BEF 1914: Mobilisation and Reservists

[Guest]

Hello - recently inspired by a few books on the B.E.F. and the Retreat from Mons I was very surprised to see the large proportion of reservists in the ranks. It has spurred further interest in trying to establish exactly how many reservists were required for battalions when mobilising.

John Terraine in his "Mons. The Retreat to Victory" says "...it was the reservists [.....] who made up the greater part of the fighting strength of the Army [....] in most British battalions that fought at Mons the Reservists amounted to fifty per cent of the total strength, in some as much as seventy per cent, while the proportion for the BEF as a whole was sixty per cent." I am particularly curious to know which unit went to war with 70% of its men from the reservists.

I would be interested in getting an accurate picture as possible at individual unit level. Any contributions would be welcome, preferably citing the source - History, War Diary etc....

So far I have the following:

1st Bn South Wales Borderers. The History of the South Wales Borderers records 1,038 Reservists reported for duty on mobilisation of which only 6 proved to be medically unfit and that 631 were sent to Bordon to make up the 1st Battalion including the 10% "first reinforcements". When the Bn went overseas on 12th August it departed with 26 Officers, 1 Warrant officer, 49 Sergeants and 911 men [26 Officers and 961 ORs]. The 10% Reinforcements sailed a week later. Assuming 10% Reinforcements equated to 96 ORs, this would imply that 535 of the ORs in the 1st Bn SWB were reservists, or something in the region of 55.7%.

2nd Bn The Royal Scots. The Royal Scots 1914-1919 by Maj John Ewing MC records that the War Establishment as laid down in the manual of Infantry Training 1914 consisted of 30 Officers and 972 ORs and mentions "in peacetime a battalion was normally about half this strength". It records 700 Reservists joined the unit on 7th August and ton the 12th August the Reservists "formed nearly fifty per cent of the battalion."

2nd and 3rd Bns The Worcestershire Regiment. The Worcestershire regiment in the Great War by Capt Fitz M Stacke MC records "A Battalion at full war strength consisted of [...] 1,024 all ranks" although the 2nd Bn embarked for France with 24 Officers, one MO and 978 ORs and the 3rd Bn embarked with 27 Officers, one MO and 987 ORS. There is no mention of the number of Reservists although it does record "The Battalions had to be filled up to war strength by reservists..."

2nd Bn The Border Regiment. The Border Regiment in the Great War by Col H C Wylly CB records 556 Reservists arriving over the 6th-7th August and the 2nd Bn departing on 27th with 27 Officers and 1,068 ORs, which implies roughy 50% of the men were reservists -consistent with the other units.

1st Bn The Royal Scots Fusiliers. The History of the Royal Scots Fusiliers by John Buchan records that " ..but to the Colonel's eye the reservists, who numbered over fifty per cent of the strength looked a little soft."

Any further information/references on other Battalions would be welcome. I have yet to get down the the National Archives to start researching this so any shortcuts would be gratefully received. Does anyone happen to know what the WO 95 references are for the I Corps and II Corps units are? Thank in advance. Regards MG

[ulsterlad2]

Martin, no figures but I do like this from "There's a Devil in the Drum" by John Lucy 2nd Royal Irish Rifles. It shows the importance of the reservists right from the start.

"Our reservists came streaming in to make up our war strength; cheerful, careless fellows of all types, some in bowler hats and smart suitings, others in descending scale down to the garb of tramps. Soon like us, they were uniformed and equipped with field kits, and the change was remarkable. Smart sergeants and corporals and beribboned veterans of the South African war hatched out of the crowd of nondescript civilians, and took their place and duties as if they had never left the army.

[battiscombe]

similar figures for artillery:

28th Brigade RFA :- 363 men and 188 horses expanded to 643 men (+ 562 horses) PLUS another 158 men in ammunition column PLUS 142 men for section of DAC. - total new arrivals 10 officers, 570ORs and 747 horses! some officers at least were special reservists, and men would have been mainly reservists with fewer special reservists, but also probably some regulars posted from other brigades/batteries which were not in first divisions.. (see Journal of RA vol LXI no.4 - 1935..).

[Guest]

There is probably some useful information Here.

A very large file

This on page 30 of 874

Mike

[Guest]

From the HLI Chronicles

HLI Regiment

ARMY RESERVE MOBILISATION.

At the date of mobilisation the Army Reservists of the Regiment numbered 1154 Of these 1087 had mobilised on 4th October, 1914, or nearly 95 per cent. About 1050 mobilised within the first three days. Those who have joined since have been mostly men settled in Canada, and seamen.

