Verdun : Reputations

[Chris Boonzaier]

On the next page Horne relates a mystery of the battle; how an entire French brigade collapsed and was taken. The answer to the puzzle was that the Bavarian troops attacking the French brigade were led by 63 flame-throwers, and in a brief engagement almost 3000 French soldiers were captured, including 58 officers, including the entirity of the three regimental and brigade headquarters. Supposedly the brigade was only able to get out a one sentence phone call: "The Germans are here!" 25 MGs, 12 cannon, and 18 mortars were also taken. The number of flame pioneers lost? Four. Useless weapon indeed.

Maybe it is worth reading French period reports on the action before launching the "flamethrowers won it!" argument ;-)

Best

Chris

[truthergw]

This probably belongs in another thread but I think one of the ideas behind Verdun was to draw the sting from counterattacks elsewhere. I.E. the Entente would fritter away men and munitions at Verdun to the detriment of any great counter attack. The Somme then, was a great blow to these hopes. Falkenhayn would have been dismayed on several counts. How many casualties he took, losing most of the territory which he gained and the size of the assault on the Somme. As to the French defence, the fact that it got stronger as the battle wore on, would have also caused dismay. Part of the motive for Verdun was a belief that the French were losing the will to fight. A prolonged assault with high casualties was meant to increase war weariness and bring France to the treaty table, leaving Britain on her own. " Her best sword knocked from her hand". The ferocity with which French soldiers continued to fight showed how wrong the German assessment of French morale was.

[Robert Dunlop]

Tom, Falkenhayn actually wanted to trigger counterattacks elsewhere, especially by the British. He felt these would be totally wasteful to the British, with minimal impact on the Germans. Then Falkenhayn wanted to launch his counterattack, having exhausted both the French and the British. It should be noted that the 'ferocity' of the French was due, in the main, to the significant artillery contribution. Petain was a strong believer in the importance of artillery support, and Nivelle was also an artillerist by trade. The artillery enabled the French infantry, whose tactics had also changed prior to and during the battle.

Robert

[phil andrade]

That most famous rallying cry of all battles " Ils ne passeront pas!" is mistakenly attributed to Petain so often that it exemplifies the theme of my thread : it was Nivelle who said that....but he has been cast in stone as the prodigal protege of Verdun's culminating French counter offensive, and his role in those stern defensive battles has been overlooked.

The fact that he owed his meteoric rise - in part - to the machinations of politicians is also sigificant. Is it true that those who politicians raise up, tend to be cast down by them as well, and that the duplicity of politics ensures that their disgrace is all the more established as a result ?

Phil

[Paul Hederer]

Phil,

I would say right now that Verdun is more of an academic pursuit, vice an emotional one.

The Germans are aware of Verdun--I mean if you ask someone on the street they would probably know where it was, and that there was a battle fought there. Maybe Egbert can give a more in-depth view from the German standpoint.

Robert Foley's book is excellent, but doesn't have a lot of detail on the battle, as that's not the thesis of the work. He explores the build up to Verdun, by going back to the pre-war period, and tracing, as much as possible, the formation of Falkenhayn's ideas. It's a great outline of Germany's strategic position and of Falkenhayn's views. He also puts Verdun into perspective of the Germans (perhaps I should say Falkenhayn's) strategy for 1916.

Falkenhayn was definitely surprised at how hard the French fought--I wouldn't say he was pleased. Tactically many mistakes were made on the German side, and having lost their initial advantage the battle became the slugging match we all know. A material battle was something Germany just couldn't afford to fight--not in men, nor material.

The Germans fought very hard to try and reach their objective on the east bank, but they just couldn't do it. In many ways Verdun simply overtaxed the Germans, both from the standpoint, again, of men and material, but it also stretched their abilities to the limit. They simply didn't have the techniques which were developed later--in the realm of artillery or infantry.

I think if they would have attacked with two corps on the left bank of the Meuse initially they may have prompted the French to evacuate the right bank pretty quickly--that almost happened as it was.

Paul

[phil andrade]

In many ways Verdun simply overtaxed the Germans, both from the standpoint, again, of men and material, but it also stretched their abilities to the limit.

Paul

The expenditure of German manpower at Verdun appears remarkably modest by comparison with what occurred in other episodes in the war. Their casualties on the Western Front - in killed and missing - between February and June 1916 were lower than they had been in the same months in 1915. It seems that Falkenhayn husbanded his mens' lives in this endeavour - an astonishing thing given the reputation of the battle.

