Gun Registration

[Pete1052]

When I was the executive officer in charge of an 8-inch/203mm self-propelled firing battery I'd have an earplug in my left ear and use a finger to plug my right ear when we fired. I had to be able to hear the fire commands, deflections and quadrants on our speaker-phones. With experience comes a certain intuition, like "That don't sound right. That great a change in mils for a 50-meter correction?"

[Pete1052]

During my day the U.S. Army Field Artillery had slightly different procedures for laying the battery for what it called Emergency Fire Missions, colloquially known as "Hipshoots," like the old quick-draw cowboy Hollywood films. The procedure was different than for a deliberate occupation of a firing position, which I described in a post above. The idea in this case was to provide continuous fire support for the Infantry and Armor even when the battery was on the move, like during Patton's rapidly-moving tank and mech infantry operations against Germany in 1944-45.

When a battery received a call for fire while moving on the road it would pull off into the next useful firing position that it found by the road. The battery XO would locate the battery and target locations on his map and use a protractor and ruler to determine the azimuth and range between the two places. When the battery turned into the firing position the XO would lay the base piece onto the azimuth to the target using a lensatic compass graduated in mils (6400 mils = 360 degrees.) The gun or howitzer then would drive up next to and line up parallel to the direction in which the XO was pointing with his arm. Then using the range tables or a slide-rule version thereof a quadrant (range stting, up/down for the tube) to the target would be given to the gun or howitzer and the adjust-fire process of shooting would then begin. (Note to Nigel Evans and John Reed: If you had time to work out site, fine, but if not, f*ck it.) While the piece was adjusting its fire the XO would lay the rest of the battery, either with his compass (crude) or with an aiming circle (much more precise). When the rounds were on target and the battery was laid it would be, "Fire for effect, HE and VT, four rounds."

[FROGSMILE]

Yes, that's a sure sign that something might be up -- multiple artillery registrations can be an indication that the enemy is about to attack. I read about the phenomenon in a German officer's memoirs of World War II. Two work-arounds are the offset registration, in which the artillery registration point is near the enemy's position but not precisely on it. The corrections are later applied to data for fire missions targetted upon the enemy. The other technique is the meteorological data plus muzzle velocity gunnery correction which doesn't requiring actual firing. It is a computational method that provides a close approximation of what a fall-of-shot registration would.

One of the first proponents of this latter method in the British Army was Brigadier General Henry Hugh (but known as "Owen") Tudor, Royal Artillery, who was BGRA 9th Division for the Battle of Cambrai in 1917. Viz the following from the LLT:

"Previous British offensives in France had characteristically opened with a long bombardment of the German positions, with the intention of destroying barbed wire defences, trenches and strong points to allow as unhindered as possible a passage for the infantry to capture the position. Even before bombardment opened, guns would be registered by the firing of observed ranging shots, with adjustments being made to line, range and shell fuze setting to ensure that firing would be accurate. These methods had proven to have several disadvantages, not least being that there was no concealment of imminent attack."

"By mid 1917, a series of technological developments had made it possible to fire accurately without registering. The new technologies and associated methods included accurate survey of the gun position; mapping of enemy positions through aerial and ground observation; calculated reckoning of invisible enemy battery positions through triangulation on sources of sound and gun flash; advanced local meteorology and understanding of the effect of weather on the flight of the shell; improved reliability of munitions through improved quality control in manufacture; calibration of the wear condition of the gun barrel, and the training of battery officers and NCOs in the mathematical methods required to turn this complex set of factors into physical settings of the fuze, sights, elevation and position."

"It is apparent that although the methods to exploit these developments were evolving, they had not as a whole been driven into artillery doctrine from the top: their use at Cambrai was an innovation from below, for the idea of a surprise bombardment using the new methods came from Brigadier General Tudor, officer Commanding Royal Artillery of the 9th (Scottish) Division. By August he had discussed his idea with Brigadier General Hugo de Pree of IV Corps General Staff and in turn had gained the approval of the commander of IV Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Woollcombe. That the new methods had not been enthusiastically adopted may have been due to lingering doubts about their effectiveness: IV Corps Order 320, issued on 15 November 1917, said that the barrage 'being unregistered cannot be expected to be as accurate as usual'."

