Trench Raiding

[Edward_N_Kelly]

This came up in another threat (on Haig and the war of attrition) and it set me a thinkin'.

British (and no doubt other armies) doctrine was to "maintain the offensive spirit" of their troops. Between the larger engagements it meant a series of trench raids from the individual opportunist to larger (up to Brigade size "stunts").

The objectives were amongst other things: to deny information to the enemy, to gain information about the enemy, to upset any small scale plans that the opposition may have, to dominate the "opposite side", to "maintain offensive spirit", to gain a morale ascendancy over the enemy, to advance own lines by taking out small enemy positions, to cause the enemy casualties, to dominate “no man’s land” (which gives you many of the features above).

Both sides seem to have adopted this policy from the start to varying degrees and varying success. The Germans after about mid-1917 seem to have stopped their troops from doing it and rely more on sudden “stonks” of artillery and/or machinegun fire. The British continued it to the end of the war with certain divisions becoming masters of the “art” (and here I count the Australians, New Zealanders and Canadians amongst them). The Dominion troops in particular are noted (mainly within their own literature) for their “peaceful penetration” tactics (to use the Australian term) which apparently

However, the statement has been made that this constant trench raiding was not really worth it as it bled the battalions of their best and brightest (those destined for higher ranks both officer and NCO) for no real gain. The British Army would have been better served by the use of technology (ie artillery in the main) to do what it did best kill people.

I am curious whether this statement applies to the whole war or mainly the early part when the British Regular Army lost so many that would have assisted the New Armies.

I would be interested in the comments of the forum on the matter…….

Cheers

Edward

[Guest bonza]

Edward.

A distinct feeling of deja vu here. Don't want to open old wounds but think discussion under the Monash/Currie threw up a few points.

One aspect that I don't think has been discussed, is that both the Turks and Anzacs were into raiding fairly seriously on Gallipoli.

ooRoo

Pat

[Guest bonza]

Apologies to Armourer. He started the thread I meant.

[Edward_N_Kelly]

On the contrary, the Currie/Monash thread (as well as that of the Haig and attrition) only passed over the concept of the trench raid and did not discuss its effects on British (and indeed other armies) ability to provide experienced NCOs and officers to leaven the New Armies in the case of the British and similar formations for the others.

The incessant trench raiding has been blamed for the loss of those individuals whose dash and initiative would have been invaluable to these newer formations. On the other hand they would potentially have been lost anyway ("luck of the draw"), become disenchanted and go elsewhere (eg the RFC), and/or not gain the necessary experience that made them so valuable.

It is the balance of the morale needs versus practical matters that need consideration.

(Remember the value of experience on "two way rifle ranges" was to be of value in the first two years of the "second innings" for the British but disastrous to the French and possibly the Italians)

Cheers

Edward

[Terry]

Once example which illustrates very well your thoughts was the large scale raid staged by 1700 men of the 4th Canadian Division on 1 March,1917, a month before Vimy Ridge. It was a disaster, with some 700 casualties, including two battalion commanders and many officers and NCO's. On April 9th, the 4th Division could have used those leaders who died in this futile endeavour.

[Guest DNH]

For me this is one of the war's great unanswerables:

almost certainly men with talent died whilst raiding, but how many men learnt vital skills, developed leadership and sharpened their senses whilst carrying out night time ops?

one of the great contributory factors to the various mental health problems suffered by soldiers was the inability to fight back when the Germans did their artillery and trench mortaring thing (I freely admit to paraphrasing here!). Without raiding and offensive patrolling, providing a means (albeit quite limited one) to fight back, how much worse would this problem have been?

in General Jack's diary, he says the continued domination of the enemy and of no man's land in front of the sector he held was vital to keeping morale up and to save lives - the Germans would think very carefully about patrolling/raiding in an active sector. It would be interesting to contrast that with what Tommy Atkins who was actually doing the raiding thought.

These are just some thoughts that strike me immediately. Don't think it's a simple balance sheet question though. What were the alternatives, and what consequences would they have on morale, casualties, leadership, intelligence etc

Cheers

[Terry]

I just took a quick look through my CEF collection and found:

1. Trio to 57463 Pte.A.P.Mitchell,20th Bn. Wounded on the night of 27 June,1916 as part of a ten man raiding party which lost three killed and three wounded.