On Wednesday, 5th August, the first day of mobilisation, provision was made for the reception of 600 Reservists; but that number was practically doubled, 1109 responding to the call.

2nd Battalion

War against the German Empire was declared on August 4th, and a general mobilisation ordered. When the writer arrived at the Depot on the afternoon of the 5th a splendid response had already been made by the Army Reservists, and on the same evening 300 had been sent, fully clothed and equipped, to the 2nd Battalion at Aldershot. Another 400 were sent the next day, completing that Battalion to war strength. The remaining mobilised Reservists (about 350) were attached to the 3rd Battalion, to be sent to the seat of war in drafts as required

Mike

[Tyneside Chinaman]

Hi

2nd Durham LI, recorded.

At 0400 hours on 6 August, the first party of 301 Regular Reservists, under the command of Major Alexander K Robb, arrived from Regimental Depot at Fenham Barracks, Newcastle.

Later on the morning of 6 August, the South Shields detachment rejoined the battalion. All day the men were busy checking kit and inoculating the new men and preparing to leave for the war station. On 7 August at 0400 hours another train carrying 384 Reservists under the command of Lieutenant Nigel Conant, who had served with the 4^th Special Reserve Battalion prior to being commissioned into the battalion in December 1910, arrived at Lichfield.

The battalion embarked roughly 1045 OR's so 65.5% reservists posssibly more if other drafts arrived before embarkation but are not mentioned in the diary.

regards

John

[andy66]

Hi MG,

From the War Diary for the 2nd Bn, Duke of Wellington's (West Riding) Regiment at Portobello Barracks, Dublin;

Friday August 7th, 7:30am; 350 reservists arrived from the Depot (Halifax) under Comd of Capt Travers, 11:30pm remaining 360 reservists arrived under Comd of Maj Kennard.

Sunday August 9th, 11am; a further small draft of NCO's (no number given) has arrived from the Depot under Comd Capt Digby.

My G/Grandfather was one of those Reservists and was KIA later that month (the 24th) during The Battle of Mons.

Unfortunately, the file copy I have is too large to attach so if you would like a copy please do not hesitate to ask.

Regards

Andy

[Ron Clifton]

Does anyone happen to know what the WO 95 references are for the I Corps and II Corps units are? Thank in advance. Regards MG

Hello Martin

The enties in WO95 are basically by division. Here are the relevant references:

1227 to 1282 France 1st Division

1283 to 1374 France 2nd Division

1375 to 1438 France 3rd Division

1439 to 1509 France 4th Division

1510 to 1580 France 5th Division

1581 to 1626 France 6th Division

Ron

[spof]

From “The Gloucestershire Regiment in the War 19194 – 1918” by Everard Wyrell:

The Battalion was much understrength and two captains, seven subalterns and about 600 men were required to bring it up to war strength. The order to mobilise was received at the Depot at 4.30pm on the 4^th August and reservists poured in during the next two days.

……

The mobilisation of the Regular reservists was completed and the required number had been dispatched to the 1^st Battalion by Friday, 7^th August. On Saturday, 8^th August, the 3^rd Battalion mobilised and proceeded that evening to its War Station on the marshes at Abbey Wood, where it encamped and started on its duties of guarding the Arsenal and training reinforcements.

On the 7^th, also, the War Office issued orders to each Battalion to send one captain, two subalterns and fifteens sergeants or corporals to the ir Depot for duty with the 3^rd Battalion.

By midnight, with the exception of some twenty men still required to complete the Base Details, the 1^st Glosters were fully mobilised and ready to move.

[Graham Stewart]

Depot Notes - Northumberland Fusiliers(24/8/1914) - Mobilize! What a lot this magic word telegraphed to all parts of the United Kingdom signified, and for the first three days perhaps there was no busier places than regimental depots. On receipt of the order to mobilize we expected 1,766 reservists of the Fifth to report themselves at the Depot Barracks to be medically inspected, clothed and armed. Within 48 hours all had put in an appearance except forty four, and perhaps of this number some were at sea, a truly magnificent answer to the call. Many had long distances to come from, Aberdeen down to the Isle of Wight and all parts of England. All were desperately anxious to join the Colours and get in the fighting line as soon as possible, and it was a very fine and sturdy stamp of soldiery that formed the party of 600 which were sent down to Portsmouth under the command of Captain Selby and Lieutenants Barrett and Boyd to join the 1st Battalion. One felt proud of such a body of men, and no wonder they got such a fine reception from the crowd as they marched to Newcastle Station.

