Reservists on Good Hope and Monmouth at Coronel

[clive_hughes]

Maybe I should expand on the four Anglesey-related casualties if it'd help:

Cole, Albert Edward 145887.

Born 1873 Almondsbury, Glos. Enlisted April 1891 12 years, moved after 1 April 1902 to HM Coastguard (including being stationed at Holyhead and Amlwch - he is recorded as a casualty by Llanbadrig near Amlwch). Stationed Padstow from 1909 and became Leading Boatman; granted LS&GC Medal 1913. Moved as of 1 August 1914 to Monmouth rated as an Able Seaman over 6 yrs service.

Jones, William 194073

Born 1881 Liverpool (recorded as a local casualty by Holyhead). Enlisted March 1899 12 yrs., extended 1911. Posted to Monmouth 12 April 1912 as Able Seaman, then left her 1 January 1914 for Talbot. However, he is then shown as Challenger (Monmouth) from 1 April 1914, and Monmouth from 2 August 1914.

Jones, William J/24194

Born 1897, Llanfair Anglesey (recorded as a casualty under Llaneugrad). Enlisted April 1913, Boy service. Under Vivid I until 30 July 1914 when posted to Monmouth.

Thomas, Owen Richard 302231

Born 1884 Beaumaris Anglesey. Enlisted December 1902 for 12 years. Under Vivid II as Stoker 1st Cl. from 3 February 1914 until moved to Monmouth 30 July 1914.

Clive

[Bart150]

Thanks, Clive. For Jones, William 194073 the entry Challenger (Monmouth) is interesting.

Other may know better but I think it means that he was living in the accommodation ship Challenger at Chatham while assigned to Monmouth, as one of a small care and maintenance crew.

This seems odd because in August 1914 Monmouth sailed from Devonport with a mainly Devonport crew.

Bart

[clive_hughes]

Bart,

Sorry, should have added that their papers show all these men as Devonport, excepting Boy Jones whose "Home" port isn't stated. However, like the others he's on the Plymouth Naval Memorial to the missing so I expect he was a Devonport matelot as well.

Clive

Edited 25 November , 2012 by LST_164

[Bart150]

Clive

I’ve just noticed something strange. Normally an HMS X is either a real ship or a shore establishment, maybe both at different times, but not both at the same time. But Warlow’s list of shore establishments (and similar things) has a Challenger as an accommodation ship at Chatham in 1914, while Colledge’s list of real ships has Challenger as a 2c cruiser at that time. That’s odd. The cruiser seems more likely.

Re Boy Jones: yes, the war mem is a pretty safe criterion.

Bart

[Bart150]

Back on message #35 I got as far as analysing the casualty list to find that only 458 men out of 1663 were reservists. For the other 1205 cases I had the following counts:

Group 1 (listed as regular and, the service number shows, definitely regular): 681;

Group 2 (listed as regular but from the service number might possibly be reservist): 401;

Group 3 (listed as regular, but no service number): 123

This result in itself is enough to show the falsity of the generally prevailing impression that the great majority were reservists.

I’ve now gone a little bit further. I possess a number of photos of church war memorials that name men who died at Coronel, namely from Corpus Christi, Portsmouth; St Augustine, Kilburn; Catherington, Hampshire; Southwick, Hampshire; Studland, Dorset; Devizes, Wiltshire. If I put these names together with those from Clive’s Anglesey project I get a set of 14 names.

These 14 men divide as follows: Reservist: 3; Group 1: 3; Group 2: 5; Group 3: 3.

I can treat those 5 Group-2 men as a random sample of that group and access their service records to see whether they were reservist or regular.

The service records show that all 5 in the sample were indeed regulars and not reservists. This result makes it certain beyond any reasonable doubt that the count in the casualty list of 401 Group-2 men as regulars is at the very least roughly correct, and there has been no substantial mis-recording of reservists as regulars.

Therefore the idea that a majority, even a bare majority, of the men on those two ships were reservists is a myth.