"The surprise bombardment using predicted firing from there on became a key part of Third Army's plan. The concealment of assembly of more than 1000 guns and howitzers on the fronts of III and IV Corps and the success of the opening bombardment at 6.10am on 20 November 1917 were strong contributory factors to the bells ringing in Britain three days later. It was not just surprise that made the artillery effective: weight of firepower and the proportion devoted to neutralisation of enemy batteries were also important factors. The number of guns and the 900,000 rounds assembled for the operation were approximately equivalent to those used in the preliminary bombardment to the successful attack on Vimy Ridge six months before.

Tudor served on the Western Front from December 1914 to the Armistice, rising from the rank of Captain in charge of an artillery battery to the rank of Major General and the command of the 9th (Scottish) Division. He continued to command this formation after 11 November 1918, as part of the Army of the Rhine, until the 9th Division was disbanded in March 1919."

"By all accounts, Tudor was a professional and forward-looking artilleryman. He was the first British general to use smoke shells to create screens, and one of the first advocates of predicted artillery fire. In addition, he was a fighting general who spent a lot of time in the front lines: he was almost killed at the Third Battle of Ypres in October 1917, when a shell fragment hit him in the head and smashed his helmet, and he was almost captured by the Germans during Operation Michael, the first German offensive in the spring of 1918."

[David B]

I think the quality of threads seen on this subject during the past few days could very well enhance the knowledge of anyone who is interested in the artillery problem, and further their knowledge

of how to fire ammunition to a long range target and make sure it hits its intended position.

Cheers

[Pete1052]

While I'm at it, have any of you guys ever looked through a pair of military binoculars and seen the horizontal and vertical scales with their tick-marks and numbers? Those are mils, 6400 of which equal 360 degrees. The reticle pattern is for adjusting artillery fire. Roughly speaking, one mil subtends one meter at a distance of one thousand meters. It's a handy measurement that helps you to judge distances from far away.

(I believe the precise number of mils in a circle is an odd or prime number, so 6400 is a compromise that was made for use in practical applications and because it is divisible by two. "Close enough for Government work," as they say.)

As a practical matter, the distance in meters/yards between two points you see in the number of mils in the reticule of your binoculars is equal to that number of mils multiplied by the range in thousands of meters to the target. Thus if your last round landed 50 mils left of the target in your binoculars at a range of three kilometers your correction should be, "Right, 150," 50 mils X an observer-target factor of 3.

The vertical scale in binocular reticle patterns is used for adjusting the height of burst of time fuzes, air bursts. Again, the distance in meters is the number of mils times the range in thousands.

The mil relationship was understood during the Great War but it did not come into widespread practice until World War II. Thus I am jumping the gun a bit.

[David B]

Pete,

No I was generally down in the ships funk hole (aka communication room) during any firing, but I don't think they used that type of binoc at all.

[nigelfe]

I was more concerned with the second and subsequent shells. Does the gun eventually dig a hole for itself and thus alter elevation and direction in some degree or is this not necessary. Suspect that in a barrage this would probably be a good thing anyway, giving the fall of shot a spread around the target.

It depends on the carriage design. If the carriage has spades at the end of the trail(s) then these will dig-in in most terrain, although if it is very soft they keep moving slowly back pushing up a pile of mud. In WW1 the field carriages for heavy and siege guns/hows often didn't have spades and instead used scotches, big ramp/wedge things placed behind the wheels and smaller ones in front. Obviously a siege gun on a mounting moved very little if at all. Naturally I think the best field carriage design is the box trail and platform (eg 25-pr and 105mm Lt Gun) that appeared at the end of WW1 (18-pr carriage Mk 4 or 5 (- I can never remember which was split trail and which box) where the platform doesn't move so the spade doesn't dig in making it easy to shift when traversing the carriage.

