Russian ordeal 1914-1917....

[SMSKaiser]

"POWs and the Great War - Captivity on the Eastern front" (available at google books) gives the number of 2,8 mio POW captured by the Central Powers. Possibly the Missing figures are included in both the actual dead and the POW figures?

Interesting on the wikipedia numbers is the link provided in the Reference:

http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/1939-1945/KRIWOSHEEW...txt#w02.htm-186

The exact number of 1,2 mio, for example on KIA is broken down into Offc. and men. This is even more confusing.

I guess that GO Kivrosheev had an exact number available for the Officers, and substarcted them from the rounded "1,2 mio" to get an exact number of common soldiers, which would not be correct consequently.

But I have no idea on how he got his MIA figures.

Another point: considering his dead to wounded ratio below 1:2, I think that in those wounded are not included sick personnel.

However, the Austrian 8mio casualties have 3mio sick in it.

To compare Austrian with Russian losses, we would now have to compare those 5mio to Russian 8mio, or add some, lets say at least 2mio sick to the Russian figures. giving just 5 to 10mio (!)

I think that in the German Sanitätsbericht sick are also included?

[phil andrade]

The exact number of 1,2 mio, for example on KIA is broken down into Offc. and men. This is even more confusing.

I guess that GO Kivrosheev had an exact number available for the Officers, and substarcted them from the rounded "1,2 mio" to get an exact number of common soldiers, which would not be correct consequently.

Another point: considering his dead to wounded ratio below 1:2, I think that in those wounded are not included sick personnel.

I think that in the German Sanitätsbericht sick are also included?

Apparently an arithmetical formula has been used, by mutiplying the official record of those posted as killed in action ( 626,400) by 1.92. This is arbitrary, and must not be considered as authentic reporting...just a guess, but probably a reasonable one. How many of the men who were actually killed had their fate recorded ? I suppose that for every man who was posted as killed, another one also perished on the battlefield but was reported as missing. I have investigated British official records for certain battles, and found that this holds true. For example, in the Third Battle of Ypres, July 31 - November 10 1917, 35,000 British soldiers were posted as killed in action, 30,000 were reported missing and 175,000 were recorded as wounded. The records of the War Graves indicates about 75,000 British dead from this battle, more than double the number posted as killed. This suggests that most of the missing were killed, and that a significant number of wounded also died from their wounds.

Applying the same formula to the 626,400 Russians posted as killed in action, we acknowledge that the actual total of combat deaths was much greater : but Kivrosheev multiplies it by three.

You're right, I think, to suppose that while the officer deaths are more meticulously recorded, a lot of guesswork has been used when it comes to the other ranks.

The german sanitatsbericht show huge numbers of wounded compared with killed for the Russian Front in the final months of the war. In 1914, they indicate 5 wounded for every one killed. In 1917 they report 10 wounded for every one killed. In the affairs of 1918, which amounted to little more than token warfare for the Germans in Russia, they show 40 wounded for every one killed ! Surely this is because the sick are counted with the wounded. This is the theme of the sanitats : very small proportion of killed, huge numbers of wounded...I think that they include the sick with the wounded, at least in the last months, or when the frontlines were quiet.

Phil

[MartH]

My aunt sent me the latest book on Mannerhiem, just started reading but the section on when he was a Russian General refers to casualties. I'll look over his references over the next few days.

[SMSKaiser]

The german sanitatsbericht show huge numbers of wounded compared with killed for the Russian Front in the final months of the war. In 1914, they indicate 5 wounded for every one killed. In 1917 they report 10 wounded for every one killed. In the affairs of 1918, which amounted to little more than token warfare

for the Germans in Russia, they show 40 wounded for every one killed ! Surely this is because the sick are counted with the wounded. This is the theme of the sanitats : very small proportion of killed, huge numbers of wounded...I think that they include the sick with the wounded, at least in the last months, or when the frontlines were quiet.

Phil

I just searched through some of my notes concerning the Sanitätsbericht and it indeed includes sick personnel from the very first months, resulting in dead to wounded sick-ratio of almost 1 to 3-4 during 1914 in the East.

If the Russian dead would have to be multiplied by 3-4 in order to get the total number of sick and wounded, we woulg get to much higher numbers than each source provides for us.