(You may feel that 5 is rather a small sample from which to derive such an assertion. Actually it’s enough. We only need to show that the notion that a high proportion (such as 50%) of Group-2 men are wrongly recorded is highly improbable. Sampling theory means that if you are testing whether 50% of apples in a barrel or widgets in a production batch or entries on a casualty list are bad, then a small sample which finds only good ones soon permits 95% confidence that there is not a 50% proportion of bad ones.)

Bart

[horatio2]

HMS MONMOUTH was commissioned on 31 July 1914 (Navy List Sep 1914) so she could not have participated in the Fleet Review, nor did the problem of dispersing reservists (if any) apply to her.

[horatio2]

Clive

I’ve just noticed something strange. Normally an HMS X is either a real ship or a shore establishment, maybe both at different times, but not both at the same time. But Warlow’s list of shore establishments (and similar things) has a Challenger as an accommodation ship at Chatham in 1914, while Colledge’s list of real ships has Challenger as a 2c cruiser at that time. That’s odd. The cruiser seems more likely.

Bart

I think the answer to this conundrum is that the cruiser HMS CHALLENGER (Third Fleet at Devonport in 1914) was the ship who carried the pay accounts for the skeleton crew of MONMOUTH (and other Third Fleet Ships). The Navy List for June 1914 shows that CHALLENGER's Fleet Paymaster and Assistant Paymaster (and Fleet Surgeon) were also responsible "for group of Third Fleet Ships". It also shows that MONMOUTH's officers were "Borne in CHALLENGER".

[Bart150]

This is all fitting quite nicely:

- MONMOUTH was in no fit state to take part in the review

- But the Admiralty wanted to use MONMOUTH for the war

- Most reservists when recalled for war went back to the same ships as in the review

- So no reservists went back to MONMOUTH

- Not all reservists had been called up for the review, so there were other reservists available,who could have gone to MONMOUTH. But these were relatively older A-number types like my great-uncles

- Since MONMOUTH needed a lot of care and attention it was far better to man her with regulars than with elderly second-choice reservists

- Therefore MONMOUTH was manned mainly with regulars

Looks good to me.

Bart

[horatio2]

"Not all reservists had been called up for the review, so there were other reservists available,who could have gone to MONMOUTH. But these were relatively older A-number types like my great-uncles"

Bart, I do not quite follow the logic of this statement. The RNR men in MONMOUTH were not "relatively older". In fact they were quite young, most of them being in their early twenties. Only two of the eight were in their thirties. "A-number" RNR seamen, on their first period of enrolment, would tend to be relatively younger. Older RNR men would be on their third, fourth or fifth periods (C, D and E seamen) but there were none of these in MONMOUTH.

[Bart150]

Horatio, there were relatively few reservists of any description on MONMOUTH. Certainly less than 10%. I'm not saying anything about them.

I'm suggesting a reason why they were relatively few compared to GOOD HOPE and the three CRESSY class cruisers which all had about 50% reservists.

Many reservists were in the review and went back to the same ships for the war. There would have been lots of other reservists turning up at Devonport who had not been in the review and who could in principle have been drafted to MONMOUTH. But they were in general relatively old or in other ways less attractive choices: like one of my great-uncles: called back 2 August, aged 48, having retired 1905 with number RFR A 1506.

But MONMOUTH was in a poor state and needed the best crew possible to meet that challenge. So she got mainly regulars.

Bart

[horatio2]

I understand now and agree. You are referring to RFR pensioners (RFR/A) not RNR A.

[Bart150]

We now know that MONMOUTH did not appear at the review of the fleet in July 1914 because she was not in a fit state. But once war threatened men worked on her with great energy so that she was fit to go to sea on August 6.

It seems to me that this account masks two quite different possibilities:

Possibility 1. MONMOUTH comes back from China at end of 1913 in a rather poor state. She remains in some quiet creek and deteriorates a bit further. When planning the review the Admiralty doesn’t include her because she is in a poor state. When planning for war in the last days of July the Admiralty decides to use her, and there is then a feverish effort to get her back to a viable state.

Possibility 2. MONMOUTH comes back from China at end of 1913 in a rather poor state. She remains in some quiet creek until at some point in the first half of 1914 she is sent to Devonport dockyard for a refit (ie a planned programme of refurbishment). This refit is still in progress at the time of the review. It is still in progress when plans are made for war, and now there is a feverish effort to complete the outstanding work of the refit quicker than planned and so get her to a viable state.

