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Remembered Today:

Yeomen Going into Action Under Fire


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Hello - This very grainy photo shows one of the Yeomanry regiments advancing under shellfire across the Salt Lake on 21st August 1915. Despite its poor focus and condition it seems to be an extremely rare photo of this action. The caption on the photo is "Our Regiment (illegible)ing from Lala Baba towards Chocolate Hill under fire" It gives a decent idea of the level of dispersion among the troops as they marched across the plain and a certain 'edginess' of a photo taken in action. The original is about 1" x 2" so this is the best resolution I can get.

I am only aware of one other reasonably well known photo of this event taken from Chocolate Hill looking back along the line of advance. I thought that you would find this of some interest. This is posted for info/research purposes only. MG

post-55873-0-88863200-1298898346.jpg

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Hi Martin,

a great photo and one I have not seen before. Many thanks for posting it. do we know which "Regiment" it is?

thanks, Steve

It is very likely from the personal records of an officer in the 1st/1st County of London Yeomanry (Middlesex Hussars) who were in the leading Bde crossing the Salt Lake (3rd Regiment to cross) . The Regiment's Squadrons were led by 2 officers who would later both win the VC (Lafone - in Palestine at El Buggar (sp?) and Watson - later DSO and VC with the KOYLI). Another officer (Capt Benn) when shot at "..felt uncommonly foolish myself, as I had had no weapon all day". There was a saying in the 4th London Yeomanry Bde: If you couldn't shoot you joined the Sharpshooters (1st/3rd County of London Yeomanry), if you couldn't ride you joined the Roughriders (1st/1st City of London Yeomanry) and if you could do neither you joined the Middlesex Hussars. This regiment crossed the Salt Lake plain to the airs of their own mouth-organ band being shelled for a mile whilst marching with a measured step the whole way. They were the leading Regiment of the 2nd Mounted Bde . There is a slight caveat; the photo is in a very damaged collection that includes many photos that also appear in the Gallipoli album of the Sharpshooters' CO (Lt Col Weston Jarvis) - it seems officers shared photos after the war. Whilst this photo itself is not in the Sharpshooters' album, there remains a very remote chance it is the Sharpshooters. I assume it is of the Middlesex Hussars as the caption is in the handwriting of a Middlesex Hussar and captions on other photos in the same series suggest Middlesex Hussar provenance.

The photo intrigues me as there are a few photos that purport to be taken "in action", but which do not stand up to scrutiny. There are 2 threads on this forum that look at (1) the RND exiting a trench at high speed (now widely assumed to be a training photo in Lemnos) and (2) another of the Australian Light Horse allegedly charging at Beersheba (now assumed to be a re-staging or re-enactment). The Yeomanry photo has completely different qualities and conveys a sense of tension and drama. One can almost feel the shock waves from the shells exploding overhead, the tension and sense of suppressed urgency to get across the Salt Lake. For me it is an extremely rare photo that captures the very last troops to be committed to a full scale assault at Gallipoli, so by definition an historically important record probably taken between 4 pm and 4.45pm on 21st August 1915 - accounts differ slightly on timing. The impact of the shelling varied across the division, but the leading Regiments suffered the most - see selected War Diary and Regimental History extracts from this day below:

[in the Side Shows –Capt Wedgwood Benn Middlesex Hussars]
... Meanwhile our men were standing equipped ready for their turn to go. In my troop we had been rather proud of a mouth-organ band which had produced some amazing orchestral effects at Moascar, and we had set our hearts on going into action on the first occasion to its music. Unfortunately, having to act as adjutant I was unable to march with my men but when the regiment was drawn up to take the lead as the first line of the reserve to sweep on towards Chocolate Hill, I was delighted to hear the sound of the familiar mouth organ. The chef d’orchestre was a certain trooper who rejoiced in the name of “Gunboat Smith” and enjoyed no small reputation in the regiment by reason of the fact that he had acted as trainer to the famous boxer of that name. “Gunboat” accordingly struck up andit was positively to the sound of music as I can aver that this troop of the Middlesex Hussars went for the first time into battle..... After about half an hour’s progress we reached the enemy’s shrapnel, through which of course we were bound to pass if we were to attain Chocolate Hill. As each line of the Division advanced into the beaten zone, the shells did their part, being timed to burst just ahead of our march. Casualties began but our orders were strict and forbade us to stop for anyone. When men fell they had to be left for the stretcher parties which were following. As adjutant I was to and fro with Colonel “Scatters” who though slightly injured in the foot was marching in front of the line. Suddenly I saw to with horror my troops hit by a shell and eight men go down. The rest were splendid. They simply continued to advance inthe proper formation at a walk and awaited the order which did not come for another quarter of an hour before breaking into the double. Some men exhibited extraordinary calm. I remember one picked up a tortoise, surprised to see it running wild and another observing a man dropped his rations bent and gathered them up for him which just bought him in reach of a splinter which wounded him. Everyone was intensely excited but all were bravely self-controlled...

[Middlesex Hussars War Diary ]
Arrived at LALA BABA at 01:30 am. MG Section left Regt, reported to XI Div. Bivouac on Lala Baba. 3 pm moved out with Div. The Middlesex Hussars were the leading Regt of the Div: to leave LALA BABA about 3:30 pm. We moved across on the right of the Bde to CHOCOLATE HILL in line of Troop Column.
We first came under shrapnel fire at about 4:45 pm & reached CHOCOLATE HILL at 5:15 pm.
On reaching CHOCOLATE HILL the Regt was ordered to attack round the right slope past HILL 50 and if possible get a footing on HILL 112: As we had not reconnoitred the ground and had no opportunity of seeing it, I ordered Capt Watson to lead my firing line consisting of 2 troops each of B & C Sqns whilst I would support him closely with the other 4 troops. We found a trench running from the slopes of Hill 53 to Hill 50 and utilised this as far as possible but found it so full of Munster & Lancashire wounded who were crawling back that it was impossible to make any progress there, so I moved acrosss the open to the slopes of HILL 50 [Green Hill], the back of which was then in flames. Pushing on we occupied a trench on the West slopes of HILL 105. One troop being pushed out in front & digging themselves in. I was ordered to wait here & get touch with General W [Wiggin] Bde left who were to form on our left. A Sqn of the Warwick Yeo and Gloucester Yeo also both Sqns of the Rough Riders there prolonged my left eventually joining with General W.....

[4th (London) Mounted Bde War Diary]
12:00 noon. Verbal orders were received to prepare for and advance on CHOCOLATE HILL (HILL 53)…. 1pm: Orders were received for the Bde to march at 3 pm. The 4th Bde to lead the Div….. 3:30 pm: The Head of the column debouched into the open from the SOUTHERN side of LALA BABA and moved SOUTH in order to clear the Salt Lake immediately west of the hill before changing direction to CHOCOLATE HILL. The Head of the column after advancing about half a mile was crossed by an infantry Bn and compelled to stop. Troops lying down. Up till that time the Div had been moving in Column of Troops with the intention of forming a Bde line of troop columns when clear of the SALT LAKE but owing to shellfire being opened by the enemy, Regimental line of troop columns was formed. These Troop columns advanced on CHOCOLATE HILL each column being slightly extended and at about 50 yds interval from one another.
4pm very heavy shellfire, shrapnel high explosive was opened up on the head of the column and throughout its whole length. This fire continued until the Div had reached the W slopes of CHOC HILL and even there troops were not protected from the fire. The conduct of the men during this trying advance was magnificent.... 4:45 pm The Head of the column reached CHOC HILL.
Rear units about 15 minutes later. The scrub caught light owing to the shell-fire this making the work of the stretcher bearers extremely difficult..

