Did the British use "infantry/support guns" on the Western Fro

[RodB]

I've been following this topic : http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=158472

and it's led me to ask the question : why didn't British forces use equivalent "infantry guns" or "support guns" on the Western Front ? Other armies such as Russian appeared to use such weapons.

I've seen a few photographs of British Hotchkiss guns on makeshift travelling carriages but I've never found any reference to any guns smaller than 13-pounders used in action, and no reference to 13-pounders used in "infantry support" or "assault" the way the Germany army apparently did.

Was there a doctrinal decision on this ? Did the Stokes mortar in effect finally fill this role ? I would have thought that with the British constantly attacking in the first half of the war that they would have tried various ways of getting forward equipment to knock out enemy strongpoints as they encountered them. Or was the problem that such strongpoints were invisible from ground level and hence not targetable by direct-fire assault weapons ?

thanks

Rod

[Robert Dunlop]

The British did use infantry support guns. There were several examples of guns of various types, including mountain guns, being wheeled into the front lines to support assaults. The rims of the wheels were often covered in rubber to minimise the noise of the guns being brought into the line. The development of the tank was the key next step beyond this concept. Nevertheless, the British field artillery provided direct support on many occasions, for example in the last 100 days.

The Stokes mortar provided support fire of a different type. The mortar could not, for example, engage the firing slit in a pillbox. Stokes mortars were difficult to carry forward, especially with enough ammunition. They did play an important role, however, in several actions. Just one or two tubes could make a significant contribution.

Robert

[RodB]

Thanks for the response Robert. I was referring to the Western Front. I've read of the occasional adhoc deployment of mountain guns in the frontline in other theatres, but such deployments come across as improvisations, whereas German doctrine seems to have provided frontline support guns in organised units as part of its official doctrine. And yes, it was such cases as attacking pillbox openings that I was thinking of - I would have thought that something like the French 37-mm gun or 3-pounder Hotchkiss would have been useful. The fact that the Lewis gun and Stokes mortar were adopted en masse but formalised infantry support guns weren't to me indicates a decision that the latter weren't the answer. ??

[centurion]

Thanks for the response Robert. I was referring to the Western Front. I've read of the occasional adhoc deployment of mountain guns in the frontline in other theatres, but such deployments come across as improvisations, whereas German doctrine seems to have provided frontline support guns in organised units as part of its official doctrine. And yes, it was such cases as attacking pillbox openings that I was thinking of - I would have thought that something like the French 37-mm gun or 3-pounder Hotchkiss would have been useful. The fact that the Lewis gun and Stokes mortar were adopted en masse but formalised infantry support guns weren't to me indicates a decision that the latter weren't the answer. ??

I believe Robert was talking about the Western Front where mountain guns were used as he has described. The tank certainly also provided some of these functions (including pill box blasting) and I suspect that the need to move more six pounders forward was the real reason for the introduction of the composite (hermaophrodite) tank. There are plenty of cases of infantry directing supporting tanks to deal with intractable German defensive positions. Indeed the Australian attitude seems to echo a similar approach utilising the Matilda II against Japanese pill boxes in WW2. Individual 18 pounders were also sometimes allocated for direct infantry support in both defence and attack.

[Robert Dunlop]

Rod, you are right about the improvised use of mountain guns in other theatres. They were also used on the Western Front too, in 1915. The pillbox was a later development, though the problem of targeting narrow firing slits pre-dated their development. The British did check out the French 37 mm gun but decided against adopting it. The Americans did use it, and there are several anecdotal accounts of its use against pillboxes, MG nests and strong points. The German infantry support guns were not integral to German infantry units, in the way that Lewis guns were. They were attached for specific tasks, more like tanks were. Tanks were the British equivalent. Bear in mind that the more widespread use of infantry support guns, grouped into infantry support gun batteries, occurred later in the war, and did not obviate the use of 77mm field guns or Minenwerfer (the equivalent of Stokes mortars) in direct support roles.

Cron noted that 'for anti-tank purposes the OHL ordered the formation of Close-combat Batteries 201-250 with the new pattern Field Gun 96 [in January 1917]. [They] were withdrawn again as early as May 1917... partly to form new batteries of "infantry guns". IGBs (batteries of "infantry guns") 28-50, were unsatisfactory and in November 1917 were dissolved again [apart from the battery that remained with Sturmbataillon Rohr]. Then the OHL succeeded in acquiring 7.5cm Skoda mountain guns from the Austro-Hungarian Army administration, so that from then on it was possible to form proper IGBs. They appeared at the front in May [1918 and] performed really well.