From some of the accounts in the books you might think that Possibility 1 was what happened. I think that Possibility 2 is more likely, in which case some of the accounts are a bit over the top.

Anybody know any better?

Bart

[horatio2]

Bart, I cannot quote a reference but I believe MONMOUTH was due for eventual disposal on return to UK and, as such, no refit was planned. Rather she was held in the Third Fleet being run down and this had to be halted/reversed as war loomed. I think your "Possibility 1" is correct.

[Bart150]

Thanks, Horatio. I don't want to dispute your recollection; just thinking aloud really; two points:

- Possibility 1 implies that the Admiralty was spoiling its three-fleet model. All Third-Fleet ships were meant to be ready for use almost immediately if given a crew; but now the Third Fleet consisted of two categories of ship: those in good shape (suitable for going to review), which did conform to the model; and those not in good shape but it didnt matter because they were due for disposal (like the presentday ships in Fareham Creek). Of course such distortions of initially clear policy do happen frequently in organisations.

- They got MONMOUTH shipshape in about two weeks at most - so there cant have been all that much wrong with her. Maybe they just concentrated on things that were absolutely vital (like engines and guns) and ignored everything else (eg disgusting heads and galleys and broken windows etc). Anyway, I know nothing about repairing engines.

Bart

[Bart150]

This thread shows pretty clearly that the number of reservists on GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH was far less than is usually stated. See message #35 for summary findings.

I got Castles of Steel by Robert K. Massie for Christmas. That book repeats the same false or misleading information about the numbers of reservists that I’d already found in books by Bennett, Hirst, McNally and Pitt. Neither Massie nor any of these other authors give any reference for what they say on this point.

How couldthey all get it wrong? I suppose somebody (not necessarily any of the five authors mentioned) carelessly got this wrong once and everybody else has followed without checking.

Bart

[simonharley]

Admiral Barry Bingham writes in his "Falklands, Jutland and the Bight" (1919) "Cradock's two best ships had been robbed of their-well trained active ratings some weeks previously and were manned for the most part by R.N.R. men." which suggests the idea had already gained currency in the Fleet. Churchill, who ought to have known better, wrote of Good Hope in The World Crisis "Her crew consisted mainly of reservists."

Simon

[Bart150]

Thanks, Simon. I was beginning to suspect that most authors relied on Churchill for this point and for the events of late-July and August. I don't have a copy of The World Crisis handy at the moment, but i remember it as a fine piece of writing. Given the huge subject he takes it's not surprising that a few details he gives are not quite correct.

What Admiral Barry Bingham writes is crazy. Fortunately I can't see that he has influenced later writers, except in a vague kind of way. As you imply it looks as though an imprecise, ill-defiined feeling had grown up that the crews of the ships at Coronel were not the Navy's best - which of course would be a sort of excuse or consolation for the defeat.

Bart

[horatio2]

Bart,

A very interesting thread. You have unearthed some important information by your very good initial question. The findings, if confirmed (and they probably can be), highlight again the way in which wartime myths get promulgated and accepted as 'fact'. Looking through just a couple of recent books I unearthed:-

"Cradock flew his flag in an old armoured cruiser, GOOD HOPE, largely crewed by reservists and boys; MONMOUTH, a cruiser also with an inexperienced crew ..." ["The First World War" Vol.1 by Hew Strachan]

"Cradock might ... have taken the old battleship CANOPUS with him. But, like his armoured cruisers, she was crewed by elderly reservists and half-trained boys from the training ships." [ "The War at Sea 1914-1918" by Julian Thompson]

[simonharley]

It would appear to be idleness on the part of historians. See this exchange between Carlyon Bellairs and Arthur Balfour in the Commons, in 1915 no less!