2 million dead, 6 to 8 million sick and wounded and at least 2,5 mio POW gives the incredible total of 10,5 to 12,5 millions of actual Russian losses...

While such huge numbers would contribute to our topic, the "helpless giant", throwing masses of soldiers into a literally mass murder on the Russian people.

I personally doubt that in that means the 2mio dead could be considered seriously.

[phil andrade]

I personally doubt that in that means the 2mio dead could be considered seriously.

Forgive me, but I do not understand what you're saying here.

Are you saying that the number was more or less than two million ?

The sanitatats tabulates about 775,000 German killed for all fronts up until end of July 1918, and also 290,000 died from wounds and 140,000 died from disease etc......but acknowledges that the real figure for the war was 2,037,000 dead from all causes, all fronts. Even allowing for the exclusion of the heavy casualties of August to November 1918, there is still a huge shortfall.

I think that the figure for killed in the SB is purely for killed in action only, and does not allow for missing who were also dead. Incidentally, the figure it gives for missing in total is almost exactly the same as for the killed : it does, however, include prisoners.

The millions of sick who were included in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian returns distort the figures, and do not afford us a chance to compare the combat performance of the opposing armies.

Phil

[John Gilinsky]

Phil: Combat performance evaluated in direct relationship to casualty quantities sustained by one's own side is somewhat ww2 Churchillian. I remember that famous North African general's response to Churchill: "A big butcher's bill is not indicative of victory." (paraphrase). I think the general was Wavell(whom Churchill then ordered transferred I think to the Far East (Burma?). Sorry if I didn't get this quite right but I believe the general's response infuriated Churchill.

John

[John Gilinsky]

I have just started a new topic on a new Russian book on infantry tactics of WWI. While not directly on casualties and medicine it should materially help us out in understanding how and why Russian infantry suffered such grievious casualties.

John

Toronto

[MartH]

What is quite interesting from the new Mannerhiem book, is that the Russian Army was designed to fight another war on in the East against Japan, not German. Also the officer losses where terrible according to Mannerhiem.

[phil andrade]

John, You mention Churchill and casualties, and his observations in the Second World War. Of all his commentaries, none is more pertinent than his rendition in his chapter THE BLOOD TEST which deals with the controversy about attrition in the Great War in his history THE WORLD CRISIS. If you have not already done so, please give it a glance. His conclusions are compelling, his prose inspirational. Not everyone will agree with him, but it remains pre-eminent, in my opinion, as an essay on the casualty exchange.

MartH, do you think that the society from which the Russian army of 1914 emanated, with its predominantly agrarian nature, bestowed a particularly lethal role on officers, who, as ambassadors of land owning classes, were destined to set the example of conspicuous leadership ? I notice this was apparent in the mortality of high ranking officers in the Southern armies in the American Civil War.

Phil

[SMSKaiser]

Forgive me, but I do not understand what you're saying here.

Are you saying that the number was more or less than two million ?

The sanitatats tabulates about 775,000 German killed for all fronts up until end of July 1918, and also 290,000 died from wounds and 140,000 died from disease etc......but acknowledges that the real figure for the war was 2,037,000 dead from all causes, all fronts. Even allowing for the exclusion of the heavy casualties of August to November 1918, there is still a huge shortfall.

I think that the figure for killed in the SB is purely for killed in action only, and does not allow for missing who were also dead. Incidentally, the figure it gives for missing in total is almost exactly the same as for the killed : it does, however, include prisoners.

The millions of sick who were included in the Austro-Hungarian and Russian returns distort the figures, and do not afford us a chance to compare the combat performance of the opposing armies.

Phil

I wanted to compare the Russian KIA to that of Austria and Germany on the Eastern front.

As those were approximatley not higher than 1,5 mio, but total losses are not much lower than that of the Russians, there would be a discrepancy on how the Russians could have lost those 25% more actual dead.

Say, those 2 mio Russian dead are to high!

On those figures of the Sanitätsbericht, lets have a look on how those figures were broken down:

Out of 2,037,000 total,

37,000 were from the Navy

100,000 MIA considered as dead.

from the remaining 1,9 mio:

yout 775,000 KIA, 290,000 died of wounds, 140,000 died from desease.

695,000 Left

From "Race to the front: the material foundations of coalition strategy in the great war."

