The Carronade

[PhilB]

I`ve long been impressed by the effectiveness of the carronade in Nelsonian naval warfare. It was so simple and destructive that it seemed likely to have advantages on land. But it didn`t. Were there any spin-offs into WW1 artillery or did the carronade disappear when solid shot did? Did a short barrelled, large calibre gun firing any kind of shell on a flat trajectory have any application on the Western Front?

[HERITAGE PLUS]

Phil

I am no artillery expert. However I believe that use of the carronade by the Army would have been limited due to the short range of fire offered by the weapon although some were used in coastal defence forts. It was effective for the Nelsonian navy due to its use at close quarters.

Dave

[MikB]

My understanding is that Carronades enjoyed a brief vogue in Napoleonic times and shortly after because of the power they packed in a compact installation, allowing a smaller ship to 'punch above its weight'. Once it became widely recognised that full-length guns comfortably outranged them, the advantage was lost and the fashion evaporated.

You don't get a flat trajectory out of a short barrel except at very close range. A WW1 equivalent might have been something like a 6" howitzer - but without the high-angle capability - firing mostly canister or shrapnel from fixed ammunition at short range. But there are two obvious difficulties: providing a satisfactory carriage to take the low-elevation recoil, and providing men and equipment able to handle such heavy ammunition on a QF basis - all without losing compactness and mobility. That's probably why it never happened.

Regards,

MikB

[SiegeGunner]

The principle, at least, of the carronade – destructive direct artillery fire at close range – was continued by the Germans with their use of trench guns and light Minenwerfer (firing on a flat trajectory off low-elevation mounts) of various calibres, chiefly in the anti-tank role.

[MikB]

The principle, at least, of the carronade – destructive direct artillery fire at close range – was continued by the Germans with their use of trench guns and light Minenwerfer (firing on a flat trajectory off low-elevation mounts) of various calibres, chiefly in the anti-tank role.

Yes, in terms of terminal effect I guess you could argue that.

I'd been thinking of the point about the Carronade achieving its effect primarily with kinetic energy. Iron roundshot had the rather counterintuitive characteristic of making a bigger exit hole in heavy wooden planking at lower velocity than they did at higher, generating a larger and more lethal shower of splinters - as well as potentially failing to exit the hull on the disengaged side and ricocheting around inside to cause further mayhem. For these reasons I understand that Nelsonian guncrews deliberately cut charges in normal guns at close range - in effect to emulate Carronade ballistics, not just to save wasting powder.

In that sense, the evolution of shells with larger and more variable designs of bursting charge really did change the way the technologies worked.

Regards,

MikB

[Ron Clifton]

There is also the question of the time-lag between inventing (or re-inventing) a weapon not in current use and being able to deploy it in sufficient numbers to be effective. If WW1 had lasted long enough for a heavy anti-tank gun to be needed, perhaps the carronade principle would have been resurrected. As it was, and as others have already pointed out, the need for that kind of weapon was never current in 14/18.

Ron

[centurion]

The idea had already been tried. Part of an unpublished book of mine

"Whilst in general there were no radical changes in cannon design in this period there are always some people eager and happy to try and ‘push the envelope’ usually beyond the point at which it breaks. One of these was the Chevalier Follard, a sort of 18th century military consultant (chevalier was the French counterpart of the English rank of baronet). Follard was addressing the problem of the so called ‘battalion gun’ which was the desire to have a piece of artillery light enough to be dragged along with (and usually by) the infantry but still able to deliver a worthwhile punch. The Swedish king and general Gustavus Adolphus had introduced the concept in the 17th century during the Thirty Years War when he equipped his troops with the famous leather guns. These were actually small built up guns with the iron reinforcing rings replaced with leather shrunk around a wire and rope wrapped barrel (to save weight). They suffered from the usual sins of built up guns but were initially successful, mainly due to the surprise factor. Once this had worn off it soon became clear that they were both dangerous to their own users and fired too small a ball to be really decisive. They were soon replaced with more conventional small cast cannon. The dilemma of the battalion gun was that if it was able to fire a useful weight of shot it was too heavy to be dragged by the infantry and if it were light enough to be dragged it wasn’t worth the effort.

