Artillery B. C. Staff

[Steve11]

Several times I have come across reference to artillery battery B. C. Staff. Does anyone know what B. C. stood for?

Steve

[charlesmessenger]

Battery commander's staff.

Charles M

[Steve11]

Thanks Charles,

Steve

[pjjobson]

Steve

Just to expand on Charles's answer, the BC's Staff comprised the signallers and specialists required toassist the Battery Commander in controlling the Battery. Use of the term seems to have died out when troop commanders were introduced. It existed prior WW1 when the Battery Commander was both the primary observing officer and at or near the gun position. BC’s Party would seem the modern equivalent.

[Old Tom]

Somewhere at the back of my mind are the abbreviations BC and BK. Meaning Battery Commander and Battery Captain I think. Not sure if those terms were in use in WW1.

Old Tom

[ianjonesncl]

Somewhere at the back of my mind are the abbreviations BC and BK. Meaning Battery Commander and Battery Captain I think. Not sure if those terms were in use in WW1.

Old Tom

Old Tom

Having held both appointments I know the statement is correct.

The modern role of the Battery Captain is to command the gun area. Essentially this is the gun line and the wagon lines, this being the logistics and first line ammunition. The Battery Commander is deployed forward to a Battle Group as their indirect fire adviser.

I think you are correct about the term BK not being used in WW1. I am not sure when this may have originated, however I am sure a Pal will advise us.

In WW1 the Battery Commander fulfilled a number of functions.

Firstly he was responsible for the reconnaissance and selection of the gun position. His next role was the issue of orders for the occupation of the position. Once the Battery was firing he was essential responsible for the technical aspects of firing of the guns, taking information from the observers, calculating firing data with his staff, and the issue of fire orders to the guns. As Op Ack outlines, he is both primary observer and controls the gun line.

The role of Artillery adviser, which is more akin to modern gunners, developed in WW1. Artillery Brigades would nominate section commanders to deploy to Infantry Company's as observers and liaison officers, this being an additional role to commanding their gun sections. In addition, Battery Commanders could also be deployed to Battalions. Again my reading is these were additional roles, rather than a primary function.

The Battery Second Command in WW1 was responsible for the Wagon lines. This held the first line ammunition of 6 double limbers, all the the horses of the Battery, logistics elements and reserve gunners. I believe in conjunction with the Battery Sergeant Major he would have held the modern role of ensuring ammunition supply to the Battery.

Ian

[akduerden]

Ian,

What rank would a Battery Second Command have had?

What rank would a Section Commander have had?

My grandfather was a 2nd Lt and was posted on a number of signals type courses. I am interested to know if we was in the wagon lines as a Battery Second Command, a Section Commander or posted to an infantry brigade as an observer/ liason officer.

Andrew

[ianjonesncl]

Ian,

What rank would a Battery Second Command have had?

What rank would a Section Commander have had?

My grandfather was a 2nd Lt and was posted on a number of signals type courses. I am interested to know if we was in the wagon lines as a Battery Second Command, a Section Commander or posted to an infantry brigade as an observer/ liaison officer.

Andrew

Battery Commander- Major

Battery Second in Command - Captain

Section Commanders - Lieutenant or Second Lieutenant

The Section Commanders commanded 2 sub-sections (unless he was in 12" / 15" or railway guns when it would have been a single gun). The sub sections consisted of 2 guns on the gun lines, with the limbers and reserve gunners in the wagon lines. Whilst in the wagon lines they would be under the control of the Battery Second in Command.

The section commanders would rotate between the guns and the observation posts. In some cases the observation was conducted in a location of good observation away from the front line. In other cases they were attached to Infantry units manning OP's in the front trenches .

Any Officer could be sent to an Infantry Battalion as a Liaison Officer.

Prior to 1916, in the Brigade Ammunition Column (commanded by a Captain), there were also Subaltern section commanders responsible for a section of ammunition limbers or wagons depending upon the type of gun being used. A similar role existed in the Divisional Ammunition Columns.

The Artillery Brigade HQ included an Orderly Office (a Captain or a Subaltern ) who looked after stores / transport. This was a permanent appointment, rather the the modern meaning of the Officer on duty / call. The Adjutant was a Captain, though I believe a Subaltern could fulfill this role.

In reality, with leave, casualties, and Officers being detached a Subaltern could end up doing all of these roles as the need arose.

Do you have any details about the units your grandfather served with ?

[pjjobson]

BK appears to have originated with the introduction of the K Tactical Sign for the Battery Captain in 1938. Therefore, it would not have been in use during WW1.