We get another 90,000 KIA for August to November 1918.

From August to November, also the Spanish flu affected the whole front, lets say there were a lot more died of deseases and wounds.

An we should not forget that even after the armistice there were those causalties from died of wounds and died of deceases well into the 1920 (I have no publishing date from the Sanitätsbericht,, but I guess It was well after 1920?)

Possibly that high number could be explained in that way.

[John Gilinsky]

Regarding casulaty compilations: they are just that: compilations done usually in some centralized office and to meet publication or political deadlines or timelines. Even contemporaneously due to the sheer scale of the Eastern front(s) it would have been very difficult had NO empires collapsed AND with post-war cooperation in sharing information and burial/graves services collaboration. Missing so far in consideration of these published numbers are the efficacy or lack thereof of the medical services as a critical factor in either increasing or decreasing the sheer numbers of casualties overall. If the Imperial Russian army overall was war weary and on the verge of morale collapse by early 1917 or at least significant chunks of it, in part due to the massive casualties sustained in the successfull Brusilov offensive in the summer of 1916 combined with not much overall to show for such casualties and the medical services were with the concentrations of especially infantry overwhelmingly or significantly understrength (remember the officer to man ratio in the Russian army was probably the worst of all the armies) then there must have been a corresponding and even worse morale collapse with the high stress medical service practitioners overall. This last point is further compounded by the medical services being dominated especially late in the war by essentially civilians in the rear areas where the opportunities for political ferment and dissent would have been notabely higher. The Zemstvo and other organizations essentially ran the Russian military medical services at least in numbers late in the war. Such local and regionalized organizations would have simply "handled" the wounded and not been much interested in official statistical compilations especially considering the overall shortages of fuel and food not to mention medicines and related medical supplies. Again, what is needed is for Russian and other historians to thoroughly vet all the relevant archival materials including regional archives correlated with the central archives in Moscow and St. Petersburg for as best a picture that one can get.

John

Toronto

[phil andrade]

I wanted to compare the Russian KIA to that of Austria and Germany on the Eastern front.

As those were approximatley not higher than 1,5 mio, but total losses are not much lower than that of the Russians, there would be a discrepancy on how the Russians could have lost those 25% more actual dead.

Say, those 2 mio Russian dead are to high!

On those figures of the Sanitätsbericht, lets have a look on how those figures were broken down:

Out of 2,037,000 total,

37,000 were from the Navy

100,000 MIA considered as dead.

from the remaining 1,9 mio:

yout 775,000 KIA, 290,000 died of wounds, 140,000 died from desease.

695,000 Left

From "Race to the front: the material foundations of coalition strategy in the great war."

We get another 90,000 KIA for August to November 1918.

From August to November, also the Spanish flu affected the whole front, lets say there were a lot more died of deseases and wounds.

An we should not forget that even after the armistice there were those causalties from died of wounds and died of deceases well into the 1920 (I have no publishing date from the Sanitätsbericht,, but I guess It was well after 1920?)

Possibly that high number could be explained in that way.

There is also, of course, the 772,000 listed in the sanitatsbericht as missing in action up until July 31 1918, of whom we might safely assume that half were dead.

There is a strange discrepancy between the losses published by the government when the war was being fought, and the SB : by the end of 1915, the Central Enquiries Office gave a total of 2.6 million dead, wounded or missing, and these were incomplete because the beaureau could not keep up with the losses; by that time the SB gives a figure of 2.3 million. The difference is well over ten per cent,

Phil.

[SMSKaiser]

Well, I have no information about which was the base of numbers avaiable to the Central Enquiries Office, but I assume that those too were the 10day-reports from the field armies, with the difference that in those numbers often soldiers who lost their units and returned later were included.

Karl Bleibtreu, a German writer, gives a very detailed account of the German war history, with break down of casualties for both fronts into units and months (or battle periods).

In his accounts one has to consider that he did not include train and supply personnel, apart from that, those "met" with the Sanitätsbericht.

His examination unmasks many faulties in official record, for example that the German VIII. Army in the battle of Gumbinnen lost not abround 15.000 but only 8.000 men.