Commander BELLAIRS

asked the First Lord of the Admiralty, in view of his predecessor having asked for publicity in the matter, whether he will state, in reference to His Majesty's ship "Good Hope" and His Majesty's ship "Monmouth," whether these vessels were commissioned on the outbreak of war with men from the reserves who are not so efficient as active service ratings; and whether, since the vessels were lost at the battle of Coronel, he can, without detriment to the public interest, give the dates for retubing the inner A-tubes of the guns of both ships so that the House may be in a position to judge as to their fitness for action?

Mr. BALFOUR

These vessels were not commissioned entirely with reserve ratings. Each of them had on board not less than the authorised proportion of active service ratings; and, in fact, His Majesty's ship "Monmouth" had a crew composed almost entirely of active service men. No guns in these ships had been retubed: they were all serviceable.

http://hansard.millb...pe-and-monmouth

So many thanks to Bart for bringing this matter up.

Simon

[Bart150]

Thanks for the kind words, chaps. Hey, what an excellent find in Hansard. Makes you wonder what other . . Anyway, I still have a couple of details on this little topic to tidy up.

Balfour’s answer in Parliament introduces the concept of ‘the authorised proportion of active service ratings’. Analysis of the crews of Good Hope and the three Cressy cruisers shows in each case that active service ratings were just over 50% of the crew. So that is neatly suggestive of what the ‘authorised proportion’ on such ships was. I wonder though if the rule was more complicated: eg for trawlers a much higher percentage of reservists might be allowed, for Grand Fleet dreadnoughts a much lower. Is it even possible that it was through some variable in the ‘authorised proportion’ algorithm that Monmouth had to be crewed almost entirely by active-service men?

A different point. What about this scenario?

1 Before the test mobilisation Good Hope was in Third-Fleet reserve with only a care and maintenance crew: say, a couple of dozen men.

2 At the start of the test mobilisation she received about 400 reservists, plus a few more active service ratings and officers. This made her crew about 90% reservist. With this crew she took part in the review and exercises.

3 After that her reservists were discharged. She was now back to a small care and maintenance crew.

4 A couple of days later she was made ready for war. This entailed having a crew much larger than that for the review and exercises. Thus all the same reservists came back to the ship but also a roughly equal number of active-service men were added. This meant that reservists were now 50% or a little less of the whole crew. The crew of the ship at Coronel was then almost twice the size of that at the test mobilisation.

That would begin to explain, though not excuse, the false information that historians have passed down ever since. I suppose that this same pattern of events occurred for a dozen or two other Third-Fleet ships.

Massie on the Cressy cruisers is really bad. No point documenting all his mistakes. But I will mention one point that might possibly lead somewhere. He writes ‘Like many reserve ships in the Royal Navy, (the Cressy-class cruisers) were local ships; most men in the crews came from nearby towns and villages, which took pride in their men now going to sea.’ First I’ve heard of any such thing. Does it have any basis in reality? If so, how would that affect Good Hope and Monmouth?

I also have a couple more points related to all this, but I’ll save them for now, or maybe start another thread.

Bart

[horatio2]

Bart,

I have some reservations about your new scenario. The implication is that on sailing for the Fleet Review and exercises in mid July GOOD HOPE only carried a crew of about 450, of which some 400 (90%) were reservists. Her complement was about 900 men. She then remained at sea for the Review and subsequent four days of exercises until about 24 July. I think it improbable that she would have been sent to sea with only 50% manning, mainly by reservists - perhaps OK when at anchor for the Review but totally inadequate for meaningful participation in fleet exercises. Surely the whole point of the mobilisation was to test the 'system' and bring ships to a fully manned state, ready for operations and subsequently tested in four days of fleet exercises. Anything less and the 'lessons learned' from the exerise would be pretty meaningless.

I believe it much more likely that GOOD HOPE was nearly fully manned with about 45% reservists.

The difference in the RFR final manning of GOOD HOPE and MONMOUTH could well be explained by the fact that they drew their manpower (regular and RFR) from different base ports, where their available manpower was drafted to meet different priorities. This bears no relationship to Massie's "nearby towns and villages" comment, which makes no sense to me.

Trawlers and drifters were nearly all RNR manned with relatively few fleet ratings.

[bill24chev]

Massie may have been confused by the fact that RN ships were mannned by ratings from one of the three main Home Ports/depots. Good Hope casualties are mostly Po for portsmouth with Monmouth being Dev (or Ply for RM ). Of course there are some ratings from different home bases.

