life expectancy

[Ron Clifton]

Hello all

If the quote was originally derived from Robert Graves, it seems to be contradicted by the evidence of his own battalion, as per Grumpy's original post!

I wonder how much of the "life expectancy" angle is due to publishers' hype in order to sell the book, as suggested in an earlier post? I suspect that is the case - these comments are not called "blurb" for nothing.

William - it may be that the Gallipoli casualties include deaths from disease, such as Rupert Brooke's, but there is also the point that troops actually on the peninsula were in or close to the front line virtually all the time, whereas on the Western Front they were regularly rotated for rest, re-training and the absorption of reinforcements. It has been estimated that, in a year, most infantry battalions spent 100 days in or close to the front line, 100 days in support, and 165 days in rear areas or on the move.

It is also true that casualy figures (DW&M) in relation to a particular period can be misleading. The figures for Arras 1917, for instance, show a higher daily average over a seven-week period than those on the Somme for the whole four and a half months. This is because the Arras battles involved more or less continual action, whereas the Somme breaks down into a series of battles with longer lapses in between.

Finally, there is the point that many of the things said to a newly-arrived subaltern would have been deliberately exaggerated in order to make the point - that he needed to be careful at all times.

Ron

[truthergw]

The remark by Robert Graves was not made under affadavit. It was presumably made in a particular context and with a desired effect. To treat it as if it was a statistic is simply silly. Graves was a poet and novelist. Not a statistician. We might as well question the surveying or numeracy skills of Tennyson for declaring " Half a league, half a league, rode the six hundred". Both the distance and the tally are demonstrably in error.

[Ron Clifton]

Tom

I have heard it said that Tennyson was pretty miffed when he found the total was nearer 700 than 600! Current estimates suggest it was around 670 - but that is a bit off-topic.

Ron

[truthergw]

I doubt he was all that miffed, Ron. Seven does not fit the metrical scheme.

[Muerrisch]

even if Graves knew the truth [however truth is defined in this case] it would not have made much difference. He never let the facts get in the way of a good story.

Don't get me wrong: I admire his work and the man enormously [as did Frank Richards] but his approach to history was journalistic rather than reportage.

[WilliamRev]

I wrote about John Lewis-Stempel's book "Six Weeks - The Short and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War":

Although the publisher's hype suggests that it is a universal statistic that junior officers only survived an average of six weeks, the text of the book makes it clear that the title comes from a quote from Robert Graves : " A soldier who had the honour to serve with one of the better divisions could count on no more than three months' trench service before being killed or wounded; a junior officer, a mere six weeks."

As an interesting exercise I spent a few hours going through the war diary of 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, a battalion which I suppose fulfills Robert Graves specification in being a regular army battalion in one of the better/busier divisions, the Third, to see how long a 2nd Leiutenant lasted before becoming a casualty.

From March 1916 until the end of the war I noted all the 2nd Lieutenants and when they joined the battalion, and then noted how long they lasted until they became a casualty. I was quite shocked by what I found:

135 2nd lieuts served in the battalion during this period, of whom 45 were killed, 63 were wounded (once or more, but not killed), and 27 survived unscathed - the majority of this latter group joined in mid-to-late 1918.

A huge number lasted 9 - 15 weeks, plenty less than a week, others a year or more. I think when I do the maths that the average will be around 12 weeks - rather more than Robert Graves' estimate, but frankly far shorter than I had thought.

These 135 men were just the 2nd Lieuts, and I intend to try to include all the other officers as well in due course and will let you all know the figures I come up with.

William

[EastSurrey]

The "three week life expectancy" has about it the same ring of absurdity as that old chestnut " a whole generation wiped out".

Hyped up claims and slogans that really have done damage. Lord knows, the truth was bad enough - a male generation was decimated : in the case of the subaltern class, doubly so. This was, and remains, a uniquely catastrophic event in British history. The turnover of officers, as opposed to their death, might well correspond to an average of three weeks.

Editing : The Black Death was, of course, a much bigger demographic catastrophe, but in terms of gender selection it was, presumably, even handed, whereas 1914-1918 was a male orientated Pied Piper. Hence my statement that for Britain the Great War was, and is, a unique catastrophe.

Phil (PJA)

Martin Middlebrook has an appendix addressing the 'Three week subaltern'myth in 'The Kaiser's Battle.'looking especially at 10th West Yorks.He identifies that almost half the officers left the battalion without being killed,wounded or prisoners.

My experience of the East Surrey Regiment indicates that whilst officer turnover appears high,many left through sickness,or transfer to both combatant and non combatant posts elsewhere.In'The Anatomy of Courage'Moran quotes a fellow officer on a new officer draft of seventeen after the Somme'I give the best of them two months.' Moran goes on to write'Two months have gone and his verdict is in a fair way of proving true..A few,and these the more fortunate,were hit ,happily before they showed signs of wear.And some went on leave and did not return,and some went sick,and some were discarded to trench mortars or in drafts to other Fusilier battalions'.