Phil

[bob lembke]

Maybe it is worth reading French period reports on the action before launching the "flamethrowers won it!" argument ;-)

Best

Chris

Hi, Chris;

I try to get all sides of any engagement I am studying or writing up. I think that I read more German than possibly all other languages together on the War, English a distant second, but probably nearly as much French. For example, in the last two years I have read about 280 French unit histories (most of them are quite short) as I mostly troll for reports of flame attacks by either the French or the Germans, and also collect information on a number of other topics I am collecting material on. (I keep careful track of which ones I have already read on a spread-sheet so that I do not read the same histories two or three times. I could open it and give you an exact count.) I would have to check on this, I have not worked on this engagement for a while, but there does not seem to be a lot of unit histories (maybe one) of the French units directly involved in this engagement. The French units most closely involved seem to have been disbanded within weeks of the engagement. I have seem this done in the case of other engagements where the French lost badly. In the case of this engagement the French supposedly suspected treachery (I think that the brigade commander was an ethnic German), and due to the nature of the defeat, the entire brigade swept up into captivity, the French may not have had a good idea of what happened.

In my wife's library there is a virtual wall of French official histories of the Great War, seemingly about 100 mostly very, very large books. I have not worked with this resource nearly enough (but probably more than with the Brit official histories), but I have attempted to research this resource, which seems to have recorded every phone call made by French units during the war, and I have found almost nothing mentioned about this engagement. But if my information so far is correct, there was not much of a narrative of messages, orders, etc. produced during this sudden attack.

My impression from reading the unit histories (not official, and mostly anonymous; perhaps it was illegal for an officer to write such a narrative) is that the French were very disinclined to write about a defeat, losing ground (unless followed immediately by a rousing counter-attack), and any officer was shot in the front, if he was to be mentioned. This filtering is probably one reason why some of these histories (mostly for regiments, and battalions of Chaussers, etc.) are 6 or 8 or 16 pages long, enabling me to read several hundred of them without resigning from life. (On the other hand, French books in French written for the French population seem remarkably candid and propaganda-free.)

I certainly will do more research before I feel that I have properly researched this engagement, but I have certainly tried to get all sides. I have attempted to read the histories of the French infantry units, but have not yet tried to obtain or read the histories of the Bavarian infantry.

Someone asked me recently, and about month ago I tried to tally the number of languages that I have read or translated in my study of the Great War, and I think I came up with 10, reading or translating many thousands of pages of German (self-taught, imperfectly, in 2001), some thousands of pages in French and English, some hundreds (say 500) of pages in Italian, and much less in other languages; probably the most pages of those in Flemish/Dutch.

I am, however, a linguistic midget compared to my wife, who works in dozens of languages, and has for 26 years. I recently gave her a copy of an Icelandic newspaper I found left in one of my apartments, and she was delighted to see that she could read it (she had never tried); the reason she can being that she has Old Norse, or "Viking-Speak", and Icelandic is based on the language of the Viking settlers. She participates in poetry readings in Anglo-Saxon.

Reportedly the French brigadier, when captured, exclaimed that "he had not heard a shot". Might that have something to do with the nature of the attack?

I will do much more work on this attack. But I think that I have a good handle on the nature of this attack.

Bob

[bob lembke]

Chris;

But if your comment is based on your having seen or possess French materials that present a different view of this engagement, or any view at all of this engagement, please let me/us know. The French unit was a brigade of the 29th Division. From memory I think that the engagement was on the west bank of the Meuse, on March 20th, I think, from memory. (My father was wounded twice on the west bank, once at Mort Homme, once on Cote 304.)

2883 Frenchmen were captured, almost all from the one brigade. I think that the fight lasted a half hour, but I am not sure. 2700-2800 prisoners from one brigade of two regiments is a quick collapse of the defenders. Large FW attacks, say 60 or 80 or 100 FW, often simply collapsed the defense at the point of attack. Four men killed from 63 flame-thrower teams suggests a sudden collapse of the defense. German FW tactics, although varied, generally featured leading an attack from the front. Especially when used in large numbers, the use of the FW often limited casualties by masking the attackers from view and fire direction. (The French used them more for mopping up dugouts by the second wave in the wake of an infantry attack, and the equipment and men used reflected this.) I have to find out the losses of the Bavarians, but it should also have been low, but possibly less so in areas where the FW were not used.

