Hindenburg Program

[wiking85]

I've been reading the book: Army Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 by Gerald Feldman, which talks about the Hindenburg Program in the exploration of the German economy during the war. The author makes several very interesting pronouncements about the failure of this program. Important points suggest that the Program caused the transportation crisis and the massive lack of coal and steel due to the mismanagement of the economy. This in turn caused the food crisis and strikes/riots and large drop in production across the board, causing further problems at the front.

So is this factual? How much could German production have been if not for this program? Could the German home front been maintained for longer?

[wiking85]

I've been reading the book: Army Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 by Gerald Feldman, which talks about the Hindenburg Program in the exploration of the German economy during the war. The author makes several very interesting pronouncements about the failure of this program. Important points suggest that the Program caused the transportation crisis and the massive lack of coal and steel due to the mismanagement of the economy. This in turn caused the food crisis and strikes/riots and large drop in production across the board, causing further problems at the front.

So is this factual? How much could German production have been if not for this program? Could the German home front been maintained for longer?

[truthergw]

Many post-war commentators were critical of the damage caused to the economy by the complete subjection of production to the needs of the armed services. My instinct is that the program may not have been the sole cause of the problems but it almost certainly increased them. There were problems in all the major countries involved, we have only to look at Russia to see that but in countries with a democratic government, measures were taken to restrict the worst of the ill effects.

[bob lembke]

I hardly can accept that the Hindenburg Program "caused the food crisis", which in my mind already existed in 1916. I think that it is quite amazing that Germany was able to hold out as long as they did.

I have asked several times, but never have received an answer: How many countries was Germany fighting during the war? I believe that 27 Allied nations attended the Versailles Conference, but that not all Allied nations (e.g., Russia) attended. Anyone know?

Bob Lembke

[wiking85]

I hardly can accept that the Hindenburg Program "caused the food crisis", which in my mind already existed in 1916. I think that it is quite amazing that Germany was able to hold out as long as they did.

I have asked several times, but never have received an answer: How many countries was Germany fighting during the war? I believe that 27 Allied nations attended the Versailles Conference, but that not all Allied nations (e.g., Russia) attended. Anyone know?

Bob Lembke

For course food shortages were already beginning to bite, thanks to the blockade of nitrates. All available resources were going in to shells, which caused problems for farming, as can be imagined. Here is a post I made on another forum about this topic:

Specifically, the release of large numbers of men for work in industry deprived the army of several hundreds of thousands of men needed at the front, but had no places to work when they arrived home. The act of transporting so many men home used up large amounts of coal that were necessary for other transportation. Also, the factories that these men were to work at were to be constructed, but there was simply not enough material to build these factories or to run them, so all stayed half built and in the process cost massive amounts of steel and coal.

The War Ministry had calculated the exact amounts of material that German could produce with the resources at its desposal and carefully worked out how much industry could expand to produce war materials without upsetting the balance and cause the structure to collapse. When the Hindenburg plan was implimented it threw everything off, and drastically upset the entire system of the nation. The over ambitious plan for factory construction had no basis in reality and used up vital materials that were necessary for artillery and shell production. The initial jump in production after H-L took command was actually due to Falkenhayn's plans at the war ministry, which promptly fell when the Hindenburg Program went into effect.

Feldman suggests that many of the food shortages in 1917-18 were not caused by a further lack of food, rather by lack of transportation availability, as the coal for the operation of the trains had been used up, and the military situation demanded that all available coal had to be used for military transportation. Additionally, he contends that the production of artillery shells, machine guns, and artillery would all have been higher if not for the problems caused by H-L.

They also tried to impliment a coersive labor policy that was a direct cause of riots and strikes in several important industries, such as coal mining, which further exacerbated the shortages when the Silesian and Ruhr mines were closed up by the strikes. This in turn reduced the amount of transportation that could be used to bring food into the cities from the countryside, which caused riots, as cold and hungry town and city dwellers were beginning to starve.

These are just some examples, which make me wonder how much more Germany could have produced/held out if this industrial program had never been implimented.

