Suvla Landings

[Guest _KaaN_]

Although units of the 14th (Light) Division had carried out a counter-attack at Hooge on the Western Front on 30 July 1915, the landing at Suvla by the 11th (Northern) Division on the night of 6-7 August that year represented the first major offensive operation by formations of Kitchener’s New Armies. As part of the overall scheme for the August offensive at Anzac, the Suvla landing would, in theory, provide a secure and sheltered base from which forces could be directed south-eastward to menace the flank of Turkish units opposing General Birdwood’s advance from Anzac.

The success of the Suvla plan, however, depended upon the rapid capture of the hills and ridges overlooking Suvla Bay – Sir Ian Hamilton’s original intention being that the Chocolate and W Hills, in particular, should be seized before daylight on 7 August. To this end, brigades

of the 11th Division were to land on beaches south of Nibrunesi Point about 10 p.m. on 6 August. One battalion was to take the Turkish outpost on Lala Baba; a second was to proceed round the bay to rush the post near Suvla Point and then clear the crest of the Kiretch Tepe ridge; others would be sent against the Chocolate and W Hills; and a brigade would be pushed across the Suvla plain to seize the Tekke Tepe ridge.

If all went well, two brigades of the 10th (Irish) Division would land on the morning of 7 August and would be hurried straight to the Anafarta gap to threaten the right rear of any Turkish forces which might still be holding out in the neighbourhood of Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) – the highest point on the Sari Bair ridge.

Even before the landing, several factors combined to undermine the prospects of success. During the final planning stages, Hamilton and GHQ

not only modified their own original scheme but also allowed further changes to be made – first by the IX Corps commander (Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford) and his senior staff officer (Brigadier General H L Reed VC), and then by Major General F Hammersley, the commander of the 11th Division. Thus, by the eve of the landing, the orders had been diluted to such an extent that the need to capture the Chocolate and W Hills and to gain the Tekke Tepe ridge before daybreak was no longer emphasised as a priority.

Moreover, fears that the southern slopes of the Chocolate and W Hills would be the most strongly defended led GHQ to advise that, instead of attacking these defences after a direct advance across, or south of, the Salt Lake at Suvla, the troops should approach them by a long march around the Salt Lake and assault them from the northern side. This modification greatly complicated the initial plan, as did GHQ’s decision to override the advice of the Royal Navy concerning the dangers posed by uncharted rocks and sandbanks and to accept the urgings of IX Corps to land one infantry brigade inside Suvla Bay. A great deal – including precise timing and dynamic intermediate and junior leadership – was being asked of inexperienced New Army units, which were required to advance across totally unknown country in the dark. Unfortunately for them, GHQ’s understandable desire for secrecy was carried to extremes

and it was not until they had actually embarked on the crowded landing lighters that most subordinate leaders received any information about the task confronting them.

In the event, the leading battalions of the 32nd Brigade (6th Green Howards and 9th West Yorkshires) and 33rd Brigade (7th South Staffordshires and 9th Sherwood Foresters) landed south of Nibrunesi Point without a casualty by 10 p.m. on 6 August. The assaulting troops

had been told to use only the bayonet before daybreak and, in capturing the summit of Lala Baba, the Green Howards – who had now been on their feet for over seventeen hours – lost all but two of the officers of the two companies involved, together with around one-third of the men. The commanding officer – Lieutenant Colonel E H Chapman – was among those killed. Instead of pressing on to join units of the 34th Brigade at Hill 10 to the north of the Salt Lake, the shaken troops, with many of their leaders gone and little idea what was expected of them, lay down and waited.

Meanwhile, the landing of the 34th Brigade had gone badly wrong. Two of the destroyers

towing landing lighters anchored in the wrong order and also nearly 1,000 yards south of their intended position. To make matters worse, two of the lighters struck a reef, forcing the troops aboard to wade ashore through neck-deep water. The 11th Manchesters succeeded in pushing along the Kiretch Tepe ridge but the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers first failed to locate Hill

10 and were then stopped short of the objective. In the confusion and chaos of the 34th Brigade’s landing, all momentum was lost and never regained.

Despite the fact that nine of its twelve infantry battalions had not yet been seriously engaged, 11th Division, by daybreak, had only seized the two horns of the bay and Lala Baba. For all the efforts of the inexperienced troops, planning and command failures at various levels had already thrown away the early advantages won by the surprise landing at Suvla.

Kaan Caglar

Hope you like it. Comments appreciated!

[andigger]

Kaan,

I didn't know much about Gallipoli until I read Alan Moorehead's book earlier this year. I think your write up is very easy to read and follow. Especially with the map I think it draws a clear picture. Well done. Andy

[Robert Dunlop]

And here is a map of what it turned into

Robert

[Guest _KaaN_]

Andy,

I'm glad you like it. Thanks for your comments really appreciated.

Robert,

Thanks for providing the map! Hope you liked the article.

Best Regards

Kaan

[Andrew Hesketh]

Kaan,

Takes a brave soul to lay your research in front of your peers. I enjoyed the read. Cheers.

[roger]

Kaan,

Thankyou for posting your article. I found it very interesting as one of the men on my local memorial was in 6/Yorks and was killed in action on 7th August.

He was,

JOHN Wm. BUCKLE

Lance Corporal 8439

6/Yorkshire Regiment 32nd Brigade, 11th Division

who died on Saturday 7 August 1915. Age 33 KIA Son of Charles and Emma Buckle, of Aishew, Bedale, Yorks.

1901 Census 18-year-old joiner Born, Bedale. Enlisted, Atherton.(SDGW, most likely Northallerton) Resided, Bedale.

LALA BABA CEMETERY Turkey.

Do you mind if I add it to my notes? At the moment the are only for my use but you'll be given proper credit because one day they might be finished and I will give them to the local history group or local museum.

Whilst on the topic can you help with what happened 21st August which will help learn something of this man,

Wm. OLIVER WATSON

Private 10885.

6/Yorkshire Regiment, 32nd Brigade, 11th Division

who died on Saturday 21 August 1915. Age 19 KIA.

Son of George and Margaret Watson, of Albert Row, Bedale, Yorks

Born, Aiskew. Enlisted, Richmond. Resided, Bedale

HELLES MEMORIAL Turkey

All the best,

Roger