[clive_hughes]

Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Regimental Records of the RWF, Vol III p.22)

Within 36 hours of the mobilisation order having been received at Wrexham (5pm on 4th August) 1,300 Reservists had reported. Of these 359 were clothed, equipped and sent to 2nd RWF on the first day of mobilisation. A footnote states that the battalion was under-strength.

(War Diary) - 1st Battalion did not return to the UK until September, but when it did it received a draft of 6 officers and 342 other Ranks including Boer War and Boxer Rising veterans. It is possible that some of these may have been Special Reservists rather than Army Reservists. In return, it dispatched to the Depot the under-age Band Boys and those who were considered unfit: something which other regular units must have been obliged to do.

The Welsh Regiment (from the Regimental History Part II p.276-7)

1st Battalion returned from India December 1914, when 250 Reservists arrived to complete its establishment. Embarkation strength 16 January 1915: 27 Ofrs., 993 ORs including 6 Drivers ASC.

2nd Battalion was very much below establishment, "and a considerable percentage of the men were too young to take the field". They received 571 NCOs and men from the Reserve. "These reservists had not sufficient time to get physically fit before being called on to bear the strain of active service, entailing long marches, with full equipment and 150 rounds of SAA." By 5pm on 8 August mobilisation was complete. Embarkation strength 12 August: 27 Ofrs., 1 WO, 978 ORs.

Clive

[Jim Hastings]

2nd Bn The Royal Sussex Regiment WD states that:

On 6th Aug the first party of Reservists arrived at their barracks in Woking - numbering 386

By 4.40pm the same day 171 of the second party had turned up at Woking Station

On the 7th Aug it reports that 101 men from the Bn had been ordered to 3rd Bn however

Interestingly on 9 Aug 123 pairs of boots had to be exchanged for being too narrow!

Hope this helps Martin,

Cheers

Jim

[Guest]

Dear all - many thanks for the contributions. I am most grateful. I shall attempt to consolidate the data in a tabulated format and post it back on this thread periodically. Thanks again, especially for the provenance too. Any further contributions would be very gratefully received. I will not be able to get to TNA for a few weeks to get to the diaries. Thanks for the references Ron. Regards MG

P.S.

[Guest]

Some rough notes from the data provided so far (with all the usual caveats). Sample size is nine battalions, so it is statistically quite a weak sample so far, but interestingly the data is proving to be consistent with Ascoli's claims. Note all the data is not available for all Battalions. It will be interesting to see if the data varies much as the gaps are filled.

1. Average number of Reservists reporting for duty per Regiment.....982

2. Average number of Reservists sent to each Battalion: ..................495

3. Average number of ORs embarked with each Battalion..................987

4. Average number of Reservists as % of ORs embarked....................53.6%

5. Highest per cent of Reservists in a Battalion...................................71.4%......note: 2nd Bn Highland Light Infantry. This is consistent with Ascoli's claim that some units had 70% reservists.

6. Lowest per cent of reservists in a Battalion.....................................25.2%......note: 1st Bn Welsh Regt - returned from India where establishments were usually kept up to strength.

Thoughts:

1. It seems that around 50%-65% was the norm. The 25% and 70% are outliers in the data. It is curious why the 2nd Bn HLI required so many Reservists

2. A Battalion returning from India (where one might presume the Bn was up to full strength) still needed 25% from the Reservists. I wonder if this was because some of the NCOs and men were required for the formation of Kitchener units, and were replaced with Reservists.

Regards MG.

[spof]

2. A Battalion returning from India (where one might presume the Bn was up to full strength) still needed 25% from the Reservists. I wonder if this was because some of the NCOs and men were required for the formation of Kitchener units, and were replaced with Reservists.

Regards MG.

Martin

I'm wondering if you need to find the appropriate paperwork - KR, AO etc. - to find out the difference between a peace time strength and war strength as mentioned in the Glosters history above.

Glen

PS

The 1st Argylls WD also has a large number of Reservists:

5/8/14 5.30pm Received the order to “MOBILIZE” and proceeded according to Mobilization Tables.

6/8/14 3pm Completed Mobilization to Peace Strength. Took over 91 Prisoners of War (German, Dutch and Austrians) taken from a fishing fleet sunk in the NORTH SEA by HMS (blank). The prisoners were confined in the moat by day and in 3 casemates by night. All very cheery.

7/8/14

4am 1st party of Reservists under CAPT THOMSON, 2ND LIEUTS COLQUHOUN and FAIRLIE arrived. Strength 400.

2.30pm Received order “Embark Expeditionary Force, taking 9th August as 1st day of movement.”

