Passchendaele

[Guest lordbest]

I am an A-level student doing an individual project about Passchendaele and would welcome your views as to whether the battle was a 'futile slaughter' or not. Many thanks

[Guest bonza]

Yes.

[Guest lordbest]

Why?

[Desmond7]

Futile slaughter:-

Item to consider when debating this statement:-

Attrition as a strategy (there is an ongoing thread on Haig's overall strategy with this sub-heading on the forum. It is posted in regularly. Do a search for those keywords and you will find many views and opinions which might be helpful).

des

[John_Hartley]

I am an A-level student doing an individual project about Passchendaele and would welcome your views as to whether the battle was a 'futile slaughter' or not. Many thanks

Please help us out a bit. What sort of contribution are you looking for from the 4000+ members of the Forum?

If the input is to be in some form of statisitical analysis, then you can set up a poll. This will give you some interesting and, no doubt, very subjective views from a lot of people of have differing interests in WW1.

If, on the other hand, you are expecting that this large group of people will give you sufficient differing views so that you can "cherry pick" comments into your project (effectively having us do your work for you), then you may well be disappointed. You may well find that you gain a better insight into the several months of battle by reading one of the many books available (for a beginner, I'd recommend Lyn McDonald). Of course, I am not suggesting you have such motive.

By way of further advice, my experience is that you will find members much more forthcoming if you are able to ask more, rather than less, specific questions.

In the meantime, my answer to your current question is "no". But that's simply because I think your question is too simplistic. However, this was a battle with clear aims and objectives for the British Army. Those aims and objectives were not achieved. And, in that sense, the battle was a failure. It was, though, part of the continual process of improvement of weapons and tactics that eventually led to victory the followng year.

Welcome to the Forum, by the way.

John

[dycer]

lordbest,

I agree with John on this one.

The reasons why the Battle was fought is well documented(Lyn McDonald is a good source).

Another thing to remember that had my Uncle and many others thought the Battle was a "futile slaughter" they would not have participated in it.Just as the French refused to fight earlier in 1917.

George

[andigger]

Actually I just finished Wilson and Prior's book Passchendaele and I was wondering what the other Pals thought. I was surprised that it seemed the first few months were 'successful' bite and hold movements moving up the ridge. It didn't seem that until Oct when the push was made on Passchendael itself that the 'useless slaughter' really seemed to get out of hand.

Andy

[bkristof]

Even when the strategic and military meaning of the battle was futile. The battle it self can never be just futile....

Passchendaele was not needed maybe, but it is not futile because of what we learned and discus now.

To me the fallen of the third battle of Ypres didn't die for futile reason. They witness now how stupid man can be / do. Their graves are reminders to us that we should be smarter and never do it again. It changed my live living inbetween them.

Futile? no not for me. Really needed? Well it weakend the Germans a lot. But that is for military experts.

[John_Hartley]

Andy

I'm going to fall into the usual trap of concentrating on first day's losses. But I find it difficult not to when I know of the effect 31 July 1917 had on my hometown Territorial Battalion, the 1/6th Cheshires. They attacked 620 strong, reached their final objective (but had to withdraw somewhat) and came out of the day with only 59 answering roll call. Of the 70-odd killed who are commemorated on Stockport's various war memorials, only 4 have a known grave.

Yes, it was pretty successful as "bite and hold", but it is hard to imagine what the effect was on survivors (and the relatives of the dead) when the withdrawal from Passchendaele Ridge was made several months later. I don't like "futile slaughter" as a term, but I can understand why it gets used.

John

[Arnie]

I would agree it was a very good example to the whole world in futility'

It was a battle fought in the wrong place at the wrong time and went on to long. Apart from the attack by Plumer on Messibes Ridge the rest of the battle was a disaste,r especially for the poor men who fought it.

[armourersergeant]

I guess that you have to say, how do you define futile?

Is it the loss of life, if so then all war is futile and almost always is started not by the soldiers but by the politicians. The soldiers who are left to sort out the problem.

Did the battle(s) contribute to the end result of the war, that is were lessons learnt that later were put into practice or not used again as they were shown as inadequate then futile can not be the answer as they helped bring about the end of the war in some way.

