26th August 1914

[Anthony Pigott]

At around 3 a.m. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien considers the situation facing II Corps, the Cavalry Division and 4th Division.

He says "Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, ..."

Anthony

[armourersergeant]

Whilst i know the 'story' I am enjoying the daily bulletins that you post. I do expect now that we will get he daily updates until he returns home in 1915

regards

Arm

[Anthony Pigott]

S.-D.:

"I myself was almost pinned to my head-quarters, though once (about noon) I went up to see Fergusson. The only other time I left it was at about 6.45 a.m., when a cyclist brought me a message from Bertry Station, distant about half a mile, saying Sir John French wished to speak to me on the railway telephone. I motored there immediately and heard the voice of the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, who had a message to give me from the Chief to the effect that I should break off the action as soon as possible. I replied that I would endeavour to do so, but that it would be difficult, and that I had hoped to be able to hold on until evening and slip away in the dark. Henry Wilson then asked me what I thought of our chances, and when I replied that I was feeling confident and hopeful of giving the enemy a smashing blow and slipping away before he could recover, he replied, " Good luck to you - yours is the first cheerful voice I have heard for three days." With these pleasing words in my ear, which I shall never forget, I returned to my head-quarters."

"The battle commenced in the streets of Le Cateau itself, the Germans having got into the houses and opened fire on the Cornwalls and two companies East Surrey, which troops were in the act of vacating the town, causing them to move out to the east and to fight their way back by a circuitous route taking them right to the rear of their Brigade. From how on the battle increased all along the line as more and yet more hostile guns came into action and hostile infantry advanced. An early attempt to turn our right flank was made, luckily not in great strength, and by II a.m. it had been foiled by the determined attitude of the 14th and 13th Brigades, helped by the Cavalry and R.H.A. Soon after 9.30 a.m. the pressure on that flank had become so serious that I had to send up the Argyll and Sutherlands from my reserve Brigade to assist, and later on another battalion of this Brigade, the 1st Middlesex, had to reinforce the same area. About 10 a.m., in view of reports from Ligny, I moved the remaining two battalions, the Scottish Rifles and Royal Welch Fusiliers, westward to Montigny. On the left, or west of our position, the fighting was early very serious where the 11th and 12th Brigades were, and the King's Own lost nearly half their strength. In the centre of the line matters were not so serious, and our troops easily held their own, but there also it was no child's-play : villages were taken and retaken, and gunners and infantry were conspicuous by their heroic conduct. The features of the fighting were the overwhelming artillery-fire of the enemy (who had the guns of four, and some say five, Corps in action against us), the glorious feats performed by our own Artillery, and the steadiness and accurate fire of our own infantry which had proved so deadly at Mons. After six hours' fighting we were holding our own everywhere, and every effort of the enemy to come on was defeated; but the strain was beginning to tell on our exposed east flank, and at 1.40 p.m. Colonel Gathorne Hardy, of my Staff, who was watching events for me at 5th Divisional Head-quarters at Reumont, brought me a message from Sir Charles Fergusson, saying his troops were beginning to dribble away under their severe punishment, and he feared he would be unable to hold on until dark. The Germans had already penetrated between his 13th and 14th Brigades, had practically wiped out the Suffolks, had brought up guns to short ranges, and were shelling heavily his own head-quarters at Reumont. The Division had stood to the limit of human endurance, and I recognised that the moment had arrived when our retirement should commence, and, requesting Gathorne Hardy to hurry back to Fergusson and tell him to order an organised retirement at once as the best means of saving a disastrous rush to the rear, I put in motion the plans already in possession of Divisional Commanders. These were to the effect that, when they got the order, they were to commence retiring by Divisions along the roads allotted to them. My Chief Staff Officer thereupon sent out the necessary instructions, saying the retirement would commence from the right. I now made the last use of my reserve, which consisted of one battery, the Scottish Rifles and Royal Welch Fusiliers of the 19th Brigade, by sending them off to take up a position astride the Roman road leading from Le Cateau to Maretz to cover the retirement of the 5th Division. This, as I have already said, and refer to again later, they carried out most efficiently, materially helped, however, by the rear-guard of the 15th Brigade under the cool leadership of Colonel Ballard, whom I have already mentioned in connection with similar services two days previously. It was now about 2 p.m., and Edmonds (the official historian), who was then General Snow's G.S.O.I, arrived at my head-quarters in Bertry to tell me that General Snow was quite happy as regards his Division, and felt sure he could hold his own and that no retirement was necessary. He wrote me subsequently that he was much amused with my attitude, as all I said was : " The order has gone out, and now I am going to try and get some lunch."

[Anthony Pigott]

Time to withdraw.

"It was after 4 p.m., when my head-quarters were retiring from Bertry, that I rode with my Staff to watch the 5th Division pass along the road south of Maurois. I likened it at the time to a crowd coming away from a race meeting, and I see the same simile in the Official History. It was a wonderful sight—men smoking their pipes, apparently quite unconcerned, and walking steadily down the road—no formation of any sort, and men of all units mixed together. The curious thing was that the enemy were making no attempt to follow. They respectfully kept their distance behind the rear-guards, and later allowed the latter to retire without pressing them. The 3rd and 4th Divisions were, as the plan of retirement provided for, considerably later in taking up the movement to the rear. But what undoubtedly decided the Germans not to follow up was the fact that several detachments did not receive the order to retire, but went on fighting, some of them far into the night, and we have to thank them largely for holding off the enemy, thus preventing his being aware that a general retirement had taken place. These detachments had marvellous and varied experiences which it is not in my province to relate here, for I did not hear of them until after, but I see the Official History describes them as less than 1,000 strong all told, a wonderful illustration of how a few resolute men can hold up an army. We had plenty of experience of that in the Boer War, for our enemies there were real experts at rear-guard fighting."