[The City of London Yeomanry by A S Hamilton MM (Roughriders)]
"The Yeomen paraded as ordered in column of Troops with the Middlesex (Hussars) leading and the Roughriders at their heels. "Soon after half-past three" to quote the Official History "all five Bdes moved off from their bivouacs in succession. Each Bde was nearly a thousand strong and as soon as this large body of men reached the open plain to the south of the Salt Lake it offered an inviting target to the enemy's guns. But the successive lines swept forward as steadily as if on parade only moving at the double when ordered to do so and by five o'clock the whole Div had arrived at Chocolate Hill. Fortunately the Turkish shrapnel had burst so high that except in the case of one or two Regts, casualties had not been heavy"..... The Commander in Chief both in his despatches and "Gallipoli Diary" has vividly described that march which he witnessed from Chocolate Hill and he too has paid a high tribute to the discipline of the Yeomen..... At the time it was suggested that the Div was sacrificed to take pressure off the 29th. Presumably too it was the 21st August that Sir John Maxwell alluded to when he wrote in a letter to Lord Kitchener "the poor gallant 2nd Mouted Div was badly left by someone". The facts however do not admit of any suggestion of its having been sacrificed or "left". Sir Ian Hamilton from the outset had disliked the idea of a large formed body moving across the open in full view of the enemy but his local commanders had liked his alternative of a night advance even less and there was no other course possible. The only cover close behind the front was at Chocolate Hill and this was required for the 88th Bde. And although this Bde had gone forward in driblets during the morning without loss, such a movement could not be repeated once the battle had begun......
Yet the 4th Mounted Bde diary makes it clear that the Div's advance was not according to plan, but through pure mischance. After traversing the narrow neck of solid ground between the Salt Lake and the sea in column of Troops, Bdes in succession were to have formed line of troop columns to the left for the march across the plain. But while on its way along the neck, the Div was compelled to halt by a Battalion crossing its front: the enemy at once opened a searching fire: and so the change of direction was expedited by being carried out by Regts instead of Bdes, each turning "sections left" as soon as its rearmost troops drew clear of the south end of the lake. The effect of this alteration was that where the Div was to have made its two-mile advance in five Bdes lines at deploying distance, that is on a frontage of about 400 yds and with 400 yds separating Bdes, it actually went over in 14 regimental lines having a third of the intended frontage and about 100 yards between successive lines - a much more attractive target..... Promptly deluging the Div with shrapnel and HE, the Turks fired "into the brown" so that the 1st Bde in the middle had every fifth man a casualty and the 4th Bde at the head escaped comparatively lightly. But even in the latter it seemed incredible that anyone could remain unscathed and the memory of that two miles still haunts many, but none more so that the trooper who burst his braces ducking at the first shell and for the rest of the way was continually stopping to retrieve his trousers! ........ In the shelter of Chocolate Hill Regts re-formed and the roll was called. Back on the plain where gorse fires had broken out, MOs and stretcher bearers were working desperately to get the wounded away and many themselves became casualties in the process "All deserved medals as big as frying pans and Father Day one a size larger." Father H C Day S J was the RC Chaplain to the Div; he had been attached to the Roughriders since about the beginning of the year. .....

[Royal Gloucestershire Hussars History]
In August the final effort was made and to reinforce the final stage of that effort was he task of the Yeomanry. In Aug 21st the entire Division including the RGH was bivouacked on Lala Baba Hill and in the afternoon moved on to Chocolate Hill. T
here was no cover and the Regt came under very heavy shell fire before reaching the hill
. 2nd Lt Gething was killed, Lt Col Playne severley wounded, Capt Longworth dangerously wounded, Lt Howard severly wounded and 2nd Lt Colledge, Bde Staff severely wounded. The Div concentrated under Chocolate Hill and at 5 pm advanced in the direction of Hill 112, the Worcesters in the front line, the RGH in support. The RGH MGs which had been carried by men of the section the previous night from the bivouacs at Suvla Bay to Lala Baba were again carried across the Salt Lake to Choc Hill where they were ordered to remain. They were able to come into action at 1,200 yds on the Turkish trenches in the very early morning. After an advance under dropping fire over very difficult country, the Regt reached the front line trenches held by the 29th Div.

[The Warwickshire Yeoamanry in the Great War
]…By time they reached their new position behind Chocolate Hill it was six o'clock and the Yeomanry Division at once moved into action, the 2nd Mounted Bde leading with the 1st Mounted Bde (including the Warwicks) in reserve…. The Bdes advanced in line of Troop columns over about 2 1/2 miles of flat country, interspersed with patches of gorze and scrub and when h
alf way across came under heavy shrapnel fire.
The enemy had got the range to a nicety and shells continued to burst about 30 ft overhead with deadly effect. The Warwicks occupied the centre and suffered more severely than some of the other Regts engaged. One troop in B Sqn was soon reduced to half its strength and its leader Sergt Peyton fell wounded hit in the head. Maj Granville in charge of the Sqn was struck and lay with a broken thigh amongst the burning scrub from which he was with difficulty extricated by two of his men, his rescue by the gallant conduct of LCpl C W Barnard and Pte G Hinton deserves special mention . These two men although severely wounded themselves succeeded in carrying their leader out into an open space; and Cpl Barnard under heavy fire managed to obtain assistance from the collecting station about 200 yards in rear to which Maj Granville was conveyed in safety...

[Historical Records of the South Notts Hussars]
Battle of Scimitar Hill commenced. Main objective seizure of Anafarta Heights. Ops commencing at 2:30 pm with Hy Bombardment of enemy positions by ships and British guns on Choc Hill and Green Hill. 3 pm gen attack. Inf did their utmost (29th Div) Gen retirement was inevitable. Mtd Div ordered to advance to position behind Choc Hill, rear of 88th Inf Bde. Hy shrapnel fire marching across dry bed of Salt Lake.
3rd Mtd Bde moved off at 4 pm
in lines of troop columns. Col Cole OIC 3rd Mtd Bde as BG Kenna commanding Div. Maj Barber OC SNH.
Initially lightly shelled, but fire grew in intensity as the Regt advanced. Leading Regiments suffered most.
SNH passed over many dead. New experience. Startled fox. Pte cried "View Halloo!" and gave chase. Pulled up by officer. Shrub caught fire. Capt Rowe (MO) remained in open to rescue wounded under heavy shellfire. Saved Many lives. Men kept excellent order. One man wounded, 2 missing, another shot on arrival at Choc Hill. Hamilton's comments remarked on. Only doubled when order was given a few hundred yards from Choc Hill. Arrived at 6 pm. Immediately sent into action.

