Oskar Von Hutier

[Desmond7]

Reading about March 21 offensive. The 18th German army spearheaded the attack under the command of General Oskar Von Hutier.

This army achieved initial results which were breathtaking. Question is :- How much influence did Von Hutier have over the tactics used to achieve this breakthrough and advance? Was he the ideal 'storm army' commander or was he simply following a plan laid down by his superiors?

Since I know little or nothing about German commanders during the war - to my shame - I may have rated this man higher than he deserves. However, he does seem to have led a very successful formation.

Anyone have a view?

Des

[Bryn_Hammond]

Von Hutier made his reputation capturing Riga on the Eastern Front in September 1917 where his troops used the infiltration tactics later employed in March 1918.

[Guest Biplane pilot]

Hutier's name was attached to the infiltration tactics used by sturmtruppen but he had little to do with their development. The US Army War College produced an excellent monograph on the subject several years ago.

[Robert Dunlop]

How much influence did Von Hutier have over the tactics used to achieve this breakthrough and advance? Was he the ideal 'storm army' commander or was he simply following a plan laid down by his superiors?

He does seem to have led a very successful formation.

Des

You have raised several interesting questions. I don't know the precise answer to your first question. I suspect Von Hutier would have been involved, along with others, in some high level discussions about the March offensive. He would have spoken with authority about his own experience of the attack at Riga and in support of comments made by Bruchmuller, who planned the artillery bombardment at Riga. The concepts of stosstruppen would have been known to all the senior commanders, including Ludendorff, prior to these planning meetings.

With regard to the detailed planning of 18th Army, von Hutier would probably have had limited involvement in specifics. This was not the German way of planning operations. Where I think von Hutier would have played an important role is in securing and fostering the 'right' type of people on his general staff.

The artillery bombardment was planned by Bruchmuller, with input from planners in 18th Army. Again, I doubt von Hutier would have been too involved in the details.

As to the success of 18th Army, IIRC the initial German reaction to day one was very muted. Yes, some penetrations had occurred but overall things seemed pretty intact. Not the success they had hoped for. Of course, to avoid a 'break out', Gough had ordered elements of Fifth Army to fall back. This turned into the retreat that was essentially a containing move on the part of the allies.

Bruchmuller would be my choice for the German commander who had the most influence on the British retreat. He shattered Fifth Army's C&C as well as punched the holes through which the infantry could attack. I don't think that 'infiltration' adequately describes the combined arms tactics of the offensive.

I can't recall the precise details but I think von Hutier did not fully appreciate the strategic opportunities and risks posed by the breakthrough in late March. It wasn't too long afterwards that von Hutier and the 18th Army were involved in Operation Gneisenau, the push south from the newly formed salient. It wasn't anything like as successful. When you combine this operation with Riga, which was mounted against the rapidly fading Russian Army, then I think you are right to be a little more circumspect in your opinion of him.

Robert

[Guest Desmond6]

To all - thanks for your postings.

Can I digress on my own topic!!

From Pals' knowledge is their a single individual who can be credited with instigating the 'storm' tactics? Was their a pioneering leader for these infantry assault tactics or were they just trench warfare/close combat taken to a logical conclusion?

In essence I'm looking for a 'Wingate of Storm' ... and I don't mean to be flippant!

des

[Robert Dunlop]

The German Lieutenant Colonel Max Bauer is credited by Gudmundsson as first proposing a special unit to test assault weapons and tactics. Bauer is described as 'the second most powerful man on the (German) General Staff'.

The first leader of the newly formed Sturmabteilung, created in March 1915, was Major Calsow. His command was short-lived following the poor performance of the unit against the French in June 1915. He was replaced by the better known Captain Rohr.