Bob

[Chris Boonzaier]

Hi, Chris;

For example, in the last two years I have read about 280 French unit histories (most of them are quite short) as I mostly troll for reports of flame attacks by either the French or the Germans,

Theam you are not reading the right stuff.... have you read the period war diaries?

I dont undersatnd what histories you talk about all the time. how many pages do your french unit histories have?

[bob lembke]

Theam you are not reading the right stuff.... have you read the period war diaries?

Not aware of the availability of French "period war diaries". (I have worked with British, Australian, and Canadian war diaries, some of which, thankfully, can be found on-line. I mostly study Prussian units, and I believe that the Prussian war diaries were destroyed during WW II, which may be why I am not that focused on war diaries. I would be in your debt if you can give me a lead as to where these can be found, if they are on-line, etc.

One problem that I have is that I utilize my wife to scout for sources. She works with a number of "mega-catalogs", such as WorldCat, on a daily basis, some of which are only available to library professionals. I understand that some aspects of WorldCat are accessible to the general public, but she has greater access, and, amazingly, she has some sort of clearance to be able to not only look at the listings in foreign on-line catalogs, but even to go into the foreign catalogs and modify and correct them from her desk at her university library. She informs me that the French catalogs tend to not be on-line, or at least I was told that several years ago.

I dont undersatnd what histories you talk about all the time. how many pages do your french unit histories have?

French volunteer Great War enthusiasts have put "on-line" about 600 WW I unit histories. They were generally written shortly after the war, seemingly by officers who served in the unit in question (the vast majority are anonymous), published by military publishing houses that I am familiar with, and vary in length, from memory, from say 8 to 128 pages, most typically about 32 pages, I think. I read about 280 in about nine months a year or two ago, and hope to get back to them and finish them off at some time. A source like that, like any type of source, has its advantages and disadvantages. The French were very secretive about flame-thrower matters during and after the war, but had a flame warfare establishment almost as large as the German effort.

One problem in this area is that many officers, of different armies, found flame warfare distastful, or for other reasons would not mention their use when writing up engagements in which one knows that they played a major role from other sources and documentary material. War diaries would be useful here as one would think that this sort of source would mention the use of FW when something that was expected to reach the public might not mention the use of the weapon. But I am happy to read these unofficial unit histories, as I seek out many different types of sources, and tend to be somewhat distrustful of "official" histories, whatever the source or nationality.

Yes, Chris, if you can give me a lead to war-time unit war diaries I would be very grateful.

Bob

[Chris Boonzaier]

Hi Bob,

French war diaries at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/

You can find the full Diaries from Regt to Armee level, in all details.

I dont want to pick, and it may seem I am doing so... but I am not.

You sometimes have a strange way of researching. You take the attack on Avocourt, see that there were flame throwers, then classify it as a flame attack and victory of the FW.

This without having read the French or Bavarian accounts.

It seems your research is usually along the following lines.

1) Reach a conclusion

2) Try to find the facts to support this conclusion

3) If evidence is not there, use the fact that you have found nothing to the contrary to support your conclusion.

This really breaks down when you dont research deeply enough to look for facts.

Having spent 2 hours reading up on your favourite attack, let me throw the following thoughts into the ring...

1) One of the regiments in question was from Avignon, one from Nice... what conclusions can be drawn from that coupled with point 2)

2) Poincare in his memoires says the sector commander deliberately did NOT relieve these regiments from their positions in the days before the attack in order not to set a dangerous precedent

3) The bavarian 22nd Inf Regt was a spearheader here... their report of the action is important to understand why the attack succeeded so fast

4) The French report is essential to see how a brigade commander can be captured without hearing a shot fired.

it is all a lot more complicated than saying "This attack shows the importance of flamethrowers"

At the risk of highjacking this thread, could you list the 4 incidents you have found about flame throwes igniting, just to compare lists.

All the best (and in the spirit of healthy debate)

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

It should be noted that the 'ferocity' of the French was due, in the main, to the significant artillery contribution.

Robert

Hi,

I may be wrong here, but was the amount of French Artillery in the opening phases of the battle pityfully small? I was under the impression that the defensive fighting at the beginning was done inspite of the guns having been stripped away for other sectors...

Best

>Chris

[phil andrade]

Hi,

I may be wrong here, but was the amount of French Artillery in the opening phases of the battle pityfully small? I was under the impression that the defensive fighting at the beginning was done inspite of the guns having been stripped away for other sectors...