In UK, etc, practice a gun should be re-layed after every round fired, although I'm not sure that this was always the case in WW1, particularly with 18-pr given reported rates of fire in the early months. That said a layer will look through his sight and look at his bubbles and if the sight is on the aiming point and the bubbles all centred then he won't touch anything, but usually he'll have to do the last 3 of the 5 laying steps (cross level, accurately for line, accurately for elevation). Similar but simpler with digital sights (just rematch line and elevation displays), which since 2002 are the only type the Royal Artillery uses. Another point is that for the last century UK generally designed guns with one man laying (the obvious exceptions being 13/18-pr), some other nations notably US, traditionally use 2 man laying. No doubt they had a good reason but I've never fathomed what it was!

[Pete1052]

Most likely the Navy had more precise instruments for adjusting its gunfire than ground troops with hand-held binoculars. However, you and many others have probably looked through an old pair of Army binos without realizing what all those lines and tick marks were for.

[nigelfe]

The vertical scale in binocular reticle patterns is used for adjusting the height of burst of time fuzes, air bursts. Again, the distance in meters is the number of mils times the range in thousands.

The mil relationship was understood during the Great War but it did not come into widespread practice until World War II. Thus I am jumping the gun a bit.

Actually the French adopted mils before 1914 and during WW1 their guns were a mix of mils and decigrades (4000/circle). UK considered mils and trialled them in 6 btys in early 1914, but decided a major war was not a sensible time for such a high impact change. Subtension was certainly used with degrees and binos marked with degree reticles. However, the British method (until 1950) of mostly ranging on GT with the observer ordering a switch and the actual GT range meant that it wasn't as important as it was with target grid corrections.

[nigelfe]

One of the first proponents of this latter method in the British Army was Brigadier General Henry Hugh (but known as "Owen") Tudor, Royal Artillery, who was CRA 9th Division for the Battle of Cambrai in 1917.

You can find a history of the British evolution of techical fire control including 'map shooting' and related issues (survey, meteor, calibration, ballistics) in the fire control history pages of my web site http://nigelef.tripod.com/fc_introduction.htm . There was also the matter of accurate target acquisition and location - without this map shooting is pointless!

All my research indicates that it was not any particular innovation by any one officer (despite subsequent reputational burnishing!), it was progressive evolution of various 'enablers', pieces in a jigsaw where the pieces weren't all widely recognised, understood and certainly not usable, in 1914. Map shooting was used with varying success and increasing accuracy and acceptance from 1915 onwards. The Cambrai innovation was that finally map shooting was sufficently developed that Commanders were prepared to take the risk of no preparatory (ie pre Z-hour) artillery fire. Extended preparatory fire (eg from Z-20 days at Arras) had proved successful in spring and summer 1917.

B-G Tudor was by no means unique, but did have interesting ideas, eg preferring HE and 1 gun smoke per bty for a moving barrage instead of shrapnel or 50/50 shrapnel/HE.

[nigelfe]

During my day the U.S. Army Field Artillery had slightly different procedures for laying the battery for what it called Emergency Fire Missions, colloquially known as "Hipshoots," like the old quick-draw cowboy Hollywood films. The procedure was different than for a deliberate occupation of a firing position, which I described in a post above. The idea in this case was to provide continuous fire support for the Infantry and Armor even when the battery was on the move, like during Patton's rapidly-moving tank and mech infantry operations against Germany in 1944-45.

Called 'Quick Actions' by UK, initiated by the observer ordering 'Action, Action, Action'. Orient by prismatic compass, take range and bearing of the map. Even with the first digital computer because they took a bit of time to prepare. Of course good organisation and planning means that batteries leap-frog each other in action so quick actions aren't really needed. Digital sights and associated self oriention & fixation by each gun has totally altered the game along with instantly ready FC computers. Day or night quick actions are now really quick and simple - they're actually militarily useful at last, it's a bit like pre-1914 again.

[FROGSMILE]

You can find a history of the British evolution of techical fire control including 'map shooting' and related issues (survey, meteor, calibration, ballistics) in the fire control history pages of my web site http://nigelef.tripo...ntroduction.htm . There was also the matter of accurate target acquisition and location - without this map shooting is pointless!