2. Pair to 474055 Pte.F.Storr, 46th Bn. Killed 13 Feb.,1917 when the 10th Canadian Brigade staged a major raid with 200 men from each of the 44th, 46th, 47th, and 50th Bns plus attached pioneers,etc., in all 870 men. Losses 150 all ranks.

3. Pair to 690268 Pte.H.G.Crockett,116th Bn. Killed 23 July,1917, when his battalion staged a trench raid. Losses five officers (all lieutenants) and thirty men killed.

[PhilB]

It would be interesting to contrast that with what Tommy Atkins who was actually doing the raiding thought.

I always have the suspicion that field officers showed their aggressive posture by sending junior officers and men to do the raiding. Possibly unfair (Did they have a choice?), but perhaps a grain of truth? Phil B

[Guest bonza]

G'day Edward

Goodonyer! Putting me right in it! On the very day I was spouting off about "Assumption is the mother of all [mistakes]"

Have now gotta come clean, and admit to absolutely no knowledge of the

"two way rifle ranges"

I did hear that Fromelles was first described by High Command as a Raid, but would have thought that even Terry's 1700 Canadians would be a bit excessive for the "Job-description"

ooRoo

Pat

[Arnie]

I think that we may be mixing patrolling no mans land and the actual break in to the Germans lines.

Patrols normally standing patrols or a ambush have some value in training leadership but this is contrary to the general melee of a trench raid where coshes, sharpened spades were the chosen weapons of day.

One particular successful trench raid brought back 4 German prisoner and killed a number of others, but the report almost as an appendix states that 5 men were left behind in the German Trench, eight were killed including the Captain leading it. No real information was gained other than what was already known. I bet the Germans were really dismayed at such a brilliant success.

Yes as the man said the only people who saw any value were those ordering the raids.

I also believe it became common practice for patrols and raids to go out fire a few rounds and throw a few Grenades and then come home honour satisfied and patrols of both sides to ignore one another whilst out in no mans land. All condoned by regimental HO.

[Annette Burgoyne]

I find Raids absoltely fascinating. All the raids carried out by the units I have researched asked for volunteers to carry them out.

There have been a few threads on raids now and I was just wondering if our lord and master Chris could do a section on the Long Long Trail with details of as many raids as possible. I am sure that lots of details of different raids could be compiled by us. I have details of raids made by 1st and 6th K.S.L.I., there lots of mention of Aussie and Canadians raids. All raids should be included, as the small raids are just as fascinating as the big ones. What do others think ?

Annette

[Adam Harland]

There is never going to be an answer to the rights and wrongs of raiding, as I doubt there was a single individual who did not have a variety of views about this at a variety of times as they served at the front. A quick read of Seigfried Sasson ( a great raider of trenches in his day) will quickly establish that individual views are variable over time.

it is certainly true that the lord Moran view, (which is that everyman only has so much they can give, and once that is gone, it is gone), has been regularly used as an adjunct to the attack on Haig's strategy of attrition. Moran was a ( very fine ) doctor, caught in the 'catch 22' of medical officers through the years, which is spending your life keeping men well so that they can be killed. Its a depressing role!

It is a commonplace remark that the BEF of 1914 was the finest army of the Great war. It is perhaps worth considering that it wasn't, but that the BEF of 1918 was. The major difference in these armies was that the 1918 model was not made up of professional soldiers. The fighting was done by men who had had no military involvement ( in the main) until the war started. They were, however, very professional soldiers in their approach. It came as a surpise to me when I first started looking at raids that they were so well prepared. In early 1916 troops were regularly practicing raids on replica enemy trenches behind british lines.These were not generic trench systems, but mock ups of the area to be attacked. Fire and movement were co-ordinated, junior officers and NCOs were exposed to direct command under fire, and the war was fought, rather than suffered.

The result was often first rate infantry, used to operating with the supporting arms. Recent work by Griffiths and Sheffield ( among others) has started to look at the tactical spremacy of British arms in 1918. It will be impossible to establish a definitive proportion of that excellence that is due to what was learned by raiding, but the regimental officers whose units fought so well in 1918 had learned how to soldier somewhere, (and I imagine that most of us would agree that this learning didn't come from days like 1/7/16).