Although these home ports do not give any indication of the ratings home town there may have been some correlation between home port and area of the UK that the men came from.

I say this because I have a local history biography booklet about a Royal Marine's (from Rochdale) service in the the 1920's to 1947. In this he states that on arrival at the RM depot at Deal new recruits were given the option for their Grand Division. This preference option may have been available pre WW1. The majority of men from the North of England and Scotland usually put Chatham as their preference becaus of easy access to London and then onto Euston or Kings Cross when going on leave. With good connections he could be in Manchester/Rochdale in about six hours and there was a regular service through out the day. The journey from Portsmouth and Plymouth would take longer and probably require a greater number of train changes with less choice of services especialy in the Autumn & Winter months.

From this a ships ratings could have come from a specific area of the UK for example Monmouth being a Devenport/Plymouth ship may have had a larger than would be expecte number of crew from the West Country

[Bart150]

Yes, Bill, that possible explanation did occur to me. But it seems a ginormous blunder for a published historian to make.

Just for fun here is an extract from the splendid little book by Phillipson about the training of young sailors at HMS Ganges in the 1950s (pp91-2):

Towards the end of a boy's time at Shotley, he was allocated to a Port Division. These were three: Devonport ('Guzz') , Portsmouth ('Pompey') and Chatham ('Chats'). Every Royal Navy warship - with the exception of submarines and light coastal forces, which had their own bases -was based at, maintained in and manned from one or other of those ports, usuaIly for the length of its active life. A naval rating, too, spent his shore service at his port division and his sea-time in ships manned from it. When he married he found lodgings there and became a 'native' . . . . At Ganges, a pretence was made of an element of choice of port and boys were invited to state a preference, but when the lists went up, invariably the Londoners and Home Counties boys were allocated to Chatham, the Scots, Irish and Northcountrymen to Devonport, together with the comparatively few Westcountrymen to be found in the Navy, and the rest to Portsmouth. In this way, many close friendships forged on the anvil of HMS Ganges were broken, for ratings from different port divisions rarely came into contact with each other thereafter.

Bart

[Bart150]

Horatio, In post #70 I was just postulating a scenario that would tend to explain the notion that sprang up even at the time that mobilising the Third Fleet ships meant mobilising crews of reservists for them and not much more than that. In fact of course mobilising all the Third Fleet ships seriously for war meant mobilising half a crew of reservists for each ship and somehow scraping together an equal number (about 15,000) of men who were in active service too. Most of the latter men would have to be reassigned from doing other things and, I should think, the management of all that would be more demanding than just sending out a standard telegram to thousands of reservists.

In a number of ways, the test mobilisation was less than a full realistic test of what would happen at the start of a war:

- planned in advance rather than happening on sudden outbreak of war

- mobilisation for an 11-day event rather than for a war of indefinite length

- only some classes of reservists

- voluntary not compulsory among those classes

- reservists manning ships but not shore establishments

- ships not loaded with full ammunition and other supplies for a long period at war at sea.

Given all that, it seems possible that the Admiralty didn’t go to the trouble of scraping together all those 15,000 men in active service in order to make that particular aspect fully realistic.

As you say, a crew that was far below a ship’s wartime complement would be more feasible for the review than for the exercises. I wonder about these exercises. It would no doubt be useful for Third Fleet ships just to steam about for a few days to check that they actually could do so without breaking down, but did they do anything more demanding than that which would call for a substantial crew: firing the guns, for example, or executing tricky manoeouvres? I don’t know, just wondering.

Bart

[simonharley]

Just found something curious, given the known composition of the crews of Good Hope and Monmouth. On learning the news of Coronel Alexander Duff raged in his diary that the Admiralty had "known for weeks that these powerful ships were coming across the Pacific & yet made no arrangements to meet them beyond two or three obsolete ships manned with reserves." Italics added. The curious thing is that until 22 October, 1914, Duff had been in charge of the Mobilisation Division at the Admiralty for nearly three years, and should have known what level of reserves were being allocated to which ship!

Simon