[salesie]

I've been reading the book: Army Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 by Gerald Feldman, which talks about the Hindenburg Program in the exploration of the German economy during the war. The author makes several very interesting pronouncements about the failure of this program. Important points suggest that the Program caused the transportation crisis and the massive lack of coal and steel due to the mismanagement of the economy. This in turn caused the food crisis and strikes/riots and large drop in production across the board, causing further problems at the front.

So is this factual? How much could German production have been if not for this program? Could the German home front been maintained for longer?

Interesting questions, Wiking, but impossible to answer definitively because of their hypothetical nature i.e. the Hindenburg Program did come into existence in 1916 so there is no way of knowing how the German socio-economic Home Front would have actually performed without it.

It is clear though that Falkenhayn’s Home Front, part military part civilian, policies were failing by 1916, hence the introduction of Hindenburg's (de facto Ludendorff's) initiatives. Given that neither Falkenhayn's nor Hindenburg's socio-economic programs were up to the job of delivering the required industrial production and food requirements to win a total-war, it seems sensible to me to look beyond Germany itself - after all, powerful strategic forces were in play and affecting Germany from outside, so to focus on what Hindenburg (Ludendorff) did in isolation is to ignore the true nature of the situation, what the allies did also plays a vital role in this matter.

The year 1916 was the year that deeper forces began to break-through, these deeper forces being the strategic realities of total-war i.e. military matters in the field being but one consideration of total-war; industrial production, food, social cohesion, economic clout and efficiency, access to raw materials, and political stability being other highly significant factors needed to win total war.

For all its rhetoric prior to 1914, Germany entered the First World War not wholly prepared to put its enormous industrial potential behind the war effort - the result of her military planners' short war fantasies. As an importer of food, industrial raw materials and labour in 1914, the German economy was peculiarly dependent upon international markets, and could ill afford a long war. When the Schlieffen Plan went awry in September 1914, the German war economy was left in a parlous situation strategically, and by 1916, under Falkenhayn, the shortages of raw materials and labour had become acute. Consequently, any policies carried out by the Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn and the War Ministry were sure to come under intense criticism. This criticism, of course, came from those convinced they could do better; a strange coalition of businessmen, certain they could produce more and better weapons, and members of the German High command. And in August 1916, this coalition had its way, Falkenhayn was removed and a "new order" came in with Hindenburg as its figurehead - in effect, the socio-economic management of Germany went from partial militarisation under Falkenhayn to total militarisation under Hindenburg (de facto Ludendorff), with a few businessmen reaping great rewards from the "new order's" policy of printing "new money" to pay for the war effort.

This "new order's" policies initially led to greater, but strategically insignificant, war production, but soon ran into trouble just as Falkenhayn's management had. I won't go into any socio-economic detail because that would focus too much on Germany itself, and the main problem for both these differing policies lay outside of Germany, and thus for all practical intents and purposes were beyond German control.

From day one, the allies placed a stranglehold on Germany. The British Royal Navy, the most powerfully strategic weapon in the world at the time, blockaded Germany cutting it off from the vitally strategic supplies necessary to fight total-war. And, just as important from a strategic point of view, the Royal Navy was powerful enough to ward off German attempts with its U-boats to blockade Britain whilst maintaining its virtually impenetrable blockade of Germany. Denied almost total access to the raw material, food and labour imports it relied upon pre-war, Germany was at a serious strategic disadvantage from the outset of war. Whereas, the Royal Navy's domination of the sea-lanes, gave Britain ready access to its Empire and foreign markets, thus allowing Britain, particularly after waking up in mid 1915 to what was actually needed in total-war, to greatly step-up its own efforts in order to out-perform Germany in all aspects of total-war.

In my opinion, the Hindenburg program was doomed to failure from its outset just as Falkenhayn's policies were i.e. the deeper, strategic forces in-play made this inevitable. Indeed, Wilhelm Groener, the General appointed by Germany's "new-order" in 1916 to head the Hindenburg Program (also Ludendorff's successor in 1918), and sacked, as a scapegoat, in 1917 when it was clearly failing, said after the war that the German General Staff never truly understood the strategic and political realities of the war, never really took the consequences of failing to achieve their strategic objectives in battle seriously. In other words, Germany went to war in 1914 grossly overestimating its own prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the allies - and it continued under this delusion for four whole years. But the saddest part of all this is that the German military, though the de facto rulers of Germany, could claim it had been let down by civilians at home, whilst conveniently failing to mention the true reasons for the Kaiserreich's demise i.e. the allies, Britain in particular, played a strategically astute game - and this lack of reality in the stab-in-the-back scenario led to Germany making exactly the same mistakes some twenty-odd years later.