"I had a momentary shock about 5 p.m. on getting clear of the village of Maretz, about three miles south of Maurois on the Roman road, for I suddenly heard very heavy artillery fire away to the north-west, which I reckoned was behind the 4th Division outer flank and feared the enemy had got behind Snow; but was much relieved, on galloping to a hill about a mile in that direction, to recognise the short sharp crack of the famous " seventy-fives," and then I knew they were French guns and probably Sordet's, and this they turned out to be."

"We had not been long retiring when down came the rain, and the discomforts of the poor weary troops were increased a hundredfold. In order to sort out the units and get them formed again, Staff Officers had been sent ahead two miles beyond Estrees, and most efficiently they performed their work. To this point was a long, weary march of sixteen miles from Reumont. How the men did it I still cannot realise—dead tired, hungry, and wet to the skin; but they did it, and went on again at 4 a.m. on the 27th through St. Quentin to Ham, another twenty miles."

"The 3rd and 4th Divisions kept on parallel roads to the west of the 5th. On reaching Estrees at 9.30 p.m. I transferred from a horse to a motor and started off to St. Quentin to report matters to the C.-in-C., ..."

"On reaching St. Quentin I heard that General Head-quarters had left that place in the middle of the day and had gone to Noyon, thirty-five miles farther off. There was nothing to be done but to go on, but before doing so I went to the station to find the Director of Railways, Colonel MacInnes, R.E., to ask him what trains he could give me for weary and wounded men in the morning. He told me he had orders from General Head-quarters to send all trains away, but agreed to keep them until I returned from Noyon."

[Anthony Pigott]

The day wouldn't be complete without reference to the 2nd Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment.

From S.-D. again, this time from his introduction to Chapter III of The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927:

"The 14th Brigade [to which the 2nd Battalion of the Suffolks belonged] automatically became the troops who would have to meet the first attack of the enemy. There was no time to choose, much less adequately to entrench a position, so they had to fight where they were, practically in a salient, fully exposed to the enemy's fire, and with their right flank en l'air, owing to the failure of the Ist Corps to come into their place in the line on the previous evening.

Some one, certainly not I, ordered that on no account were the Suffolks to retire. Such an order was enough for the Suffolks. For nine hours they fought with desperate losses, their C.O., Lieut-Colonel Brett, being killed comparatively early in the day; but no thought of retirement entered their heads, for had they not been told to fight to the last? I was not surprised when I heard of their grand behaviour, for I had had previous experience of this magnificent regiment, especially in the Boer war, but it was never my intention that any troops should be called on to fight to the last. My intention was to fight a serious rear-guard action and, when the pressure became too great, to order a general retirement by divisions, and this I actually did about 2 p.m. It may be some satisfaction to the regiment to feel that their gallant adherence to the letter of the order helped the remainder of their comrades in the 5th Division to fall back practically unpursued; in fact, had not the Suffolks and other intrepid troops refused to budge, there would have been nothing to prevent the enemy sweeping onto the scattered units of the division before they had had time to get on the road allotted for their retirement. Had this happened the whole B.E.F. would have been jeopardised. It is becoming more and more appreciated by the world, as facts become known and history of the war is studied, that it was the blow to the Germans delivered on the field of Le Cateau which upset their plans and prevented their descent on Paris.

The Suffolks were one of the units which made that blow possible. I thank them, and the whole nation should be grateful to them."

There were 720 casualties in the battalion.

Anthony

[healdav]

Was this the occasion when the French liaison officer, seeing the men mixed up and strolling along smoking, etc. came to the conclusion that it was a rout and told the French command not to expect anything from the British for a very long time?

[steve chilton]

Anthony,

Great reading this thread, my grandfather was with the VIII Brigade RFA which was itself part of 5th Division, he was wounded at some stage but I dont know when or in what action, he had his horse shot out from under him. He servived the war but unfortunately died before I was born.

Steve Chilton

[Anthony Pigott]

Whilst i know the 'story' I am enjoying the daily bulletins that you post. I do expect now that we will get he daily updates until he returns home in 1915

regards

Arm

I'll do my best.

Anthony

[Anthony Pigott]

Was this the occasion when the French liaison officer, seeing the men mixed up and strolling along smoking, etc. came to the conclusion that it was a rout and told the French command not to expect anything from the British for a very long time?

According to A J Smithers, Huguet, French military attache to GHQ (I think), telegraphed GQG at 8.15 saying "Battle lost by British Army which seems to have lost all cohesion. It will demand considerable protection to enable it to re-constitute. GHQ to-night to Noyon Fuller details will follow".

Anthony

[bkristof]

I was there thursday at the remembrance service with the GWS doing our retreat from mons...

[ianw]

Smith Dorrien comes across as such a modest and calm commander being generous in his praise and recognition of subordinants. His sending home deprived us of a great officer on the Western Front. Who can tell what the cost of that decision was.

I know that my grandfather was proud to serve under 'Orace.

Good luck to all those re-enacting the retreat.