Smith-Dorrien and Le Cateau

[armourersergeant]

It can not really be argued that Smith Dorrien did the correct thing in stopping and dealing the Germans a blow that very likely saved the BEF and Paris. What i would like to know from others is do we think that he actually the correct type of battle.

SD claimed his men were 'stone cold' and that he had no choice but to stand and fight. But did the full use of his troops offer both them and the BEF later the best oppotunity to get away. Could he not have better used his Artillery and a rearguard that could have stopped the Germans, made them recce and deploy for battle and then slip away, thus having saved many more troops and guns to fight later?

Were his troops dispositions sufficent to enable him to pick the type of battle he wanted to fight, or was it almost a matter of turn and fight and then hopefully limp away whilst the Germans were licking their wounds?

I have the greatest respect for SD and his stand at Le Cateau and whilst i realise that he had no choice but to stand and fight, i have always wondered weather he fought more of a battle rather than a stopping blow! Having read a letter recently at IWM the same sort of thing was mentioned in a letter and it has spurred me to ask this question.

regards

Arm.

[Anthony Pigott]

Without going into a lot of detail and analysis, isn't it simply a matter of time (the Germans were already attacking along most of the line by very early on the 26th) and space (to hold off 3-4 German Corps with much cavalry you would need most of II Corps to form a long enough line otherwise you would be enveloped, which they had a good go at anyway)?

As it was, the battle was primarily a matter of rearguards (at brigade level) with close artillery support.

I suppose, in the real world, there's a limit to how much one can play David and Goliath without getting hurt.

I'm sure others have better knowledge and insight.

Anthony

[Guest DNH]

The German attack was certainly made in large numbers and early in the day - the elements of 14th Brigade (1/DCLI and 1/East Surrey) on the South Eastern side of Le Cateau were cut off by about 6 or 7am and spent most of the day making a fighting retreat round the German advance to get back to 2/Suffolk and 2/Manchester the other side of the Selle River.

It was difficult enough disengaging from the battle after 7 hours: the country is open, well observed by the Germans and under heavy fire. You only need to see the VC citations of the RHA chaps (3 of them I think, Driver Drain whose name stays in the memory and the other two who don't!) to see how difficult it was to extricate themselves from battle.

The Germans did try hard to turn the left flank (4th Division, newly arrived) as well as the right (5th Division). 3rd Division in between made in all a pretty long line (maybe 6 miles?). So it was always going to be a major action. Otherwise why would it have slowed the Germans down and buy the vital time?

Don't forget also that I Corps played virtually no part in the battle, much to the disgruntlement no doubt of those infantry being shelled to pieces from the high ground across the Selle that I Corps might have occupied. However the pursuit of I Corps was also slowed as a result of Le Cateau.

So yes a major encounter (more important than Mons, I would argue), and i think rightly so, with appropriate dividends. Arguably, like the war as a whole, it is not surprising that it was so big and casualties were heavy (about 8,000 in the BEF): what we should consider is why casualties were not much higher in suffering defeat in detail.

Cheers

[Robert Dunlop]

Just a couple of quick thoughts. Leaving aside the decision to stand and fight, SD refused both flanks in setting about the defenses. Perfectly appropriate in light of what was bearing down on II Corps. The biggest tactical problem was the early loss of Le Cateau and the dominance of the high ground beyond the town by the Germans. This meant the Germans could enfilade parts of the line. The attached picture shows how the church tower formed an ideal perch from which the Germans could observe and bring MG fire to bear on the British right flank.

Another tactical problem related to the general way if which artillery was used. Something that was not specific to Le Cateau. Field guns were pushed well forward. They did fearsome damage, as 'The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau 26 August, 1914' testifies. But they were themselves badly punished.

Another significant tactical problem was the lack of cavalry support. It seems that Allenby's cavalry were in a shambolic state at the time. One of the factors that SD weighed up in his decision. That meant the left flank was less well covered. Sordet make a superb effort (given everything else that his corps had done) to cover SD on the left. Much thanks is owed to the French cavalry in my opinion.

Finally, there is the shameful (in my opinion) retreat of Haig and his I Corps away from SD.

