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Remembered Today:

Tactics of the Eastern Front


pelle

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Has much been written about what happened on the Eastern Front on a tactical scale? The only book I have read about the Eastern Front at all is Norman's book but it is of course more on a strategic level (difficult to cover all of 1914-17 and also get into too much detail).

I'm curious about how battles were fought since there was flanks to turn, unlike the western front, and with less extreme trench-lines. Was many battles fought throughout the war more in the style of western front 1914 open warfare? And unlike the western front some really big cities were changing hands. Did the front ever bog down for long times fighting from house to house in some city like often happened in ww2? I know even the tiny villages and towns in France could hold up attackers for hours or even days sometimes before it was completely cleared, but I never read anything about east front cities being the obstacles I would imagine they could have been.

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Pelle,

Hello. There is a great deal of literature in German on the Eastern Front, but I fear it will never see the light of day in English.

A newer offering in English is "Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915," by Dinardo (2010). I haven't read it myself, but I would like to. "Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands," by Barrett is an interesting look at an unusual operation on the Eastern Front. There is also "The Brusilov Offensive," by Dowling, not one of my favorite books, but one of the only on the battle in English.

I've not read of any large battle within cities (like Stalingrad) from 1914-17.

Paul

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Gorlice - Tarnow and Brusilov Offensive are names that conjure up images of immense space, huge advances and retreats, battles of encirclement and dispersal : very different from the Somme and Verdun.

I believe that there is a danger that some of the positional fightng on the Eastern Front is thereby overlooked.

For example, after the initial phases of the Gorlice- Tarnow Offesnive, the Germans were stuck before Vilna and made frontal attacks which were bloodily repulsed by the Russians. The German Tenth Army did eventually take Vilna, after ten days of very sticky fighting that cost them fifty thousand men.

Earlier in the war, the fighting around Lodz in late 1914 was also characterised by fierce attacks and counter attacks over the same ground, which makes me suspect that it resembled the First Battle of Ypres which was being fought on the Western Front at about the same time.

The Battle of Lake Naroch in March 1916 was a series of murderous frontal assaults against entrenched Germans, as was the fighting in the notorious " Kowel Massacres" in the summer of 1916.

I know too little about that front to speak with authority, but I feel confident that it witnessed its share of static fighting, and it's probably so readily associated with open warfare that people are unaware of how often it degenerated into the same sort of slogging that characterised fighting elsewhere in Europe.

Phil (PJA)

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Thanks! Good to see there are some books in English. Any recommendations in particular about books in German worth reading? I think I might be able to work my way through one.

Norman's book on the eastern front, as much as I remember from it, mentioned many bloody assaults on prepared positions. But looking at how far the front moved there must have been much more open fighting as well after breaking through one enemy line until a new one could be established?

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This is a left field response, but Solzhenitsyn's 'August 1914' is a fascinating read. It follows a particular draft, 18-year old soldiers born in a particular year.

While a work of fiction, it is supposedly based on historical research. I haven't ready it for some time but I still well remember some of the outstanding descriptions, such as when an entire corps marches down a woodland path, intersecting with another marching down another and how it took all day to sort out the confusion. Also the assembled army slowly advancing in one large body, over 30 kilometres in length, towards the enemy, just as Russian armies had done for hundreds of years. At some stage the screening cavalry would locate the enemy and the Russian army would deploy. This time the Germans used those new fangled flying machines and flew into Russian territory to detect exactly which army had assembled where.

In time, the entire draft is largely lost and the book ends as the senior commanders make their plans as how they will continue when the next draft is trained and ready.

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The Germans are quite clear in the Introductions to Der Weltkrieg, war progress and tactics in the East impacted the West and many tactics where interchangeable and tested initially on the Eastern Front

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Hello,

I agree totally with the suggest of Solzhenitsyn's 'August 1914'! It is surely true that many tactical procedures tried out in the east first were later used in the west. Robert Foley also discusses this in a few chapters of his "German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916." I also forgot to add "Tannenberg: Clash of Empires 1914," by Showalter.

I ordered ""Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915," by Dinardo yesterday and it should be here tomorrow--I will post a review when I'm done.

Let me give some thought to books in German. Don't forget the Austro-Hungarians! I've not read many first-hand accounts from the Russian side--perhaps someone can give some suggestions?

Paul

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Thanks to the wonders of internet I am already reading that book on Operation Albion, and it is very interesting. It is not at all what I had in mind when I started this thread, but looks like something I will really enjoy reading about that I knew nothing about before.

August 1914 sounds like fun, but I think I will look for a few works of non-fiction first.