[Derbyshire Yeomanry War History]
Parade at 12:00. Orders. No maps issued. Learned later from the Times what the target was. 14:00 fomed up. 15:00 bombardment of Hill 70 and Hill 112 1
6:00 Advance starts. Column of lines of Troop columns. 28 Sqns [two per Regiment].
Notts & Derby last rearmost Bombardment half way across. Men ignored shells. "elation" Bursts too high HE duds.
CO of Herts Yeo wounded but cheerful. Tortoise observed in barrage.. 16:00 [??] Chocolate Hill reached.
Orders to lie down. Shelling. Scrub ablaze on plain. Stretcher bearers rescuing wounded. 2 hour wait behind Choc Hill. Night attack on Chocolate Hill.

[
Herts Yeomanry War Diary]
1 pm: Orders received to march to CHOCOLATE HILL …. parading at 2:30 pm were heavily bombarded until 4 pm…. Div advanced over crest of LALA BABA - the 5th Bde (in reserve) being in open Regimental line of Troop Column had to f
ace a terrific storm of shrapnel and heavy shell fire while traversing 3 miles of open and exposed country.
To the intense regret of all ranks, Lt Col S G Sheppard DSO fell mortally wounded during the advance, whilst bravely leading the Regt. ...... 5:15 pm CHOCOLATE HILL reached, 1 Officer and 19 OR s wounded and 23 OR s missing being reported on roll call. Of the 43 casualties, it transpired that four were killed and one dead of wounds the following dayy when 9 of the missing men rejoined unwounded. Maj R Halsey who took over the command was informed by Gen Peyton Brig Gen Biscoe and by Staff Officers who had watched the operations that the discipline of all ranks was excellent and that their conduct under exceptionally trying circumstances could not have been excelled by any regular troops. This was afterwards confirmed by a special complimentary order issued to the Division.

etc...

A small moment in history frozen in time. Regards MG

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"The Yeomanry photo has completely different qualities and conveys a sense of tension and drama. One can almost feel the shock waves from the shells exploding overhead, the tension and sense of suppressed urgency to get across the Salt Lake"

This photo may well have been taken under fire but I can`t sense any tension, drama or suppressed urgency. It`s quite unlike descriptions of men going forward under fire on the Western Front. However, maybe that`s how the yeomanry did it - who knows?

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"The Yeomanry photo has completely different qualities and conveys a sense of tension and drama. One can almost feel the shock waves from the shells exploding overhead, the tension and sense of suppressed urgency to get across the Salt Lake"

This photo may well have been taken under fire but I can`t sense any tension, drama or suppressed urgency. It`s quite unlike descriptions of men going forward under fire on the Western Front. However, maybe that`s how the yeomanry did it - who knows?

My view is of course subjective. Like all research, having some knowledge of the context adds to the understanding and interpretation of new information. Pictures are an excellent example of this concept. Anyone visiting an art gallery, say, would have a much greater understanding of the pictures if they have knowledge of the background and context. It helps interpret the image., albeit a subjective interpretation.

I had assumed some knowledge of the context and that is entirely my error. My point (clearly badly made) is that in this action the Yeomanry was ordered to walk across 2 miles of open plain and not break in a run or double until ordered. They were shelled half way across and from the accounts above it seems they suffered for at least 15 minutes walking in the open with no cover across a flat plain under intense shellfire for about 3/4 of a mile. It was much commented on by the senior officers observing the advance from Lala Baba (and mentioned in the OH). These were tactics that would have been familiar to Wellington a hundred years before. I would assume that these conditions would induce a certain degree of tension and desire to run, (which was suppressed due to their incredible discipline). The men in the photo were Territorial cavalry men who had been taken off their horses only 2 weeks before, had no infantry training, and went in action for the very first time, walking. The men in the photo are walking, not running, and (allegedly) under fire from the caption. I have handled the original photo and it seems fairly certain to me that they are under shrapnel fire exploding overhead which might explain the shakiness of the image. The men on the right appear (to me) to be breaking their stride which suggests to me some evidence that some men in the line were feeling the pressure - literally and metaphorically.

Others may rightfully interpret it how they please but reading the accounts and looking at the photo one can only imagine what was going through their minds. The infantry at Suvla were astounded by the way the Yeomanry advanced. Expectations of the Territorials were extremely low (there are many allegations that the TF Infantry Divisions performed poorly at Suvla in the few days immediately prior to the Yeomanry action - there is very lengthy correspondence between surviving officers and Aspinall-Oglander and many comments in Gallipoli period War Diaries on this subject) and that expectation was further reduced by the fact that these were dismounted Cavalrymen, not trained infantry men. In my humble opinion it was extraordinary what the Yeomen did that afternoon and the photo is an extremely rare record of the events. MG

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Martin,

A unique photograph; thanks for sharing.

Regarding the opposition - In his recent book, Erickson says that the Turks had even more artillery at that time than previously thought; he corrects the British OH saying 99 pieces instead of their 84.

"Supporting the Kiretch Tepe sector were 16 field-artillery guns, 14 mountain howitzers and 2 howitzers (32 pieces). Supporting the 12th Division sector were 20 field-artillery guns, and 8 mountain howitzers. Importantly this sector had an additional 11 heavy guns in the 120mm to 150mm caliber range (39 pieces including most of the Anafarta Group's heavy artillery). Supporting the Sari 7th, 4th and 8th Divisions on Sari Bair ridge were 8 field-artillery guns, 16 mountain howitzers and 2 150m howitzers (28 pieces in all)."

In my humble opinion it was extraordinary what the Yeomen did - agreed

all the best

Michael

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Martin,

There is at least one other photo taken on the Salt Lake from within the advancing line of Yeomanry.

It’s included in a sequence of photos of the Yeomanry at Suvla on 21st August, on pages 135-142 of Peter H. Liddle’s ‘Gallipoli: Pens, Pencils and Cameras At War’.

It’s captioned ‘21st August: Lieutenants Crocker and Marsden of the 3rd County of London Yeomanry under shell fire crossing the Salt Lake’. It was taken by a Capt J.N Mankin,

A slightly cropped version of Mankin’s photo can be seen at this website (bottom right):

http://www.gallipoli.com.tr/silent_witnesses/suvla_plain.htm

Was the photo you’re showing also taken by Capt Mankin?

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http://www.gallipoli...suvla_plain.htm Was the photo you're showing also taken by Capt Mankin?