Altogether, towards the end of the war, the mobile field artillery comprise 297 regiments. There were 3 horse artillery battalions, 6 independent battalions and 7 mountain artillery battalions, 15 batteries of the original battalions behind the front, 6 independent batteries and 50 batteries of infantry guns, together with 3 IG detachments in Palestine.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I would have thought that with the British constantly attacking in the first half of the war that they would have tried various ways of getting forward equipment to knock out enemy strongpoints as they encountered them. Or was the problem that such strongpoints were invisible from ground level and hence not targetable by direct-fire assault weapons ?

Rod, I missed this when I first read your post. Just a couple of thoughts. The British weren't 'constantly' attacking in the first half of the war. In fact the BEF did not attack very much at all. The attacks were very limited in scope, and badly constrained by the relative lack of ammunition. As mentioned, the British experimented with mountain guns and different field guns, including the 18 pounder. Tests were done looking at wire cutting as well as parapet busting [remember that the British were mostly attacking in the area where trenches had to be created above ground]. The effects of field guns against hardened targets were well known.

The other problem was not so much that enemy strongpoints were invisible at ground level, though this was an issue in some battles, but it was the vulnerability of infantry support guns. They were vulnerable to counter-preparatory artillery fire and, if moved forward, to infantry and MG fire. These problems plagued the German IGs earlier in the war. Later developments in artillery barrages in infantry attacks, as well as the lighter guns, enabled IGs to play a more useful role.

This is a brief account of the involvement of the Württemberg Mountain Regiment and Infantry Gun Battery 4 in Operation Friedensturm, the unsuccessful attack either side of Reims in mid 1918:

'Group Conta again assigned the Württemberg Mountain Regiment, along with IGB [infanteriegeschütz Batterie] 4 as support battery, to the 10th Reserve Division for the attack. The rain was pouring down. The area was under violent artillery fire. Nevertheless the regiment moved quietly and smoothly into the support trench, so that at 0100 hours it was ready on the left half of the division's attack sector. Soon after the beginning of the German artillery preparation, the Mountain Regiment pushed up close to the outskirts of Trotte; later, IGB 4 also moved to the jumping-off position. The initial lively activity of the enemy artillery diminished significantly around 0300 hours. The German gas bombardment was working.

At 0450 hours, the regiment broke into the enemy position; IGB 4 followed up closely. The first enemy line was quickly overrun. Deeper into the defences, however, the resistance began. Despite the strong preparatory fire and the creeping barrage that was marching forward, tough enemy machine-gun nests held out in the Trotte forest and in the Bois de Navarre (southeast of Pareuil). Without thinking about it, elements of the regiment pushed through between both woods and took the controlling heights between Trotte forest and the Marne, while Stoßtrupps and support weapons worked in close co-operation to overpower the enemy resistance from the rear.

The Mountain Regiment continued to advance and the two battalions were established on the south side of Vandières by 0800 hours. The French defended every foot of the ground beside their precious Marne with extreme force. But, as always, Sturmbataillon 7's infantry guns were ready surprisingly quickly to fire at the focal point of the battle.

"Under the incisive leadership of Leutnant Feninger, the infantry gun battery had moved up close to Vandières despite the violent enemy machine-gun fire, and unlimbered in a small clay pit there. Protected by the high gun-shield, against which machine-gun bullets ricocheted, the guns sent shot after shot into the toughly defended locality. Then strong enemy fire also came from the upper vineyards on the left. Two guns immediately attacked the new opponent. Using the scope, one clearly saw the smoke emitted by the enemy machine-gun hidden by a vineyard wall, between vines and bundles of stakes. The first shell quickly whistled in the direction of the smoke, and after a few shots the enemy machine-gun vacated the field. The battery made quick and clean work. Their crowning achievement, however, was still to come. Suddenly a French battery fired on our support guns from the Binson Farm, south of Chatillon. The top of all four guns, which had unlimbered in the courtyard of the farm, were visible just a short distance of scarcely 3 km away. Four quick flashes, the whoosh of the shells, four explosions in a circle around our battery! The first French shells had barely landed and Leutnant Feninger had already given the order to fire. A few seconds later, the farm in the valley was covered in black smoke. An artillery duel began with both sides firing guns at each other. The shells rushed over in both directions, exploding above the clay pit and down in the valley. The fire-fight did not last long. By our third salvo, only two guns were returning fire and a little later Binson Farm had fallen quiet. The French battery was destroyed. When going past there two hours later, we saw the effect of the duel. The guns stood mutely between the shell holes, surrounded by a heap of empty shell casings. The gunners lay dead or wounded in the yard, and some horses that had been killed by shrapnel fragments were still behind the farm."

