barrage and machine-gun fire. ‘B’ Company established a post on the left which secured that flank, and on the night of the 25th/26th ‘C’ Company took over from a company of the Border Regiment on the right and so extended the King’s Own front. Casualties continued to mount up and amongst them were two officers, Lieutenant W. O. Jay killed and Second Lieutenant S. G. Katz wounded. At 11:30 p.m. on the 26th the enemy launched a most determined assault, the weight of which fell on ‘C’ Company in their new position on the right. The men reserved their fire until the enemy was almost upon them and effect was so devastating that the attack melted away. Few Germans regained their trenches and several were taken prisoner, but Lyons was wounded. On the 28th another heavy attack was delivered, the brunt of which fell on Captain D. A. Jones’s company. He directed the defence and controlled his line standing in the open behind his trench, and it was largely due to his fearlessness and determination that the enemy was successfully driven off. As the main action that day was round the village of Arleaux, north of Greenland Hill, it gave its name to the battle. The battalion was relieved on May 1.

The Battle of Arras.

Extract from “The King’s Own, The Story of a Royal Regiment, Volume III, 1914-1950,” by Colonel J. M. Cowper, pp 168.

When 8/King’s Own returned to the line on May 10 it occupied trenches in front of Monchy and was therefore in the sector next to the 1st Battalion, on the other side of the river. Three weeks’ continuous shelling and sniping had reduced it to three hundred and fifty rifles and it was hardly numerically strong enough to hold the front allotted to it. During the previous week when the battalion was theoretically resting, it had been continuously employed digging communication trenches, and the men were worn out by strain and want of sleep. On the first day in the trenches Second-Lieutenant A. W. Holgate, who had been commissioned from the ranks only a short time before, was wounded. It was in the afternoon of the 12th that the battalion was ordered to attack a trench which was to be incorporated in the British front system, and after three minutes’ drum fire the men went over the top at 6 p.m. Their failure to reach their objective was due to a cause as unfortunate as it was unexpected. They were subjected to heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from both flanks and they were also caught in their own machine-gun barrage which, though accurately laid on the enemy trenches, swept in its trajectory the crest of a rise over which the battalion had to pass. Assailed on all sides, the attack launched in two waves on a three-company front had not enough momentum to carry it through. Five officers were wounded as soon as the battalion rose from its trenches and thirty-eight other ranks were killed or missing. When the survivors struggled back under cover of darkness, the battalion numbered only a hundred and sixty-seven.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks very much Andy.

Two highlights for me. One is the excellent description of German defensive tactics at this time. The other is the mention of a British machine gun barrage, which contributed to the failure of the last attack. All of the material was very interesting.

Robert

[John Holmes]

Hi Andy,

thankyou very much for the info on the 8th King's Own I have now also some on the 1st Gordons and 2nd Royal Scots so I'm getting there. Thanks once again

John