Consequently, it seems to me that if the Hindenburg Program had not been initiated in 1916 then an argument could be made to say that the German Home Front may have stayed intact a little longer - but, in my opinion, this would be an extremely shallow argument simply because it ignores the fact that control of its war-time economy was virtually taken out of Germany's own control by allied actions.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

I've been reading the book: Army Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918 by Gerald Feldman, which talks about the Hindenburg Program in the exploration of the German economy during the war. The author makes several very interesting pronouncements about the failure of this program. Important points suggest that the Program caused the transportation crisis and the massive lack of coal and steel due to the mismanagement of the economy. This in turn caused the food crisis and strikes/riots and large drop in production across the board, causing further problems at the front.

So is this factual? How much could German production have been if not for this program? Could the German home front been maintained for longer?

Interesting questions, Wiking, but impossible to answer definitively because of their hypothetical nature i.e. the Hindenburg Program did come into existence in 1916 so there is no way of knowing how the German socio-economic Home Front would have actually performed without it.

It is clear though that Falkenhayn’s, part military part civilian, Home-Front policies were failing by 1916, hence the introduction of Hindenburg's (de facto Ludendorff's) initiatives. Given that neither Falkenhayn's nor Hindenburg's socio-economic programs were up to the job of delivering the required industrial production and food requirements to win a total-war, it seems sensible to me to look beyond Germany itself - after all, powerful strategic forces were in play and affecting Germany from outside, so to focus on what Hindenburg (Ludendorff) did in isolation is to ignore the true nature of the situation, what the allies did also plays a vital role in this matter.

The year 1916 was the year that deeper forces began to break-through, these deeper forces being the strategic realities of total-war i.e. military matters in the field being but one consideration; industrial production, food, social cohesion, economic clout and efficiency, access to raw materials, and political stability being other highly significant factors needed to win total war.

For all its rhetoric prior to 1914, Germany entered the First World War not wholly prepared to put its enormous industrial potential behind the war effort - the result of her military planners' short war fantasies. As an importer of food, industrial raw materials and labour in 1914, the German economy was peculiarly dependent upon international markets, and could ill afford a long war. When the Schlieffen Plan went awry in September 1914, the German war economy was left in a parlous situation strategically, and by 1916, under Falkenhayn, the shortages of raw materials and labour had become acute. Consequently, any policies carried out by the Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn and the War Ministry were sure to come under intense criticism. This criticism, of course, came from those convinced they could do better; a strange coalition of businessmen, certain they could produce more and better weapons, and members of the German High command. And in August 1916, this coalition had its way, Falkenhayn was removed and a "new order" came in with Hindenburg as its figurehead - in effect, the socio-economic management of Germany went from partial militarisation under Falkenhayn to total militarisation under Hindenburg (de facto Ludendorff), with a few businessmen reaping great rewards from the "new order's" policy of printing "new money" to pay for the war effort.

This "new order's" policies initially led to greater, but strategically insignificant, war production, but soon ran into trouble just as Falkenhayn's management had. I won't go into any socio-economic detail because that would focus too much on Germany itself, and the main problem for both these differing policies lay outside of Germany, and thus for all practical intents and purposes were beyond German control.

From day one, the allies placed a stranglehold on Germany. The British Royal Navy, the most powerfully strategic weapon in the world at the time, blockaded Germany cutting it off from the vitally strategic supplies necessary to fight total-war. And, just as important from a strategic point of view, the Royal Navy was powerful enough to ward off German attempts with its U-boats to blockade Britain whilst maintaining its virtually impenetrable blockade of Germany. Denied almost total access to the raw material, food and labour imports it relied upon pre-war, Germany was at a serious strategic disadvantage from the outset of war. Whereas, the Royal Navy's domination of the sea-lanes gave Britain ready access to its Empire and foreign markets, thus allowing Britain, particularly after waking up in mid 1915 to what was actually needed in total-war, to greatly step-up its own efforts in order to out-perform Germany in all aspects of total-war.