Best

>Chris

If my memory is reliable, the Germans deployed about 2,250 guns at Verdun when the battle was at its height - maybe this was in May. The French, meanwhile, assembled about 1,750 pieces. The advantage lay with the Germans in so far as their fire converged - it's as if the French were in the base of a fan - a function, I suppose, of the fact that their position was in a salient. It's significant that the German guns fired three shells for every two fired by the French between February 21st and mid July...this reflects the enormous amount of rounds fired by the Germans in their opening attack, when, as you say, the French response was at first paltry.

Phil

[truthergw]

Just off the top of my head, I'll have to check, I believe Verdun fortifications were stripped of their heavy guns. That was early on, France entered the war with a superlative field gun but very short of heavies. I think that the ease with which the Germans defeated the Belgian fortifications and trapped large numbers of French and Belgians inside others, persuaded Joffre to get the garrisons out of the forts and into surrounding defence works which could be abandoned if need be. That made the heavy fortress guns redundant, so they were nicked to beef up the heavy guns in the field. I believe the French forces left in and around Verdun would have had the usual complement of field artillery at that time. Joffre was husbanding resources for the coming battle of the Somme but Verdun would not have been squeezed any harder than other parts of the line.

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, thank you for raising this important point of clarification. There were instances where the French artillery response was very limited, especially during the opening days of the offensive. I don't want to belittle the determination of the French poilus. They played an important role throughout, not least when artillery support was meagre. It should be recognised, however, that heavy casualties tended to occur after major attacks, during the consolidation phase and afterwards. During an attack, the attacker's casualties might be light (if the attacker's artillery support was effective) or heavy (if not). Once an attack was done, it was difficult to maintain heavy concentrations of artillery fire on defenders. This allowed the defender's artillery to reposition and retarget captured territory. This process was much easier for the defender, as the Germans found in the Verdun area.

Although the Germans may have had more guns and fired more shells than the French, Verdun illustrates how these measures are not adequate in analysing effectiveness. During the early phases of the German campaign, the French had the ability to enfilade the German attacks and positions. Artillery fire in enfilade is significantly more effective than non-enfilade fire. Hence the German shift in focus to the west back of the Meuse.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Robert wrote:

"...Although the Germans may have had more guns and fired more shells than the French, Verdun illustrates how these measures are not adequate in analysing effectiveness..."

That's exactly right. Lack of oberservation played a large role in making the German artillery less effective. Ammunition transport was a problem as well. Getting the shells to the batteries, and then storing them. Where there were no tram lines the shells had to be transported by horse-drawn transport, and these suffered large losses.

The German shell supply was reduced as well, first in May, and then again at the beginning of June. There is a statement in the German OH about delivering shells at the rate of 33 1/3 trains per day, but this figure is about double of what was actually delivered.

There were a large number of barrel bursts as well, and this is something I need to explore further.

Paul

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening everyone,

An excellent thread, my congratulations to all contributors - I hope it continues. I know the area quite well and have a general overview of the battle (which has been enhanced through reading the GWF) but am keen to learn more.

Paul and Robert have commented on the reduced efficiency of the German artillery fire; an often overlooked point is that the French had virtual air supremacy for most of the battle, reducing the aerial intelligence and observation available to the Germans.

[bob lembke]

Chris;

I think it will take several posts and about half a day to answer the questions you poise and to address some of your assertions. I will try biting off a chunk now.

I want to state that I am not at present actively working on the topic of flame warfare in WW I, although if I come across a useful item on that topic I file it away in the system that I have set up to order and keep track of the results of my research. (Since you seem to feel that I am not a serious researcher, or at least one that approaches this work in an illogical fashion, I will probably {later} describe how I do organize my work. This will bear on several of your questions.)

Hi Bob,

French war diaries at http://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/

You can find the full Diaries from Regt to Armee level, in all details.

Many, many thanks for this. I had not seen these documents or this web-site. About four months ago someone mentioned something on this Forum which suggested that these might be available in some form, without mentioning a lot of detail, but I had not yet turned my efforts to trying to look into this, as these diaries would not be useful in the work that I am doing at present. As I will probably mention below, I have been working on too many WW I topics at once. You might guess from the fact that my father fought at Gallipoli and Verdun that I am of a certain age, and about 18 months ago I had an epic rebuilding of my heart, five different operations, of two types, so I finally realize that I am not immortal, and I am now actively writing one of the books that I have been working on, a biography of my father and grand-father, focused on their experiences in WW I, but not entirely devoted to that. Two very interesting and differnt guys. Happily, I am now actually grinding out what seems to be fairly decent draft text. But if I come across material of interest to my other WW I interests, such as FW, I enter the info into my system of note cards, time-lines, and indices, but as I am presently working on Belgium 1914 and the siege of Antwerp I am not specifically working on Flammenwerfer (FW) material.