Tunesmith - . Thank you for highlighting this. The short answer is no. The photo was in a collection of 1st/1st County of London Yeo (Middlesex Hussars) photos, not 1st/3rd County of London (Sharpshooters). I think the photographer of the picture I posted was Capt Benn, but given the plethora of other photos that were clearly taken by Weston Jarvis (Sharpshooters), the jury is out. Having said that the caption is in Benn's handwriting, so barring any other claims, I think Benn is the originator. That said, why is the adjutant of the leading regiment in an advancing Division running around taking photos at such a critical moment? It does not reconcile with the role of an adjutant supporting a CO in a regiment during its baptism of fire. I suspect that another member of the regiment took the photo, which later came into his possession...viz the Weston Jarvis overlap, which raises the possibility of a Mankin overlap. Personally I would eliminate the Weston Jarvis collection as a source because it simply is not replicated in that collection (meticulously archived). I have not seen the complete Mankin collection, but would welcome any leads on how to see the collection. I have had access to the Sharpshooters' (Weston Jarvis) immaculately preserved collection and the Makin picture is not included.

I can't understand why two Lieutenants are marching side by side when the number of officers were reduced to the absolute minimum for the Suvla bay Yeomanry operations (12 officers per regiment - nearly half the normal number in a regiment dispersed over a few hundred square yards). In theory they both would be at the head of their respective troops (note Benn's total despair at not being able to march with his own Troop having been delegated as Adjt), and I therefore would cast a lot of doubt on the authenticity of the description of this photo. By that I mean I am sure it is of these officers in this regiment but I doubt it is of the advance. It does not reconcile with the substantial evidence of Officers leading their Troops - i.e. they would be at least 50- 100 yards apart. Also Suvla plain is like a billiard table and this photo shows rising ground on the right which simply does not exist on the axis of advance on Suvla Plain (I have walked the ground extensively). I think this is an example of 'back fit' - contemporary photos with later captions that don't reconcile with the actual events. This is quite common in histories and recollections and certainly evident in many publications. At best it shows the regiments forming up near Lala Baba - but again the rising ground would be on the left, not the right so at a stretch it would be a printed negative. There are no fixed bayonets, having already gone into the advance. Odd when reconciled with diary accounts. Anyone who has walked from Lala Baba to Chocolate Hill will understand that this view is nigh on impossible. The heights of ANZAC would /should be visible in the distance but appear to have evaporated.

Another thought which I can not prove is that I think it unlikely that the Yeomanry officers carried the SMLE on their first advance. These gentlemen were culturally conditioned to carry walking sticks or swords (banned) and revolvers. Their conversion to the sensible SMLE was (I believe) slightly later in the campaign (when officers were ordered to dress as soldiers). I also refer you to the fact that Benn forgot to arm himself - a clear indication that the Officers were conditioned to "lead" and not get their hands dirty with the business of actually shooting anyone. Some were so indignant at being used as infantry they marched off to war still wearing their spurs (difficult to do - trust me on this). Remember, these were aristocratic Territorial cavalry officers on their first day in action. Conditioned by centuries of cultural bias, sense of status and expected behaviour in front of their men who were often tied labour from their own lands- there was more at stake than just the Empire!. I can not see them marching into action with soldiers' weapons. Within days they were brutally enlightened as to the ways of war, but on the advance their cultural conditioning would probably prevented them from strolling into battle carrying a 'soldier's' weapon. Shoot me down, but I come from three generations of cavalry (and Yeomanry) and the same (wrong) assumptions are alive and kicking to this day. Rightly or wrongly, Officers in the Yeomanry on 21st Aug 1915 were expected to look like Officers, act like Officers and die like Officers. And they did.

The great tragedy of Bloody August at Suvla is that a disproportionate number of young officers died in the first 2 weeks partly because of this preconceived sense of duty and conditioning - leading from the front, conspicuously dressed etc. The first mass blooding of the raw Kitchener's Army happened at Suvla between 7th-21st August. The massive casualty rate in officers (way above that of the ORs) created a leadership vacuum at battalion level which is one of the main reasons for failure at Suvla. Sufficient numbers of Officer reinforcements were not immediately available. I don't think this has been fully explored in any written history. It is only my humble (and very subjective) opinion but one which the statistical 'arithmetic of the frontier' clearly substantiates. For me the scale of the tragedy is almost beyond comprehension. MG

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Martin

Capt Mankin’s photo is in the Liddle Archive.

I agree its caption is not absolutely accurate: the ground appears to be covered with scrub with a few small, low bushes, and is not salt-flat. So that leads me to think Capt Mankin’s photo was taken not on the Salt Lake, but either between Lala Baba and the Salt Lake or between the Salt Lake and Chocolate Hill. As far as one can make out, the ground in Capt. Benn’s photo looks the same.

However, I would definitely not apply the term ‘back fit’ to this caption, for two reasons.

First, the photo is one of three pictures taken by Capt Mankin which appear in Peter Liddle’s book. The other two show images of 3rd COLY on Chocolate Hill, so Capt. Mankin evidently carried and used his camera on Aug 21st.

Second, I haven’t been to the Liddle Archive (I only wish I could get the time!) but I see from its catalogue that, as well as Capt Mankin’s photos, it holds a transcript of an interview Liddle did with him. So if Peter Liddle says this photo is of two 3rd COLY lieutenants under fire on 21st August, I’m inclined to believe it is, because the man who took the photo told him that’s what it was.

One point, I don’t think the image is flipped – rectangular regimental flashes are seen on the left side of the helmets of the two foreground figures. Mankin’s two other photos also show this (I’m assuming all three photos aren’t reversed – or that there weren’t flashes on both sides).

So this leaves us with the anomalies you outline, and for which I have no real answers:

Yes, the ground would appear to rise on the right - in fact, it inclines more steeply in the uncropped right edge of the photo – or is it the skyline? I note that the skyline also rises to the right in Capt. Benn’s photo. The line of soldiers in Benn’s photo look like they are all on the same level, the troops in Capt Mankin’s not. However Mankin’s is a much wider picture and they are much more spread out. In fact I’d argue that what we see in Mankin’s photo are two or more lines of soldiers, and each of these lines is in fact on level ground.

And yes, I agree absolutely that officers with rifles is very strange. In another picture of Mankin’s, the 3rd COLY’s Maj. Llewellyn sits coolly surveying the scene from Chocolate Hill, walking stick stuck in the hillside behind him. The foreground figures in this picture are evidently not carrying walking sticks, but rifles. One thing, though – they’re not wearing packs. Troops in the background are, as are troops in Benn's photo.

The two Lieutenants do indeed look like they are marching side by side. Also they are just a few feet away from the unseen fellow officer, presumably also marching, who was taking their picture. I agree that’s very odd. But could they be moving back to their positions after an on-the-move company conference? After all, Captain Benn himself wrote that he was ‘to and fro’ during the march.

Yes, bayonets aren’t fixed. The advance was well over an hour long - at what point would they have fixed bayonets? I should point out that I'm uncertain if bayonets are fixed in Benn’s picture.

I also concede that the two men don’t seem to have the air of men under shrapnel fire. However the Yeomanry’s remarkable sang froid on Aug 21st has been widely noted and that could be what Makin’s picture conveys, above anything else. (In the other picture I referred to, Major Llewellyn looks like he’s having lunch at a grouse shoot).