The rearguard actions by elements of II Corps immediately after Le Cateau were brilliantly conducted. Jack Giffard's account of L Battery for example illustrates why the Germans were very wary of getting too close.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This photo is taken from the approximate position of the British front line on their right flank. The view is to the east, across Le Cateau town. The dominance of the church spire is very clearly seen.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Much thanks is owed to the French cavalry in my opinion.

Finally, there is the shameful (in my opinion) retreat of Haig and his I Corps away from SD.

I think SD in his reports and memoirs gave alot of credit to the French cavalry.

Why did I corps retreat away from II corps.Was there no communication between the two headquarters?

I know that Forestier-Walker and Gough were not on good terms but I also know that Haig and Sd had a conference as to what they were about before they started the retreat. So surely they were aware of the routes they were going totake! If thast is the case then which one deviated from its course or was forced from its course.

I am assuming that Haig and SD conversed on the retirement seeing as when FW and Gough went to the meeting to discuse it at GHQ they were not given specific orders. After this i beleive Haig and SD had a meeting to discuss the matter. I have heard it said that Haig abandoned II corps but i would require more proof of this before i conceed this point. Surely the terrain played a major part in the route the both corps took?

Wouls I corps not have been retreating in line with the original plan and that it was II corps that deviated from the plan by stopping and repulsing the enemy, albiet a necessery action?

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

From Gardner's book 'Trial by Fire', which you and I have touched on before:

'According to John Charteris, when the [German] attack opened [on the outskirts of Landrecies] on the evening of the 25th, the usually reserved Haig "was jolted out of his usual placidity. He said 'If we are caught, by God, we'll sell ourselves dearly'." Haig's alarm apparently manifested itself in an attempt to take charge of the impending engagement. While this description may contain some exaggeration, it is evident that Haig remained in Landrecies for several hours after the initial encounter with the Germans. Only after 11pm did he move his headquarters to the village of Le Grand Fayt.

By this point in the evening, the I Corps commander was apparently satisfied that the intervention at Landrecies no longer required his personal attention. Orders issued from Le Grand Fayt, however, suggest that he continued to believe that I Corps was in grave danger. At 12:30 am on 26 August, Haig instructed his troops to dump excess supplies and even cast off their packs in order to expedite the withdrawal of the entire corps southwards. Such an order, with its potentially troublesome repercussions should I Corps manage to survive its engagement indicates the apprehension that prevailed at Haig's headquarters. In a message dispatched to GHQ at 3:50 am, after the German attack had ceased, Haig requested further assistance from Smith-Dorrien's corps, suggesting that "troops near LE CATEAU should cooperate by advancing directly on LANDRECIES".

Sir John French and his staff had already spent 25 August in a state of trepidation. Throughout the evening, alarming messages had been arriving from I Corps. While these were generally exaggerated, they cannot have been reassuring to GHQ, especially in the light of the long-standing and close relationship between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig. Consequently, any subsequent information that arrived at GHQ was intepreted through a filter of anxiety. Arriving under these circumstances, the news that Smith-Dorrien intended to face the enemy at Le Cateau had a devastating impact on the collective psyche of GHQ. Upon receiving Smith-Dorrien's telegram shortly before 5 am, Sir John French and his staff rapidly concluded that II Corps was doomed. After trying to convince French to force II Corps to retire, Henry Wilson apparently fell into a depression. Archie Murray was asleep when [the] message arrived, but upon reading it... he promptly fainted. While Sir John French did not succumb to distress to the same extent... he too concluded that Smith-Dorrien's decision meant the almost certain destruction of II Corps. Thus, instead of bringing the two corps back together, the commander-in-chief resolved to salvage I Corps by directing Haig either to retreat southwest on St Quentin, or southeast to gain shelter with the French on his right.

Haig, who remained unaware of the plight of II Corps, interpreted French's failure to send reinforcements to his aid early on the morning of the 26th as evidence that the commander-in-chief had abandoned I Corps erroneously. As he remarked in his diary: "GHQ had evidently given my corps up as lost from their control". In the absence of what he perceived to be adequate support from his commander, Haig continued his retreat directly southward on 26 August.