It is interesting to contrast the British and the German approach to the problem of assaulting static lines. The German's created a hierarchy of forces, from the elite stormtroopers down to the lowly holding divisions. The British approach was to disseminate best-practice more widely, though variations in performance of divisions persisted.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

A brief quote from Kitchen's book 'The German Offensives of 1918':

'Von Hutier and his chief of staff, von Schulenburg, were eager to press on, regardless of the needs of 2nd and 17th Armies. Schulenburg exploited his friendship with Lt-Colonel Wetzell at the OHL to persuade Ludendorff to concentrate on consolidating 18th Army's successes at the expense of his overall strategic concept.'

Robert

[Desmond7]

Robert - thanks very much for those details. You have been very kind in following this up. Since my research project is about to enter the 1918 phase I want to know a little more about the men attacking on March 21. I'm now firmly pointed in the right direction and also well directed towards the genesis of the stormtroops.

Thanks Des

[Chris Boonzaier]

The 2nd Jäger Batln was in the Alpenkorps, one of the most highly rated assault divisions. in the history of the Jägers it is mentioned that they learned the assault troop methods in the time leading up to their attack on Fleury in Verdun (1916).

These methods of troops bypassing resistance etc. etc. were actually based on a note book found on the body of a French officer. Captain Laffarque had used the methods in local attacks in 1915 and had jotted dowm his ideas and observations ín a book which the Germans took off his body.

That may be an idea worth following up on.

All the best

Chris

[duckman]

von Hutiers reputation rests on the capture of Riga and the first few days of Kaiserschlacht. I wonder if any here have more details than me on what he did for the rest of 1918 (the later offensives, plus defensive battles later in the year).

Seems to me Fayolle handled him in August,* and Fayolle doesn't exactly leap off the page as the best French General since Napoleon.

Cheers

Duckman

*Granted the German army had shot its bolt by August, but by the same token von Hutiers reputation is helped by the fact he was breaking through a thinly manned and underprepared line in March.

[chris.wight]

I came across this contemporary discussion of von Hutier's methods in the July 19th, 1917 edition of the Red Deer Advocate (Red Deer, Alberta), link. It was quite surprising to find it in this newspaper.

[chris.wight]

Part 2.

[bob lembke]

Chris;

The article is remarkably good, especially considering how fantastic and propagandaistic most journalsim was during the war. I assume that the author was severely punished. (Only kidding! I could digress OT on this but will control myself.)

The concept that storm tactics were developed in the east and transferred to the west for the Spring Offensive, perhaps by von Hutier, is common but really rather bizarre. Will return to this later.

I am writing a book under contract about, mostly, one of the two major innovative storm units, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) (GRPR), and have begun one on the other principal unit, the Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr) (S=B Rohr). My father was a member of the former, wounded four times at Verdun and Reims, and fought with the second unit several times at Verdun. These units had three roles; to test and develop special equipment and tactics for storm attacks; to train other units, even foreign allied armies, in these tactics; and to undertake especially difficult "tactical problems", both to solve serious tactical situations, and to hone their own skills and tactics and to keep close to the reality of the battlefield. The S=B Rohr was double-sized to be able to carry out all of these roles. The third important unit was Jaeger=Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3. There were, in total 17 storm battalions in the Imperial Army, besides the GRPR; all of them were infantry units, with the exception of the first two above, which were pioneer units, and the third, a Jaeger unit. In the German Army the Pioniere traditionally handled technical tasks, but also was the arm that tested new equipment, even weapons like new artillery pieces, in some cases.

The GRPR had a strength of about 14 companies, plus all or part of a Ersatz Bataillon back in Berlin which carried out a good deal of their training, including flame thrower training, as well as an elaborate staff and additional support formations. The S=B Rohr was about nine companies. The GRPR was formed, in its earliest form, a bit before S=B Rohr, in December 1914 or January 1915, the S=B Rohr a bit later. It is my opinion that the former was clearly as important as the latter in the development of storm equipment and tactics, but the later is much better known, for several reasons.

