The Entente just defending from 1915

[Anthony Pigott]

Something that's often occured to me but I've not seen written about - was there serious consideration given to just holding the line on the Western Front once the difficulties of mounting successful offensives was realised, i.e., waiting until there was enough overwhelming force (with the appropriate technology) to give a very high chance of success? I can see the political difficulties in delay, but then isn't it just what the Allies did in WW2 from 1942 to 1944? Was it discussed?

Regards

Anthony

[paul guthrie]

The allies in WW2 were fighting all over the world 1942-44 with heaviest action in USSR. They fought everywhere but NW Europe.

There were certainly advocates, Petain for one, for waiting for the USA to deliver lots of men.

[Chris_Baker]

King Albert propounded a not dissimilar view: stand on the defensive and find a negotiated peace.

I can find no reference to the French, having lost a large slice of their population and a bigger slice of their economy and productive capacity, to supporting such a stance. Quite the opposite.

[Anthony Pigott]

The allies in WW2 were fighting all over the world 1942-44 with heaviest action in USSR. They fought everywhere but NW Europe.

I only meant the delay in invading France etc.

I think the analogy is quite strong. There was great political pressure (especially from the Russians) to move more quickly; they were facing a continuous line of strong defences (the Atlantic Wall) and they could have mounted large scale amphibious attacks earlier (although they would probably have been like Dieppe on a grand scale).

It's interesting that in the Great War, the attitude was apparently to keep up the offensive pressure more or less continuously, whereas in WW2 it was to wait, plan, prepare until everything seemed right.

Anthony

[jdajd]

I too have thought the same thing, but I think it is a case of hindsight being 20/20. As Paul Guthrie stated Petain was a major proponent of the defensive, but that was 1917 after the French had broken their back in the Nivelle Offensive and mutinied. In 1914 and 1915 it would have been unthinkable to military thinkers to defend as a first choice. The French attitude of elan and the glory and power of the bayonet are evidence of this. Just as the British, as opposed to the Germans, made their trenches as uncomfortable as possible so as the men would not complacent. At this time defense was a last resort.

I also do not think that the political influence can be discounted, but I think it is more an issue of national pride and morale. Sometimes these two factors far outweigh the military reasoning. Look for example at two of the more hellish spots on the Western Front Ypres and Verdun. Both, it could be argued, became blood baths because of the pride and morale. How could the British withdraw from an area it had fought so hard to keep? Even if straightening the line would have freed up troops and taken away an advantage the Germans had on the high ground. Would France have been "bled white" if Verdun did not hold such symbolic value?

In the 21st C. it is easy for us to look at the mistakes the leaders made and find solutions. It would have been much harder if not impossble for the man on the spot at the time to do.

Jon