Michael

[phil andrade]

135 2nd lieuts served in the battalion during this period, of whom 45 were killed

'Struth, William, that's one in three !

This regiment appears to have taken rather more than its fair share of punishment : it brings to mind Niall Freguson's contention that the per capita death rate among those who served was outrageoulsy high for Scotland, far more than for the rest of the UK and only surpassed by two other belligerent powers.

I have acquired Jack Sheldon's the German Army at Ypres 1914. A superb read. The German officer class, apparently, suffered a death rate that exceeded that of the British. In his book there is a photo of twelve officers from Bavarian RIR 16. At the end of the Battle of Geluveld, eight of them had been killed, two were wounded and only two emerged unscathed. And that was just one battle.

Phil (PJA)

[WilliamRev]

Further to my post above:

I get the impresion that 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers were among the more heavily-engaged British battalions, hence the heavy attrition-rate amongst junior officers. Apart from the many day-to-day casualties they suffered heavily at: The Somme (Longueval/Delville Wood): 364 casualties. Arras: 499 casualties. 3rd Ypes: 437 casualties. German Spring Offensive 11-13 April 1918: 360 casualties. Early Sept 1918: 195 casualties, late 1918: 263 casualties.

Whilst I was calculating the casualties amonst junior officers in the battalion, I was somewhat disconbobulated to find that the only officer to have been wounded three times and survived the war was my grandfather. He joined in March 1916 and lasted 11 weeks until getting a bullet in the arm. Back in time to fight on the Somme he lasted 4 days before being badly wounded. When he rejoined in June 1917 he lasted 16 months before being badly wounded again. During this latter spell he was a company comander and one of only 4 officers out of 24 not killed/wounded in 3rd Ypres 26-28 Sept 1917 when the 9th Brigade captured Zonnebeke.

William

[phil andrade]

During this latter spell he was a company comander and one of only 4 officers out of 24 not killed/wounded in 3rd Ypres 26-28 Sept 1917 when the 9th Brigade captured Zonnebeke.

William

That's exactly the same casualty rate as that suffered by the officers of Bavarian RIR 16 on nearly the same ground, over a similar time period, just under three years previously . But in the German sample, out of the twelve officers, eight were killed and only two wounded : an appalling lethality rate, and virtually a reversal of the normal ratio between killed and wounded. How many of the 20 officer casualties in the British sample were killed ?

Phil (PJA)

[WilliamRev]

I wrote about my grandfather :

"During this latter spell he was a company comander and one of only 4 officers out of 24 not killed/wounded in 3rd Ypres 26-28 Sept 1917 when the 9th Brigade captured Zonnebeke.

Phil wrote:

"That's exactly the same casualty rate as that suffered by the officers of Bavarian RIR 16 on nearly the same ground, over a similar time period, just under three years previously . But in the German sample, out of the twelve officers, eight were killed and only two wounded : an appalling lethality rate, and virtually a reversal of the normal ratio between killed and wounded. How many of the 20 officer casualties in the British sample were killed ?".

I have had another look at the casualty figures, and realise that I should have written that out of 20 (not 24) officers, eight were killed (Lt. Col. Teacher, Lt. Swales, 2nd Lts. Cochrane, Currer, McCracken, Wood, Kennedy, W. Brown), eight were wounded (Capt. Smith, 2tls. Ewing, Keef, McKenzie, White, H. Brown , Hancock, Graham). Four were unhurt (Capt. Orr, Acting-Capt. Revels, Lt. Shute, Lt. Gilmour).

[As a postscript, of those four officers who survived this battle, Lt. Shute left the battalion within days to become a bombing instructor - it is possible that he didn't distinguish himself in the battle, or perhaps was totally exhausted - he survived the war; Lt. Gilmour died in March 1918; both Captain Orr and Captain Revels were in hospitals in Britain recovering from wounds received in 1918 when the war ended on 11/11/18.

William

[phil andrade]

Thank you, William. Your grandfather's ordeal is awful to contemplate....it becomes very apparent that not only was the officers' casualty rate significantly higher than that of the other ranks : it also entailed a much higher incidence of fatalities compared with wounded. Do you have casualty figures for the battalion as a whole in this action ? It would be interesting to see what proportion of the OR casualties were fatal. Presumably, if 437 casualties were sustained by the battalion, then 421 of them were NCOs and men.

This is based on the premise that all the casualties were suffered in the period 26-28 September. I would guess that the battalion went into action with no more than 700 ORs, so that implies a 60% casualty rate, and probably more, among the men. The rate for the officers was 80%. But whereas fifty per cent of the officer casualties were fatal, probably between twenty five and thirty five per cent of the OR casualties were killed or died from wounds. Perhaps you might supply information to confirm, or refute, my estimate.