In the late morning and the afternoon, the Würtembergers fought hotly for the important bridge crossing at Pont à Binson, which resulted in heavy losses. Again, IGB 4 successfully assisted the Ist Battalion to break open a strong enemy blocking position between Châtillon-sur-Marne and the forest east of Vandières. Requests for support came from in and around Pont à Binson, where Ist Battalion advanced south of and IInd Battalion north of the Marne from Troissy via Mareuil. The high ground south of the Marne was reached at 1730 hours.' [From 'Sturmgrenadiere' by Fritz Ristow]

Robert

[centurion]

The concept of the infantry support gun goes back as early as Gustavus Adolphus and the 30 Years war although in their earlier years they were known as battalion guns. Throughout military history there was a tension between building something big enough to make a difference and light enough to keep up with the infantry. There was a second even bigger problem - keeping the gun supplied with ammunition, often in the past the gun ended up near the sharp end with its ammunition supply in the rear vainly trying to catch up (this was one of the problems the French had in the Napoleonic period when their assault columns were accompanied with cannon acting in an infantry gun mode). Whilst light infantry guns continued to be developed , especially by the Germans, there was a growing realisation that infantry support needed to be achieved through mechanised artillery. For the British the tank initially performed this role being able, within reason, to carry its own ammunition supply across broken ,off road, terrain and mount guns capable of delivering a fairly effective short range punch as well as providing its crew with some protection against enemy fire. The Americans also came to the conclusion that a self propelled assault gun would be the answer and late in the war Pliney Holt designed such a gun which, whilst not built, bears a resemblance to the German assault guns of WW2.

This would have carried a mountain gun firing forward. It's probably also the reason why the American inspired specification for the MK VI tank had a gun firing forward from between the horns. In the event the Mk V male and composite tanks appear to have done the job reasonably well up to the point when warfare became more open again at which point they were too slow. However freed from the need to cross shell torn ground the French St Chammond proved to be an effective assault gun. In WW2 the job was mainly done, for the British, by the infantry tanks (Matilda, Valentine and Churchill) whilst the Germans developed a whole series of SP assault guns. Much hope was put to using the recoiless gun (such as the Burney) as an infantry gun but whilst extremely portable its ammunition was not (being heavier than conventional rounds.

[nigelfe]

In the first years of the 20th C, as indirect fire was being adopted, there was undoubtedly a body of traditionalists in RHA/RFA who continued to believe that the guns should be with the infantry, alongside if not in amongst. Le Cateau ended this notion.

That said there has always been some judicious use of direct fire artillery, even today on current ops. Appx B to GHQ Artillery Notes No 4 Artillery in Offensive Operation, April 1916 gives 'Example of the Employment of an 18-pr Gun in a Front Line Trench', although it was omitted from the 1917 edition.

However, the British Army has basically never subscribed to the 'accompanying artillery' (Soviet and German term) concept, so presumably they've never identified a need for it. However, their tanks originated with a similar function. It might also be related to the superiority of their field artillery including the effort put in to moving batteries forward when the advance moved out of range of gun positions (ie in 1918). The points raised in Ludendorf's March 1918 letter to the Minister for War on the subject of the battlefield zone of artillery, eg the 100% battlefield zone of 10cm guns at max range was 1140 metres, might also indicate a relevant factor.

Bruchmuller's organisation of artillery for attack included artillery assets (funtional groups IKA, AKA, FEKA and SCHWEFLA) and Infantry assets. These were:

MW (Minenwerfen), mission of close support, controlled by inf bns during assault, targets primarily MGs.