The learning curve was not striaght and it went up and down but all the actions taught those in command a lesson that was built upon. If they learnt slowly, which they did often, then it still does not make it futile. Without these battles and the mistakes made would the likes of Currie, Monash, Maxse have been as good as they were by the end of the war?

Without the Somme, and Passchendeale would the war still have ended in 1918? How strong would the German army have been having not suffered the casualties they did during those battles? Would thye have attacked harder and more productively in march 1918.

Conversly did the Germans learn much from fighting those battles, that enabled them to fight more efficiently in 1918, with better tatics?

Like others have said the question is too wide to answer, it is almost a yes no answer that is required but this can not be done when you analysis the subject matter.

regardless i am glad that someone is aking the question as it means others will learn some answers

welcome

Arm.

[Malcolm]

Actually I just finished Wilson and Prior's book Passchendaele and I was wondering what the other Pals thought. I was surprised that it seemed the first few months were 'successful' bite and hold movements moving up the ridge. It didn't seem that until Oct when the push was made on Passchendael itself that the 'useless slaughter' really seemed to get out of hand.

Andy

I have read this along with Lyn MacDonalds, Martin Marix Evans and other books on Passchendaele and my conclusion was that it does seem to be that the early Battles were reasonably successful - in terms of WW1 - and the later Battles deteriorated with the weather into a futile struggle. You also have to remember that the French were not up to taking any major action at the time. A senseless slaughter? is a term I would not use myself but , like John, I understand why some use it. Some of my relatives are still there.

Lordbest,

I suggest some Library time and some reading is required before you can make a reasoned dissertation. When's your deadline?

Lyn MacDonald ' They Called it Passchendaele '

Martin Marix Evans ' Passchendaele '

T Wilson & R Prior ' Passchendaele. the untold story '

Chris McCarthy ' Passchendaele, day-by-day account'

Aye

Malcolm

[griffy]

Futile - possibly, slaughter certainly, reckless to Allied war aims - arguably (with hindsight)

While its true that Lloyd George kept new conscripts back from Haig during the winter of 1917/18. The fact that so many men perished at 3rd Ypres meant that the entire army structure and defensive tactics had to be reorganised. British divisions became smaller but were still expected to hold the same length of line. This (and learning from German strategy) led to box type defence in depth instead of the usual linear trench lines, in which the British soldier was familiar.

While there are obviously many other contributarory factors the loss of 250,000 largely experienced and irreplaced if not irreplaceable soldiers at 3rd Ypres was a significant factor in the German success in 1918. They were able to replace their lossess by switching troops from the Eastern Front. The British army was punch drunk and undermanned after Passchendaele and it nearly cost them the war as a result.

[Desmond7]

Liked that one Griffy!!

Especially when you examined the consequences for 1918.

To LordBest - quantifying what was 'achieved' in the battle - a bit of square footage and, in my opinion, not a great deal more. A very expensive conquest in human terms.

[Guest bonza]

Why?

That's more like it!

"Why" could well be the most important word in our language.

Good Luck

Pat

[mcderms]

Firstly, you need to hit the books to understand your topic, In addition to the ones recommended above I would also get hold of Tommy by Richard Holmes and "I Was There - The Untold Story Of The Great War".

IWT is a collection of interviews with veterans shortly after the war and I have a bound set if you'd like me to scan in any relevant ones (send me a message).

Secondly, get yourself a good book on strategy in WW1 and a Haig biography. There are a number of titles I can dig out for you but send a msg as I'll need to go and have a look on the shelves.

Thirdly, after the reading all the above get yourself over to the Salient and walk the battlefields. Do not come home until you've spent an hour at Tyne Cot and don't leave out Bandighem and Mendinghem.

You will now have an understanding of the battle, where, how and why it was fought.

The futility of the Third Ypres was not in the battle itself or the bite-hold strategy used. The rank stupidity of blasting reclaimed marsh lands with high explosives during the wettest summer on record is way up there in the annals of British Military balls-ups. Also pushing limited sucesses over massive defeats that saw another three month slogging match emerge for crippling losses is another... BUT remember that whatever else, the Allies held the high ground at the end of 1917 and we'd pulled the enemy into a big fight neither of us could afford (as 1918 showed). This kept pressure off the estern front for our allies although this didn't save Russia from the October revolution (but that's another story).