The two principal people in the field developing these new capabilities were Major der Landwehr Dr. Bernard Reddemann, who formed and then led the GRPR, and also was the co-inventor of the modern flame thrower; and Captain Willi Rohr, who took over the unit that became the S=B Rohr and led it through the war. Both of these units were combined arms units (for example, GRPR made their own especially light mine throwers in their own workshop, which also made many of their flame throwers in France). Besides the workshop, the GRPR had a Research Company.

These two units totalled about 5000 men, were active in early 1915, and were largely formed by early 1916. The idea that these ideas came from a pamphlet found in a French trench, or were developed in late 1917 on the Russian Front for the Battle of Riga. (For this battle, as well as for other major battles in Russia, two companies of GRPR were brought to the East Front to lead this battle with 84 flame throwers. For the greatest flame attack in history, with 154 flame throwers, needed in November 1916 to take an extraordinarily hard fortified position after conventional attacks failed, three companies of GRPR were brought from France, and the battle was directed tactically by Major Dr. Reddemann from the air with two-way radios and air-dropped messages to the leaders of the assault formations.)

The German troops in the East were mostly second and third-rate troops, and when brought to the West Front they had to be re-trained to a higher standard. The idea that these sophisticated tactics developed there is wide-spread, but really is rediculous.

The two other people who were probably most important to the development of storm warfare were Colonel Bauer, previously mentioned, and Crown Prince Wilhelm. The latter even seemingly bank-rolled the formation of the GRPR out of his own funds until the unit proved itself to the Highest Army Command.

Bob Lembke

[Desmond7]

An old thread .. but a goodie.

Bob ... over to you .. Sturm Rohr played a siginificant part in March 21 1918 attacks?

Des

[Robert Dunlop]

Des, elements of Sturmbataillon 5 (Rohr) played a very small part in the March 21 attacks. The whole of Operation Michael covered a frontage of 50 miles, with three armies taking part. Sturmbataillon 5 was parcelled out as corps assets. They fought with vigor and distinction, as always, but their contribution was tiny compared to the whole. I think this is often forgotten in accounts of the specialist stosstruppen units.

Robert

[Desmond7]

Robert .. as always my thanks .. just back from a mind bogglingly and wallet emptyingly expensive Euro Disney and Paris!!!!!!FUME. Were Rohr used against 14th DIV.?

That's not a trick question by the way .. I can't remember where I may have read that??

Des

[bob lembke]

Des;

As Robert indicated, the S=B Rohr fought usefully in the Spring Offensive, but one battalion, even oversized, could only have a limited impact based on its fighting contribution.

I think that the ultimate goal of the storm battalions was to spread these skills through the army, and perhaps eventually get to a point where the storm battlions themselves would become unnecessary. But of course they never got to that point. One weakness of the concept was that, in the real world, as you formed elite units with selected men the average quality of the average unit suffered, as strong, young, smart men were combed out and put in special units.

The Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) was extensively reorganized in the months befor 21. 3. 18. to be in a form to effectively function in the mobile warfare that it was hoped would develop with the big offensive, with more motorization, more self-contained logistics, etc.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

One weakness of the concept was that, in the real world, as you formed elite units with selected men the average quality of the average unit suffered, as strong, young, smart men were combed out and put in special units.

Bob, this is an extremely important point! I am leading up to this in the thread about command and control as well. It is interesting that Ludendorff commented about this in his memoirs, too late after the event.

Robert

[Greenwoodman]

These men were also leading the assault, so were were likely to take higher than normal casualties, therefore reducing the number of men of this calibre available.

Certainly the German Army had a trickle-down training plan in operation. Ludwig Renn in "War" recounts being pulled up by a newly-arrived company commander for wearing storm-trooper accoutrements after returning from a storm battalion. The response is ‘That’s excellent. We’ll get together a whole platoon of shock-troops.’ (War p. 300 in my copy).

[Robert Dunlop]

These men were also leading the assault, so were were likely to take higher than normal casualties

Not necessarily. These units were more heavily armed, both with close range and fire support weapons. They were highly trained, especially in following close to the barrages, moving in small groups, and overwhelming the dazed opposition very quickly.