IBB (Infantriebegleitbatterien, originally called 'shock batteries' in 1916) they belonged to the infantry for the op but were owned by div arty), mission accompanying arty controlled by attacking regt, each with a 4 gun bty organised in 2 sects, using older horse drawn light guns (eg Model 1896 7.7cm). The role was close support once the infantry got beyond the barrage, and followed 1 - 2 km behind the first wave, or on the flanks of the second wave, they fired as field artillery. In 1918 their mobility was a problem because of the horse shortage.

IGB, (Infantrie-Geschuetzbatterien) mission MG suppression and ATk controlled by attacking bn, 1 gun per bn for direct fire, using captured 7.62 cm Russian guns with cut down barrels on large wheeled carriages and manhandled.

[battiscombe]

From various artillery records of the mobile warfare of later 1918 one quite often encounters accounts of 18pdrs being deployed very much upfront = often singly - working very closely with infantry .. effectively taking on this role of close support to deal with specific targets.. but this is also often poorly documented in war diaries as the fighting became more fluid and faster moving (and casualties also seem to have been quite heavy amongst subalterns who seem to have developed an aptitude for this..) ... that is my impression anyway.. And indeed - as previously noted - there are examples in later 1914 with guns being manhandled up into the very front line to engage specific troublesome targets. The few Mountain Batteries deployed in France/Flanders may have been rather more mobile than the 18pdrs. Webers account of 2nd Bde RFA in 1918 does mention occasions of failure of Trench Mortars to provide necessary support, mainly due to lack of mobility (compared unfavourably with German mobile TMBs in March )

[nigelfe]

Its important to remember that occasional use of a gun from a field battery on a direct fire task (in 1944/5 in Burma medium if not heavy guns were used for direct fire) is a very different matter to having 'infantry guns' or the tactical mission of 'accompanying'.

Mountain guns were very rare in the W Front, the only reference in Farndale is a dozen 2.75 inch in 1915, clearly a time of desperation. Not clear who owned them, possibly a couple of batteries in the Indian divisions, which didn't remain long in the theatre or British TF Mountain batteries before they were sent to the Balkans.

[SiegeGunner]

IGB, (Infantrie-Geschuetzbatterien) mission MG suppression and ATk controlled by attacking bn, 1 gun per bn for direct fire, using captured 7.62 cm Russian guns with cut down barrels on large wheeled carriages and manhandled.

From a German 1917 'lessons learnt' report I translated a while ago about ways of dealing with tanks: "The most effective weapons for use against tanks are small trench guns manned by the infantry. These guns are kept under cover in dugouts until required and are fired at very short range. They should not be much more difficult to manoeuvre than a machine gun."

[centurion]

From a German 1917 'lessons learnt' report I translated a while ago about ways of dealing with tanks: "The most effective weapons for use against tanks are small trench guns manned by the infantry. These guns are kept under cover in dugouts until required and are fired at very short range. They should not be much more difficult to manoeuvre than a machine gun."

In fact these were not conventional guns but light mortars (minenwerfer) on a revised wheeled carriage that allowed the barrel to be depressed much closer to the horizontal (they could still be used as a conventional mortar with the wheels removed). In 1918 an emergency instruction stated that he prime duty of these guns was anti tank and they should not be used for any other purpose without prior permission from senior officers. However by this stage the Germans had already concluded that the best tank killers were conventional field guns deployed in an AT role and the AT mine. A very small number of specialist AT guns were produced and some Austro Hungarian mountain guns were also acquired and deployed in an AT/infantry support role.

[SiegeGunner]

In fact these were not conventional guns but light mortars (minenwerfer) on a revised wheeled carriage

No, in fact they were not — the next section of the same report is headed 'Leichte Minenwerfer' and describes their use in the anti-tank role.

[centurion]

No, in fact they were not — the next section of the same report is headed 'Leichte Minenwerfer' and describes their use in the anti-tank role.

The Germans had no such small trench guns (Edit Except a small number semi improvised by Krupp utilising barrels from obsolete captured French Hotchkis revoving cannons) which is why they converted the light minenwerfers

Possibly a distinction is being drawn between the LMs on a field mounting and those still deployed in a mortar role. The 1918 instruction to which I refer does give such instructions (but also includes medium and heavy trench mortars)

[centurion]

German field gun deployed in the direct fire AT/infantry support role.