Pictures capture a moment. To be honest, I can’t see evidence in either picture of shell fire. But three or four men are definitely on the run in Capt Benn’s photo, which gives the image its tension. Is this the moment when the Yeomanry began to charge or are the three or four men just moving forward at the double to straighten up the line?

So when it comes down to it, the two captions are really the most compelling evidence that these are pictures of the Yeomanry marching under fire on August 21st - and I’d argue that the provenance of Malkin’s is no less strong that Benn’s.

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A little bunched.....watch your spacing men!

Rgds

Tim D

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Tunesmith. Thanks for your detailed post. You make some excellent points that I had not considered. A few thoughts:

General. It is the other detail that concerns me most and especially the provenance of the photos. I think there is a very strong case to argue that at least one of Mankin's photos is incorrectly captioned, which by extension casts doubts on the others.(see below)

1. Ground. I can not disagree with your point on the ground. Looking at it again, for me there is just not enough detail to accurately place both photos, and sometimes the distance in old photos is whited out, so we have to start by assuming the author's descriptions are accurate and stress-test them by examining the other evidence.

2. Negative. You make an excellent point. I absolutely agree. After I had posted I then realised that most (all?) were right-handed.

3. Packs. The packs were dumped near 'A' beach just before the move to Lala Baba - a few pieces of evidence from diaries of units in 4 of the 5 Brigades:

a. 1st Mounted Bde -
Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry.
R G Cripps RGHY diary: "
Div Bivouac August 21st, 1915. The Division moved off last night after dark, with two days' iron rations only,
no packs,
no blankets"
.

b. 3rd Mounted Bde - Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry
War Diary 20th Aug: "1
9:20. Div marches to Lala Baba. 5 Bdes in column of sections. SRY was 3rd Regt in 2nd Bde 3 miles. 5 hours.
Greatcoats and packs left on beach
MG section detached to cooperate with Infy attack. 6 signallers and 6 stretcher bearers ditto. 8 Officers and 275 ORs left.
"

c. 4th Mounted Bde - City of London Yeomanry (Roughriders).
A S Hamilton "…
on the evening of the 20th, however,
dumping rear-packs and bedding under guard
and leaving a proportion of the officers in reserve the MG sections moved to Chocolate Hill whence they were distributed to the trench-line and the remainder of the Div trudged labouriously along the sandy beachto Lala Baba, where each man scraped himself a shallow trough which afforded protection from the chill night wind, if not from the enemy's fire.
.."

d. 5th Mounted Bde.
War Diary 8 pm. "
Move to LALA BABA about 8 pm as follows: - Bde Staff 5 Offrs 42 OR s …..Herts Yeo 9 Offrs and 300 OR s …. 2nd Co of Ldn Yeo 9 Offrs and 298 Ors 2 MG Detachmnets of 2 Offr and 52 OR s. Total all ranks 691. A detachment of 38 and Capt & QM Diggory were left with stores etc.
Moves without cloaks, blankets, valuables or waterproof sheets.
Herts bivouac on the beach and 2nd Co of London in dug-outs. Very heavy fire at night about 2 miles to our front".

I can not tell if the men in the Benn photo are carrying packs (the extreme left man looks as if he is) but at least one regiment (RGHY) was allegedly carrying its MGs too - but not the 3rd (Notts & Derby) Bde MGs which were sent to Choc Hill the night before along with the Roughriders's MGs (see above) and I think very likely all the others' MGs. The RGHY diary is the only record of the MGs being carried on the march across the plain - something I always thought very unlikely.....So it is remotely possible that some packs were carried to haul the ammo. If the Roughriders MGs had been man hauled the night before I think it unlikely that the other London Yeomanry's MGs were not also taken. If, and it is a big IF in my view, some MGs were man handled across the plain, it would be the MG section carrying the packs (establishment: 26 men per Regiment). If we can establish that they are all carrying packs, then it throws doubt on the Benn picture as I am pretty certain that packs were left in a dump near the beaches and not carried into action.

4. Bayonets. I guess there is a strong possibility that bayonets were not fixed until Chocolate Hill. There is no diary evidence of when bayonets were fixed. I had (maybe incorrectly) assumed bayonets would be fixed on an advance of that nature. [Edit: Have subsequently found one reference in Tpr Bullwinkle's diary (Middlesex Hussars - so the same unit as the photo) that bayonets were fixed at Chocolate Hill.

5. Capt Mankin's Three Pictutres. I have now seen the three pictures (thanks for highlighting them). The first thing I noticed is that the colour and quality of the photo that you posted is different from the other 2. The other two are also in Lt Col Weston Jarvis's Gallipoli (Sharpshooter's archives at Sharpshooter House) album AND in Capt Benn's papers (held at the House of Lords). I have copies of both sets and they are exactly the same photos. So we now know that at least 2 photos are in 3 collections. That suggests multiple prints were made from one camera roll. The Weston-Jarvis albums contain well over a hundred photos. I have copies of about 50 of his Gallipoli photos for my research and I have fortunately handled the originals. The Weston Jarvis photos all have white numbers in the corner and run sequentially, and have Weston Jarvis's handwritten captions, so there is a long line of chronological continuity which is important in identifying dates and locations. They are very well preserved and catalogued. The copies in the Benn archives are loose photos but also have the same white numbers as the Weston Jarvis photos in the bottom left corners. I am not an expert on photography, but I suspect the numbers were added during the printing process - they are an integral part of the print, rather than being written on the surface of the print. The (other) 2 pictures in the Mankin collection don't have these numbers - it is the only difference.

Candidates for the Photographe
r. Note - There are 3 Makin pictures. When I refer to the 'other two' pictures, these are the ones posted below. The third picture being the one you posted.

a. Lt Col Weston Jarvis
. WJ kept many photos from the Boer war right through to the end of WWI. There are eight (from memory) large albums at Sharpshooter's House which also hold his diaries. He was a prolific diarist and photographer so I think there is a strong case that his camera took the pictures that appear in all three collections. The archivist has kindly agreed to let me show copies for research purposes only - see below. For me he is the best candidate for the 'other' 2 photos as there is significant continuity in the photos - age, wear, colour, contrast etc. and the fact that they are in the middle of a long numbered sequence of photos.

b. Capt Wedgwood Benn.
WB's photos are in a bit of a mess. They are held as part of the Stansgate Papers (he was later Lord Stansgate) at the House of Lords archives. There are 2 boxes full of loose photos from various part of his life. After Gallipoli he was in the RNAS flying with Sampson doing work with aer photos. There are a few hundred photos but most are in a shocking state and many have been burned at the edges. The 2 photos in question are loose and not in an album. Despite the strong evidence of Benn having had a camera throughout the war, I suspect that his 2 photos are copies i.e. not from his camera. Benn's Gallipoli album is very small, half is missing having been burnt. It is in tatters, the photos are much smaller and where there are gaps (photos having fallen out), the captions do not suggest that they fit these 2 photos. The photo I originally posted is in this collection. The last and most compelling point is that Benn was a Middlesex Hussar, not a Sharpshooter and although they were in the same Bde and one wonders why Benn was photographing the Sharpshooters and not the Middlesex Hussars. He is the least likely candidate in my view.