I dont want to pick, and it may seem I am doing so... but I am not.

You sometimes have a strange way of researching. You take the attack on Avocourt, see that there were flame throwers, then classify it as a flame attack and victory of the FW.

This without having read the French or Bavarian accounts.

I am far from finished in my study of this attack, but I have done a fair amount of work on it, and have probably to date referenced about 12 sources, including several French sources. A couple of those little unit histories did refer to the engagement; while the two regiments who were captured were immediately disbanded, and from memory did not have one of these little histories, the very information that they were disbanded is interesting. But I did find little French histories for about two of the units that did have to be rushed to the site of the battle to plug the hole in the line left by the loss of the brigade.

The fact that the French sources that I have used to date hardly seem to mention the dissapearance of the brigade speaks volumes, itself. As I said, my impression is that French sources, of different types, generally do not like to mention reverses. The French war diaries, I am sure, will be much more candid and useful.

In the course of time I will attempt to find the Bavarian unit histories. I only have a few German unit histories, they are very hard to come by in the US, and of course are very expensive, and also were not written for every unit. I have collected about (including duplicates) about 110 volumes from the official histories published by the Reichsarchiv, and I have used tyhem, but not exhaustively.

The attack was not soley a flame attack, it was a well-planned combined arms attack, with good troops, and with a 7 hour long artillery bombardment, 25 heavy artillery batteries shelled the French, and about 13,700 Minenwerfer shells were dropped on the French positions. However, if an attack on a limited front employed 63 flame-throwers in the front ranks I would say that it could reasonably be described as a "flame attack". Once the infantry attacked the attack was over in an hour. However, I just looked in a source that I have not looked in for say 3 years and I am surprised to see that the Germans, in total, lost 1200 men, so there must have been such more severe fighting than I was remembering, but also stated that 3000 French POWs were taken. With that many German casualties, and a very successful attack, clearly a large number of French soldiers were killed or wounded, besides the 2883 or 3000 prisoners. I know that the prisoners also included men from other units aside from the brigade. So by any reasonable standard it was a very successful attack, the attackers seemingly inflicting casualties at a ratio of at least four to one, and captured important terrain. More research deserves to be done (not by me now), but clearly it was a successful attack, it is reasonably described as a large-scale flame attack, and the speedy collapse of the French was remarkable and such as often happened in flame attacks with 60 or 100 FW. Is that very surprising?

Does this attack deserve more research. Of course. I will do it when I can, and I may take a peek into the war diaries that you revealed to me, and see what they say.

It seems your research is usually along the following lines.

1) Reach a conclusion

2) Try to find the facts to support this conclusion

3) If evidence is not there, use the fact that you have found nothing to the contrary to support your conclusion.

This really breaks down when you dont research deeply enough to look for facts.

A more petty mind might consider the above a bit of an insult. (But I admit that I have "a bit of a mouth" myself. I recently accused one of our English Pals of suffering from ACBS, or "Acute Colonel Blimp Syndrome". ) You do not know me from a hole in the wall. I do have a bit of pompous pride in thinking that I try hard to be objective and logical, although I certainly suffer from as many predjuces as most people. My study of this engagement is far from over, if I persevere, but I do not expect to get back to it for 2-3 years. But the outlines and general results of the attack are apparent. My statistics on the success are from multiple sources that largely agree between themselves, and with the several Allied secondary sources that mention the attack, like Horne.

Having spent 2 hours reading up on your favourite attack, let me throw the following thoughts into the ring...

Not my favorite Verdun attack. I have reseached another much more deeply, and have already written about 30 pages on it. For that attack I have four letters from my father detailing it (to his father, a staff officer); that is the one where the piece of his left arm bone that I have became detached.

1) One of the regiments in question was from Avignon, one from Nice... what conclusions can be drawn from that coupled with point 2)

2) Poincare in his memoires says the sector commander deliberately did NOT relieve these regiments from their positions in the days before the attack in order not to set a dangerous precedent

I do know that the French brigade had been in the line for a while and was considered tired.