For me, the most important thing (taking the bigger picture) is the legacy of Passchendaeleis that it left us with an army in no fit state to defend when we needed to in Spring 1918. Although that buffoon Lloyd George had withheld recruits from Haig in 1917, he left us with an England full of raw 18 year old conscripts. Better if he'd really had the courage of his convictions and saved a few more experienced troops by shipping them off to Italy as he wanted...

[AndyHollinger]

I am thinking the key to the question is the word "futile" ... many things in many perspectives can be described as "futile." It has both short-term and long-term common and philisophical meanings. I am not trying to quibble here but, it goes to the heart of the questions.

Was the battle futile if propagators of the battle win the war? We can sit and day-dream all we want, but the "what-ifs" of history are simply that - day-dreams. The battle simply was. It is our job to understand it and then, as historians and enthusiasts make judgements and form opinions. Some, therefore, might consider it "futile" but in what sense? As mentioned above - square feet per men; enemy casualty count? British Morale? Futile implies an siginificant effort that was actively persued but not successful. Passchendaele is probably that in terms of its announced and understood battle objectives - but, on a larger scale could it be futile if the Allies won? I'd say no.

[robbie]

[Although that buffoon Lloyd George had withheld recruits from Haig in 1917, he left us with an England full of raw 18 year old conscripts.]

Yes, AND ANZAC volunteers.

[Canadawwi]

Re: futility of war - I've copied below an interview with Canadian historian and author Pierre Berton (publ. in the Toronto Sun in 1998).

**************************

Popular historical writer and journalist Pierre Berton argues the deaths of more than 66,000 Canadians were in vain.

"The whole bloody war was stupid," says Berton, adding a negotiated peace with Germany in 1917 could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives and prevented the humiliation of the Germans which laid the groundwork for the rise of Nazi fascism.

Berton says the countless war memorials dotting our country today are a testament to the stupidity of a war led by generals and politicians who should have known better than to involve Canada in a war that pitted Europe's greatest powers against each other in a wave of nationalism, imperialism and ambition -- the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy vs. the Triple Entente of France, Russia and Great Britain.

DIED 'IN VAIN'

"They did die in vain, of course, that's the terrible thing. But nobody wanted to say that because of the mothers. If you think that your son was killed uselessly, you'd be very upset," Berton says.

"Was it worth it? I don't think it was. They weren't fighting Hitler. That was a different kind of war. There was some reason to fight Hitler."

Berton argues world leaders at the time didn't realize technological advances in machines guns and other weaponry would result in a war of such massive, endless carnage. Without tanks to advance the troops, the two sides were deadlocked in a bitter stalemate that dragged on for years as casualties mounted.

[Chris_Baker]

"fu·tile, adj.

Having no useful result.

Trifling and frivolous; idle".

It would also be worth reading John Terraine's "Business in Great Waters". It covers the submarine war, in both world wars. Why do I say this? Because Passchendaele was authorised by Lloyd George when the Royal Navy advised that the war could not be continued beyond 1917 unless the U-Boats were defeated. The key U-Boat bases were along the Belgian coast, and Passchendaele was planned initially to sweep along and recapture the coast.

Haig and Lloyd George also knew that the French Army was tottering; the French government pressed the British to maintain pressure on the enemy.

So, given the information at the time, not a futile objective to begin with.

But futility began early in this campaign. Mid afternoon on the first day, to be precise, when the heavens opened and a deluge of rain halted the initially encouraging advance.

Futility continued when continuous piecemeal attacks continued to be made. This can be pinned squarely on Haig and Gough.

Success stepped up when Haig, Plumer and Second Army got things organised in bite and hold as described above, from late August. But the RN had not alerted the government and army sufficiently that the U-Boat menace had been defeated by other means by then. Not futile, bu definition, but arguably not a wise commitment of resources.

And futility certainly in continuing to attempt to advance once bad weather had returned, after say Polygon Wood had fallen and the only objective was to secure the Paschendaele ridge for the winter. I ask, what possible difference did it make, standing in a morass on the "height" of the ridge, which must be all of 5m higher than the lower ground, rather than in a morass a little further down, during the winter - and especially once it was known that the enemy was moving large numbers of troops from the East?