All my research indicates that it was not any particular innovation by any one officer (despite subsequent reputational burnishing!), it was progressive evolution of various 'enablers', pieces in a jigsaw where the pieces weren't all widely recognised, understood and certainly not usable, in 1914. Map shooting was used with varying success and increasing accuracy and acceptance from 1915 onwards. The Cambrai innovation was that finally map shooting was sufficently developed that Commanders were prepared to take the risk of no preparatory (ie pre Z-hour) artillery fire. Extended preparatory fire (eg from Z-20 days at Arras) had proved successful in spring and summer 1917.

B-G Tudor was by no means unique, but did have interesting ideas, eg preferring HE and 1 gun smoke per bty for a moving barrage instead of shrapnel or 50/50 shrapnel/HE.

I know he was not unique, that is why I took great care to emphasise he was but "one of the first proponents" (the latter word being plural). He came to notice because of his gunnery tactics at Arras and then the plan (which was apparently largely his own) for the all arms assault at Cambrai.

Here are some other proponents who played a part in the advanced gunnery techniques referred to in this thread:

BRAGG, William Lawrence: In October 1915, 'Professor' Bragg was a Nobel prize winner for Physics (1915) but well out of his depth in army uniform. Atypically, for the military, he was assigned to highly appropriate scientific work developing the artillery sound-ranging apparatus originally designed by the French Army. It used a series of interconnected telephones, cinematography and electronic circuits to detect and locate with some precision the presence of an enemy artillery battery. Faulty microphones delayed progress until the more reliable British 'Tucker' microphone was produced. Large amounts of information were collected concerning the location of artillery pieces, and the ballistics of their shells closely monitored. The effect of the weather on shell ballistics could be equally well determined; all of this information added to the ever-increasing accuracy of Allied gunnery. Eventually, almost 50 artillery sound ranging units were established on the Western Front, forming and reforming as the German Army reorganised its dispositions.

The work of Bragg's team was one of the major scientific efforts of the Great War.

HEMMING, Henry Harold: Hemming, a Canadian Reconnaissance Officer, realised a new system of locating enemy artillery batteries by the flashes the muzzles emitted when firing shells. The system called was 'Flash-Buzz' or 'Flash Spotting'. It required very accurate and up-to-date maps and highly supportive senior artillery officers. Sadly its true potential was often lost due to deficiencies in one, or both, of these essential criteria.

HORNE, Henry Sinclair: Military records clearly indicate that the first of what came to be known as a 'rolling' or 'creeping' barrage was used by the Bulgarians in the Siege of Adrianople in March 1913. On the Western Front, it is usually agreed that this concept of covering artillery fire by lifting it in strictly timed stages to match the advance of the troops, whilst causing the enemy to cower in their trenches or dug-outs, was first employed by British 51st Division at Loos in September1915. The commander was Douglas Haig, of British First Army.

However, it was on the Somme in 1916 that Henry Sinclair Horne, Commander of XV Corps and then First Army, first routinely deployed this technique using a rate of approximately 50 metres advance per minute, but considerably slower in bad (e.g. muddy) conditions.

In April 1917, Horne again highly successfully used the technique with the Canadian Corps at Vimy Ridge; hence the Canadians are often described as original deployers of the 'creeping' barrage.

In its final form, the 'creeping' barrage could be a wall of several rows of exploding munitions over a mile in depth. Depending on the circumstance, it could include artillery shells, howitzer, mortars and even machine gun fire. Once the barrage had crossed the enemy defence-line it would be halted, providing a protective curtain against any counter-attack. And then, when the allied troops were ready to advance again, it would continue its timed forward progression until the next objective was attained. And so on.

However, Horne was the first to concede that much of his success with the 'creeping barrage' was due to the ideas of Ernest Wright Alexander,VC, who was Brigadier General Royal Artillery XV Corps on the Somme and, later in 1918 Artillery Commander of British First Army.