8/8/14

4am 2nd party of Reservists arrived under CAPT MUIR, LIEUT CONNAL-ROWAN and 2ND LIEUT BUCHANNAN. Strength 300. LIEUT BENNET (from Colonial Force) and 2ND LIEUT ANDERSON also joined.

1pm Order received to move Battalion to SOUTHAMPTON on 9th August in 4 parties, the 1st leaving at 6.10pm. Mobilization completed but no time available for exercising Remounts in wagons as fitting of harness took every minute. Contrary orders received regarding carrying of spare shoes in Base kit caused great trouble.

[Jim Hastings]

2. A Battalion returning from India (where one might presume the Bn was up to full strength) still needed 25% from the Reservists. I wonder if this was because some of the NCOs and men were required for the formation of Kitchener units, and were replaced with Reservists.

Regards MG.

Hi Martin,

I remember reading about the formation of 7th Royal Sussex and IIRC their new CO 'claimed' many Officers and NCOs who were in England on courses, convalescence, leave etc from 1st Royal Sussex in India. Ok, 1 RSR stayed in India, but maybe if the same was done by, say, the Rifle Brigade Kitchener Bns from 2RB men in England before the Bn returned from India, then such Bns on returning would not only need to absorb their Reserves but also the men 'poached'. Could contribute to the 25%?

Just a thought, cheers Jim

[Graham Stewart]

Depot Notes - Northumberland Fusiliers(24/8/1914)(cont'd) - Newcastle has answered Lord Kitcheners appeal splendidly, the barrack gates are beseiged by crowds. Inside the barracks are all and every kind of man of all ages, all anxious to do something for their country. The only difficulty now being to get them completely clothed and armed and to accommodate them all. At present there are over 1,000 recruits billetted in the town.

The headquarters of the 3rd Battalion are at Canning Street Council School, about two miles from the Depot Barracks, and from here we presume will be sent the first reinforcements. We have a battalion strength of 1,780, of whom the vast proportion are reservists, whilst recruits are posted to us in batches every day. Our chief duty up-to-date has been furnishing guards for important railway bridges, works, etc, Newcastle Station, German POW's and a Turkish battleship, besides a large number of supply fatigue parties which all help to diminish our numbers.

First post also amended.

[Guest]

Hi Martin,

I remember reading about the formation of 7th Royal Sussex and IIRC their new CO 'claimed' many Officers and NCOs who were in England on courses, convalescence, leave etc from 1st Royal Sussex in India. Ok, 1 RSR stayed in India, but maybe if the same was done by, say, the Rifle Brigade Kitchener Bns from 2RB men in England before the Bn returned from India, then such Bns on returning would not only need to absorb their Reserves but also the men 'poached'. Could contribute to the 25%?

Just a thought, cheers Jim

Jim - the detail in the Army List provides a lot of evidence for the Officers' movements. The names of Regular Army Officers posted to the Kitchener battalions (and sometimes the TF) were all annotated as such. I have a copy of the Dec 1914 Army List and the May 1915 Army List and it is interesting to see the amount of movement within the Regular battalion Officers who were posted to form the nucleus for Kitchener battalions in particular. The Reservists in the examples above all seem to be led by Officers from the Special Reserve.

Specifically for the 7th (Service) Bn of the Royal Sussex Regiment, it looks as if the CO, 2IC, Adjt and two Company Commanders ad the QM were Regulars posted to the Bn, which was fairly typical.[ Source: Army List May 1915 section 1229d-1230]. They were all serving one rank lower in either the 1st or 2nd Bns according to the same source as in addition to be listed under the 7th Bn they all also appear under the 1st and 2nd Bns with 7 next to their names denoting a posting to the 7th Bn.

Many of the Indian Army Officers on furlough were kept in the UK and posted to Kitchener formations. They were generally spread around, however there is at least one example of a high concentration; all four Company commanders of the 8th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers came from Indian Army of which three came from the same Regiment, the 25th Punjabis, which is the highest concentration I have found so far.

A slight digression from the thread....MG

[Graham Stewart]

Two years out of date, but still a good read - I actually missed out on the 1914 edition a few years ago.

[Muerrisch]

From my aticle in Stand To! , some errata now apparent but thrust is accurate. The diagram is missing, I can supply if demand exists.

SPECIAL RESERVISTS OF THE ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS IN 1914

The purpose of this note is to investigate, describe and explain the very different augmentations of the two Line battalions of the Royal Welch Fusiliers by special reservists in the first few months of war.

The rôle of the Special Reserve.