[John Gilinsky]

Thanks. You raise the real problems confronting everyone: a) fluidity of the actual events of both actual and perceived "casualties" - that is a soldier is reported "missing" officially in an official casualty report BUT turns up a few days, 1 week or even a few weeks later after having been "lost" with another unit(s), actually "lost" physically, deserted but had a change of heart(!), slightly wounded and left behind, etc.... Despite returning to his original and proper unit he has been reported "missing" and thus he accounts for the untold of both actual missing and NEVER found again as distinguished between the "missing" and found again multiple reports of the same event - a man is slightly wounded and is left with a field ambulance or flying ambulance as the Russians called them and the field ambulance reports this fact to the "central" office via paper - shortly afterwards the field ambulance is shelled the man is killed and in the rush to evacuate to safety some or all of the field ambulance's papers are lost thus the man's death is never reported - while NOT that common at times especially during mass retreats in 1914 and during 1917 this must have occurred; c) sheer massive illiteracy amongst the peasant made up infantry with massive influxes of wounded would have created sheer havoc with medical record keeping making the casualty returns and records that were done practically anonymous - many many soldiers must have simply been given a diagnosis of sorts and a number(s) AND the illiteracy as the war progressed of some of the medical record keeping personnel such as stretcher bearers of "feldsheers" / orderlies themselves causing NO records especially at the initial intake stages of casualties.

John

Toronto

[SMSKaiser]

Well, but as we recently talked about the German figures, your point C must not be counted, as iliteracy rate in Germany was I think under 1% (which few states in history ever had!), but of course, especially in Russian, Austrian, perhaps later Romanian Armies on the Eastern front this must have been severe for the reports.

[phil andrade]

Well, I have no information about which was the base of numbers avaiable to the Central Enquiries Office, but I assume that those too were the 10day-reports from the field armies, with the difference that in those numbers often soldiers who lost their units and returned later were included.

Yes, that is true.

There is still a significant difference in the numbers of deaths - please note, I refer here to fatalities, i.e. killed or died from wounds - in the two sets of figures. Up until the end of October 1917 the German goveernment acknowledged a loss of 1.1 million killed in action or died from wounds, plus another 85,000 + died of disease + another 300,000 "missing" ( as opposed to known prisoners of war).

The sanitatsbericht, up until end of July 1918, gives 772,000 killed in action and 290,000 died of wounds, a total well below that admitted to by the official count as early as 8 months before, with the huge losses of the Kaiserslacht yet to come.

Sorry that I am diverting this thread into a myriad of statistics...I can't help but remark on the difference, and I'm sure that both SB and the Govt. figures are authentic and meticulous.

I suppose it depends on who and how you count !

Phil

[John Gilinsky]

Well, but as we recently talked about the German figures, your point C must not be counted, as iliteracy rate in Germany was I think under 1% (which few states in history ever had!), but of course, especially in Russian, Austrian, perhaps later Romanian Armies on the Eastern front this must have been severe for the reports.

Focus of comments was naturally on Imperial Russia's armed forces especially on the NW or SW fronts.

John

[wiking85]

I find this discussion VERY interesting, especially the casualty statistics. However, I would like to return to a topic that appeared several pages ago: the Brusilov offensive. Common myth asserts that this attack was the panacea of Russian tactical prowess, but I beg to differ. During his planning, Brusilov realized that a victory could only be won against the Austrians, as the Germans were too strong despite being stuck in at Verdun during this period. He chose the weaker enemy to affect a breakthrough and was further aided by the mania of Conrad for an offensive against the Italians.

Courtesy of Holger Herwig's the First World War:

For the "Strafexpedition" he withdrew several hundred thousand troops from the Eastern front, including all of the best divisions and all reserves. Transferred were also nearly all the heavy artillery and much of the lighter batteries as well. 3/4's of the shell stock and all of the heavy artillery shells were taken too. Supplies such as food were taken and directed to Italy leaving the men demoralized when they had less than enough for themselves. Though troops were in a defensive posture and equipped with blockhouses, they were given only offensive training. When the Russians rolled over the Austrians, they had a massive superiority of everything including morale. It would have been a major shock if the Russians could not have achieved a massive victory on that front.

In February, before the withdrawals, the Russians attack on the Austrian front and suffered a Lake Naroch-level defeat with over 100,000 men lost for miniscule casualties inflicted on their enemy. So there were a number of factors outside Russian control that made their victory possible. While I do not doubt the Russians would have been capable of a victory in 1916, it would not have been nearly as crushing in the early months had Conrad not denuded the Eastern front to fulfill his vendetta against the Italians.

