German WW1 Machine Guns

[derekspiers]

I am researching the opening phase of the July 1916 Somme offensive and currently reading an account which is devoted to the action around Thiepval.

It refers frequently to British casualties from machine gun emplacements particularly during the crossing of no man land on the morning of July 1st. However I am surprised at the amount of wounding and killing which resulted from machine guns at considerable distances from the lines that were being attacked.

What was the typical effective range of these guns to inflict "stopping" damage to a foot soldier and what was this range dependent upon.

thank you

[truthergw]

A round from a machinegun could injure a man at over 2000 yards. Generally, the effective range was line of sight. The gun was usually capable of killing much further away than it could be aimed. On an elevated site like Thiepval, that limitation did not apply so if you think in terms of being under the hammer, a mile or more from the gun, you will have some idea. In addition to that direct fire mode, guns could also be used indirectly. That is, with an elevation in excess of 45 degrees, they could fire into the air and ' drop' rounds onto area targets which were invisible to the gun crew. Over a hill, for instance. Used at night on a known crossroads, it could severely harass supply and changeover of troops.

[Jack Sheldon]

Derek

I am pleased that you have picked up on this point which is all too often misunderstood or overlooked. The answer to your question is that it depends largely on the range at which the effect of the fire can be spotted and therefore judged. Here I am not referring to indirect fire which, in barrage form, can be useful (and lethal) out to over 3,000 metres. In practical terms, on a clear day and with a good telescope or binoculars used by a well trained gun controller, somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 metres is feasible in the direct fire role. This distance has not really changed since the early days of the machine gun. Modern tracer burns out at about 1,100 metres, but a skilled gun crew can be effective out to almost double that distance.

In practical terms this means that many men on 1 July 1916 were hit by fire from guns which they simply could not locate and, whilst it is true that most engagements were at ranges of less than 1,000 metres, I am personally convinced that much of the damage done to troops advancing down the slope of the Newfoundland Memorial at Beaumont Hamel that day was caused by machine guns on the Grallsburg to the east and above Beaumont Hamel at ranges of between 1,200 and 1,500 metres. Because of your particular interest in Thiepval, you should note that guns in Feste Alt-Wuerttemberg [beaucourt Redoubt] could fire almost into the rear of troops advancing up the slope between St Pierre Divion and the Ulster Tower.

Jack

[derekspiers]

Thanks for the prompt replies

Jack

Yes it was indeed the fact that men advancing to the north of Thiepval Wood fell victim to guns at Beacourt that caught my attention!

I've just measured that to be c2000 metres.

Perhaps its a rather simplistic view but to my mind any plan which involved exposure of infantry for more than a few moments in areas which MAY be covered by machine gum arcs of fire was doomed to failure and/or huge casualties.

I suppose that is why the tank/ground attack aircraft/helicopter naturally evolved out of necessity?

[Jack Sheldon]

You are right in the sense that to advance against unsupressed machine guns is a recipe for disaster, but there seems to have been a genuine belief on the British side that the bombardment would destroy so much that coordinated defence would be impossible. You may find it helpful to look at a copy of my Battleground Europe guide The Germans at Thiepval, which contains a fair bit about machine guns and maps showing their placement. One gun alone near the village fired 18,000 rounds in the direction of the Ulster Tower that day. Small wonder that the crossing of No Man's Land was a highly risky undertaking.

Jack

[TonyE]

Just to add a couple of points to Jack's reply.

Many people think of machine guns as simply firing to their front and thus producing a field of fire that traversed slightly to left and right. In practice, the guns operated in concert to produce a beaten zone that was almost impenetrable if all guns survived the barrage.

The attached is an illustration form the German MG08 (Maxim) manual.

Regards

TonyE

[Rob Connolly]

Derek, there is a thread somewhere else on the Forum that deals with this topic also. Apparently many of the British casualties suffered in an attack on one German position in particular (memory fails me, can't remember which one!) were hit in the back by MG bullets fired from positions in enfilade a considerable distance away. One of the posters included a useful schematic that showed the positions of the German MGs and their arcs of fire. Again, memory fails me and I can't remember who began the post or who contributed; other, better-organised minds might remember.