Special reservists belonged to the Special Reserve [sR] battalion, 3^rd Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers [3RWF], whose HQ was at the Depôt, Wrexham, at the beginning of the war. They were trained soldiers [six months initially, and a few weeks annually thereafter], who were obliged to report to the HQ for duty when the Army mobilised. Special Reserve battalions were not intended to fight as formed units, but to provide men for drafts to replace casualties in the fighting battalions.

Recruiting, retention, and the soldier’s individual regimental number.

The Special Reserve was created in 1908, and was the successor to the Militia. RWF had previously had two Militia battalions numbered 3RWF and 4RWF but they did not simply merge to become a new, Special Reserve, battalion. Indeed, for a while after 1908 official reference was made to the “moribund” units of the Militia. Members of the Militia were not obliged to serve in the new unit, and did not have to sign new attestation papers [which were for an initial term of six years]. However, Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers [RRRWF] states that 3RWF “transferred” to the Army Reserve as a unit of the Special Reserve with effect 28^th June 1908, so there was clearly some continuity. Reserve recruiting had been poor for many years, and retention was even worse. Taking the Militia as a whole, around the turn of the century one third of all recruits were under 18 years, one half under 19 years, and only 20% of all the volunteers completed six years service: of those who did not stay the course, 33% became regular soldiers, 20% deserted [both these losses in the first year or so] and the balance were discharged, mostly unfit. These statistics make the startling turnover in the Special Reserve, deduced and discussed below, just about credible. Historically, reservists had reacted well enough when needed; when the army mobilised for the South African war, there was an almost 100% response to the call to the colours.

The Peace Establishment of Special Reserve battalions [other than Extra Reserve] in 1914 was 89 regular other ranks and 580 reservists, increased for 3RWF to 1500 soon after the outbreak of war. The Special Reserve was allowed to continue to recruit after war was declared. Mobilisation Regulations 1914 make clear that all untrained soldiers in the home Line battalion, together with the under-age and the unfit, were to be sent to [and become part of] the Special Reserve battalion. RRRWF noted that when the 3^rd battalion arrived at Wrexham on 9/10^th August 1914 its strength varied between 1500 and 2000. Of the 580 special reservists 3RWF might have provided if it were at full strength, a proportion would be under-age [as the recruiting age was 17 and the active service age was 19 years], unfit, untrained or deserted, so the soldiers available for the Line battalions might be expected to fall towards 500. Of these, some would not have arrived at Wrexham by the time 2RWF completed to war establishment on 8^th August.

There was almost certainly a parallel system of regimental numbering within the old Militia [each battalion independent of the other] with inherent risk of duplications. Little is known of the numbering system in use by the Special Reserve either, and no relevant Army Order or Army Council Instruction has yet been identified. As the Militia battalions had existed for a long time, their numbers in use may well have covered a large range. Perhaps those who transferred to the Special Reserve retained their Militia numbers, probably not. The authorities, if they gave it any thought at all, possibly shrank from beginning again at number 1 in 1908 as this might have made triplication possible. The SR soldier’s regimental number was in any case in a different series from the two Line battalions, who shared a series. Many Special Reserve battalions used a prefix ‘ 3/ ’ before soldiers’ regimental numbers [indeed they were urged to] but the Royal Welch Fusiliers did not. Thus, some duplication of regimental numbers in the Line battalions was likely once special reservists were used in their ranks.

Be that as it may, there is strong circumstantial evidence that plenty of 3RWF men had numbers in the 3000 zone, number 4225 was issued to special reservist Pte. William Arthur Davies when he joined 3RWF in 1910, with 5231 to Pte. Claude Louis Lawrence before, say, June 1914 as he was killed in action 28^th November 1914 aged 19 [his age/number combination make it impossible for him to be a regular soldier enlisted c. 1897]. Evidence of pairs of numbers up to about 6500 presented below suggests an even bigger turnover before June 1914. The number range appears to have grown at an annual rate of about 500 men, a hugely inefficient business.

The take-up of reservists of both kinds by the Line battalions.

The regimental history, RRRWF, states that some 1300 reservists had reported to the Depôt within 36 hours of the declaration of war. It is likely that this figure included both regular and special reservists, and that the total pool numbered about 2000, with around 1500 regular reservists and about 500 special reservists as deduced above. This ratio is similar to that obtaining in the army as a whole, 145,350 regular reservists and 64,000 special reservists. The Special Reserve of the Army was some 16,000 below establishment, perhaps pointing to a continuing difficulty in attracting and retaining recruits such as is implied by the apparent large turnover in 3RWF and the historical problems of the Militia.