Gudmundsson in Stormtroop Tactics also discuss the eastern front and how tactics could be learned there. I guess German units in the east had a lot more opportunity to practice large scale offensives than their countrymen in the west had (except for Verdun). The German counterattack at Cambrai in november 1917 was to some extent successful thanks to the experienced units just arriving from the eastern front that were already experienced in using modern offensive tactics.

Looking forward to some recommendations for German books. Unfortunately Russian is no option for me. I wish the eastern front in ww1 could get at least 5 % of the attention the BEF part of the western front do; that would give us more and enough information to learn what happened there in very good detail.

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"Operation Albion" is good, yeah? It is such a different operation to read about, and the book is well written. I'm also reading it now. We should post a review when we're done.

Another good book I forgot is "The Romanian Battlefront in World War I," by Glenn Torrey--an excellent study of the Rumanian campaign(s).

Paul

P.S. I'm still looking at German books. The "Schlachten des Weltkrieges" series has quite a few volumes on the eastern front. I actually know of no good modern general German history of the war in the east. Here is one volume you can download for free, "Die Kämpfe um Baranowitschi, Summer, 1916."

http://archive.org/details/schlachtendeswel02olde

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My impression from the first chapters of the Albion book is that it is well written indeed, but a bit repetitive (I think the author so far has described the reason for the operation, to threaten Petersburg and push Russia out of the war, at least ten times so far).

By coincidence I downloaded all the Schlachten des Weltkrieges books I found on archive.org last night. Didn't look too close at what battles they covered, so only luck one was in the east then. Looks like a very nice series, but only 4 or 5 volumes (of ~35 or so) are on archive.org so far. Will try to read volume 2 and see if I can learn to decipher that old font ("Fraktur" is it?) and language.

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I cannot think on any example of prolonged fighting in dense urban areas. Large cities were rather abandoned when in danger of immediate enemy attack; apparently it was not considered civil to fight in the cities. Thus Lodz, Warsaw, Lwow/Lemberg, Lublin, Rzeszow, Czerniowce and other large cities on were abandoned without a shot.

The only instance of a town being for some time a part of the frontline I can recall of at the moment is the town of Gorlice. The reason being that the front rested along the Ropa river, and the town straddles the river.

Coming back to the main issue - the comparatively larger expanses of the theatre in the east had enormous influence on the operational level, but not so on the tactical scale. The engagements of August-December 1914 were not significantly different than the fighting in the west in 1914. Later on, of course, the trenches were built, although due to the lower density of units the trench systems never reached the scale of the western front. Still, both sides did entrench, there was a continuous line of trenches stretching from Riga to Romania in 1915 (with a gap in the middle - to allow for the Pripyat Marshes). Breaking these entrenchments required much the same methods as were utilized in the West. It was easier to achieve a breakthrough, because there was much more frontline to cover, and, consequently, reinforcements were not readily available in the crucial area.

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Hello,

You may find the "Schlachten des Weltkrieges" books to be pretty heavy going at times--the authors often have a penchant for flowery language!

It's an interesting topic you've brought up--one of the things that has really surprises me is the lack of a new and comprehensive military history of the eastern front since the opening and greater accessibility to the archives in Russia. You made the observation about the second world war--and man, isn't that true. Go to any bookstore and half the books in the military section are "Thunder in the East," or "Drive on Moscow" books.

I think Jan's post is an excellent overview of the general situations encountered on the eastern front at the various levels.

Paul

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The first volume of a Mannerheim The Years of Preparation by J E O Screen cover his life a Russian Cavalry general and discuss tactics where he was stationed.

The Russian tactical doctrine was heavily influenced by the Russo Japanese war and other campaigns in the Far East, pity they did no learn the lessons better for their troops.

I think a proper English book on the taking of Riga would be of immense value to understanding German tactical doctrine and its evolution.

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Actually they did learn the tactical lessons. The new regulations adopted in 1910 and 1912 corrected many of the tactical shortcomings of the army. When you read detailed accounts of the fighting in 1914 (most from the German side), you find the Russians doing much better than the Germans. Golovine’s book on East Prussia is likely the easiest account to find that includes many first-person descriptions of tactical fighting. There are several memoirs by Russian officers that have been translated that help as well (with the usual disclaimer about using memoirs).

The problem was at the operational level where many major mistakes were made. This resulted in the serious losses to the active army who were well trained in the new tactics. The reserve forces were three years behind (for the first cohort) and more for older cohorts. This is one of the drawbacks of the conscription/reserve structure in use in 1914. Until you cycled soldiers that had received the new training as active duty soldiers through the reserve cohorts, your replacements/reserve units would be only familiar with the older tactical manuals. An example of the impact of this reserve system is that many reservists called up for the RJW in 1904 had never trained with the M91 rifle, in service since 1893.

