Artillery on the Somme

[truthergw]

Old Tom. The decision to attack on a broad front was the answer to casualties and checks inflicted by flanking fire. When a part of an advance was checked this resulted in defending troops being able to enfilade the successful attack. That is why targets are set and troops are not allowed to go charging on if they happen to hit a soft spot. The whole line must move forward together. From the other side of the wire, that is what the redoubts are for. A strong point holds up all the advance, not just the bit in front of it.

Ian. Delegation of tasks was the way the army worked. The CiC told Rawlinson that he was to attack on a specific front. Rawlinson produces a plan with objectives and required resources. Haig replies with a demand for more ambitious objectives. That settled, Haig allocates the resources he has available. It's Rawlinson's baby now. This was standard practice. The idea of leaving it to the man on the spot, he knows best, is also working here. That was very much the way the German Army operated as well, more so than the British. There was always a nice balance to be sought between accepting and devolving responsibility and with it, freedom of action. The general consensus was that the British were too reluctant to devolve.

[Old Tom]

Tom,

I have read, somewhere, that avoiding being subjected to fire from the flanks was behind the wide front attack as you say. Perhaps I am guilty of hindsight, but I fell that the front did not have to be as wide at that on the July 1 to achieve that end. I am not sure when the version of the 'principles of war' that I first encountered back in the 50's (and have now largely forgotten) came into fashion, but 'concentration of force' and 'economy of effort' were two of them and as general ideas probably existed in 1916, and may have been neglected. Without, I'm afraid, checking the detail most of the sucessful offensives of the later battles, Messines, Cambrai and the 100 days were on comparitively narrow fronts.

The question of what may be called density of fire is often raised together with the choice of depth of penetration i.e. how many lines are to be engaged and taken. On a narrower front the artillery task might have been achieved.

I'm inclined to fall back on the 'learning curve' approach, but still wonder if it need have been as steep as it was.

Old Tom

[truthergw]

I think the points you raise are legitimate concerns but involve a lot more than the use of artillery. The width of front was not an arbitrary choice made by local commanders. There was a strategic element as there was to the date of the attack. We would have to look at the joint attack as first envisioned by the Entente, I.e. Joffre & Haig with Joffre the senior partner. We would then have to take into consideration the Verdun attack and its ever increasing affect on the French forces available for the Somme. Plans being continuously changed to match aims and resources which keep changing are almost bound to result in a less than optimal outcome. If Rawlinson had been set the task in February/ March of planning for the battle of the Somme as it happened on 1st July, he would almost certainly not have put the same plan into operation. All of this goes well beyond the use of the artillery on the Somme although it does include it.

[Robert Dunlop]

The width of frontage issue was illustrated schematically in this and the subsequent post. The key point that the diagrams illustrate is that concentration of effort by the attacker would have enabled concentration of effort by the defender. This was one of the key lessons learned at Neuve Chapelle, and subsequent battles.

As to the seeming folly of attacking the strongest part of the line, it should be noted that the British 36th (Ulster) Division did just that. Their initial success was due to a very important option that was the equivalent of using a creeping barrage. They solved the problem of the time lag after the artillery lifted off the German trenches by having the men sneak up close to the trenches. 36th Division's problem was that its neighbours didn't do the same, which enabled the Germans to isolate and eventually force them out again.

There were other ways to 'neutralize' strong points. The attack on Fricourt illustrated the approach you described, attempting to pinch out the salient/strongpoint from the flanks. Another alternative involved smothering such strongpoints in very heavy HE, smoke and gas, thereby neutralizing the garrisons until the attacks either side had joined up to and isolated them. In July 1916, the BEF did not have what was needed for this approach. Smoke could only be delivered from smoke candles ignited in the British lines or from short-range mortars. There weren't enough supplies of gas shells to smother a large strongpoint.

Simply bypassing strongpoints without neutralising them was NOT an option. The dangers of this approach were illustrated during the first tank attacks on the Somme. Lanes with left untouched in the artillery barrages. When tanks did not occupy those lanes (did not arrive or were destroyed), then these shell-free lanes became killing zones for the British infantry.

Robert