After the war, Edmonds alleged that the I Corps commander had "definite word" of the movement of German forces across his front on the 26th to attack Smith-Dorrien's right flank. While this is impossible to confirm, Haig was undoubtedly aware that II Corps was in some difficulty. The I Corps and 1 Division diaries note that during the day artillery could be heard from the direction of Le Cateau. In addition, E.S. Bulfin, commander of the 2nd Brigade of 1 Division, commented in his diary: "gather there was a bit of a mix up at Le Cateau". Haig proved more concerned for the safety of his own force than for the rest of the army, however, leaving II Corps to face the Germans alone.'

Charteris' book contains no mention of the plight of II Corps at all at this time.

As to how I and II Corps came to be separated and then, more importantly, how they handled the separation prior to the material quoted above, I will try and quote some of Gardner's material on this at a later date.

Robert

[Terry]

Great contributions gentlemen, on one of my favourite BEF generals. I always tend to think of S-D as a "real" fighting soldier who like so many others of his type before and since, could deal with the enemy but not the internal politics of his own army. An example I have used before is how Simmonds, ranked by Montgomery as the best Canadian high level commander in WW2, was shuffled out of the way after the war by Foulkes, the politically adept beaurocrat.

[armourersergeant]

General Sir Archibald Murrray was of the opinion that SD should have fought a delaying blow rather than the full on battle that he did. Murray i assume must have been in the know of all the facts regarding the situation that II corps was in even if it was not until after the war. Apparently he and SD corresponded when SD was in malta. They often discussed the issues of 1914, but Murray never changed his mind. He felt that the corps should have been saved for later and that a stopping blow by the use of artillery and some rear gaurds could have forceded the germans to deploy and then skitted away before they were inviolved greatly.

Murray in the letter states that he was always fond of SD but that his temper often got the better of him and that it got worse as he aged (something my wife says of me). He says it formed a sort of gout of the mind and often it was forgotten no soone rhad it passed and on many occasions he was sure that SD was not even aware of it. (he also commented that the only one who could pull him out of it was his wife with a resounding 'Horace', again much like my wife)

He says that during the battle of Mons Forestier-Walker came to him and said he would not work under SD anymore due to his temper. He was sent away with the 'stupid boy this is no time to change horses' type flea in his ear. But seeing as SD had only been in charge for a little time it seems to imply that his temper was either very ferocious or that it was far more known by subordinate officers than we seem to give it credit for today. He implies that it certainly was known in the Beor war where he was witness to it on one occasion.

Anyway i digress from the original question.

I do find that Travers has some good comments to make but also that he over simplifies in the other direction, by giving some examples of good then hitting you with what he really wanted to, and thus seeming to show that he has given a balanced view, when infact he has on occasion done axactly the opposit. that said he has cetainly made me ask some questions of my beliefs that i am still in certain areas trying to answer.

I think he over plays the Haig deserting II corps when perhaps (and simplified greatly here) he was trying to save his own corps from aniliation. I also know that Haig had a very low opinion of II corps staff work, though as yet i have not been able to find out what he basis this on (further investigating to come on subs visits to IWM etc).

I would say that if both corps HQs could not keep in touch with each other then GHQ should have formed that link and made them aware. This surely reflects more on GHQ than on individual corps staffs who had there hands full.

[armourersergeant]

I always tend to think of S-D as a "real" fighting soldier who like so many others of his type before and since, could deal with the enemy but not the internal politics of his own army.

Ishould add on the 'head gout' that SD suffered from was usually directed at his officers and not the men he commanded. He did much for his men and was a true fighting General as you say.

regards

Arm.

[Anthony Pigott]

Here's the background to the decision from the man himself:

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Would what resulted be classed as a stopping blow or did the situation turn out that SD was forced to engage the enemy for longer than he had anticipated. Is a stopping blow defined well by the commitment of the whole corps?

My opinion of the blow that Murray would have wanted SD to conduct may have taken a lot more moving around and detail than the staff of II corps had time to do. So it maybe it was just a matter of shuffling around the men and turning about to fight the oncoming Germans.

was that copied from 'Forty eight years'?

regards

Arm.

[Anthony Pigott]

Would what resulted be classed as a stopping blow or did the situation turn out that SD was forced to engage the enemy for longer than he had anticipated. Is a stopping blow defined well by the commitment of the whole corps?

My opinion of the blow that Murray would have wanted SD to conduct may have taken a lot more moving around and detail than the staff of II corps had time to do. So it maybe it was just a matter of shuffling around the men and turning about to fight the oncoming Germans.

was that copied from 'Forty eight years'?

regards

Arm.