In 1723 the Chevalier’s solution to the two seemingly irreconcilable requirements of lightness and punch was to design a radically different gun. This was bronze, extremely short being no more than 28 inches long (70 cm) and weighing 15 cwt. but firing a massive 24 pound shot. To put this in context the heaviest field gun of the time was usually a 12 pounder. 24 pounder guns were normally confined to the main gun decks of ships of the line, fortified batteries and siege trains and would typically weigh 50 - 60 cwt. Follard’s gun recoiled along a slide and was traversed across another. Curiously Follards design shows no means of elevating the weapon, this would suggest it was intended only to be used at point blank range. In many respects this design foreshadowed the very successful British Carronade introduced at the end of the 18th century which was a very short gun firing a large shot over a short range. It too was usually slide mounted for recoil and could be fitted to a transverse slide.

However the iron carronade was still a much more sophisticated weapon, and mainly ship borne. The Chevalier’s gun had one radically different characteristic – on firing it exploded violently. Although it was actually 2 cwt. heavier than the later 24 pounder carronade much of its metal which should have been applied to the breech was wasted on an elaborate tail/slide (and intricate but functionless decoration) and it was thus too lightweight in its construction and could not take the stress of firing such a heavy round. Follard abandoned his cannon design, recommended that the infantry once more take up the ballista and designed a field catapult. Although the men in white coats didn’t come for him at once he did loose some credibility.

In fact even if it didn’t explode the Chevalier’s gun would still have been a non starter. It may have been relatively lightweight but its users would have had significant problems lugging its ammunition about the battlefield. It doesn’t take many 24 pound cannon balls and their powder cartridges (adding up to at least 30 pounds per round) to reach the point where the ammunition wagon would be heavier than the gun. The sheer weight of ammunition and the difficulty of heaving it around so that it ends up at the same place as the gun (and at the same time) has always been the underlying weakness of attempts to provide the infantry with a light weapon with a big punch.

[MikB]

Another thing that makes it a bit of a failure from the drawing board is that it ain't got no wheels.

It would need an additional carriage to give it mobility.

For the Carronade, the ship provided the mobility. For a land-based equivalent, except in defensive applications where the enemy are forced to pass through a place within its fire, mobility would be essential.

PS. Follard's bronze tail is not without function - its purpose has to be to resist rearward rotation of the barrel in recoil, the approximate mechanical equivalent of the Carronade's elevating screw. Not that there mightn't've been alternative methods of doing that whilst still allowing for more metal in the breech.

A guess here, but part of the problem may have been that he couldn't get enough velocity out of such a short bore without whacking up the breech-pressure considerably, most likely by using a finer-grained powder. This would have put him outside the envelope of existing internal ballistics experience, with the results described.

Regards,

MikB

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I am no artillery expert. However I believe that use of the carronade by the Army would have been limited due to the short range of fire offered by the weapon although some were used in coastal defence forts. It was effective for the Nelsonian navy due to its use at close quarters.

With a range of 400 yards (364 m) HMS Victory's 68-pdr carronades out ranged muskets, firing kegs of musket balls it would cut a swathe through troops. In WWI that was achieved more effectively with a machine gun. The carronade's smasher characteristics were achieved by weapons like the howitzers up, to 15 inch, and Minenwerfer. As discussed before in relation to Napoleonic gunnery, naval ordinance didn't have a flat trajectory if they fired with the roll of the ship.

[PhilB]

With a range of 400 yards (364 m) HMS Victory's 68-pdr carronades out ranged muskets, firing kegs of musket balls it would cut a swathe through troops.

Victory`s first carronade shot at Trafalgar is alleged to have sent 500 balls into the stern of Bucentaure.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

Don't forget the 68 lb. (30.6 kg) round shot!

http://www.hms-victory.com/index.php?optio...1&Itemid=91

When you say alleged, do you have research to contradict their information?

[PhilB]

No, but if I said it was true someone would ask for research proof.

[centurion]

As the canister (not a keg) was hand filled the exact number of ball in an individual canister would not be known - a few more, a few less - whose counting?