Given a choice between taking a regular reservist or a special reservist, no Commanding Officer, Adjutant or Regimental Sergeant Major of a Line battalion would be likely to choose the latter. The regular had signed for a total obligation of twelve years [seven years with the colours and five on the Regular Reserve before the South Africa War, three and nine from April 1902, nine and three from November 1904, and back to seven and five years in September 1906]. The ex-regular would have a known face, character, and [hopefully] be a known asset to many of the older NCOs. The normal rate of recruiting and turnover of the RWF Line battalions, about 375 men in each peacetime year, would provide 1500 men at most [about four year’s worth of reserves, not five, as the first year of reserve liability was often spent overseas, compulsorily retained and serving with the colours]. There were several reasons why the Regular Reserve might be reduced below 1500 men. Premature death, invaliding-out, buying-out and desertion had an impact of about 5% per annum across the Infantry of the Line in 1913, a remarkably consistent figure reaching back into the nineteenth century. Also, some soldiers chose not to pass to the Reserve, but were permitted to serve on after seven years towards 12 years and ultimately a pension at 21 years. Thus the potential 1500 might become about 1400 men. The existence of Section D of the Reserve complicates the matter: Section D comprised soldiers who, with their full obligation about to be completed, signed on for extra reserve liability and a continuing 6d per day. An estimate of the size of Section D for RWF is that it was less than 100 men: this can be deduced from the number of men with pre-1902 regimental numbers [say, number 6500] on the 2RWF 1914 medal roll, who total 75, including a proportion of older men working towards pension. [The assumptions here are that, as shown below, 2RWF had very few special reservists, and that the battalion took up a disproportionately high number of Section D men before 1RWF arrived in Britain].

The official belief was that there would be 80% casualties in the first year of a major war. Thus the Regular Reserve would soon be committed and the Special Reserve would be needed in no time at all. This had occurred in the South African war, when, by the end of September 1900 all the sources of reserves [the Reserve and the Militia Reserve] had been exhausted. There is compelling evidence that the Special Reserve was used almost from the very beginning of the Great War, but not by 2RWF.

The known take-up of reservists by 2RWF.

2RWF needed a total of 489 reservists to complete to the war establishment of 1076: a large number, almost as many again as the serving soldiers. Not only had 2RWF been short-handed, but there were numbers of under-age, under-trained and unfit in their ranks. This paralleled the experience of the South African war, when the proportions of reservists needed to complete battalions were as high as 52%, and many units replaced 370 to 460 ineffectives before embarking. There is no direct proof that only regular reservists were taken by 2RWF. However, neither the official regimental history, nor 2RWF’s history The War the Infantry Knew, nor Frank Richards’s graphic account Old Soldiers Never Die make any mention of specials in that context, so it is reasonable to infer that few or none were taken, even if any were available in the first days after declaration. After 2RWF left for France, arriving on 11^th to 13^th August, a further 186 men were sent to them from the Depôt, in two parties, on 26^th and 30^th August, to be available to replace future casualties. Thus, of the roughly 2000 reservists initially available [of both natures] and fit for active service, nearly 700 had been committed to 2RWF before the end of September 1914.

The known take-up of reservists by 1RWF.

1RWF returned to the UK from Malta, and themselves needed 342 reservists, whom they received at Lyndhurst on 9^th September. This is a surprisingly large number, given that the Peace Establishment for Malta was 904 men and that the overseas battalions were supposed to be kept at strength. Somehow, in addition to the 172 men required to come up to the War Establishment, another 170 needed to be replaced. Assuming that these were unfit [they could hardly be untrained or under age or they would not have been in Malta in the first place] although they automatically went on to the books of 3RWF they were in no sense immediately deployable.

At all costs regular staff of the Depôt and 3RWF [the latter included 89 other ranks as we have seen], together with eight men for each of the four Territorial Force battalions, had to be maintained so that future growth would not be prejudiced. Additionally, as early as 8^th August, substantial cadres of experienced regulars were being set aside to form the nuclei of what became the Service battalions. It is no wonder therefore that special reservists were posted to 1RWF in time to earn the 1914 star [reaching the unit in BEF by midnight 22/23^rd November], and, in a substantial number of cases, were already members of 1RWF when that battalion landed in Belgium on 6^th October.

The evidence of take-up of special reservists by the Line battalions: pairs of numbers.