As far as the relative casualties are concerned, my experience of reading about Kitchener's Scottish Divisions ( perhaps unusually belligerent?) was that they took great delight in casting all kinds of unplesantness into dugouts (Phosperous, fuel cans and motar bombs was the 1917 cocktail). How many germans were killed? I don't know, and neither did they, but in general terms they seem to have been content in their own minds that there were none left. How this unkown can be included in the 'killing' figures is unclear.

As a final pause for thought, for those who are fans of German 'stormtroopers' as the infantry of the war, it is informative to read Rommel of Junger:....both seem rather keen on raiding as a proper activity for fighting infantry. In the end it is the infantry that allows for defeat or victory; everything else is there to support. Raiding was a substantial training ground that allowed the British army to move away from lines of men walking towards machine guns to being the fighting organisation that could take any german position at will, and had defeated thebgerman army in the field. Discuss!

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

I also believe it became common practice for patrols and raids to go out fire a few rounds and throw a few Grenades and then come home honour satisfied and patrols of both sides to ignore one another whilst out in no mans land. All condoned by regimental HO.

In the case of my current research of the XIV Reserve Corps on the Somme, 1914-1916 there are numerous accounts of patrol clashes in no man's land and in many cases both sides would go out of their way to lay traps and ambush the opposing side.

While the Germans knew most of the enemy units opposite down to individual company commander names, the raid and offensive patrols were generally used to maintain the offensive spirit of the men as well as controlling no man's land. Numerous volunteers went out on a regular basis night after night, in some cases the number of patrols made by individual men numbered in the hundreds before they were killed or captured. I can only speak of the units I am currently studying.

[spike10764]

I've always thought raiding came to the fore with the arrival of Kitcheners volunteers on the Western Front- the senior officers felt that the maintaining of the offensive spirit was a training ground for actual fighting, for troops that were intended to break the lines and actually fight. What the volunteers(for raids) thought may have been along similar lines- the best way to learn something is to do it.

Also I think the top brass dreaded the "live and let live" system that sometimes developed, and did not wish to encourage fraternising (as in Xmas 1914)-in fact to positively discourage it. Raiding also would try to instill in the troops the idea that the Trench lines were temporary, soon to be gone and replaced by mobile warfare.

That's my twopennorth......

[Edward_N_Kelly]

I thank you all for you comments - an interesting selection.

As to how you define a raid - that is one of the more interesting exercises.

"Raids" varied from a one person hate campaign to elaborate exercises up to brigade or more (plus support arms and services).

I think that you could differentiate between patrolling of No Man’s Land from that of going into the opposition’s trenches though the techniques used and the end objective could be similar – to dominate the enemy.

One overlooked feature is how the techniques of aggressive tactics, patrolling, recce, handling troops in quick and brutal firefights, coordination of all arms (at a lower level) assited the BEF with the return to open warfare from March 1918.

The problem with raids per se was the lack of standardised SOPs early in the war. This meant each unit had to devise its own methodology and commit its own mistakes (and consequent casualties). It was not until the widespread distribution of “Lessons Learned” pamphlets and the “bull rings” swung into full play that the general level of training rose (some units were already very good, some were newly arrived and/or not very good).

I think this was the area where the Regular Army failed and cost the BEF in general time and more casualties (as WWI seemed to be one of those wars where a quiet day was only relative). They failed to institute the free interchange of ideas within the BEF and Home Army, the development of formal doctrine and its dissemination and the standardisation of training amongst the various units and formations (or at least plan for it when they had sufficent personnel from 1916). It all seems to have came about rather ad hoc and over time though by the end of the war it was very good indeed from when the recruit reached the BEF. From his induction to movemnet ot france that appears to have been a different matter....

And that brings on another subject under this header – unless a complete unit was forwarded to the BEF (and here it had to go through a painful and usually costly learning curve), drafts from the Home Army were in general not regarded as up to speed – and these were trained or re-trained in unit or in the “bull rings”. During WW1 was there in fact 2 British Armies (BEF and Home Army)? Why didn’t either party see the need for the free interchange of personnel to provide good training cadres to minimise the “downtime” (and perhaps the survival) of new arrivals ?

Cheers

Edward

(Edited coz I immediately thought of something else!)