Quite an entry for 30.03.18

[Bardess]

30.03.18 RAILWAY S11.c.9.6

Enemy attitude at “Stand to” was very quiet and remained so until 8am when he suddenly put down a very heavy bombardment on our front line trenches. This bombardment was strongly supported by minenwerfer; the latter weapons were employed against points which he evidently considered of tactical value as regarded the attack and the remainder of the ground was prepared by artillery only. At 8:45am the barrage became intense and also spread back into the area S17a and S11c. At 10:20am the enemy thickened up his barrage by machine gun fire and also used intense machine gun fire on the back areas which swept down the valley S17a and S11b towards Bn HQ. At 10:45am the enemy barrage lifted off the front trench and was replaced by heavy machine gun fire which swept the parapets from the flank in enfilade; considerable assistance was also rendered by 14 hostile aeroplanes which fired on the trenches in the Bn sector and also dropped bombs behind the front line.

Under cover of this small arms barrage, the enemy attack developed. He evidently anticipated that the preparation by his heavy TMs and artillery would have inflicted so many casualties and so demoralised the survivors of No 2 Coy on the RIGHT as to render them ineffective as a fighting unit. He therefore camp up the SUNKEN road in S18b in dense masses and in waves on the Bn front from the SUNKEN road NORTHWARDS. The SUNKEN road and neighbourhood had undergone an intense preparation and the enemy, who attacked in pack order undoubtedly considered he could open up this road towards BOISLEUX ST MARC by sheer weight of numbers and having gained this locality that he could then develop the attack WESTWARDS turning the front held by the 1st Guards Bde.

The heavy column pressing forward up the road attempted a minor outflanking movement round the SW flank of the road but immediately found itself under heavy enfilade Lewis gun and rifle fire from the Coy which, as stated above, then evidently affected to ignore as a fighting unit. The result was that only a small party succeeded in penetrating our defences at the SUNKEN road. On the remainder of the front the enemy was stopped and driven back by our rifle and Lewis gun fire before he could even reach our furthermost belt of wire. The Coy Commander on the spot then organised an immediate counter-attack to eject the party of about 50 Germans who had effected a temporary lodgement in our front line trench. The scheme was to send an officer with a party to a position on the SUNKEN road whence they could catch by rifle fire any Germans who attempted to return down the road. He then led a bombing attack in person, largely assisted by rifle grenades, down the trench towards the SUNKEN road. This immediate counter-attack was developed with the utmost rapidity and gallantry and, as anticipated, the enemy commenced to retire down the SUNKEN road offering a fine target to the party which had got into a position to shoot them down. They left 18 dead close to our trenches and the numbers killed and wounded outside the wire were impossible to ascertain as the ground fell away sharply. No live prisoners were taken.

The enemy maintained a heavy machine gun and rifle fire, probably with the intention of stopping our patrols following him up and also to enable him to clear his wounded accumulated from the dead ground in front.

The casualties suffered by the Bn were approximately 80 including Lieut L HARVARD and 2/Lieut C C MAYS killed and Lieut Hon G CORBETT wounded.

Intelligence issued from the VI Corps stated that the attack had been made by the 452nd and 453rd Regts each with one Bn in front, one Bn each in very close support and the third Bn of each in local Rgtl reserve with the 451st Regt in Divl reserve [234th Div] ready to exploit success.

King’s Coy relieved No 2 Coy at dusk.