Phil (PJA)

[WilliamRev]

Phil wrote:

"But whereas fifty per cent of the officer casualties were fatal, probably between twenty five and thirty five per cent of the OR casualties were killed or died from wounds. Perhaps you might supply information to confirm, or refute, my estimate."

I think that your estimate is almost exactly right: the other ranks casualties of 437 are made up of 121 killed/missing/DOW and 316 wounded.

William

[phil andrade]

Phil wrote:

"But whereas fifty per cent of the officer casualties were fatal, probably between twenty five and thirty five per cent of the OR casualties were killed or died from wounds. Perhaps you might supply information to confirm, or refute, my estimate."

I think that your estimate is almost exactly right: the other ranks casualties of 437 are made up of 121 killed/missing/DOW and 316 wounded.

William

Thank you.

It is very clear that not only was an officer more likely to become a casualty, he was more likely, if he was a casualty, to be killed than those he lead, who tended to suffer less lethal wounds.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Thank you.

It is very clear that not only was an officer more likely to become a casualty, he was more likely, if he was a casualty, to be killed than those he lead, who tended to suffer less lethal wounds.

Phil (PJA)

I am not at all sure this was correct as a generality. At first sight it seems very unlikely, unless the enemy had officer-seeking missiles or a multitude of snipers. As the majority of casualties were caused by shell-fire, I am very sceptical.

Will have a look at 2nd RWF casualties and report back.

[Ron Clifton]

Very roughly speaking, officers constituted three per cent of the manpower and accounted for five per cent of the casualties. This alone supports the contention that officers were more likely to become casualties than other ranks.

Ron

[truthergw]

I think line officers would normally lead by example and were more likely to put themselves deliberately at risk and to remain in that condition longer. An officer would prefer to remain where his men thought he was even under fire, he would be keen to seek out and gather information. We have only to think of the number of very senior officers killed or wounded going up to the line to get information and ' see for themselves' as well as the archetypal ride up Menin Road, undertaken by Haig when the situation was critical. It was an OR's job to get where he was sent and then dig in. Much riskier to be a line officer than one of his men and that was one of the reasons the men followed them.

[Muerrisch]

I think line officers would normally lead by example and were more likely to put themselves deliberately at risk and to remain in that condition longer. An officer would prefer to remain where his men thought he was even under fire, he would be keen to seek out and gather information. We have only to think of the number of very senior officers killed or wounded going up to the line to get information and ' see for themselves' as well as the archetypal ride up Menin Road, undertaken by Haig when the situation was critical. It was an OR's job to get where he was sent and then dig in. Much riskier to be a line officer than one of his men and that was one of the reasons the men followed them.

It was the probability of fatality rather than wounding, given the fact of wounding, that I was querying. That certainly does not follow from the 3%/ 5% statistic, does it?

[phil andrade]

No doubt about it....the officers who were hit were more likely to be killed than the men who were struck down.

Your scepticism is understandable...indeed, that is why I have emphasised this point.

In a situation where a leader makes himself conspicuous it's blindingly obvious that he will be sought out and targeted, but, as you suggest, the more random and indiscriminate nature of firepower on Great War battlefields, especially those of the great artillery dominated battles, make this disparity more perplexing.

For the record, I will cite the Medical History tabulations for the Western Front 1914-1918

Officers : killed, died of wounds ; 36,069. Wounded and survived ; 76,224. Proportion of fatalities to number hit : 1 to 2.11.

ORs : killed, died of wounds; 641,446. Wounded and survived; 1,761,389. Proportion of fatalites to number hit : 1 to 2.75

That's a big difference.

Phil (PJA)

[truthergw]

It was the probability of fatality rather than wounding, given the fact of wounding, that I was querying. That certainly does not follow from the 3%/ 5% statistic, does it?

Hi Mr. G. I was not replying to your post, that was an accidental juxtaposition. I was simply making an observation. The increased death toll which you point out, as against wounding, is a puzzle. I seem to recall several reports of officers being wounded more than once because they refused to seek medical attention or insisted on returning to the firing line after first aid. I'm relying on memory( a very chancy thing nowadays) and my reading of personal memoirs where 'carrying on' seems to have been the done thing. Deliberate exposure to danger, as practised by many officers, will offer a better target. We know that officers tunics and personal weapons had to be modified to try to reduce their losses. It might be interesting to compare statistics from early battles to those of later when not only were officers harder to distinguish but many had come up through the ranks. Was there any difference in deaths per wounded at Passchendaele or Amiens compared to Loos, for instance.

[Muerrisch]

No doubt about it....the officers who were hit were more likely to be killed than the men who were struck down.

Your scepticism is understandable...indeed, that is why I have emphasised this point.