Yes, from Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, p 401. Sorry, I should have said.

It's still far from clear to me what Murray had in mind. How much less of a 'stopping blow' would be possible - you couldn't have 'stopped' most of Von Kluck's army with much less. The length of engagement doesn't seem that long for a Corps action.

Regards

Anthony

[Robert Dunlop]

I would say that if both corps HQs could not keep in touch with each other then GHQ should have formed that link and made them aware. This surely reflects more on GHQ than on individual corps staffs who had there hands full.

I couldn't agree more. Sir Archibald Murray should have known this. Maybe he was trying to deflect attention, albeit implicitly, in his comments about and to SD. But of course he was in the invidious position of being displaced by Sir Henry Wilson.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

you couldn't have 'stopped' most of Von Kluck's army with much less.

Anthony

I agree with this point. Anything less risked not stopping the German advance on either flank of the 'stopping' force, with the risk of annihilation. Breadth of defensive front was critical. Even so, II Corps came close to being outflanked as it was.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

I cant think of a worse position to be in than stuck between French changing his mind every two minutes, and Wilson just doing his thing and sod the consequences. I saw Murray's diary entries. Not only were they brief to the point of not existant but they were so poorly written they were almost ineligable on some days. Pressure must truely have been bad at GHQ with French thinking he was running the show and Wilson thinking he was and Murray trying to hold it all together.

regards

Arm.

[armourersergeant]

It's still far from clear to me what Murray had in mind. How much less of a 'stopping blow' would be possible - you couldn't have 'stopped' most of Von Kluck's army with much less. The length of engagement doesn't seem that long for a Corps action.

letter dated 28th dec 1933 to Jasper?

" I shall always consider that he did wrong to fight other than a strong rear-guard action. He fought because he said his men were 'stone cold' and could not march. it was vital to get this splendid personnel back as intact as possible to form the nucleus of a larger army, and 'stone cold' men after the further nerve strain of another fight, so soon after a gruelling at Mons, would still have to retire, and probably have two marches instead of one, in order to keep steps with Haigs corps.

I would have had him leave most of his artillery and strong rear-guards, to force the germans to reconnoitre and deploy and then trot away. His artillery horses were quite capable of this. However this is only my opinion."

This is what he meant, or would have done in SD's position. It may be that we should be greatful that he was not commander II corps. murray was by many opinions a good administrator but was not so hot on the fighting side.

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the quote. A couple of things to pick up on. Firstly, the tactics suggested by Murray were indeed used after Le Cateau. By then, the tactics carried the additional pyschological effect on the Germans of the setback in that battle.

Secondly, here is the material from Gardner on handling of the split between I and II Corps, which Murray argues was so important to close:

'During the afternoon of 24 August, French and Murray thus resolved to send the battered II Corps to the vicinity of Le Cateau via the Roman Road, while I Corps, still relatively unscathed, was instructed to find its way to the same town using roads to the east. This demarcation made the roads with the forest itself the responsibility of the I Corps commander, whether or not he chose to use them to move the bulk of his force. After the war, Murray contended that GHQ Operation Order No 7 of 24 August, which laid out the respective routes of both corps, should have made this fact plain to Haig. He also admitted that after issuing the order, he considered emphasizing the importance of maintaining touch with II Corps. Ultimately, however, Murray submitted to the protocol of umpiring, which stressed nonintervention in the operational responsibilities of subordinate commanders. As he maintained: "[w]e had been trained in the same school, and trained not to tell Commanders to do what was obvious as part of their duties."

Whatever the reasons... the chief of staff clouded the issues further by sending Haig a report on the 24th, which stated that all of the roads through the forest were in poor condition and thus unfit for heavy traffic [though the roads did not prevent the Germans from debouching out of Mormal Forest in their attack on Landrecies soon after I Corps arrived there!]. Based on this information, Haig assumed that they were of little importance and directed I Corps to move entirely to the east of the forest. Whether or not this supposition was correct, Murray's silence created ambiguity in the orders issued by GHQ at a crucial point in the retreat.