[phil andrade]

In February, before the withdrawals, the Russians attack on the Austrian front and suffered a Lake Naroch-level defeat with over 100,000 men lost for miniscule casualties inflicted on their enemy.

Was this in addition to the defeat they suffered at Lake Naroch itself, which took place in March 1916 ?

If so, it's remarkable how little we hear of it.

But then, I suppose, that's the theme of the Russian Front 1914-1917...so many battles which have been forgotten.

Your comments are interesting, wiking. Most historians credit Brusilov with brilliant planning and execution skills. Some say that his offensive was the most brilliant exploit of the war. The huge numbers of Austrian prisoners that were captured indicate that there were plenty of Austro-Hungarian troops left in Russia ; likewise, the heavy losses susutained by the Russians indicate that those Austrians put up some kind of a fight....although it's apparent that the Germans inflicted a very high proportion of that loss.

Phil

[wiking85]

Was this in addition to the defeat they suffered at Lake Naroch itself, which took place in March 1916 ?

If so, it's remarkable how little we hear of it.

But then, I suppose, that's the theme of the Russian Front 1914-1917...so many battles which have been forgotten.

Your comments are interesting, wiking. Most historians credit Brusilov with brilliant planning and execution skills. Some say that his offensive was the most brilliant exploit of the war. The huge numbers of Austrian prisoners that were captured indicate that there were plenty of Austro-Hungarian troops left in Russia ; likewise, the heavy losses susutained by the Russians indicate that those Austrians put up some kind of a fight....although it's apparent that the Germans inflicted a very high proportion of that loss.

Phil

Sure there were still a large number of men on the ground, as the front was still very long and needed large numbers. However, most were newer conscripts with little experience, as the Italian front was drawing in the best troops. The Eastern front was the red-headed stepchild of the Austrian military. They kept a defensive, sloppy line with little firepower, as they thought the Russians were a spent force. Block houses and trenches were all that Conrad thought was needed to keep the Russians at bay.

Yes that battle was in addition to the Lake Naroch offensive. It was launched in the middle of a storm, so that is partly the reason for its failure, but the Austrians were able to beat it off themselves with minimal casualties, helping convince AOK that the Eastern front was going to wrap up soon.

I don't want to denigrate the achievements of Brusilov and his armies, but I want to place them in context of what was going on. The Austrians had left many of their most unreliable units in the East were they were not supposed to be tested in combat, which really helped make the Russian breakthrough possible. That and the distinct lack of artillery and ammunition, which were shipped West, made the front especially vulnerable for attack. That was truly Brusilov's genius; he recognized an opportunity on his front and took it.

[SMSKaiser]

Interesting statement, but not the whole truth:

I never heard of any Russian offensive during february against the Austrians, possibly you have mistaken the Russian New Year's offensive (until mid-January) for that offensive you were talking about?

The actual decline of forces on the Austrian part of the Eastern front from Feb to June 1916 was the equivalent of 6 1/2 Infantry Divisions, of which 3 were German.

But due to no large scale battles in the spring, Austrian strength rose from 560,000 in february to 620,000 in June. (but of course, as was your point, there was a lack in artillery and trained men!).

The Russians still had more than 1,5 mio men in their lines, clearly outnumbering their opponents.

Interseting to mention here is the fact that more than two third of those were opposing the German frontline, while only one-third opposed the Austrians...

Still, the Russians decided to attack Austria, as they thought they would have BETTER CHANCES THERE.

[wiking85]

You're right; I was off on my dates on the Russian attack. I started looking through Stone's and Herwig's sections and it was a winter battle starting in December. The Russians made decent progress by seizing the Austrians first line, but were slaughtered trying to hold it. But they learned from their experiences learning not to repeat the same mistakes while the Austrians were confirmed in their flawed tactical doctrine.