[Pete1052]

Perhaps later in another thread we could address the subject of fire planning to support the operations of the ground-gaining arms. I was a Fire Support Officer for a straight-leg infantry battalion as such I had about 20 forward observers working for me ranging in rank from private to lieutenant who worked with the battalion's rifle companies. Informal fire planning means having the supporting firing batteries record targets in your area of operations -- likely enemy locations, avenues of approach, and prominent terrain from which fires can be shifted. Recorded targets have the firing data worked out in advance so they can be engaged instantaneously. The manuals have detailed guidance on fire planning for both offensive and defensive operations. The general guidance taught in school is not to overdo it when having the batteries record targets, but have enough of them recorded so the guns can start firing at a moment's notice. My favorite was "Groups" of targets, several locations that are to be engaged simultaneously, like a mini-concentration. You say "Fire Group Tango Bravo" and three minutes later rounds are on the way there .

[nigelfe]

I know he was not unique, that is why I took great care to emphasise he was but "one of the first proponents" (the latter word being plural). He came to notice because of his gunnery tactics at Arras and then the plan (which was apparently largely his own) for the all arms assault at Cambrai.

Here are some other proponents who played a part in the advanced gunnery techniques referred to in this thread:

BRAGG, William Lawrence:

HEMMING, Henry Harold:

HORNE, Henry Sinclair: In its final form, the 'creeping' barrage could be a wall of several rows of exploding munitions over a mile in depth. Depending on the circumstance, it could include artillery shells, howitzer, mortars and even machine gun fire. Once the barrage had crossed the enemy defence-line it would be halted, providing a protective curtain against any counter-attack. And then, when the allied troops were ready to advance again, it would continue its timed forward progression until the next objective was attained. And so on.

However, Horne was the first to concede that much of his success with the 'creeping barrage' was due to the ideas of Ernest Wright Alexander,VC, who was Brigadier General Royal Artillery XV Corps on the Somme and, later in 1918 Artillery Commander of British First Army.

Bragg was concerned with sound ranging, and was a major contributor to

that. But not AFAIA 'tube' gunnery.

Hemming made a useful contribution, but if you've read Chasseaud closely you'll realise that Franks as GOC 1 HARD was experimenting with coordinated FS Xobs before Hemming.

A closer study of artillery history might lead to discovery of the use of a creeping barrage in S Africa. It also gets a mention in GHQ Arty Notes No 4 April 1916 edition.

As I indicated in a previous post this is a complicated area that developed through rapid evolution and incremental improvements. The more I research the less inclined I am to be definitive about dates or people first responsible for making something happen.

[FROGSMILE]

Bragg was concerned with sound ranging, and was a major contributor to

that. But not AFAIA 'tube' gunnery.

Hemming made a useful contribution, but if you've read Chasseaud closely you'll realise that Franks as GOC 1 HARD was experimenting with coordinated FS Xobs before Hemming.

A closer study of artillery history might lead to discovery of the use of a creeping barrage in S Africa. It also gets a mention in GHQ Arty Notes No 4 April 1916 edition.

As I indicated in a previous post this is a complicated area that developed through rapid evolution and incremental improvements. The more I research the less inclined I am to be definitive about dates or people first responsible for making something happen.

My point regarding Bragg was that without the sound ranging some of the advanced gunnery would not have been possible.

I did not know about Franks.

I am however, aware of the early use of creeping barrage artillery fire in the 2nd Boer War, it is even mentioned in the wikipaedia article on "barrages".

The point about Horne is that he was apparently one of the first to use the creeping barrage quote 'routinely' unquote.

[nigelfe]

My point regarding Bragg was that without the sound ranging some of the advanced gunnery would not have been possible.

The point about Horne is that he was apparently one of the first to use the creeping barrage quote 'routinely' unquote.

'Routine' sounds a bit hyperbolic (or hagiographic) to me. As a div commander in 1915 he would have experienced a moving barrage at Loos, that that was a corps fireplan by Birch, in the new year he was a corps comd in the Balkans. Then he returned as an army comd. Throughout this period creeping barrages were the norm, routine everywhere.

You'll have to explain to me in simple terms how Braggs SR work was key to some advanced gunnery. Basically, SR was just another form of target acquistion, ie like air photos and flash spotting. I've yet to find an authoritive account that doesn't put air photos at the top of the importance list.