It was theoretically impossible for any two regular soldiers in any regiment to share the same number …… by the time the series was exhausted [that is, ran from 1 to 19999 and started again] all the veterans would not only have completed their Colour service, but would have completed their Regular Reserve or their extended service to pension at 21 years. Soldiers on the Regular Reserve retained their service number. Not surprisingly, there is only one pair of identical numbers on the 2RWF roll of the 1914 star. This is 8088. Other than possibly a clerical error, no explanation is offered. By contrast there are at least 29 pairs of identical numbers on the 1RWF roll, running from 4458 to 6345, so the total range detected [both Line battalions, and excluding the anomalous 8088] is 4458 to 6345.

There are also six pairings of numbers between 1RWF and 2RWF, probably caused by the presence of special reservists. Of these:

4943 is a 2RWF Company Quartermaster Sergeant, a typical number for a senior Line NCO, so the 1RWF man is probably ex-3RWF,

5670 has a 2RWF disembarkation of 13^th August whereas the 1RWF one is in November and therefore favourite to be a special reservist,

6217 has the 1RWF man arrive much later and he is probably the ex-3RWF man,

6284 also has the 1RWF man arriving later.

6210 and 6241 have nothing to provide a clue one way or the other.

Including the four 1/2RWF pairings where some evidence points towards 1RWF, we have 33 pairs of numbers on the regimental medal roll where the duplication is likely to involve a special reservist in 1RWF.

Further evidence: distribution of regimental numbers within each Line battalion.

There is another way of examining the medal roll for the presence of special reservists. By and large, the numbering series that the two line battalions were sharing ran from a very small number of senior soldiers in the range 2000 to 3000 to a very small number of newly-joined with numbers just over 12000. In the normal course of events, the randomness of a man’s initial posting and subsequent postings would be expected to produce similar number distributions in the two battalions, with perhaps the peaks offset by the provision of annual drafts to the overseas battalion. Bearing in mind that 3RWF numbers were very much at the low end, 3000 to 6500 say, then a substantial number of specials in one unit and not the other should distort the distribution. This will now be examined.

The front bar chart, in light grey, shows the distribution of regimental numbers in 1RWF taken from the official medal roll of the 1914 star. There is a bulge of the smaller regimental numbers which is not found in the rear chart, the 2RWF distribution, dark grey. 2RWF shows something akin to the statisticians “normal distribution” , with a peak offset from the major peak of 1RWF. This offset is easily explained by the trooping process for overseas, whereby the outgoing battalion, 1RWF, was topped-up by young soldiers before leaving, and this would have been [was due to be: they returned after less than one year] repeated annually thereafter. The totally unexpected early peak in 1RWF distribution belongs to what the statistician might call “another population”, as indeed it was, from another numbering series, that of 3RWF. Special reservists with numbers in the 5000 and 6000 series [columns 6 and 7 below] are probably undetectable unless there is number duplication, in that there will be an overlap with recalled regular reservists and, seemingly, 2RWF absorbed almost all of these latter.

It is an unkind stroke of fate that, in the very zone where regulars’ numbers more or less start [say, 5000 and upwards] the numbers of the specials were reaching their pre-war peak. This has caused a great difficulty in analysis.

Conclusions

3RWF men were heavily involved in the augmentation of 1RWF, and scarcely or not at all for 2RWF. If one is considering a soldier with the 1914 Star in 1RWF or 2RWF, with a regimental number in the 3000 to 6000 range, and who is not a non commissioned officer, the odds are in favour of him being a special reservist. The official summary of the flow of reservists [of both natures] was that a total of 2429 men had been sent to [towards, that is, and held in bases in France and Flanders until needed] the two Line battalions by the end of 1914. This total of 2429 men [which also included soldiers returning to active service after illness or wounding, young soldiers achieving 19 years of age, and soldiers, joined pre-war, completing training] must almost have scraped the bottom of the RWF barrel. This is another echo of the South African war experience. It was not until May 1915 that the first draft of men recruited after the outbreak of war was ready to be sent to either Line battalion on the Western Front.

Acknowledgement.

This work could not have been even considered, let alone undertaken, without the purchase of an entire copy of the 1914 Star Medal Roll by the Trustees of the Regimental Museum. To them, and the Director, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Crocker, RWF [Rtd], I owe great thanks, forgiving as I do their tempting me to undertake at least 50 man-hours of transcription on to a data base.

DE Langley

January 2004 ©

Sources consulted

Regimental Medal Roll 1914 Star, PRO WO 329 2445 and 2446

Manuscript Diary and Scrap book of 3RWF held in the Archive of the Regiment.