Of all the campaigns undertaken by the British Army, this is the one I consider - in parts - to have been futile.

[Annette Burgoyne]

Was Third Ypres Futile, it cost lots of life on both sides, but from a military point of view, no it was not futile, I guess it's all down to how you look at it. War is Futile after all, the only people who gain from war are the those who owned the Arms Factories.

After the war I believe General, Von Kuhl, Chief of Staff of Prince Rupprecht Army Group wrote :-

"even if he (Haig) had not broken through the Flanders front he had weakened German strength to a point where the damage could not be made good. The German sword had become blunted"

Could the battle have been fort else where, I think not, the orginal plan was to break through and threaten the German coastal defences from the rear, while allied forces attacked along the coast from Nieuport in combination with a landing by British troops near Ostend. The coastal attack was to begin when the main offensive had arrived level with Cortemarck and this had to be achieved by the end of October because of the change in the tide. So bearing in mind the main objective, the battle could only take place in Flanders.

Should the battle have stopped once the it became clear that Cortemarck could not be agained by the end of October. May be yes but did Haig have much choice but to carry on, the Russian offensive had collaped in July, the Italian front had collapsed in October and the French had lost its fighting capacity due to mutiny and unrest, if Haig had broke off the battle of third Ypres, would the Germans sat on their hind legs and seid we are glad thats all over and rest or would they have taken the chance to seiz the initiative; we will never know but Haig could not take the chance and call off the battle.

Annette

[andigger]

Here's a thought I've often wondered. Perhaps my imagination is colored by modern warfare, but what if the coastal attack (with or without landings) also commenced on 31 July?

ideas????

Andy

[Robert Dunlop]

The coastal attack would probably have been disastrous. Without the amphibious landings, the British had no significant bridgehead left from which to launch a land-based attack. The astute reactions of the MarinesKorps Flandern had detected the French handover to the British. Thinking (rightly) that something was up, they launched a pre-emptive strike (Operation Strandfest) that all but destroyed 2nd Brigade, 1st Division (see http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/strandfest.htm for an account of this action).

The seaborne invasion depended (again rightly) on assistance from the Nieuport bridgehead to suceed. Without this, the German defenders, who had practiced hard for just such an eventuality, would have encircled the landing site and then destroyed the force. I think that the amphibious forces could have got ashore as the Middelkerke area was the least well defended locale on the coast. But it would have been hard to break out. Meanwhile, the big coastal batteries, especially just south of Ostend, would have made short work of the landing craft and support vessels, especially once the heavy smoke screen had disappeared.

(see http://www.1914-1918.net/BATTLES/hush/hush.htm)

Robert

[Bernard_Lewis]

We all know the cost of the Great War was enormous. It is commonplace to describe all the sacrifices made as 'futile'. I think the best judges of whether it was 'futile' or not on the whole must surely be the French and Belgians who finally saw the Germans pull out. Futile from their viewpoint? I think not. Costly and tragic - of course.

Lets not forget that in WWII Ike had two messages for release to the public in his pocket on 6 June - one commending the troops for their great success; the other absolving the troops of all blame for the disasterous landings and taking the blame on himself. Had it failed would D-Day have been called 'futile'? What was the alternative? In WWI If it was not to be Ypres in 1917 should it have been the Somme again (after 1916?). Or Maybe Gallipoli again (after 1915?). As the French General Mangin remarked 'Whatever you do you lose a lot of men'. Hindsight should be used exceedingly sparingly...

[Mat McLachlan]

Lordbest,

Probably the best advice I can give about Passchendaele is to remember it was part of a larger battle - the Third Battle of Ypres. Even though Passchendaele was a bloody mess, the earlier stages of the battle had been a great success. Ask yourself what effect the earlier successes had on the morale of the Germans. Did success encourage the British to keep pushing at a time they should have backed off? I'm not really giving you my own opinion about the futility of Passchendaele - I'm just trying to encourage you to see the big picture.

Feel free to contact me with more specific questions.

Mat