c. Capt Mankin.
I don't know how many photos there are in Mankin's collection, but I have now seen 3. The one you posted and the 2 that also exist in the WJ and WB collections. It is possible that WJ and WB got these photos from Mankin. It would be interesting to see Mankin's originals and if they are in an album - then we could see if there is any photographic continuity similar to WJ's albums. If there are only 3, or they are loose photos, it might suggest these are copies. By contrast the absence of the white numbering may indicate that these are the originals and WB and WB had copies, but that doesn't explain the hundreds of other WJ photos. I think we have to consider the possibility that just because Mankin had these photos, they were not necessarily all taken by him. Peter Liddle might have assumed that Mankin was the photographer just because he had the photos, rather than Mankin claiming he took the photos. . I think it is also worth considering that inclusion in a publication does not necessarily provide accurate provenance. I will post the other 2 with WJ's captions so you can compare

6. Pictures. The two pictures below are the WJ versions of the pictures that appear in all 3 collections. To give an accurate idea of the sequence here are the captions of the photos in the WJ album (Pictures run in batches of 6 which is the number of photos on each roll of film I assume)

32.2 "Transhipping from the Transport Caledonia to HMS Doris Mudros Bay 17th August"

32.3 "Disembarking from HMS Doris early morning 18th August " - note this photo is also used in Henry C Day's book ' A Cavalry Chaplain' - further evidence of wider circulation of these photos

32.4 "Disembarking from HMS Doris early morning 18th August" - different view

32.5 "2nd Mounted Division digging in after landing 18th August" - view taken from the slopes above 'A' Beach

32.6 "Major Llewellyn Captain Hastings Regimental Headquarters - Suvla Bay 18th August" - view taken from the slopes above 'A' Beach
this is shown below

33.1 "Major Rome, Hon R Blythe Brigade Headquarters Suvla Bay 18th August" - ditto

33.2 "The Regiment Dug in on Chocolate Hill 23rd August"
this is shown below

33.3 "Chocolate Hill from the West"

33.4 "Waiting to draw water- Chocolate Hill"

33.5 "C Sqn trenches" etc..........the photos continue in perfect chronological order to 40.3 "Bde HQ, Maj Gen Sir W Peyton, Brig Gen Taylor Gen Peyton's HQ Lala Baba" taken on the day of departure (49 Gallipoli photos in total)

Continuity.
One other small piece of continuity evidence is that all these photos have the same characteristics - a black frame, a white exposure bloom on the bottom left hand corner - indicating they were on the same roll of film that was accidentally briefly exposed to light before it was developed or the camera was not properly shut tight. These 'blooms' have been completely cropped out of the Mankin photos and slightly cropped out (by me) on the left hand photo but clearly visible on the right hand photo. Another thread on this forum
also shows another photos from this album - Cator's House - note the white bloom and the white number (37.5) in the bottom left hand corner which reinforces the continuity of the date sequence with the numbered phots (They were in Cator's House a few days after the Scimitar Hill action). The photo that you posted has none of these and unless they were cropped out, it would support the view that this photo is not from the same series.

a. Left hand photo below (number 32.6
) "
Major Llewellyn Captain Hastings Regimental Headquarters - Suvla Bay, 18th August
" In the Mankin version the caption is "
Major Llewellyn of the 3rd County of London Yeomanry surveys the Suvla scene from Chocolate Hill".
This is a very important point -
He could not be on Chocolate Hill on 18th August, so one of the captions is wrong.
In the WJ album this photo is number 32.6 and is sequentially sandwiched between a well know picture of the massed Yeomanry digging in on the ground above 'A' Beach immediately after landing and a picture of Bde HQ with Major Rome and Hon R Blythe on the same slopes (overlooking 'A' Beach) - see sequence above - the chain of evidence strongly suggests the photo was taken on the slopes overlooking 'A' Beach and is not Chocolate Hill. The casual setting would also support this. Chocolate Hill was a lot more exposed. If I am right on this point, the Mankin caption is wrong and this is a good example of back-fit and would also cast doubt on the accuracy of his other captions.

b. Right hand photo below (number 33.2)
-
"The Regiment Dug in on Chocolate Hill 23rd August"
In the version that you sent, the caption is
" 3rd County of London Yeomanry dug in on Chocolate Hill"
so these at least agree. Anyone who has been there would recognise this ground as the slopes of Chocolate Hill.

I hope this all makes sense! I think there some inaccuracies in early histories that modern authors are trying to iron out. Sometimes we see early errors being perpetuated in later histories as the authors did not use original source material and also did not stress-test the provenance. This might be a small example. To my mind the left hand photo can not be on Chocolate Hill, and that means that Mankin 's caption is wrong and Liddle has unfortunately perpetuated this mistake. I doubt it was intentional. The Aspinall-Oglander correspondence highlights many examples of officers' fading memories at odds with the facts. This is not unusual. This might be an example. By extension, it would cast doubt on the caption on the photo of the officers strolling into battle

Any mistakes are mine. Regards MG

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post-55873-0-84599400-1299145661.jpg

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Hi Martin,

You admirably lay out what must be conclusive proof that one of the photos in Peter Liddle’s book is both ascribed and captioned incorrectly, so I concede willingly that the caption of the photo I pointed you towards might therefore also be inaccurate.

I’m now even more curious to know exactly what all the other photos of Capt. Mankin are in the Liddle Archive – whether they’re duplicates of Lt Col Weston Jarvis’s photos, or from a different source.

Tunesmith

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Tunesmith - The debate is extremely useful. It forces one to really question one's assumptions. Thanks to you for stress-testing my theory and making me deconstruct the photos. This is a collaborate effort . You raised some excellent points to the extent I am becoming doubtful of Benn's photo. I have edited my last comments with some additional info from the diaries to support our views. Sometimes we will never know the truth, but the excellent debate on the forum helps us at least come to an informed and educated view.

Separately, I hope to be able to post all the Weston-Jarvis photos soon on this thread (seeking permission) there are probably 45 photos high quality photos that I have never seen in any Gallipoli publication. Stand by.....MG.

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  • 1 month later...

Martin, There is at least one other photo taken on the Salt Lake from within the advancing line of Yeomanry. It's included in a sequence of photos of the Yeomanry at Suvla on 21st August, on pages 135-142 of Peter H. Liddle's 'Gallipoli: Pens, Pencils and Cameras At War'. It's captioned '21st August: Lieutenants Crocker and Marsden of the 3rd County of London Yeomanry under shell fire crossing the Salt Lake'. It was taken by a Capt J.N Mankin, A slightly cropped version of Mankin's photo can be seen at this website (bottom right): http://www.gallipoli...suvla_plain.htm Was the photo you're showing also taken by Capt Mankin?