[bob lembke]

Standard German MG practice, mid-war, evolved to placing the heavy MGs (MG 08) typically not in the front line trench, but often in MG "nests" a bit behind the trench. Many MGs were equipped with telescopic sights, and there were one or several binoculars issued to each MG crew. And, typically, the guns were not set up for fire to the front (although I am sure that the crew was ready to re-orient it in that fashion if necessary), but to fire enfalade fire to the left or right. It occurs to me that if this was done it would be easy to conceal the gun from both observation and fire from the front. These MGs usually belonged to special MG units, like the "Machine Gun Sharpshooters' Detachment", a formation, I believe, of three small companies of about 100 or a few more men, equipped with 12 MGs each. (A MG and artillery battalion was called an Abteilung, not Bataillon, and often had three companies or batteries, not four.)

Additionally, the infantry in the front line trench were also equipped with the lighter MG 08/15, for the close-up defense of the trench line. These guns, despite being basically the same gun, were not as well suited for long-range fire, due to more rudimentary mounts, and iron sights. However, they were water-cooled, and could also produce a considerable volume of fire.

I am not an expert in these matters, but knowledgable.

Bob Lembke

[Jack Sheldon]

The MG 08/15 did not enter service until the Somme 1916 fighting was a memory. Madsen light machine gun teams did play a role,locally on 1 July, but more particularly during the later fighting for the Schwaben/Stuff Redoubt areas when about fifty appear to have been deployed by the defence.

Jack

[bob lembke]

The Germans formed three battalions of Madsen MG from their stocks at hand, some captured from the Russian cavalry, who used them as a LMG, and some obtained in some sort of scam involving a shipment destined for some other country being diverted to Germany. (I don't know the details of this supposed event.) When their stock of Madsens drew down, the Madsens were replaced with Lewis Guns. There is a lively discussion elsewhere on the Forum over details of this, like rechambering the Lewis Gun for standard Mauser ammunition.

In late 1916 my father's flame company at Verdun adopted about six Chauchat LMGs into the company's weaponry. If a man brought one in the company welfare fund for the EM/OR was paid a standard bounty, I think 25 marks. I am sure that they were carefully cleaned and tested; despite its awful reputation, the French weapon chambered for the intended French ammunition actually usually did fire, especially when clean; in the more powerful US cartridge, an adaptation that the French made for the US forces, seemingly that modification was absolutely awful, its odds of actually firing being bad, that fact being why the gun is known as the worst MG ever made in the English language literature.

Bob

[Mark Finneran]

Derek if of use you can see examples of the MG08 in the MG08 thread in this Arms section.

With the ZF sights already expertly mentioned (magnification on the standard ZF12 is 2.5) one can already see how the effective distance is extended. The ranges mentioned are also correct and supported with evidence and although the British machine gunners were very well practised at indirect fire during WWI, the German indirect fire sight was only introduced in 1918.

ZFs for German Mgs were first introduced in 1912 so again their use and operation were sadly far in advance of the BEF.

Mark

[Mark Finneran]

Top example is the 1912-1914 example and the bottom example the more common.

[Mark Finneran]

2 images of the ZF in posn. There are about 8 or 9 ground gun variants!!

Mark

[Mark Finneran]

Indirect Fire Sight. 1918.

[Martin Bennitt]

Thanks for the pictures Mark, but assuming the gunner would have to have his eye quite close to the ZF sight eyepiece, he would find it quite uncomfortable to traverse and fire the gun with his head right forward and his thumbs on the trigger, especially the one on the right.

cheers Martin B

[derekspiers]

Thanks for the pictures Mark, but assuming the gunner would have to have his eye quite close to the ZF sight eyepiece, he would find it quite uncomfortable to traverse and fire the gun with his head right forward and his thumbs on the trigger, especially the one on the right.

cheers Martin B

Indeed - I assume therefore the gunner's crew would identify targets for him with binoculars and then give him instructions to traverse left or right until the gunner picked up the targets in higher magnification with the sight. When that target was "dealt with" another instruction would be given and so on.

In this way he doesn't really need to remove his eye from the sight until reload or targets are exhausted.

Notwithstanding the ferocity of MG fire on July 1st, I have seen a claim that more casualties were inflicted by artillery fire than by MG fire.

[MikB]

In practical terms, on a clear day and with a good telescope or binoculars used by a well trained gun controller, somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 metres is feasible in the direct fire role. This distance has not really changed since the early days of the machine gun. Modern tracer burns out at about 1,100 metres, but a skilled gun crew can be effective out to almost double that distance.

Jack

I would think that distance optimistic. It's easy to spot a fullbore round going into a sandbank at 600 when the sand's dry, the plume rises clearly, and only one shooter is firing on the target. When bullets are striking damper soil and many guns are firing, spotting the fall of shot for your own gun could become problematic at much shorter distances. The signal to noise ratio of where your rounds are going could become unintelligibly poor.