As to the Brusilov offensive, you are right about absolute numbers, which you seem to have quoted verbatim from Herwig's book. An article by Rudolf Jerábek entitled "the Eastern Front" from the book "The last years of Austria-Hungary" mentions the draw down of important war materials in passing. Apparently he also wrote a book entitled "die Brussilowoffensive 1916", which might clarify the situation more. Raw numbers do not equal effectiveness, as the Russian and Austro-Hungarian armies had shown repeatedly. The elite units removed from the Austrian line equaled about 6 divisions, which were replaced by far less effective units which either ran or surrendered like the Czechs when attacked on a massive scale (no insult intended to the Czechs as they fought well when it was for a cause they cared about).

The Habsburg commanders drew the wrong conclusions from their experiences in December and January and completely offered up a juicy, vulnerable target to the Russians. Brusilov's victory was as much a product of tactical and strategic ineptitude as well as poor leadership on the Austrians part, as to the methods of the Russians.

From the article A U S T R I A-HU N G A R Y A N D

T H E B R U S I L O V OF F E N S I V E

O F 1 9 1 6 by

GR A Y D O N A. TU N S T A L L:

"Habsburg defensive positions were comprised of three separate lines of three

trenches one hundred meters apart. This allowed room for defensive machine gun

and artillery support if the position came under attack. Reserve troops were

placed in the second line. Following the successful battlefield outcome in late

December 1915 to early January 1916, Habsburg artillery units were deployed

behind the first defensive line or within a few kilometers of enemy trenches. When

the offensive commenced, only the first line of defense had been completed."

Also

"Consequently, General Brusilov was able to achieve one of his main

objectives—the opponent’s reserves were rapidly committed to battle, while

Russian artillery decimated the tightly packed Habsburg forward trenches where

two-thirds of the defenders were deployed. The result was a frightful casualty level

in the Austro-Hungarian lines, which produced psychological shock among both

troops and commanders. Such losses, more than 50 percent, were because of a

lack of heavy artillery, infantry, and artillery coordination and because of the

destruction of artillery pieces during the barrages."

Interesting statement, but not the whole truth:

I never heard of any Russian offensive during february against the Austrians, possibly you have mistaken the Russian New Year's offensive (until mid-January) for that offensive you were talking about?

The actual decline of forces on the Austrian part of the Eastern front from Feb to June 1916 was the equivalent of 6 1/2 Infantry Divisions, of which 3 were German.

But due to no large scale battles in the spring, Austrian strength rose from 560,000 in february to 620,000 in June. (but of course, as was your point, there was a lack in artillery and trained men!).

The Russians still had more than 1,5 mio men in their lines, clearly outnumbering their opponents.

Interseting to mention here is the fact that more than two third of those were opposing the German frontline, while only one-third opposed the Austrians...

Still, the Russians decided to attack Austria, as they thought they would have BETTER CHANCES THERE.

[phil andrade]

Was Conrad anxious to deploy forces against the Italians because he felt it was the only front where the fighting resolve of his troops would not be compromised by their largely slavic symapthies ? In their war against the Italians, the Austro-Hungarian soldiers did dispaly a determination which was not so apparent in their fighting against the Russians.

Phil

[SMSKaiser]

Conrad was always determined that Italy was "the enemy" of Austria-Hungary.

The Italian betrayal on their Allies in 1914 might also have been a factor for Conrad.

I think it was something of personal revenge on his favourite adversary. His plan to defeat the Italian by a "Cannae" from Tyrol into the Venetian plains was some of his favourite strategical plans, and in 1916 he had the chance to make this campaign come true.

When Falkenhayn announced his plan for an German offensive in the West during 1916, Conrad should have held back his troops in Galicia, to serve as a rear guard for the battle of Verdun against Russia, but in the end he prepared his own offensive and the parallel offenisves of Asiago and Verdun were responsible for the desaster of the Brusilov offensives during 1916, as the Eastern front was considerably weakened.

In 1918, there was another attempt by his Army group from Tyrol, which possibly stole Austria the ultimate victory over Italy. This attack obviously was to fail, but Conrad insisted on it in any way...and as histoy taught us, he got his will.

This might help to understand why General Conrad was focussing on the Italian front in 1916 and your point may have contributed additionally to this.

[phil andrade]

It's almost as if Conrad was exhibiting a kind of rivalry here....every time the Germans attacked in the West, he launches an offensive against the Italians ! Was this to show the World that Austria was not to be underrated when compared with Germany ? Prestige excercising a dangerous influence on strategy.

Phil