Carronades where used against infantry in 1801 when the British made a large scale opposed landing in Egypt. A number of the landing boats had a beefed up carronade mounting in the bows allowing something heavier (24 pounder I think) than the usual boat carronade. These were used to sweep the beach ahead of the landing troops and by all accounts proved very effective.

One advantage of the carronade so far not commented upon was that it needed less men to serve it than a similar calibre cannon. Initially there was some resistance to the weapon as it was at first not counted in the weight of a ship's broadside and the captain's pay was determined by this. Replacing a cannon with a carronade meant a cut in pay! Eventually an adjustment was made (much at the instigation of a Captain Bligh who commanded an experimental ship of the line with an all carronade broadside - those silly pay scales were enough to make a man mutiny).

The carronade declined because of improvements in gunnery that meant battles fought over longer ranges, the eventual introduction of the shell gun which was lighter than a cannon but had a similar range and packed a bigger punch and finally the development of armour plated warships.

[PhilB]

The carronade declined because of improvements in gunnery that meant battles fought over longer ranges

It was the short range nature of much trench warfare that made me wonder.

[centurion]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Aug 22 2009, 06:11 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

It was the short range nature of much trench warfare that made me wonder.

But by WW1 the functions of the carronade were met by other means

Man stopper - by the ACW the rifle from cover (see Fredricksburg) and by WW1 the machine gun (as demonstrated in the Russo Japanese War).

Short range 'cruncher' - by WW1 the trench howitzer (as demonstrated in the Russo Japanese War esp at Port Arthur).

[per ardua per mare per terram]

If the allies had examined the lessons of amphibious warfare demonstrated by operations in the Mediterranean from 1800-1815, their attempts in WWI might have been more successful. Even if they had only concentrated on Egypt 1801 they would have learnt a great deal; Sir Ralph Abercromby, of Tullibody had had a steep learning curve with such operations in the West Indies. They might also have learnt a lot from the Dardanelles expedition of 1807, the subject, I believe, of one of Phil's earlier threads!

The utility of the rifle as a man stopper, from behind cover, had been demonstrated during the American War Not to Pay Taxes 1776-83; it increased in its ability in this role after the magazine rifle was available. The machine gun had proved its ability as a man stopper at Alexandria in 1882. The Admiralty followed the advice of the post war analysis report submitted by Captains JA Fisher and AK Wilson (both later First Sea Lords prior to/ during WWI) and made machines gunspart of the armament of all capital ships. Consequentially the Navy had proportionately more mgs available in 1914. The War Office as usual was far behind.

[centurion]

If the allies had examined the lessons of amphibious warfare demonstrated by operations in the Mediterranean from 1800-1815, their attempts in WWI might have been more successful. Even if they had only concentrated on Egypt 1801 they would have learnt a great deal; Sir Ralph Abercromby, of Tullibody had had a steep learning curve with such operations in the West Indies.

He also made the effort to hold trials and a dress rehearsal on a similar shaped beach on the Turkish coast. He was also fortunate in having an excellent rapport with the naval officers involved - something that could not always be said for future combined ops. The landing in Egypt was the biggest such operation before Gallipoli.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

As noted in post #16, many useful lessons could have been learnt studying this expedition. Abercromby also ensured that the supply chain was secure, which as the British were only recently returned to the Med was no mean feat. The army having an excellent rapport with naval officers had not always been a feature of previous combined ops either. Then again army officers didn't always have an excellent raport with each other then or subsequentially.

Short range howitzers had been captured in China before 1905.

Back to the carronade: when a mg belt of 250 could be fired in less time that it took to load a carronade, it wasn't going to be required. The particular short range smashing characteristics were a feature of naval warfare at that time and again not easily replicated in trench warfare. Later, in the DDay landings, the pill box buster tanks could I suppose be seen as a descendent of the idea.

[Story]

The U.S. made "King" howitzer might qualify. Named for the maker, Daniel King of Germantown (Philadelphia), they had a 17 inch, 38 lb barrel with a 2.75 inch bore and could fire cannister rounds, solid shot or fused "grenade" shells.

http://www.legionville.com/Howitzer.htm

http://lassengunsmithing.com/html/KHp9.htm