Conventional 'attack' divisions tended to be more bunched together, move more slowly and be less capable of suppressing the opposition. There are noticeable differences in the descriptions of the the non-stosstruppen attacks in Operation Michael for example.

reducing the number of men of this calibre available

Any significant number of casualties, even if relatively less, would affect the performance of these specialist units in the longer term. More significantly, the need to replace the casualties meant further depletion of the non-specialist units, further reducing their performance. I think the latter was the bigger problem that the German Army never resolved.

Robert

[bob lembke]

On the quality of men issue. (The following I believe to be true, but it is from an excellent secondary source, not from my reading a primary source.)

When the Jaeger Bataillon Nr. 3, an elite unit, was converted into Jaeger=Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 3, reportedly 500 men had to be selected out and sent to other units and replaced. Typically men for storm units were, among other things, expected to be under 25 and unmarried. In my father's unit, the basic tactical unit was a Trupp of eight men and a Gefreiter (sort of a corporal or lance corporal) or at other times a Trupp of only four men, with no sort of NCO at all. Again, this was at the time when, I understand, the British Army was trying to shift the basic tactical unit from the battalion, often commanded by a lieutenant-colonel, to the company, commanded by a captain or possibly a major (?). So the men had to be smart and possess initiative, as well as being young, strong, etc.

One downside of this collection of energetic men with initiative and smarts was the capacity for mischief, especially in an envoroment that involved a serious shortage of food, made worse by the thefts by corrupt mess sergeants. My father's company spent 90% or 95% of the time in barracks in Stenay-sur-Meuse, as most of the regiment was at the Somme, and his 2nd Company was the only FW company for the whole 5th Army at that time (late 1916), and they deployed from there when needed on their own trucks, which were permamently loaded with FW, oil, spares, etc. in the courtyard of their barracks. So there was scope for mischief. Their own uniforms were so distinctive (the full outfit included alpine half-boots, puttees, alpine-style breeches with leather knee-patches, and a uniform blouse with the Crown Prince's death-head on their lower left sleeve, leather elbow-patches, the Garde Litzen on the collar, and the black pioneer shoulder-straps; the latter, probably uniqely, with no unit number on them.) that the men collected ordinary infantry uniforms to use on missions of mischief.

Here or on another forum I have mentioned several of these. Here is one that I know I have not shared. The Flamm=Pioniere got wind of the fact that the general commanding the local area (as opposed to the units) was having the Crown Prince, the flame troops' patron, over to dinner. They scouted the Kommandant 's house, on the banks of the Meuse, and snuck up to his fish weir in the Meuse and poached the one fine live salmon in the weir, which was on the evening's menu. They took it to the gereral's cook, and offered it to him for sale, representing that they had just caught it. The cook happily bought it for use as a second salmon for the big dinner.

Of course, the deception did not remain secret for long. The next day the outraged general himself burst into their barracks, shouting that he knew that they had done this dastardly deed, that he had no evidence this time, but that he would catch them red-handed one day and really deal with them. The flame pioneers' reputation had proceeded them.

I guess you have read a post of mine where I described how my father's company shot their rotten company commander off his horse on the manuver grounds. They were surrounded by infantry and officers came into the barracks for three days and conducted interviews and took depositions. At the end of this process it was clear that the CO was a coward and a rat; he was expunged from the rolls of the regiment, and the infantry was withdrawn, and barrels of beer were brought in to the men, at least 31 of which had fired and hit the CO. Remarkable pragmatism. An elite storm company was worth a lot more than a miserable first lieutenant. I suspect that in the British Army some of the men would have been tied across the muzzles of carronades and sprayed over the others in formation. (Sorry, excessive, that had not been done in a British Army for 50 years, probably. Pardon my excessive comment. I do love to be provocative.)

So to some extent the men having initiative and spirit, hardly being sheep, was a double-edged sword.

Bob Lembke