In my opinion, the Hindenburg program was doomed to failure from its outset just as Falkenhayn's policies were i.e. the deeper, strategic forces in-play made failure inevitable. Indeed, Wilhelm Groener, the General appointed by Germany's "new-order" in 1916 to head the Hindenburg Program (also Ludendorff's successor in 1918), and sacked, as a scapegoat, in 1917 when the program was clearly failing, said after the war that the German General Staff never truly understood the strategic and political realities of the war, never really took the consequences of failing to achieve their strategic objectives in battle seriously. In other words, Germany went to war in 1914 grossly overestimating its own prowess whilst seriously underestimating the capabilities of the allies - and it continued under this delusion for four whole years. But the saddest part of all this is that sections of the German military, though the de facto rulers of Germany, had the audacity to claim it had been let down by civilians at home, whilst conveniently failing to mention the true reasons for the Kaiserreich's demise i.e. the allies, Britain in particular, played a strategically astute game - and this lack of reality in the stab-in-the-back scenario led to Germany making exactly the same mistakes some twenty-odd years later.

Consequently, it seems to me that if the Hindenburg Program had not been initiated in 1916 then an argument could be made to say that the German Home Front may have stayed intact a little longer - but, in my opinion, this would be an extremely shallow argument simply because it ignores the fact that control of its war-time economy was virtually taken out of Germany's own control by allied actions.

Cheers-salesie.

[centurion]

Both Germany and AH were self sufficient in basic food stuffs in 1914 - it was mainly luxuries that were imported. Germany had more than enough coal and had more than adequate supplies of high grade iron ore from Sweden via a short sea passage that could be well protected. Indeed during WW1 German steel production exceeded that of Britain and France combined. However whilst Germany was strong in basic heavy industry (and indeed manufactured the best cast and thick plate armour in Europe) there were fatal weaknesses. Firstly whilst Germany had adequate steel production capacity (if managed properly) there were extreme difficulties with special steels as all the main sources of the alloying metals were in either in Allied hands or at the end of easily blockaded sea routes. There was a hidden war of smugglers shipping such materials from neutral countries into Germany via other neutrals and Allied agents seeking to uncover and block such schemes. A number of French industrialists were implicated in trading with the enemy in such products. However most of these sources were finally locked down by mid 1917. The entry of Brazil into the war on the Allied side completed this process blocking a major source of Chrome. Artillery and shells had priority for special steels, this increased the 'engine famine' which hit aircraft design and production and eliminated any hope of Germany building its own major tank force. Other important metals such as tin were in short supply

Germany had a car, truck and bus industry that was much smaller than most of the Allies (only Italy's was smaller). As a result the German army was significantly under mechanised when compared to its adversaries. Vehicles were requisitioned from industry and agriculture with dramatic effects on their productivity and on distribution in general.

Agricultural production dropped by 50% during the war. This was due to the following factors:

• lack of man power as agricultural workers were taken into the forces
• lack of horses as these were requisitioned for the army
• shortage of tractors as production was switched to artillery tractors
• an almost complete lack of artificial fertilizers as all nitrate production went to the manufacture of explosives

Whilst adequate supplies of oil to meet pre war demands were available in 1914 from territories under the control of the Central Powers demands for fuel and the chemical industry proved more than could be met.

And it goes on and on

[wiking85]

Does anyone have food, artillery, machingun, and munitions stats for each year? Preferably each month, but there is only so much I can expect

Also, does anyone have any German sources that deal with the German economy during the war?