In a situation where a leader makes himself conspicuous it's blindingly obvious that he will be sought out and targeted, but, as you suggest, the more random and indiscriminate nature of firepower on Great War battlefields, especially those of the great artillery dominated battles, make this disparity more perplexing.

For the record, I will cite the Medical History tabulations for the Western Front 1914-1918

Officers : killed, died of wounds ; 36,069. Wounded and survived ; 76,224. Proportion of fatalities to number hit : 1 to 2.11.

ORs : killed, died of wounds; 641,446. Wounded and survived; 1,761,389. Proportion of fatalites to number hit : 1 to 2.75

That's a big difference.

Phil (PJA)

At this risk of pointing out the blindingly obvious, might not officers have received better care all the way along the aid chain? Thats the way things were in those days, perhaps?

[phil andrade]

It might be interesting to compare statistics from early battles to those of later when not only were officers harder to distinguish but many had come up through the ranks. Was there any difference in deaths per wounded at Passchendaele or Amiens compared to Loos, for instance.

Here are some more figures, which I hope will throw light on this. Again, the source is Medical Statistics. The tabulation is for Western Front only. Included in the "Killed" are those who died of wounds, and those who were initially reported as missing but were subsequently counted as killed. For "Wounded", read only those who survived their wounds. The "Fatality Ratio" is the percentage of hits that killed or mortally wounded.

1914 : Officers, Killed : 1,519. Wounded : 1,877. Fatality ratio : 45%

ORs, Killed : 21,743. Wounded : 53,812. Fatality ratio : 29%

1915 : Officers, Killed : 4,189. Wounded : 7,434. Fatality ratio : 36%

ORs, Killed : 75,254. Wounded : 217,529. Fatality ratio : 26%

1916 : Officers, Killed : 9,198. Wounded : 20,345. Fatality ratio : 31%

ORs, Killed : 163,251. Wounded : 443,352. Fatality ratio : 27%

1917 : Officers, Killed : 11,691. Wounded : 20,385. Fatality ratio : 36%

ORs, Killed : 200,469. Wounded : 494,027. Fatality ratio : 29%

1918 : Officers, Killed : 9,472. Wounded : 25,733. Fatality ratio : 27%

ORs, Killed : 180,729. Wounded : 552,669. Fatality ratio : 25%

This is rather convoluted, but it does indicate one clear theme : the officer fatality ratio ( i.e the proportion of casualties that were killed) was always higher than that of the ORs, but the disparity diminished markedly between 1914 and 1918, with 1917 being the anomaly. The difference between 1914 and 1918 is remarkable. In the early battles, officers who were hit were more than fifty per cent more likely to die than the men who were hit; by the end, the difference was less than ten per cent.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

Fascinating, thanks for the graft!

Is this a function of developing democracy, with the OR's treatment being levelled up, or the officers' levelled down? [There is a case for the latter because the OR's stay nearly constant].

Or a function of the gradual dilution of the old-school ethos whereby officers placed themselves in lethal situations to do their duty as they saw it? Robert Graves described how he maximised his chances of not receiving a fatal wound, without giving the appearance of cowardice, for example.

Disparities such as you point out are undoubtedly significant, because of the large numbers involved. Statistics work best, as we know, with big samples ..... its working out what drives what that is the hard bit.

[dfaulder]

>><<

Or a function of the gradual dilution of the old-school ethos whereby officers placed themselves in lethal situations to do their duty as they saw it? Robert Graves described how he maximised his chances of not receiving a fatal wound, without giving the appearance of cowardice, for example.

>><<

Or possibly it being pointed out that the supply of replacements was not infinite and "duty" included being around the next day!

Discretion is the better part of valour?

David

[phil andrade]

Is this a function of developing democracy, with the OR's treatment being levelled up, or the officers' levelled down? [There is a case for the latter because the OR's stay nearly constant].

The "dumbing down" of officers, I would reckon....they were probably attempting to blend in more, and render themselves less conspicuous, as the war dragged on.

There is also the different nature of the 1914 fighting : very intense battles fought at close quarters, infantry versus infantry, in which officers were expected to lead their men. I'm sure that they were more in plain view of the enemy then than they were to be in the trench battles of later years. There was something a lot more "personal" about those early battles.

Monty's account of the action in Flanders (Meteren) in 1914 brings this home.

Perhaps the lack of steel helmets made a significant difference to wound lethality.

I admit that I'm rather surprised at the implications of my own work here....I had expected that there would be a difference, but I'm taken back at the size of the disparity.

The nature of the officer cadre must have a lot to do with this : the social make up, the noblesse oblige effect and so on.

Edit; IIRC from Monty's memoirs, he described lying desperately wounded, and ordering that no further attempts be made to rescue him after the death of one of his men who was trying to bring him back....illustrates the 1914 officer code of conduct.

Phil (PJA)