Ian, thanks for the further breakdown of the roles, that will go towards amending the entries in my book.

Phil

[Old Tom]

Ian, Many thanks. You introduced the term 'artillery advisor'. My reading of late has lead to the understanding that a shortcoming of artillery in much of WW1 was that above the commander of an artillery brigade all senior artillery appointments at Corps and Army (possibly at division) were advisors rather than commanders. Thus in the early stages of the Somme offensive for example, there was no army control of bombardment and different corps used different techniques. Some were effective and others were not. You may like to comment on the general point of status of senior artillery appointments. I don't want to start a debate on the Somme

Old Tom

[ianjonesncl]

Ian, thanks for the further breakdown of the roles, that will go towards amending the entries in my book.

Phil

Phil

One other vital role of the BC in WW1 was the establishment of the Battery Director. He was responsible for the establishment of the zero line (centre of arc), and passage of line to guns or section directors.

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

Ian, Many thanks. You introduced the term 'artillery adviser'. My reading of late has lead to the understanding that a shortcoming of artillery in much of WW1 was that above the commander of an artillery brigade all senior artillery appointments at Corps and Army (possibly at division) were advisor's rather than commanders. Thus in the early stages of the Somme offensive for example, there was no army control of bombardment and different corps used different techniques. Some were effective and others were not. You may like to comment on the general point of status of senior artillery appointments. I don't want to start a debate on the Somme

Old Tom

Old Tom

You are correct that in 1914 there was no senior Artillery commander above Division. The Divisional Artillery was commanded by the Commander Royal Artillery (CRA). The Army level Artillery I believe was a single Siege Brigade of 6 Batteries.

In January 1915 on the formation of the First and Second Armies, Artillery Advisers were established in the rank of Major General, with a small staff including a Brigade Major and Staff Captain. Their role was more on the technical side, design of Artillery equipment and ammunition, investigating defective ammunition, accidents to guns and equipment problems. They did not advise on the tactical use of Artillery, did not coordinate between Divisional Artilleries within the Army, and were not involved in the allocation of resources.

The problem that started to arise was Artillery fire and resources were not being co-ordinated effectively at both Corps and Army level, both the Divisional Artillery and the ever increasing numbers of Heavy Artillery. The Corps level was rather an ad hoc affair, some Armies would not have a Corps level function, others would establish command for particular operations.

One of the key drivers behind the development of Command and Control of Artillery was Brigadier JFN Birch. Increasingly the Artillery Advisers started to preform some of the co-ordinating functions. In the planning of the battle of Loos it was found it was not possible to coordinate the CRA's direct at Divisions at Army level.

In August 1915 it was proposed that Artillery Advisers be substituted by an Artillery commander who would be responsible for all Artillery within the Corps - Divisional CRA's and a Commander Heavy Artillery would report to him. I understand that no similar arrangement was proposed at Army level.

What I believe happened was the Corp Level Commander was given command of the Divisional Artilleries, however, the Heavy Artillery was infact broken down into Lieutenant Colonels Groups typically of 5 batteries, with a Brigadier in overall command. This arrangement was part of the problems on the Somme. Your point about there being no overall Army level command during the Somme is well made. This I believe was part of the issue in not being able to supress the German defences. Again as you rightly point out, I believe Corps tackled the problems of wire cutting, infantry support, counter bombardment and other tasks in different ways, no common methodology being established despite 2 years of warfare.

In addition an interesting comment from "Artillery Lessons Drawn From The Battle Of The Somme", December 1916 was "Any what is commonly called "monkeying" with the barrage by subordinates should be absolutely prohibited". My thoughts are Artillery commanders were still not used to the new command and control arrangements and were following the mechanisms of 1914/15 when units acted more independently. Consequently this "monkeying" around could have contributed to the problems when executing Corps and Army level plans, possibly even at a lower level.

Following the lessons of the Somme, in December 1916 the post of GOCRA (General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery) was established at Corps, commanding all Corps Artillery, and MGRA (Major General Royal Artillery) at Army level. The fact these Artillery Commanders were now an part of the headquarters, meant that the Artillery would become more integrated into the planning process, particulary when establishing the overall Artilley resources in both guns and ammunition.

Hopes this makes sense - and open to challenges on any of the interpretations of events.

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

The role of Artillery adviser, which is more akin to modern gunners, developed in WW1. Artillery Brigades would nominate section commanders to deploy to Infantry Company's as observers and liaison officers, this being an additional role to commanding their gun sections.

Old Tom

Just re read the post and want to clarify what is probably my loose definition.

There was an appointment of Artillery Adviser, a senior RA officer with designted responsibilitiess, as described in the previous post.