One possibility might be that SR produced not just the source of guns firing but also the location of the fall of shot aimed back at them. The two positions could then be compared and a correction produced for the guns to hit the target. Plotting or calculating such a correction is very straightforward, and used with any form of cross obs, ie the RGA were doing it a few decades earlier, its basically what their 'observation of fire' instruments were designed to help with. After WW1 (1930s) a device called the 'comparator' was developed to produce the SR correction data, a cunning mechanical computer to solve second order differential equations using the bearing from each SR mike, I wouldn't be surprised if Bragg was at least consulted but it certainly wasn't main stream gunnery.

Actually, it was FS that needed a new gunnery technique, for airburst ranging. The gunnery problem was non-rigidity of the trajectory, this was known, it just wasn't really needed until high airbursts were used for cross obs.

[FROGSMILE]

'Routine' sounds a bit hyperbolic (or hagiographic) to me. As a div commander in 1915 he would have experienced a moving barrage at Loos, that that was a corps fireplan by Birch, in the new year he was a corps comd in the Balkans. Then he returned as an army comd. Throughout this period creeping barrages were the norm, routine everywhere.

You'll have to explain to me in simple terms how Braggs SR work was key to some advanced gunnery. Basically, SR was just another form of target acquistion, ie like air photos and flash spotting. I've yet to find an authoritive account that doesn't put air photos at the top of the importance list.

One possibility might be that SR produced not just the source of guns firing but also the location of the fall of shot aimed back at them. The two positions could then be compared and a correction produced for the guns to hit the target. Plotting or calculating such a correction is very straightforward, and used with any form of cross obs, ie the RGA were doing it a few decades earlier, its basically what their 'observation of fire' instruments were designed to help with. After WW1 (1930s) a device called the 'comparator' was developed to produce the SR correction data, a cunning mechanical computer to solve second order differential equations using the bearing from each SR mike, I wouldn't be surprised if Bragg was at least consulted but it certainly wasn't main stream gunnery.

Actually, it was FS that needed a new gunnery technique, for airburst ranging. The gunnery problem was non-rigidity of the trajectory, this was known, it just wasn't really needed until high airbursts were used for cross obs.

You clearly have your view and far be it from me to decry it in any way. I am merely quoting what I have read about the record of these individuals, rather like you will no doubt be quoting what you have read. Neither of us will have met the gentlemen concerned, or be in a position to debunk their alleged achievements and I am no longer really interested in the ping-pong of comments that seems to have developed between us. Those who have an interest in this subject area will be able to research the matter and draw their own conclusions. A recently published book that I can recommend is titled: 'Artillery in the Great War', by Paul Strong and Sanders Marble - ISBN 9781844159499.

[Pete1052]

One of the problems involving discussion of military tactics and techniques during periods when they were changing rapidly is that any general statements one might make will soon be contradicted in other messages by specific examples others may cite. Although those incidents were real enough they may have been relatively rare outliers or exceptions to a general rule. On forums like this there are a lot of people with a wealth of knowledge about hundreds of verifiable historical incidents and events who still fail to understand the fundamental reasons of how or why military organizations function the way they do. There was a thread a while back regarding the depth of trenches that drove me up the wall because it suggested a defensive BEF consisting of infantry battalions cowering in their holes in abject fear. Sometimes it's best to bite your tongue and let enthusiasts about history be enthusiasts without saying anything.

[ianjonesncl]

I spent time in happy M-L, swingers on the NATO ranges (south of the town) were extremely rare, particularly after a major error by a US or Cdn bty (can't remember which) forced all charges to be prepared and checked before firing started (loading wrong charge is the most common mistake). If the range safety procedures were being properly followed then a round outside the impact area was impossible, if it happens the safety officer should be court martialed.

Nigel

It may have been British...around 1969 per chance ??

[ianjonesncl]

Nigelfe,

I realized that when you see a gun jump the shell is probably half way to the target, I was more concerned with the second and subsequent shells. Does the gun eventually dig a hole for itself

and thus alter elevation and direction in some degree or is this not necessary. Suspect that in a barrage this would probably be a good thing anyway, giving the fall of shot a spread around the target.