[wiking85]

Both Germany and AH were self sufficient in basic food stuffs in 1914 - it was mainly luxuries that were imported. Germany had more than enough coal and had more than adequate supplies of high grade iron ore from Sweden via a short sea passage that could be well protected. Indeed during WW1 German steel production exceeded that of Britain and France combined. However whilst Germany was strong in basic heavy industry (and indeed manufactured the best cast and thick plate armour in Europe) there were fatal weaknesses. Firstly whilst Germany had adequate steel production capacity (if managed properly) there were extreme difficulties with special steels as all the main sources of the alloying metals were in either in Allied hands or at the end of easily blockaded sea routes. There was a hidden war of smugglers shipping such materials from neutral countries into Germany via other neutrals and Allied agents seeking to uncover and block such schemes. A number of French industrialists were implicated in trading with the enemy in such products. However most of these sources were finally locked down by mid 1917. The entry of Brazil into the war on the Allied side completed this process blocking a major source of Chrome. Artillery and shells had priority for special steels, this increased the 'engine famine' which hit aircraft design and production and eliminated any hope of Germany building its own major tank force. Other important metals such as tin were in short supply

Germany had a car, truck and bus industry that was much smaller than most of the Allies (only Italy's was smaller). As a result the German army was significantly under mechanised when compared to its adversaries. Vehicles were requisitioned from industry and agriculture with dramatic effects on their productivity and on distribution in general.

Agricultural production dropped by 50% during the war. This was due to the following factors:

• lack of man power as agricultural workers were taken into the forces
• lack of horses as these were requisitioned for the army
• shortage of tractors as production was switched to artillery tractors
• an almost complete lack of artificial fertilizers as all nitrate production went to the manufacture of explosives

Whilst adequate supplies of oil to meet pre war demands were available in 1914 from territories under the control of the Central Powers demands for fuel and the chemical industry proved more than could be met.

And it goes on and on

What about the transportation crisis? Was it affected by the external causes, or was it somewhat "engineered from within" by mismanagement of the economy? My understanding was that shortages were partly caused by the coersive labor policies that were part of the Hindenburg Program that cause strikes in the mining industry, among others. The other aspect was that the construction of new factories and transport of men home from the front to work in those industries used up limited resources that were needed sustainable industry/necessary military transportation/food transportation.

[salesie]

What about the transportation crisis? Was it affected by the external causes, or was it somewhat "engineered from within" by mismanagement of the economy? My understanding was that shortages were partly caused by the coersive labor policies that were part of the Hindenburg Program that cause strikes in the mining industry, among others. The other aspect was that the construction of new factories and transport of men home from the front to work in those industries used up limited resources that were needed sustainable industry/necessary military transportation/food transportation.

It wasn't just German men being transported from the front, there were also many men forced to leave the occupied territories to work in German industry and agriculture - Belgians etc. taken against their will and "exported" to Germany as forced labour (a pre-cursor for the next war). And this attempt by the Hindenburg Program to solve the labour crisis did create transport bottlenecks which the Falkenhayn regime had managed to avoid, but Falkenhayn didn't try to import "labour" (up to 1916) to solve the acute shortages of labour, if he had then the same problems would have undoubtedly occurred.

In a way, the importation of labour into Germany i.e. soldiers returned from the front as well as forced labour from the occupied territories, had a certain logic to it: 1) Shorten the line by retiring to the Hindenburg line and go on the defensive in the west to release some troops for home service (as well as for the east). 2) Germany was a net importer of labour pre-war, and the acute labour crisis was caused by the allied blockade so why not "import" again, by force, from the external countries Germany did have access to? 3) Forced labour will alleviate many of the problems coming from internal German labour markets created by the Hindenburg Program's own policies (i.e. strikes etc.). (The forced labour move, could explain why the failed German peace feelers put out in late 1916 contained an insistence that Germany retain, by annexation, the captured territories of Belgian and northern France?)

But this "logic" was deeply flawed: The real problem for both Hindenburg's and Falkenhayn's regimes was the acute labour shortage plus the raw materials famine; in other words, the effects of the blockade were two-fold, and both were inseparably linked, making the problem akin to having two diseases where the medicine to cure one disease made the other much worse i.e. transporting huge numbers of men to cure the labour crisis entailed using raw materials that industry could ill afford to lose, and the initial increase in war-material production going out was actually counter productive to the extra labour coming in, and visa-versa.

Germany was in strategic check, and the only way out was to break the blockade - and this strategic necessity applied to both Hindenburg's and Falkenhayn's policies; without breaking the blockade neither approach could possibly work, without breaking the blockade Germany was not in control of its own war economy at the strategic level, and thus any tactical/operational attempts to remedy the situation were mere window dressing.