Regimental Records of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, Dudley Ward, London, Forster Groom, 1928

The Development of the British Army 1899 to 1914, JK Dunlop, London, Methuen, 1928

The Late Victorian Army 1862 to 1902, EM Spiers, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1992

The War the Infantry Knew, JC Dunn, London, PS King Ltd, 1933

Old Soldiers Never Die, F Richards, London, Faber and Faber, 1933

Duty Done, Second Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers in the Great War, DE Langley, Caernarfon, The Trustees RWF Museum, 2002

The Reserve and the Training Reserve, T Cave, Stand To Number 36

Mobilisation Regulations, War Office, 1914.

Peace Establishments 1913-14, and War Establishments 1914, War Office, 1913

Army Orders and Army Council Instructions, 1900 to 1914

From my article in Stand To! ......... a few errata now obvious, but the thrust is clear.

[spof]

Thank you very much Grumpy. A fascinating insight.

I can't help but wonder what the Battalion returning from abroad must have felt about the sister Battalion "cherry picking" the available Reservists before they got home.

Glen

[Ron Clifton]

I'm wondering if you need to find the appropriate paperwork - KR, AO etc. - to find out the difference between a peace time strength and war strength as mentioned in the Glosters history above.

Hello Glen (and others)

You won't find those details in King's Regs or Army Orders. They are given in the Army Estimates (for the peacetime establishments) and in War Establishments 1914 (and in the Field Service Pocket Book).

To save you looking them up, here they are:

Peace estab of a battlion at home: 25 officers + 777 other ranks

Battalion in the Colonies or Egypt: 29 + 904

Battalion in India: 28 + 1003

War estab of a battalion, BEF: 29 + 971 (excluding attached RAMC, AOC and ASC)

As well as the simple shortfall in numbers, those soldiers under 19, or not fully trained, or not medically fit for active service abroad, would have to be deducted from the peace strength of 777.

Ron

[Muerrisch]

Hello Glen (and others)

You won't find those details in King's Regs or Army Orders. They are given in the Army Estimates (for the peacetime establishments) and in War Establishments 1914 (and in the Field Service Pocket Book).

To save you looking them up, here they are:

Peace estab of a battlion at home: 25 officers + 777 other ranks

Battalion in the Colonies or Egypt: 29 + 904

Battalion in India: 28 + 1003

War estab of a battalion, BEF: 29 + 971 (excluding attached RAMC, AOC and ASC)

As well as the simple shortfall in numbers, those soldiers under 19, or not fully trained, or not medically fit for active service abroad, would have to be deducted from the peace strength of 777.

Ron

other than drummers, buglers, trumpeters and pipers "with the approval of the CO" according to Mobilization Regulations.

[Guest]

Hello Glen (and others)

You won't find those details in King's Regs or Army Orders. They are given in the Army Estimates (for the peacetime establishments) and in War Establishments 1914 (and in the Field Service Pocket Book).

To save you looking them up, here they are:

Peace estab of a battlion at home: 25 officers + 777 other ranks

Battalion in the Colonies or Egypt: 29 + 904

Battalion in India: 28 + 1003

War estab of a battalion, BEF: 29 + 971 (excluding attached RAMC, AOC and ASC)

As well as the simple shortfall in numbers, those soldiers under 19, or not fully trained, or not medically fit for active service abroad, would have to be deducted from the peace strength of 777.

Ron

I know from my Yeomanry research that the War Establishment figures had embedded drivers as part of the established strength but also has attached ASC drivers, which went a long way to explaining the differences between War Establishments and the actual numbers embarking. Also it seems most Battalions regarded the RAMC MO and the VO as attached and not part of the battalion War Establishment. Ditto Chaplains, Interpreters etc. It is interesting to see the variance in battalion strengths on embarkation.

On Grumpy's point I had always thought the pipes and drums required the regimental officers to subscribe to pay for the instruments. I am not sure about who paid for the extra men (I am sure I will be corrected soon). I know the Scottish Horse had special authorisation to add extra six extra pipers to the authorised war establishment. When the deployed to Gallipoli there seems to have been much correspondence with GHQ requiring the Scottish Horse to prove their authourised establishment. ....MG

Grumpy - many thanks for taking the trouble to post such a detailed account. Much appreciated. MG

[Muerrisch]

The best, easily accessible, account of numbers embarking at beginning war is in Westlake's British Battalions France Belgium 1914. Some very large differences.

I should not have had pipers on my list, having checked Mob Reg 1914 163 d.

The others went "at the discretion of the OC unit and the medical officer".

All the above excludes Foot Guards, who enlisted 3 years colours, 9 years reserve, did not usually garrison overseas, and had huge numbers of reservists and NO SPECIAL RESERVISTS.