By mid-1915 most of the well trained army was gone. The wartime training for the reservists and new conscripts was what it was. The operational problems remained with the added issue of artillery and other modern implements of war shortages.

My general take on 1914 is the Russian won tactically but lost operationally. Once the front stabilized in early 1915, the smaller authorization of divisional artillery, the lack of heavier guns, and the weak training/replacement system began to have greater impact because of the low level of training. The Gorlice-Tarnow offensive and the months following caught the Russian Army at its lowest point. By 1916 the training had improved and the Russians achieve some successes. The training base couldn’t keep up with losses and as social and political issues begin to affect the army, you have the final nose dive to impotence.

In regards to cities, the fighting was mainly confined to any fortress system surrounded the city. Once the fortress system was breached, the defender normally retreated (if a pathway was open) or surrendered. The size of the theater and the relative sparseness of cities allowed offensives to avoid these areas during the initial penetration. Cities were normally turned by successful advances.

The low density of forces and the lack of rail lines general meant that once a penetration occurred, the defender would pull back to a new line. Hence operational security when massing forces paid out as a significantly greater reward in the east than in the west. Gorlice-Tarnow and the Brusilov Offensive gained great success as operational security made the time-distance factor much harder for the defender to solve.

Jeff

Edited by jwsleser
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Wow, thanks!

Captured by that Operation Albion book at the moment, but I will look for more when I'm done with that.

Was cities not held simply because it was difficult to hold the flanks and it was too risky to leave an army surrounded?

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Basically yes. Because of the distance between major built-up areas and the low density of forces per kilometer, it was difficult to make a city/built-up area a key/critical point. There was plenty of maneuver space for armies to bypass cities. Remember the maxim that forces committed to defending a fortress/city are not free to maneuver and the enemy can usually avoid them and focus their strength on a weaker point.

Neither side could afford to lose an army. Russian survived 1914 because she was still deploying her strength and the Central Powers suffer equally large losses. The length of the front and the low density of forces meant that any significant loss created a large gap. The lack of rail lines meant it was difficult to move fresh forces to close such gaps. The Russian retreat in 1915 recognized this fact. Falling back actually lengthens the front, but the Russians lack the forces to close the existing gaps. By trading space for time, Russia was able to mobilize fresh forces and establish a new defensive line further east.

Golovine's The Russian Campaign in 1914 has been reprinted and provides a good feel for the tactics in 1914. Showater's Tannenberg is another good book. The problem is finding English language books that provide the same level of detail for 1915 and 1916. (or 1914 in Galicia).

Jeff

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"August 1914" is based at least in part on Solzhenitsyn's family history and is bedded in a good deal of research, albeit (inevitably) heavily coloured by his own religious and political views - he clearly hates both revolutionaries and liberals with a passion (and generals, mostly)! I've read it a couple of times and I think the combat scenes are very evocative. The bit where a particular regiment (the Dorogobuzh I think) forms a rearguard all day, bayonet charges the Germans when they've run out of ammunition and then carries their dead Colonel off the field having lost 90% of their men is incredibly moving.

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The second knot of Solzhenitsyn's 'The Red Wheel' was also translated. It is set just after the Brusilov Offensive. Excellent detail and provides another look at the army, this time as it slowly slides into revolution. The third and fourth knots, March 1917 and April 1917, have not been translated into English.

Jeff

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  • 2 weeks later...

Like in any large organization indeed super large for the times even: mass WW1 armies there were bound to be found highly intelligent, perceptive invidivuals who were quick to grasp strengths and weaknesses and how to exploit either or both including one's own side. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia all had very good divisional, regimental and battalion commanders who LOCALLY or TACTICALLY made good decisions when it came to LOCAL or restricted / limited operational activities: reconnaissances, testing the other side's lines, probing for weaknesses in defences, feints for other major attacks, surprise local attacks, supply raids, denial of local resources to the other side, etc.... Eventually in the next couple of decades the broader Army level successfulnesses of in particular Imperial Russia will translate into such identified competent plus middle or what we refer to as field officer command. This will clearly address the gross historical disparity that we still have.

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I think a big part of the lacuna on the Eastern Front is the lack of interest on the Russian side, even though there is no lack of archival material. There is nothing approaching the scale of volunteer associations for study of the BEF, the official German desire to 'learn lessons' from WWI or the French glorification of their heroism and so on. Indeed, the Russians treat WWI with deep ambivalence, as seen in the article below:

Aaron J. Cohen, 'Oh, That! Myth, Memory, and World War I in the Russian Emigration and the Soviet Union', Slavic Review 62, 1 (2003), 69-86.