Hello again.....GWF member Andrew French of the Berkshire Yeomanry Museum has kindly sent me the attached page from an unknown newspapers dated 29 Sept 1915 showing the Yeomanry going into action. I have never seen 3 of these images before. Note that the oval vignette shows the same photo of the two officers taken by Capt Mankin that GWF member Tunesmith highlighted in the link above. This might suggest the other images below were taken by Mankin. The only Mankin I can find in the Yeomanry was a Trooper (presumably later commissioned). Interestingly the paper describes the Officers as the "3rd London Yeomanry" which would indicate them being the 1st/3rd County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters). The two subalterns "Crocker and Mason (sic)" in the oval are I believe Lt J A Crocker and Lt T B Marson who the Army List of July 1915 confirm as serving with the 1st/3rd County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters). Cross checking with the MICs on Ancestry.co.uk shows both. There is no result for any Officer named T B Mason in any Yeomanry. This also illustrates the propensity for errors in names. Marson is called Mason below and called Marsden in the Liddle's book 'Gallipoli: Pens Pencils and Cameras At War'. Ancestry has no Yeomanry Officers called T B Marsden and has only one result for a QM and hon Lt T Marsden from an unspecified Yeomanry regiment MiD in 1917. The QMs did not advance across Suvla Plain. MG

The description in the paper and the image are slightly at odds. If it show them crossing the Suvla Plain they would not have been 'charging up' the hill at the top of the picture. That would be Chocolate Hill that they regrouped behind and used as a forming up position to 'charge up' the next hills - W Hills and Scimitar Hill.

Many thanks to The Berkshire Yeomanry Museum and Andrew French for permission to reproduce this image. Please respect their copyright. MG

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I must add a correction to my earlier posting about the ‘Crocker & Marsden (sic)’ photo. The photo in the Liddle Collection turns out not to be in the papers of Capt. Mankin. It’s actually in the papers of Lt. L.G.C. Booth who, according to the collection catalogue, served with the 1st Suffolks and possibly with the 3rd CLY at Gallipoli.

In fact Booth’s Yeomanry service is confirmed by the medal records which show: Booth, Leslie George Cyprian, 1275, Private, 3rd CLY.

The photo itself is glued on a piece of thin grey card which may originally have been cut out of an album. It’s hand-written title reads:

Lts John Crocker Marsden

GALLIPOLI AUGUST 1915

3rd COUNTY OF LONDON YEO – ‘SHARPSHOOTERS’

CROSSING SLALT [sic] LAKE, SUVLA – UNDER SHELL FIRE

The photograph is actually about a fifth wider than the version in Liddle’s book, with the cropped out section showing 4 or 5 more figures advancing and a rising sky-line. There’s also an ink blot in this section (the same coloured ink as the writing in the caption) which may be why Liddle cropped it for his book. I can’t think why it was misattributed, though - presumably a publisher’s error.

Unfortunately there are no photos in the papers of either Capt Mankin or Lt Booth which are similar or at all linkable to this one.

So who was the photographer? I’m really intrigued to see the photos in the newspaper page at the Berkshire Yeomanry Museum. Many thanks, Andrew, for making it accessible, and Martin, for sharing them. Like the other photos so far shown in this link, they prompt even more questions.

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The photo in the Liddle Collection turns out not to be in the papers of Capt. Mankin. It's actually in the papers of Lt. L.G.C. Booth who, according to the collection catalogue, served with the 1st Suffolks and possibly with the 3rd CLY at Gallipoli. .............In fact Booth's Yeomanry service is confirmed by the medal records which show: Booth, Leslie George Cyprian, 1275, Private, 3rd CLY...........So who was the photographer? I'm really intrigued to see the photos in the newspaper page at the Berkshire Yeomanry Museum. ....... Like the other photos so far shown in this link, they prompt even more questions.

Tunesmith. Many thanks for this. I see in Booth's MIC his date of entry in Egypt was 28th April 1915 which is consistent with the 3rd County of London Yeomanry. Given he was a private in the 3rd COLY and later commissioned into the 1st Bn Sufflok Regt on 15th Aug 1916 (almost one year after the events) I think we can be fairly sure if he was in Gallipoli it would have been with the 3rd COLY..... So it is distinctly possible Booth was the photographer. Having done a bit more scrambling around pursuing other photos (see Dead Man's Gully thread - there are at least 3 key photos in 4 separate collections all inferring their own provenance) it now seems pretty clear that photos were often reproduced and shared, so tracking down the original photographer is extremely difficult. The provenance can I think be correctly tilted towards photos in a large album with direct reference to the alleged owner, but single photos become much more difficult.

For reasons highlighted earlier I think the photo of Crocker and Marson must have been taken by a 3rd COLY (Sharpshooter) so again Booth as a candidate would fit. I think we discussed the issue of bayonets being fixed or not. I recently obtained a copy of Tpr Bullwinkle 1st County of London Yeo (Middlesex Hussars) diary account of Gallipoli and he clearly records bayonets being fixed after the crossing of the Salt Lake (I have added an edited comment to the relevant post), so it remains a possibility that it does show them crossing but I still have my doubts - the Officers carrying rifles being my main concern as any Yeomanry diary reference to Officers during the crossing mentions Officers carrying canes and sticks and in the case of Benn he was actually unarmed. Also in Column of Troop Columns the officers should have been at the head of their respective Troops and would have been at least 50 yards apart, especially when each Regiment went in with 4 fewer officers than War Establishment. Each Sqn only went in with a Sqn Leader and 2 Troop Leaders, leaving the Sqn 2IC and a Troop Leader in reserve. Some Troops were commanded by Senior NCOs so it does not make sense that the only subalterns in a Sqn of 150 men were marching side by side dressed as soldiers.

As you say, the photos raise more questions than they answer. You will be aware of soldiers' alarm at seeing newspaper accounts weeks after the events recording feats that simply had not been achieved. Given the photo of Crocker and Marson appeared only 5 weeks after the attack on Scimitar Hill, I would be concerned that the newspaper received Ashmead Bartlett's syndicated accounts of the (initially) leisurely march into battle by the Yeomen, obtain a picture of 2 Yeomanry Officers strolling back from a reserve trench (say) and incorrectly attribute the picture to the advance across the Salt Lake. By 29th Sep 1915 (the date of the newspaper article) it was known that Gallipoli was an irrecoverable disaster and any positive spin on the events would have been encouraged. It is interesting to compare the jingoistic triumphalist captions of "Undying Glory" with the grim reality of the butcher's bill that day. No mention of the catastrophic casualties. I suspect the newspaper (I am researching which one it could be) might even be the source of the caption rather than the photographer. I think this is exactly how myths are created by the media. These are only my thoughts and I may well be completely wrong.

Thank you for the additional info. The plot thickens. I have no doubt that Crocker and Marson/Marsden/Mason will appear in other photograph collections. I wonder if the newspaper's article created demand for reproductions. Regards MG.

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Hello - thank to the generosity of Andrew French and the Berkshire Yeomanry Museum, we are able to see another extremely rare photo of the 2nd Mounted Div marching into battle for the first time on 21st August 1915.