3) The bavarian 22nd Inf Regt was a spearheader here... their report of the action is important to understand why the attack succeeded so fast

Thanks for the lead. I certainly would do a search for relevant Bavarian sources before I would complete my study and come to final conclusions. Are you referring to their unit history? I do know that the Bavarian archives have survived.

4) The French report is essential to see how a brigade commander can be captured without hearing a shot fired.

I will look for more French sources on this engagement. The ones that I have found to date seem disinclined to discuss it.

it is all a lot more complicated than saying "This attack shows the importance of flamethrowers"

Of course.

At the risk of highjacking this thread, could you list the 4 incidents you have found about flame throwes igniting, just to compare lists.

My flame-thrower time-line, a sort of outline of material on WW I FW matters, is about 800 pages long. It is ordered cronologically, not by exploding FW, and mentions many thousands of FW incidents, citations, etc. from WW I. I have many, many thousands of 4" by 6" note cards, based on my reading perhaps 2000 books and other sources. I have entered the incidents of "igniting FW" that I have found, including the incident that you kindly provided a year or two ago, but as my material is not ordered in that fashion, but cronologically, and also by a certain number of other criteria, it would take many hours, I suspect, to find them. (But, if I were writing the FW topic up, that material would finally float to the surface.) But I can state that I have only come across 3 or 4 cases, from reliable sources, where one of these devices ignited in combat, and in every case I compared the incident to the very complete and detailed death role for the flame regiment, and I have never found a clear case of a Flamm=Pionier killed by a FW "exploding" in combat.

On the other hand, I have evidence of a surprising number of possible deaths from training accidents, but in the Berlin area, where the initial training occurred. But I have no details at all. These certainly were dangerous devices, but less so than most Allied designs.

All the best (and in the spirit of healthy debate)

Chris

Bob

[Paul Hederer]

Phil wrote:

"...If my memory is reliable, the Germans deployed about 2,250 guns at Verdun when the battle was at its height- maybe this was in May. The French, meanwhile, assembled about 1,750 pieces."

The Germans deployed around 1,250 guns in February, and this reached around 1,850 by the end of June.

The French had around 375 guns in February, and this grew to 2,230 by the end of June. Where the French enjoyed a marked superiority was in long-rang cannon, 502 to the Germans 228, by the end of June.

Paul

[Paul Hederer]

Good evening everyone,

An excellent thread, my congratulations to all contributors - I hope it continues. I know the area quite well and have a general overview of the battle (which has been enhanced through reading the GWF) but am keen to learn more.

Paul and Robert have commented on the reduced efficiency of the German artillery fire; an often overlooked point is that the French had virtual air supremacy for most of the battle, reducing the aerial intelligence and observation available to the Germans.

Steve,

That's a great point, and rolls into the observation problems the Germans faced. The air situation at Verdun would make a great study on its own!

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Agreed, Steve. Thank you for bringing this up. As Paul says, this is an area ripe for study. Most major offensives were associated with air superiority on the part of the attacker, at least in the preparatory and immediate assault phases.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil wrote:

"...If my memory is reliable, the Germans deployed about 2,250 guns at Verdun when the battle was at its height- maybe this was in May. The French, meanwhile, assembled about 1,750 pieces."

The Germans deployed around 1,250 guns in February, and this reached around 1,850 by the end of June.

The French had around 375 guns in February, and this grew to 2,230 by the end of June. Where the French enjoyed a marked superiority was in long-rang cannon, 502 to the Germans 228, by the end of June.

Paul

Much to my embarrassment, I appear to have transposed the figures ! One thing I am sure of, though, is that the German expenditure of munitions exceeded that of the French by fifty per cent in the period Feb 21st to July 14th. I would imagine that the strain on the artillery tubes must have been tremendous : fewer German guns fired many more shells...presumably their gunners were more at risk than the French from muzzle bursts etc. ( edit : I see you've made this point already, Paul).

Georges Blond writes on page 148 of his book, referring to the fighting in later May "..The army of Verdun possessed, at this time 1,770 guns, of which 1,200 were fieldpieces and 570 heavies. The Germans had 2,200 guns, of which 1,730 were heavy...." Clearly my memory is not at fault : it's my reliance on a rather journalistic account as a source which let me down !

Few if any of the battles in the Great War have had their statistics so hyped up as Verdun.