The intended replacement for the converted minenwerfer (600 built but too late for action) http://www.landships.freeservers.com/jpegs/37mm_tak_rheinmetall_3.JPG

The Austro Hungarian contribution http://www.landships.freeservers.com/7.5cm_gebirgskanone_m15.htm

[centurion]

Here is a screw gun (mountain gun) used as an infantry (battalion) gun by the British army on the Western Front in the early part of the war. The bodies of its crew can be seen around it.

This may explain why the British army concluded why a towed and unarmoured gun was not suitable for direct infantry support.

[Robert Dunlop]

Possibly a distinction is being drawn between the LMs on a field mounting and those still deployed in a mortar role.

Mick, I am sorry that you're expertise in translation has not been recognised. Could you provide the German words for 'small trench gun' please? This might help to show that the AAR was not referring to leichte Minenwerfer. I know that you have already mentioned that MW were dealt with in the next section.

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

Could you provide the German words for 'small trench gun' please? This might help to show that the AAR was not referring to leichte Minenwerfer.

"...kleine von der Infanterie bediente Grabenkanonen ..."

[Pete1052]

Mick, I am sorry that you're expertise in translation has not been recognised.

Halt, this is the Apostrophe Police! You're bad and guilty! Drop and give us 20 push-ups.

[Robert Dunlop]

"...kleine ...Grabenkanonen ..."

Brilliant. Thanks for taking the time to post the extra information.

Robert

[centurion]

Brilliant. Thanks for taking the time to post the extra information.

Robert

Sorry to spoil your delight in proving me wrong on as many little points as you can find but this proves nothing as Grabenkanone was used to refer to any form of gun (as opposed to a mortar) used in a trench position. It's a generic term and doesn't specify any particular weapon. The French 37mm was referred to by the Germans as a Grabenkanone as was a German field gun emplaced in a front line position. The gun improvised by Krupp using single barrels from obsolete captured Grunson or Hotchkiss revolver cannons was also called a Grabenkanone. This was intended to supplement the light minenwerfers and provide a direct fire capability. It was static (no wheels) and had to be emplaced by driving long steel spikes into the ground. To move it any distance required a truck (hardly as manoeuvrable as a machine gun). Very few were used (and before you ask no I don't know exactly how many, I don't suppose anyone does) as the new version of the LM with a low low angle fire capability proved adequate to the job. These used in a direct fire capacity could well have been referred to as Grabenkanone. In an anti tank mode they were used very much as Siege Gunner describes. An attempt was made to turn the Krupp improvise trench gun into an assault gun for use by storm troops. Ths involved beefing up the shield and mounting it on captured French field gun carriages. In this form they were called Sturmbegleitkanone (another generic term describing function rather than a specific model). Unfortunately the term leit was a misnomer as it proved far to heavy to be used by the storm troops and was abandoned (although I think some did get the dubious pleasure of proving on the battle field it unsuitability).

There is one thing I was incorrect about . The low angle fire LM was not a conversion of existing models but a development of the type. It had a round baseplate (as opposed to an oblong or square one) to which a trail was fixed (it could be removed). The barrel was longer. It was in effect a new dual use weapon and could well have been treated separately from the older light Minenwerfers that remained very much in use.

BTW Siege Gunner - do you have a date for the document you refer to? I have been building a picture of German AT tactics for some time and it would be useful.

[SiegeGunner]

In this form they were called Sturmbegleitkanone (another generic term describing function rather than a specific model). Unfortunately the term leit was a misnomer as it proved far to heavy to be used by the storm troops and was abandoned ...

What are you on about? — 'leit' is part of the word 'begleit', as in Sturm-begleit-kanone, from the verb 'begleiten' meaning 'to accompany'. No connection whatever with 'leicht' = 'light'.

The report is from May 1917. I am fairly sure that the reference to 'kleine ... Grabenkanone' in this instance is to 37mm guns on improvised static mounts, lightened to be manhandled in the front line positions. I notice that you have amended your earlier contention that the Germans had no such 'small trench guns'. In any event, they were not the modified 'leichte Minenwerfer' that you confidently asserted they must be.

[Robert Dunlop]

centurion, further to Siege Gunner's last reply, I can add some further detail. Unfortunately, I travelling at present so do not have access to my primary sources. The following, however, is available online here. It is 'Field Artillery Notes No. 7', published by the [American] Army War College in August, 1917. The notes, starting on p. 50, contain some details about 'small-calibre guns' in the German Army. 'klein[e]' refers to 'small' but not 'smallest', which is one of the reasons for including the quote on 53 mm guns and Grabenkanonen Abteilungen.

