Kitchener's Armies

[Edward_N_Kelly]

One of the often stated "facts" about Kichener's Armies (by Haig amongst others) was that their standard of training was not up to scratch.

Most of the volunteers were embodied by the end of 1914 and undergoing training of one sort or another by about March 1915. They did not transfer to France until early 1916. Many did at least one (albeit short) stint in the line (perhaps in a quiet sector).

So why was their training so woefully inadequate?

(And this can lead to another topic if need be - the cooperation (or lack of it)between the BEF and the Home Army re interchange of ideas and methods and why it was not optimal)

Cheers

Edward

[Guest Comsat Angel]

Not sure about the why, but on several occasions in "The War The Infantry Knew", Dunn and other officers comment with some acidity on the lack of training of their replacement drafts, a situation which does not improve. So not solely a statement by Haig.

[Desmond7]

I suspect regular army 'snobbery' may come into this ...

Re: Kitchener's New Army - The 36th (Ulster) Division was described by Kitchener as the 'best new division he had seen' when he inspected them in England prior to their departure to France.

It has often been argued that since many of the men had been pre-war Ulster Volunteers, they had a 'running start' on some other formations.

Des

[mcderms]

The New Army was not lucky enough to receive training to pre-war standards and what they got prior to going overseas was a mixed bag. However, they were young, very fit and very keen even if they'd only fired a few rounds from a Lee Metford. Their on-the-job training in France was better and the units engaged at Gallipoli came back with reputations as fighting battns. They also underwent excellent training and rehearsals for 1/7/16 although this all went to cock at approx 7:31!

Covenant With Death has a good few chapters on training and I cannot recommend Tommy by R Holmes highly enough.

[DrB]

I believe that the New Armies suffered from the old malady of not enough veterans or old sweats in its ranks to carry out a proper training agenda.

Coupled with the fact that the meat-grinder on the Western Front was screaming for more "bullet blockers" to fill the ranks, a greater entension of the front line from the French, a "final push," etc.

We are fully aware that the number and type of training cadre has a lot to do with both the quanity and quality of training. There just weren't enough to go around.

The training time and agenda was probably shortened in order to prep them for overseas as well. In the US, during WWII, and the Korean War, the training of draftees was at a minimum and I can personally recall some events in Southeast Asia which proved to me that the training of replacements (FNG's) was just barely adequate. Being an ex-enlisted Marine and having undergone "peacetime" training before becoming commisioned, it was easy to see the difference in training, and screening, criteria.

This is not to say that the New Armies lacked enthusiasm, but their leaders who insisted on them attacking on the Somme shoulder-to-shoulder because they lacked the proper training for "fire and movement" was unconcionable. And the casuality lists proved that.

DrB

[iain mchenry]

As well as not having the right amount of qualified experienced manpower available for the new army you also have to realise that there would have been a shortage of equipment available to train the troops. Look at Britains Pre-WW1 standing army and the budget available to train new troops then look a few years later at the massive rise in recruits due to the New Army. A large percentage of the instructors available would have probably served pre WW1 and therefore would not be used to the type of warfare being seen on the Western Front. As has been said in a previous post a lot of the New Army Bns deployed late 1915 early 1916, and had some (little) time to get used to "How it was out of training". A short sharp learning curve. No disrespect to the lads who served in the New Army but I would not have liked to have been there.

[spike10764]

Lack of experienced NCO's and training instructors, Untried Officers, the somewhat slapdash make do and mend nature of Britain's volunteer system, her apparent lack of preparedness(compared to the other combatants) for war. All these will have played a part in the lesser efficiency of Kitcheners Armies.

The professional British Army prided itself on it's musketry, and Kitcheners Men had to learn to shoot as they went along, so to speak. This meant regulars would look down on the newer recruits. A certain amount of snobbery meant that even the efficient units were considered inferior at first. Time and harsh experience would prove the lie of this.

[Apache IP]

Without being well read on the subject of training in WWI and how adequate or not it was perceived to be by drafts heading to the front, I must add this - What soldier thought his training was adequate for what he was to be faced with? What old sweat thought he was handed a battle ready trooper in any war? I submit to you not many.

It is my opinion discipline in the British Army outstrips any other Army in the world at that period. However, that discipline alone can never prepare one for actual trench warfare or any combat. It is a learned experience, you can't teach that stuff.

[Apache IP]

Without being well read on the subject of training in WWI and how adequate or not it was perceived to be by drafts heading to the front, I must add this - What soldier thought his training was adequate for what he was to be faced with? What old sweat thought he was handed a battle ready trooper in any war? I submit to you not many.

It is my opinion discipline in the British Army outstrips any other Army in the world at that period. However, that discipline alone can never prepare one for actual trench warfare or any combat. It is a learned experience, you can't teach that stuff.

[Apache IP]

Without being well read on the subject of training in WWI and how adequate or not it was perceived to be by drafts heading to the front, I must add this - What soldier thought his training was adequate for what he was to be faced with? What old sweat thought he was handed a battle ready trooper in any war? I submit to you not many.

It is my opinion discipline in the British Army outstrips any other Army in the world at that period. However, that discipline alone can never prepare one for actual trench warfare or any combat. It is a learned experience, you can't teach that stuff.

[Bernard_Lewis]

The Swansea Battalion started forming in August 1914, moved to North Wales and then Winchester and left for France in December 1915. It was only very late in 1915 that the rifles for the entire battalion arrived! The Swansea Battalion committee had earliert taken the initiative and bought (from the local dept store!) a small number of rifles and 5000 rounds...The War Office subsequently queried the cost and initially resisted reimbursing the committee. Gawd help us!

[Edward_N_Kelly]

Now to throw something else into the melting pot !

Perhaps it was not the training of the troops at the battalion level and below that was at fault (they learnt very quickly or they did not survive !). Perhaps the references in the “writings” is actually to the lack of trained staff officers ?

The staff work is required to ensure that the troops on the ground are in the right place at the right time, have the support they need from artillery (and later tanks), engineers, air, “loggies” and all the panoply of a modern army. Here the expansion of the British Army was to suffer its most glaring deficiency – the General Staff was only a few years old and there were only some 600 qualified officers at the start of the war. Most moved to France with the “Old Contemptibles“ and suffered casualties in the first year. The need to make up the shortfall meant that many (though no doubt suitable candidates) were placed in roles to which they were inadequately trained.

The division is the only “all arms and services” formation that is basically stable in the British Army of the time – Corps and Armies are really a series of individual units “brigaded” for a particular mission and units are moved and swapped as the situation requires. As a consequence much of the decision making on how the battle was to be fought was decided at this level (Haig directed when/where/with what forces, Army Commanders determined the allocation of resources, timings and control, Corps decided which divisions were to "go over the top" but it was the division that "controlled the battle" at the "sharp end").

As a consequence it was the level of Divisional Staff Officers that the shortage was most acute - the Captains/Majors/Lt Colonels (GSO2/3 grades) that no way to hide as part of a larger machine (they were the heads of the various sections in the division) and these were the ones that had not been trained…..

While these were “learning their trade” the troops were suffering their fate. The staff was not to come to fruition until Passchendaele (but the weather defeated many of the efforts) and the “Kaiserschlact” (when the British Army showed remarkable resilience) and its culmination in the “Hundred Days”.

Cheers

Edward