Phil

[bob lembke]

Much to my embarrassment, I appear to have transposed the figures ! One thing I am sure of, though, is that the German expenditure of munitions exceeded that of the French by fifty per cent in the period Feb 21st to July 14th. I would imagine that the strain on the artillery tubes must have been tremendous : fewer German guns fired many more shells...presumably their gunners were more at risk than the French from muzzle bursts etc. ( edit : I see you've made this point already, Paul).

Phil

One detail about the barrel question. I don't have the figures before me, I have been cooperating on a study of the 420 mm howitzers with a friend feeding him some sources and doing a bit of translating/reading for him; the fellow is out of country at the moment, but his work indicates that as many as seven 420 mm howitzers burst their barrels at Verdun, out of a roster of not many more guns than that. That led to modified firing proceedures to protect the crew; one would not want to stand next to a gun when a 2100 lb (more or less) shell burst in the barrel. In contrast, in 1914, during the reduction of the French and Belgian fortresses by the 42 cm howitzers and 30.5 cm mortars, I do not believe that a single barrel burst. My friend feels that there is evidence that the principal problem was a decrease in the manufacturing quality of the shells from 1914 to 1916.

Additionally, I have heard that these guns wore their barrels out at Verdun; I do know of a critical attack where the German assault forces, ready to attack, were hit by one or more short 42 cm shells, paralyzing the troops in their jumping off point. I could state that, according to one account, these troops finally rallied when FW troops attacked by themselves at the end of the barrage, the sight of the streams of flame and smoke snapping them out of their paralysis, but if I did, Chris would scoff at the idea, so I will not state that. I suspect that the short might have been due to a worn-out barrel.

Bob

[phil andrade]

Reflecting on the figures for artillery pieces that Paul has provided for the end of June at Verdun, and looking at them rather simplistically, I refer to the analogy of the "fan" that describes the configuration of the battlefield. While the defending French endured converging fire because they were at the base of the fan, the Germans had to deploy their ordnance round the exterior line, and therefore their numerical disadvantage in cannon was compounded by dispersal.

Concentration versus dispersal - there are pros and cons in both cases. The testimony to the success of the French munitions industry is remarkable : to outmatch the Germans at Verdun at the same time as unleashing a huge artillery barrage on the Somme was something indeed. How much credit is due to Nivelle for the development of this artillery programme ? He was, after all, a gunner.

Phil

[bob lembke]

Hi,

I may be wrong here, but was the amount of French Artillery in the opening phases of the battle pityfully small? I was under the impression that the defensive fighting at the beginning was done inspite of the guns having been stripped away for other sectors...

Best

>Chris

The Germans certainly had much more artillery in the first days of the battle, and much more heavy artillery. But there were two other factors that were even more important in the opening artillery duel. One was the supply of artillery ammunition. Figures that I worked out, per caliber of gun, indicate that in the opening days the Germans had 10 or 15 times as many shells on hand than the French had.

Additionally, The French artillery was almost blind. The tremendous opening barrage, which lasted a day and a half, not only overwhelmed the French forward observers, and probably killed or wounded many, but it cut most of the phone lines and other means of communication. Although it was mentioned that the French later established air superiority, the Germans saw to it that they had control of the air in the opening days, and I believe that they even fired on air fields close to the front lines with rail-mounted naval 380 mm spare battleship guns (I think they had three), in order to further suppress any attempt at air observation. Therefore the cumulative effect of all of this was that the French had almost no fire control at first, and were reduced to fire missions on known important cross roads, which they could fire off a map, although probably not as accurately as they could if they had observers to adjust the initial fire. If you read German accounts of the first days you see accounts of wagons speeding down a road to try to run the fire upon a cross-roads not far behind the lines.

I also believe that there was a fair amount of German counter-battery fire. All of these measures and conditions, put together, led to overwhelming German fire superiority in the opening days. But then the French brought up many more resources, guns and ammunition, and the German resources began to degrade thru attrition and ammunition consumption, and the duel became more equal.

Paul, it is interesting that the "OH" exaggerated the amount of ammunition brought up. I remember your figure, I think that it was from the correct Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 volume. I have not read them for years, but I generally was disappointed with the four Schlachten des Weltkrieges volumes on Verdun. I found them too impressionistic, with too little meat on the bones, so to speak. With their individual authors, I think that they lacked sufficient editing and quality control. If anything, the other series may lean toward over-editing.

Bob