The angle of descent at long ranges means that small errors in rangefinding or sight calibration can cause all rounds to miss high or low. This effect is increased firing over a concave landscape - this is one reason why long-range MG fire was best employed against enemy assembling on reverse slopes, as the slope could approximately parallel the descent, giving a long dangerous zone.

If German MG crews really did engage effectively at such distances, it argues that they were very well-trained and their sights very assiduously calibrated. Walking the rounds onto the target by 'spot-and-correct' would most likely have been very difficult in the circumstances.

My understanding is that tracers were rarely used if at all at this period, at least in ground fire.

Regards,

MikB

[truthergw]

Thanks for the pictures Mark, but assuming the gunner would have to have his eye quite close to the ZF sight eyepiece, he would find it quite uncomfortable to traverse and fire the gun with his head right forward and his thumbs on the trigger, especially the one on the right.

cheers Martin B

Machine guns were primarily used on known headings to cover a particular zone. It would not be normal practice to aim, traverse and fire at the same time.

[Mark Finneran]

Good input from everybody as expected. The sled mount is an excellent (heavy) very very steady/sturdy firing platform and suprisingly it is possible to fire accurately, and consistently whilst face pressed against the leather cup. No 1 gunner had nothing to do with feeding the belts so he could always keep an eye on the target and keep firing. However as mentioned it was also practice to use the sight as an initial locating aid and then make best use of its area weapon purpose.

Furthermore, German MG crews were the pick of riflemen and had much stricter 'qualifying' standards so one should never forget these were professional machine gunners which also had a bearing how how much damage they inflicted.

Finally the use of MG08/15 on the Somme? Good question and yet to be fully put to bed for me, but so far there is no decent evidence to suggest they were in the line by July......but who knows what might pop one day!

Mark

[Story]

I am researching the opening phase of the July 1916 Somme offensive and currently reading an account which is devoted to the action around Thiepval.

It refers frequently to British casualties from machine gun emplacements particularly during the crossing of no man land on the morning of July 1st. However I am surprised at the amount of wounding and killing which resulted from machine guns at considerable distances from the lines that were being attacked.

What was the typical effective range of these guns to inflict "stopping" damage to a foot soldier and what was this range dependent upon.

thank you

For comparative reading, check out this British 1917 manual for Infantry Machine-Gun Company Training (Provisional)

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=0B-q0H1VSpj1wYTVhZjNkM2EtYzAxMC00MzZiLThkNmItZDIzZjg4YWMxMDE2

[Chris Boonzaier]

The indirect fire sites were probably used the same way we used 81mm Mortars. The sites are not used to aim at the enemy but to line up with 2 Javelins set with map coordinates.

You get the enemy on the map, adjust the site, ain at your jevelins, and fire away....

If you know where a crossing or a bunker or a tree is, and you have your javelins correctly set, you can hit the target easily, without a spotter...

By the way... anyone who wonders how effective falling rounds are in indirect fire should read this...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Celebratory_gunfire

Bullets fired into the air usually fall back at speeds much lower than those at which they leave the barrel of a firearm. Nevertheless, people can be injured, sometimes fatally, when bullets discharged into the air fall back down. The mortality rate among those struck by falling bullets is about 32%, compared with about 2% to 6% normally associated with gunshot wounds.[5] The higher mortality is related to the higher incidence of head wounds from falling bullets.

A study by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that 80% of celebratory gunfire-related injuries are to the head, feet, and shoulders.[6] In the U.S. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, about two people die and about 25 more are injured each year from celebratory gunfire on New Year's Eve, the CDC says.[3] Between the years 1985 and 1992, doctors at the King/Drew Medical Center in Los Angeles, California, treated some 118 people for random falling-bullet injuries. Thirty-eight of them died.[7] Kuwaitis celebrating in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War by firing weapons into the air caused 20 deaths from falling bullets.[7]

Firearms expert Julian Hatcher studied falling bullets and found that .30 caliber rounds reach terminal velocities of 300 feet per second (90 m/s) and larger .50 caliber bullets have a terminal velocity of 500 feet per second (150 m/s).[8] A bullet traveling at only 150 feet per second (46 m/s) to 170 feet per second (52 m/s) can penetrate human skin,[9] and at 200 feet per second (60 m/s) it can penetrate the skull.[10] A bullet that does not penetrate the skull may still result in an intracranial injury.[11]