The ambivalence of CGS, combined with the practice of requiring staff officers to travel to GHQ to receive instructions, further obscured the army operation orders for 25 August by creating confusion over the start time of I Corps. French and Murray first articulated their plan of circumventing the forest to Haig on the afternoon of the 24th. At this meeting, Murray instructed the I Corps commander that the rearguard of his force was to have cleared Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth Road by 8 am. In the evening, however, both Smith-Dorrien and Forestier-Walker of II Corps arrived to receive orders, and emphasized the continued pressure on their force necessitated an earlier start. As a result, when Murray issued Operation Order No 7 at 8.25 pm, he changed the departure time for the entire BEF to 5.30 am the next morning. When Johnnie Gough arrived [from I Corps HQ] "rather late at night" to receive the same order, Murray again failed to underscore what seemed obvious, as he neglected to point out the changed start time.

The next morning, the oversights of the 24th were laid bare as the army separated to bypass the Forest of Mormal. II Corps began retiring as early as 2 am, with most units clearing the road by 5.50 am and ultimately making their way to Le Cateau. I Corps, however, only began its march after a delay of up to five hours.

Although it was spared German attacks most of the day, the difficulties of I Corps were compounded by the fact that it was forced to share the same road with retiring French forces. By 4 pm, Haig... had abandoned hope of reaching Le Cateau, and pulled his corps to a halt with its head at the town of Landrecies. Thus, rather than rejoining the rest of the BEF, I Corps went into billets... at least seven miles from its assigned destination.

Haig's decision to halt clearly exceeded the operational leeway permitted by umpiring, as it precluded his fulfilment of the objectives outlined in the previous evening's march order. In his diary, however, he went to great lengths to suggest that his actions met with approval of GHQ. According to the I Corps commander, he was the principal architect of the British Army's plan of retreat for 25 August. By Haig's account, he visited French and Murray [and] convinced them of the necessity of continuing the retirement the next morning. At Murray's request, Haig then adjourned with his aide-de-camp, John Charteris, where he determined by a route by which his corps would march "so our head would reach Landrecies". Charteris then delivered a letter to Murray outlining this scheme, for which Haig claimed he received approval.

In his diary, Haig took the trouble to include a copy of his letter... Strangely, however, he neglected to include Murray's reply. Murray [did not] refer to any such exchange of ideas. Moreover, diaries of British commanders and staff officers express surprise at the failure of I Corps to reach Le Cateau. As Henry Wilson exclaimed: "Found to my disgust that I Corps were retiring [to] Landrecies. This is mad. [Haig] says he cannot go any further but he ought to be made to go on to Le Cateau, otherwise there will be an awkward gap and tomorrow the II Corps will be unsupported."

Evidently, GHQ expected I Corps to arrive at Le Cateau, and its inability to do so caused considerable consternation. Haig's elaborate attempt to deny that I Corps had failed to reach its assigned objective implies that he recognized his own liability in leaving a significant breach between the two corps, perhaps devising the alternative account out of concern for his reputation.

In any case, the halt of I Corps at Landrecies proved short-lived. Despite instructions from GHQ to resume his march as soon as possible, Haig ordered I Corps to remain in billets until 2 am before continuing on to positions south of Le Cateau.'

As we know, in the interim, the Germans penetrated the Forest of Mormal and attacked I Corps. Haig's reaction was not to move in the direction indicated above but to move away to the southeast, stranding SD. The comment was made previously that Haig's reaction was potentially justified in light of the attack. However, the outcome would have been quite different if he had not parked at Landrecies in the first place but had pushed on to reconnect the 2 corps.

Charteris' account relates that 'DH worked out with Gough the plans for [the retreat on] the next day, and sent me back to GHQ to get the C-in-C's approval of them. We were to start at 5 am and make a long march to Landrecies. I had some difficulty at GHQ [he does not say what this was] and did not get back till late'

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

Firstly i must be excused, i have had a brain ****, i saw Gardner and read Travers for you previous post!!

My only defence is that Gardner definately signs up to the school of Travers for his angle of Haig and the western front.

On the 7th April next year Gardner will be talking at Birmingham university at the Centre for First World War Studies, shall enjoy that birthday present.

Does Gardner give his sources for all this writing, that is original sources. Travers usually quotes sources regularly i was wondering if he was the same.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Does Gardner give his sources for all this writing, that is original sources.

Yes he does Arm. They are liberally studded through the text.

Robert