"37 mm. Guns.

There are two kinds of 37 mm. guns:

a. The (Hotchkiss) revolving gun with 5 tubes, firing a shell of 460 gr. and a case shot. Rapidity of fire, 40 shots per minute.

b. A gun having only one tube and firing the same projectiles as the above. Rapidity of fire, 10 to 12 shots per minute.

The first seems to be the armament of detachments or batteries of revolving gun "Revolver-Kanonen-Abteilungen" or "Batterien" ; the second, that of the detachments of trench guns, "Graben-Kanonen" or "Schuetzengraben-Kanonen-Abteilungen." This distinction does not seem to be positive.

The "Revolver-Kanonen-Abteilungen" are usually designated by the indication of the unit to which they belong (1) (R.-K.-Abt. of the 8th D. R., Bav. [bavarian Reserve Division]).

NOTE.—The only numbered formation that has been discovered is the Rev.-Kan. No. 8. So far only eight of these formations have been discovered, but there certainly must be a good many more.

The "Graben-Kanonen-Abteilungen" are numbered. Eighteen is the highest that has been discovered to date. According to a prisoner, the strength of detachment No. 5 is 1 officer, 40 men, and 4 guns.

Most of these formations seem to be fixed organizations and remain permanently in the sector to which they are assigned; the guns are usually placed in concrete shelters.

Their duties are distinctly defensive and consist in making a quick barrage in case of attack.

5 cm. (53 mm.) Guns.

The 5 cm. (53 mm.) gun is for flanking forts and fires a shell of 1 k. 670 (maximum range, 3,000 m.) and case shot. Rapidity of fire, 25 to 30 shots per minute.

There are not many of these guns. According to the statements of prisoners a few may be found in the above formations (Revolver-Kanonen-Abteilungen or Graben-Kanonen-Abteilungen)."

Robert

[centurion]

What are you on about? — 'leit' is part of the word 'begleit', as in Sturm-begleit-kanone, from the verb 'begleiten' meaning 'to accompany'. No connection whatever with 'leicht' = 'light'.

Oh dear have you never seen a pun before?

The report is from May 1917. I am fairly sure that the reference to 'kleine ... Grabenkanone' in this instance is to 37mm guns on improvised static mounts, lightened to be manhandled in the front line positions. I notice that you have amended your earlier contention that the Germans had no such 'small trench guns'. In any event, they were not the modified 'leichte Minenwerfer' that you confidently asserted they must be.

1. Where is your evidence that the reference is to the Krupp guns?

2. Where is the evidence that these (and there weren't very many) were lightened to be man handled?

3. Given that the things were designed to be emplaced with a an armoured shield and a mirrored (periscope) sight and spiked down I wouldn't call them small trench guns (not

like the KuK's 37mm_infanteriegeschutz_m15) which was highly mobile and could have been a candidate. http://www.landships.freeservers.com/37mm_infanteriegeschutz_m15.htm

4. Jager states that the Krupp gun needed a truck! These were not light weight pieces

The history behind the Krupp weapon is interesting. The German Navy had some Gruson revolver cannons (built under license). Some time after the outbreak of the war these were transferred to the German army which tried them operationally both as an infantry weapon and as an AA gun. They proved unsuccessful in both roles. Krupp (which owned Gruson by this time) then tried to find something to do with them and dismantled them. Tests showed that if used as a single barrel QF a fire rate similar to that of the revolver cannon could be achieved. They were then used to produce a number of fixed, emplaced guns. Some were used as coastal/harbour defence (against fast light craft coming inshore) and a few ended up as trench weapons. They weren't meant to be moved around and were installed in strong points. When they were introduced in this role is still to be confirmed (unless someone has verifiable material) but the implication in some accounts is about a year after the French 37mm trench gun. This could possibly be after May 1917.

If you read my posting properly you'll see that I admit that the 'leichte Minenwerfer' were not modified but a new dual use version was developed. Given that these were produced in their hundred, maybe even thousands and the Krupp guns in their scores (if that) I still hold that they are a much more likely candidate.

[Hans k.]

Here's another view of the leichtes Minenwerfer. It is set up in direct fire mode, in this case during field training. One of the removed wheels is visible in the foreground. The unit is the Minenwerfer platoon of Sturmbataillon 16 according to what's written on the back of the photo.