David

I believe it was a problem, especilialy during 3rd Ypres where it was difficult to find a stable firing platform.

As Nigel poined out relaying between each round can mitigate the problem. However, if movment is so bad that the aiming point is lost ,as the gun has gone so far back or has slewed, a change to a new aiming point is required. One aspect of movement is that it can effect I have seen the conditions so bad that fresh survey had to be passed to guns.

During 3rd Ypres it was regonised that inaccurate firing was arising from unstable platforms. Gun detatchments resorted to trying using cartridge cases as a means of building a platform of sorts.

[Pete1052]

In spite of all the safety double-checks put into the system shooting out of the impact area happens during peacetime from time to time. It happens during wartime too, except in those cases they're not called impact areas. It's a risk that comes with the terrritory when you play with the big toys.

In other threads I've discussed how the current U.S. Army training system was inspired by the American experience of the First World War -- how to train a large number of people quickly from a relatively flat-footed start. We used it during World War II to create our 100-division Army. Nigel and I could probably go round and around about whether the U.S. Army training system produces highly-skilled and trained artillerymen. During WW II the U.S. was using statistics and input-throughput-output personnel models to train people in schools to a certain level of average competence. For better or for worse, that training system was a product of the First World War on what it takes to equip and train combat formations during a short period of time. I'm sure Churchill was glad to see U.S. Infantry Divisions begin to arrive in the UK in '42 and '43. A higher level of training for the U.S. Army might have meant Normandy wouldn't have happened in June 1944, but rather much later in 1947 or so. Whether the U.S. Army should continue to train its people that way now is open to debate, but it worked during the world wars. "We get thar the fastest with the mostest."

[FROGSMILE]

One of the problems involving discussion of military tactics and techniques during periods when they were changing rapidly is that any general statements one might make will soon be contradicted in other messages by specific examples others may cite. Although those incidents were real enough they may have been relatively rare outliers or exceptions to a general rule. On forums like this there are a lot of people with a wealth of knowledge about hundreds of verifiable historical incidents and events who still fail to understand the fundamental reasons of how or why military organizations function the way they do. There was a thread a while back regarding the depth of trenches that drove me up the wall because it suggested a defensive BEF consisting of infantry battalions cowering in their holes in abject fear. Sometimes it's best to bite your tongue and let enthusiasts about history be enthusiasts without saying anything.

Yes, I think you are probably right Pete. Like the two of you I have an indirect fire background, but it is but one part of my time in the Service and I cannot get myself enthused enough to debate who did what when in terms of advanced gunnery techniques. To use an old Tommy expression....'fill your boots pal'.

[Pete1052]

Nigel knows his Artillery stuff and I believe he was RA. My point was that occasionally real-world examples taken from history can sometimes muddy the waters of a discussion more than informing people. From 1914 to 1918 the British Artillery went from being mainly a direct-fire arm to indirect fire. Any discussion of that evolution might be confounded by people dropping into the thread with examples to the contrary. Someone might say, "Captain John Smith of the 17th Loamshires wrote that in August 1916 the RFA battery supporting them rode forward of their position and engaged the Germans with direct fire... "

[FROGSMILE]

Nigel knows his Artillery stuff and I believe he was RA. My point was that occasionally real-world examples taken from history can sometimes muddy the waters of a discussion more than informing people. From 1914 to 1918 the British Artillery went from being mainly a direct-fire arm to indirect fire. Any discussion of that evolution might be confounded by people dropping into the thread with examples to the contrary. Someone might say, "Captain John Smith of the 17th Loamshires wrote that in August 1916 the RFA battery supporting them rode forward of their position and engaged the Germans with direct fire... "

Yes Pete, I can see that Nigel knows his stuff. As it happens I was RA too for some years, but many other things also. As regards your point I understood it well, but am not sure that I was guilty of any dropping in of the "contrary examples" that you imply. My comments were merely those obtained from historical sources that seem to be well found, but as I said, it is for others to form their own opinions about who did what when just as he clearly has.

[nigelfe]

Nigel

It may have been British...around 1969 per chance ??

No, IIRC more like a decade later. Not to say there weren't others.