The photo was taken by C of E Padre to the 2nd South Midland Mouted Bde, Rev Arthur Groom Parnham MC, later Bishop of Reading. It was taken from the foothills of Lala Baba looking almost directly east towards Chocolate Hill. The semi-dry Salt Lake can be seen and the far extreme left horizon is the eastern extremity of Kiretch Tepe ridge line. The troop formation is consistent with contemporary accounts and shows Column of Troop Column. It was probably taken at about 3:30 p.m. as the last Bde set off across the plain.

Please kindly note this photo is the copyright of the Berkshire Yeomanry Museum. Regards MG

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It was taken from the foothills of Lala Baba looking almost directly east towards Chocolate Hill. The semi-dry Salt Lake can be seen and the far extreme left horizon is the eastern extremity of Kiretch Tepe ridge line.

Martin,

Thanks to you and to the BYM for sharing the above photograph here

I am going to suggest that the scene is viewed along a slightly different line; that is, slightly to the south of the line previously suggested, which would make Chocolate Hill the shoulder seen rising to the left margin.

What leads me to think this is the nose or peninsula of land between the gleaming (wet?) area and the grey (drier?) area beneath it; again this is on the left hand side of the picture.

Suvla21Aug1915cBerksMuseum.jpg

This peninsula can be clearly seen on the maps at aprox. SW from Lala Baba

and it still shows up on today's (March 2010) photographs.

P1000350.jpg

In this example the beginning (southern slope) of Chocolate Hill is just discernable on the left.

The angle of my shot is not the same as I was standing higher up Lala Baba, but what do you think?

regards

Michael

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I think you have a good case. The photos are a good match. Ironically near the landing site of one of the Aircraft we were discussing in another thread....

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  • 2 years later...

I am researching the Father of an 88 year-old friend of mine, who was shot through the knee, at Suvla Bay, while serving with 1/3 Company

County of London Yeomanry.

His details are as follows:-

Name: Wilfred Allen Pooley, Rank: Lance Corporal, Regt No: 846

Any info most gratefully received!

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Martin,

A unique photograph; thanks for sharing.

Regarding the opposition - In his recent book, Erickson says that the Turks had even more artillery at that time than previously thought; he corrects the British OH saying 99 pieces instead of their 84.

"Supporting the Kiretch Tepe sector were 16 field-artillery guns, 14 mountain howitzers and 2 howitzers (32 pieces). Supporting the 12th Division sector were 20 field-artillery guns, and 8 mountain howitzers. Importantly this sector had an additional 11 heavy guns in the 120mm to 150mm caliber range (39 pieces including most of the Anafarta Group's heavy artillery). Supporting the Sari 7th, 4th and 8th Divisions on Sari Bair ridge were 8 field-artillery guns, 16 mountain howitzers and 2 150m howitzers (28 pieces in all)."

In my humble opinion it was extraordinary what the Yeomen did - agreed

all the best

Michael

HI All

This is what Lt Tom Kidd of the 10th Light Horse, then still up on Russell's Top had to say from his vantage point on 21 August.

At shortly after midday enemy brought many guns to bear on troops advancing from beach to W Hills near Anafarta village. From our elevated position could see shells bursting with great effect. Enemy using shrapnel with black effect in bursting charge. Heavy musketry indicates our men advancing from advanced positions. The whole plain undulating country obscured from view by dust roused by shrapnel coming into contact with earth...

I popped this quote into our history on the 10th Light Horse.

Cheers

Ian

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  • 2 months later...

I am researching Pte Frank Martin, Berkshire Yeomanry, service number 2075, who was killed at Gallipoli, I understand. Any information on the involvement of Berkshire Yeomanry at Gallipoli would be appreciated. CWGC record suggests that he died or was buried at sea (from a hospital ship perhaps?)

Janey

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Martin, just a couple of things I know about human moments in this action, right off the top of my head. Captain Viscount Quenington (Michael Hugh Hicks-Beach) was "The Squire" in my village, and served in the Royal Glos Hussars whilst still a Member of Parliament. He is on our village memorial, and there is a plaque in our church, as he was killed at Katia in 1916. He recounted that throughout the Salt Lake advance he was engaged in a vigorous discussion with a Trooper about dairy farming.

Quenington was heir to his father's earldom (St Aldwyn)but missed succeeding by about a week, as his father died just after his son. The old man had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in Salisbury's government during the Boer War, and the local story is that the news of his son's death was withheld from him. Quenington, mortally wounded, was brought in by a corporal whose name I forget, but who was second whipper-in to The Beaufort, of which Quenington was a member. (The RGH was essentially The Beaufort in khaki!) Lady Quenington had made her way to Cairo, but died there a few weeks earlier. Her husband was buried next to her in Cairo New British Protestant Cemetery.

Major Hoel Llewellyn is another man I have had a long time interest in. At the time of Salt Lake he was 2 I/c Sharpshooters (3 CoLY)and was wounded in the advance with shrapnel piercing his left scaphoid bone. He wrote to his CO (Weston Jarvis) from St Thomas's Hospital saying "the last time I saw you, you were stepping through shrapnel like rice at a wedding." Llewellyn and Jarvis had known each other since (at least) Matabeleland 1896 and again at Mafeking.

Many of Jarvis's letters, including private correspondence with his wife, are still held by the regiment (in their current guise) at their drill hall in Croydon.

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I am researching Pte Frank Martin, Berkshire Yeomanry, service number 2075, who was killed at Gallipoli, I understand. Any information on the involvement of Berkshire Yeomanry at Gallipoli would be appreciated. CWGC record suggests that he died or was buried at sea (from a hospital ship perhaps?)

Janey

Janey

Firstly, welcome to the Great War Forum.

Sadly the Berkshire Yeomanry War Diary did not survive. The unit was one of twelve Yeomanry regiments forming the 2nd Mounted Division which was sent to Egypt in April 1915 and then sent dismounted to Gallipoli in mid August 1915. Its big battle was on 21st August at Scimitar Hill. The War Diaries of most of the Yeomanry regiments survive and can be downloaded or a mere £3.36 online. Although the Berkshire Yeo dairy is 'missing in action' most of the other untis' diaries survived and given the worked very closely together it will at least give you some ide of the conditions. The ref is WO 95/4312.

His medal index card with very basic information will also be available on-line from the same website for another £3.36. It confirms he landed in Egypt on 21st April 1915 and died of wounds.

If you are interested in reading a book or two on the Yeomanry, to get a fee of what their lives were like, I would recommend Yarn of a Yeoman by S F Hatton who was in one of the other regiments but his detailed narrative of events will be similar to the experiences of most Yeomen in the 2nd Mtd Div. It has been reprinted in recent years and will cost less than £10.

The CWGC data indicates he died on 25th August, some four days after the Yeomen's big battle. I think there is a good chance he was wounded on 21st/22nd and died of those wounds some days later. If he died on a hospital ship he would have been buried at sea. He is commemorated on Helles memorial which lists the men who died who have no known grave or who were buried at sea.

As luck would have it, here is the panel that his name in on.

Good luck with your research. MG

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