All of which makes Wilhelm Groener's words, about the German High Command's failure to recognise the strategic and political realities, all the more insightful i.e. Britain had used, to great success, the blockade strategy in the Napoleonic wars - was Germany so convinced in the omnipotence of its army in 1914-18 that it ignored such a vital strategic lesson of history, ignored an almost identical strategic move by Britain which actually made it possible for Prussia, an ally of Britain at the time, to free itself from Napoleon's grip? It seems that the quick-war fantasy, coupled with a grossly inflated belief in its own military prowess, was so ingrained within the German psyche that even when its army failed to win a quick war in 1914, it still ignored an important historical lesson stemming from Prussia's own rise to power.

Cheers-salesie.

[centurion]

Giving the military absolute priority over motor vehicles and draught horses is likely to create transport problems. Each German state was resposible for food distribution in its own area and this was often delegated to administrative units further down. I've seen reports of centres that had adequate supplies of food that they could not distribute to where it was needed because of a lack of lorries, draught animals etc.

[joerookery]

I just found this and I think it is a fascinating subject. We spent a lot of time on the "homefront" in the the Handbook of Imperial Germany. the section starts on page 203 and the footnotes cite the sources. But in general. Our research showed that the entire economy was a mess. The shortage of raw materials, I think was more telling than the transport. But you can get into a serious chicken and egg argument. The horse issue that was mentioned earlier was bigger than a bread box and disaster was upon the economy long before the Hindenburg plan. Of course I'm biased, but I would recommend you to chapter 4 of the Handbook of Imperial Germany. This will take you chronologically through the problem, as seen by a series of social historians. Here are a couple of quotes from the book.

In August 1914, Walther Rathenau, the president of the German General Electric Company, was able to persuade the government to establish a War Raw Materials Office. As the war continued, more agencies were created, and the government, which had never had an expenditure of over 10 percent of gross domestic product, began spending over 50 percent of the GDP by 1918. While war planning was never completely centralized, many contemporaries spoke of it as war socialism. There was a 200 percent increase in the cost of living index between 1914 and 1918. This was on top of an already struggling economy. Those individuals whose wages did not keep up with inflation, including civil servants, those on fixed incomes, and those not working in the war industries felt the impact. Stable middle-class individuals such as school teachers, watched their economic situation erode to where it was worse than the workers in the war industries. The upper class lost much of their savings.

The shortage of raw materials and the loss of the export market, dramatically affected the labor market early in the war. Unemployment, which was approximately 2.5 percent of the trade union members in June 1914, jumped to 22.4 percent in August. Key war-effort firms lost between one-third and one-half of their workers in August 1914 to the mobilization. Other industries, which employed people in the nonessential sectors, lost between 66 and 100 percent of their workers. Even though the initial shortages were mostly those of unskilled laborers, skilled laborers also became a scarce commodity.

An even bigger issue on the home front was the lack of food. Before the war, Germany had been a net importer of food. The imports were approximately 25 percent of the consumption of the empire. The British blockade that effectively cut Germany off from outside imports was compounded by the lack of farm horses due to their use in the military. The huge loss of able-bodied men created a 30 percent reduction in food production. Foreign workers and prisoners of war exacerbated the problem. Of the 1.6 million prisoners of war held in Germany, 735,000 were employed on farms and 331,000 in industry by August 1916.

And this section contains my favorite quote about ersatz things!

One quote by a resident of Leipzig commented that she did not mind eating rat; it was the rat substitute she objected to. There were 11,000 Ersatz products. There were patents awarded for 6000 types of wine, beer, and lemonade. There were 1000 different kinds of soup cubes, 837 types of sausage and over 500 recipes for coffee.

[wiking85]

http://books.google.com/books?id=2YqjfHLyyj8C&pg=PA551&lpg=PA551&dq=hindenburg+program&source=bl&ots=BQk7Y7TNUK&sig=Tx2jEZzGH0qlUBCYziugQU9BXJI&hl=en&ei=qWU8TeuINIuugQfprZWFCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=14&ved=0CFUQ6AEwDTgK#v=onepage&q=hindenburg%20program&f=false

I found this, which adds some numbers to the point I was trying to make.