Liason Officers were able to advise on the use of Artillery when they were deployed to Battalions. Artillery adviser in this instance is a function rather than an appointment.

Sorry about a bit of modern terminology creeping in at the wrong place.

Ian

The

[pjjobson]

Phil

One other vital role of the BC in WW1 was the establishment of the Battery Director. He was responsible for the establishment of the zero line (centre of arc), and passage of line to guns or section directors.

Ian

Thanks Ian, it all helps.

Phil

[Muerrisch]

BK certainly in use BAOR 1980s 1990s we had a neighbour who was a RHA BK.

[Old Tom]

Ian,

Thanks for that, RSA - if there had been one in WW1 - would be proud of you. I found your statement quite clear. If I may muse in a general sort of way. I think one of the problems with the planning and conduct of operations in the BEF in the early days was that the scale of these operations and the quantities and varieties of support equipment overwhelmed the commanders and their staff. I suppose the emergence of GOsCRA and MGsRA was a recognition of that factor. The same sort of consideration may well apply to the arrival of the tank. A new capability for which tactics had to be developed while the capability was also developing at the same time.

Old Tom

[ianjonesncl]

Old Tom

Thank you for your comments.

I think your statement regarding the growth of the BEF and the problems this brought to commanders and staffs is correct. One book I found particularly interesting is Architect of Victory Douglas Haig , Walter Reid, which tracks Haig's career and provides a good insight to the issues of growth within the BEF, especially in command and control.

However, I believe it is just not the scale of operations and new equipment that was a problematical, but there was an underlying problem in the command style of commanders.

In 1914 the BEF consisted of 6 Divisions, and 3 Corps, though I believe they were largely administrative rather than operational. So if you made Divisional Commander you pretty much had overall control of the operations, troops and artillery under your command. And as only one of six, you had a major influence on higher affairs. Your staff is small as most of the decision making process is your own.

Roll on to 1916. As Divisional Commander you were now part of a Corps plan and in turn an Army plan, you are under more direction. Now you are only one of fifty plus divisional commanders. Artillery has become a dominant factor, but it is not all under your control. The vital Howitzers will be allocated by a higher authority. Your staffs have grown as they need to co-ordinate artillery, engineering, logistics, medical and many other factors. You increasingly are being asked to make decisions on options where constraints are placed upon you.

I think many would struggle with this increased need for liaison and cooperation, and this would manifest it's self in the planning and conduct of operations, leading to uncoordinated plans, with the subsequent terrible consequences. Not only at Divisional level but Corps and Army as well.

I was amazed to learn that on the Somme the mines were planned to be detonated at 7:28 am, but a local Corps Commander decided the Hawthorn Redoubt mine would be blown at 7:20 am. So all the planning, preparation, days of bombardment were partially negated by a stupid decision.

Looking at Major General Birch's report on the Somme Bombardment .

"It will be convenient to first take the disposition of the Artillery for attack before these operations commenced. There is no doubt that if the Artillery—and the Artillery alone—had been consulted and asked how much Artillery was necessary to attack the front in question they would have said one howitzer, 6-inch or over, for every 50 yards for destructive purposes only; our Northern limit of attack would then have been about LA BOISSELLE with the number of howitzers available"

The involvement of Artillery within the planning process is therefore questionable. Ironically just South of La Boisselle the Tyneside Scottish and Irish suffered some of the highest casualties on the Somme.

The comment from "Artillery Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the Somme", December 1916 "Any what is commonly called "monkeying" with the barrage by subordinates should be absolutely prohibited", is I stated previously is another example of the independent command style. An increase of a rate of fire on a plan can cause ammunition shortages if not supported by a consequential request for more ammunition. Or cause problems in the ammunition supply if the additional ammunition lifts are not planned, or routes coordinated to transport additional ammunition etc etc.

Scale of operations, new equipment and tactics and the need to adopt new command styles were all brought to a head 1^st July 1916.

[Old Tom]

Ian, The allocation of artillery for the opening phase of the Somme campaign has been the subject of much discussion. This aspect is well covered by Command on the Western Front by Prior and Wilson. It was been suggested that they place too much emphasis on the number of equipments per yard. I think it is often forgotten that the important factor is the number of shells and their quality and accuracy rether than simply the numbers of guns/howitzers. Books you may find interesting include the Artillery’s Astrologers by Peter Chasseaud (a magnum opus) and Command and Control on the Western Front edited by Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman.

Old Tom

[Robert Dunlop]

I respectfully disagree, FWIIW. Prior and Wilson's account is poor.

Robert