The result is that most of what we know about the WWI Eastern Front is from the German and Austrian POVs, with the inevitable problem of lopsidedness.

If Russian academics and amateur researchers (or Russian speakers/readers) displayed half the enthusiasm they show for the study of the 'Great Patriotic War', we would all benefit...

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Have just re-read Solzhenitsyn's August 1914 which I think is a wonderful book. Like Doctord84 I thought the highlight of Russian stoicism was the regiments euphemistically allocated a rearguard role in a Corps rout strategic withdrawal. With no possibility of leaving their position, sometimes in the open or in narrow trenches, they faced heavy artillery, then repelled German attacks with rifle fire and bayonet, then bayonet-charged the Germans when their ammunition ran out.

The description of divisions marching 20 miles in a day through marshy ground ready to fight, then the next day marching back to the same position not having seen the enemy were almost comical if it was not for the impact it would have had on the common soldier.

I might have missed something, but I did not see post #17's description of Solzhenitsyn's hatred for revolutionaries or generals. For example, having a corps detrain then march alongside the same railway track for 3 or more days reflects dysfunctional command. For an Army Group to lose control such that 5 corps are advancing into Prussia fanning out like spokes on a bicycle with no flank guard is another example of poor generalship, as is transferring cavalry and infantry so rapidly between commands, that some divisional commanders hardly knew which were their own forces and corp commanders assumed they could deploy units that they didn't even know were no longer under their command.

Solzhenitsyn documents an unreformed command structure where court patronage ensures the Tsarina's favourites will escape almost any recrimination and the loss of a corps or two or three is just one of the ill-fortunes of war. The many lessons of the Russo-Japanese war have filtered through sucessfully to an educated officer class but these men are dispersed into liaison postings and the like and the high command themselves are insulated from change, buttressing each other from criticism or formal enquiry. To make matters worse, the poor standard of Russian infrastructure means that communications are almost non-existent and the chances of an order from an Army Commander to a Corps or Division reaching him in a timely fashion were remote. However I had to smile at the German high command losing a day watching Russian divisions moving around in random circular patterns, where the Germans could not press home an attack as they had simply no idea what the Russian Army was doing. When General Samsonov finally emotionally withdraws then commits suicide, Solzhenitsyn describes it sympathetically, even though he was in many ways the architect of his own misfortune.

The fictional character who is both a committed revolutionary and young infantry officer, torn between propping up a rotten system or defending his country, must have applied to so many soldiers. In the end, the character fights with his unit but when the Germans encircle the remains of the Army after Tannenberg, he deserts following the mass of soldiery simply trying to return home.

This is a wonderful book with a foldout map at the end so you can read the text and see the names of unfamilar forests and villages. Now that I know there is a companion, 'November 1916', I must track this down and read it.

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There's also a fantastic section where a staff Colonel sums up various generals - "X is a complete blockhead, Y is a doddering old woman, Z is a sack of ****; dripping wet **** at that!" I laughed till I ached the first time I read it. But there are some good Russian commanders, mostly at the junior level, but including one corps commander (Martos), but as you say they are mainly a reflection of the corrupt system of patronage that put them in their positions. "November 1916" focuses rather more on the political situation and less on the front line and though it features one of the same central characters - Colonel Vorotyntsev - it is more of a political polemic and less of a successful novel as a result (in my opinion). Still worth reading if you are into that period of Russian history though. :thumbsup: And the Brusilov offensive does show that there were Russian commanders even at the higher levels who were not without ability.

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I have a few more:

The World Crisis Volume 6 by W.S. Churchill deals with the Eastern front in WW I

The end of the Russian Imperial Army Allen K Wildman 2 volumes the second of which has a good account of the Kerensky offensive

Then there is on this site a link to where you read "The Effectiveness of Military Institutuions Volume I WW I

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I should like to point out in #21 there is mention of the "Tsarina's favorites" . In reality the Tsarina Alexandra did not have anything to do with the appointment of Russian generals before and during WW I. The men who did were War Minester V.A. Sukhomlinov the book "The Foe Within" has a good description of him. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolaivich who headed up the Supreme Examination Board which vetted all generals at division level and above. See the "Effectiveness of Military institions Volume I WW I, on his role as cinc. Also see N Stone's book and "The Russian Revolution " R Pipes. It also helped if the Tsar liked you. I have read that he was partial to guards officers and old officers that had served his father.

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  • 2 weeks later...

There is a book "The End of Chivalry" Alexis Wrangel that does deal with tactical combat and heroic deeds of Russian cavalrymen and a brave nurse during WW I

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