Trial by Fire

[Robert Dunlop]

Subtitled: 'Command and the British Expeditionary Force in 1914' (ISBN 0 313 32473 5)

I picked up a copy of this book recently. Expensive new but a fascinating read. Gardner sets out to address the following 2 questions:

1. How did British officers exercise command (concentrating primarily on command at the corps level and GHQ) in 1914?

2. How did their conduct of the 1914 campaign affect the operations of the BEF?

He begins by penning portraits of several key commanders and senior staff officers, including French, Murray, Wilson, Harper and Macdonogh from GHQ, and Haig, Smith-Dorrien, Capper, Rawlinson, Weston-Hunter and Gough. From these 'biographies', Gardner compiles a list of traits shared by higher-level commanders, including: limited knowledge of commanding large formations, personally ambitious, unable to pull together, strong ties to traditional forms of command in regiments - leadership from the front, pride in the regiment comes first, umpiring, etc.

The choice of commanders for the first chapter is not complete, leaving out Allenby, Willcocks and de Lisle to name but a few others who operated at the same levels. They are featured in the rest of the book, which suggests that the initial choice was made to illustrate particular points.

The subsequent chapters then examine the battles of Mons, Le Cateau and the retreat; the Advance to the Aisne; the Demise of II Corps; the brief interlude of IV Corps; the Indian Corps; and Haig and I Corps at First Ypres. Gardner has drawn together a fascinating account of the intrigue and malfunction within the BEF. Two things really stood out for me. The first was the way in which Macdonogh's contribution as Head of Intelligence Section was virtually negated by Wilson's optimism and influence. I had wondered how the clear evidence of significant German forces prior to Mons and First Ypres seemed to be ignored.

The second was Haig's intrigues. Gardner points out that Haig was required to rejoin forces with Smith-Dorrien below Mormal Forest. However, Haig failed to do this and so began smearing Smith-Dorrien's reputation in his diary, which he sent edited copies of to the King (as did Smith-Dorrien). Gardner believes Haig did this because he knew he had been in the wrong.

The further decline of Smith-Dorrien's status, the problems of command and control in the cavalry, the marginalization of the Indian Corps and the problems faced by Rawlinson made for a really interesting read. What comes through very strongly is that the ability of commanders at brigade and battalion level often contributed as much, if not more, to any 'success' that the BEF enjoyed. From my reading of the Spring 1918 campaigns, this seems also to have been true when the formal command and control structure collapsed under the impact of Bruchmuller.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

It sounds as though this chap leans heavily to the school of thought held by Prof Tim Travers, especially in his book 'The Killing ground' where inter realations and politics comes heavily amongst the higher command. I happen to think that there is a middle ground where this did play some part but perhaps not so much as is implied by Travers.

That said I have read a document at the Pro and IWM from records and papers of General Snow where he says that much was done wrong in the retreat of 1914 and alot was due to bad training and lack of realistic training. I have also read in relation to Snow that pre war he was one of the few inovative officers who tried differenet things in training like a retreat scenario which was against policy of the current CIGS (Douglas I think) He also used cammoufladge for Artillery and other things. (this is from sections of Brian Bonds book 'Victorian Army and the staff college 1854-1914')

I would be interested to know of any refernces this book has to the conduct of Snow and 4th Division and also as regards the competance of Forestier-Walker BGGS II Corps. Also what are the main sources of reference he uses?

Regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

Snow gets limited mention. Sir James Edmonds was his chief staff officer in August 1914 and described the new staff officers as 'either incompetent or uninterested in staff duties'. Apart from this, there are only brief glimpses of 4th Division's activities.

Re Forestier-Walker, there is mention of his having to travel 30 miles to Le Cateau to receive the rather vague orders from GHQ on 24 August to retreat, the delay in returning to II Corps and then the difficulties in contacting all units. He went in person to Haig to repeat Smith-Dorrien's request for troops to close the gap between 3 and 5 Divisions. Haig wrote that he was 'unimpressed' with II Corp's staff.

The next mention in connection to Forestier-Walker was in October 1914. He supported Lord Loch's claim to Smith-Dorrien that 5th Division was spent and that 3rd Division was little better off. Gardner believes that this compelled Smith-Dorrien to tell French what was happening.

Traver's book is listed in the extensive references. There are 9 pages in the bibliography, including diaries and papers from several collections, along with 40 other first hand accounts and reports. Gardner appears to have been developing this theme over some time.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

Thanks for the reply, it sounds like a good book, though I have had someone tell me they thought it so bad they gave it to someone else to read, as it was so badly researched!!!

On occasions I hear Travers refered to in references like "and even Tim Travers is hard to argue with on this matter" he would probably take this as a compliment as it gets people asking questions about the topic, which i think is all too important.

It is so easy to settle into ones chair and not question if the springs are solid but just assume they are.

It sounds like a book I shall have to read at some point though price may mean a library loan etc. thanks fro bring the info my way.

regards

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the reply, it sounds like a good book, though I have had someone tell me they thought it so bad they gave it to someone else to read, as it was so badly researched!!!

Arm

Gardner has gone to a lot of trouble to track down personal diaries and the like. So it is not 'badly researched' in that sense.

From the PRO, he has referenced: CAB 45/129 (correspondence about the retreat from Mons, including Snow's account), CAB 45/140 (Bulfin's diary), CABs 45/141, 182, 183 (comments on the Official History), CAB 45/206 (Smith-Dorrien's diary), PRO 30/57/52 (Kitchener papers), WO 33/713 (War Office - GHQ Telegraphic correspondence), WO 79/62 (Smith-Dorrien/Murray postwar correspondence regarding August 1914, WO 95 (GHQ, Corps, Divisional and Brigade war diaries), and WO 256 (Haig, typescript diary).

From the Imperial War Museum: Brereton papers, Craig-Brown papers, Edwards papers, John French papers and diaries, Habgood diaries, Keary papers, Lord Loch papers, Ivor Maxse papers, miscellaneous files 154/2388 and 43, Mowbray papers, Archibald Murray papers, Price-Davies papers, Smith-Dorrien papers, Tower papers, and Henry Wilson papers and diaries.

From Liddle Hart Centre: Allenby papers, Beddington papers, Charteris papers, Clive papers, de Lisle papers, James Edmonds papers, Liddell Hart papers, Maurice papers, Montgomery-Massingberd papers, and Spears papers.

From Liddle Collection: Acland papers, Alexander papers, Jeune papers, and transcripts of interviews with Marshall-Cornwall and Floyer-Acland.

From Churchill College: Rawlinson papers.

From British Library: Hunter-Weston papers, Shaw-Sparrow papers, and Oriental and India Office Collection L/MIL/5/825

From Intelligence Corps Museum: Walter Kirke papers

From National Army Museum: Rawlinson papers

From National Library of Scotland: Haig's manuscript diary

As you can see, Gardner has gone to some effort to get at primary sources relating to the main protagonists (not including the other accounts and memoirs that I won't list). Certainly, I cannot comment on the validity of Gardner's selection of material therein. Undoubtedly, he will have preferentially selected that which best supports his case, what author doesn't. I can only judge from a reasonable understanding of the events of the time, which had always left me with some questions (having not read the Traver's book that you mentioned).

For anyone who loves Haig or feels starry-eyed about the performance of the BEF, then this will be a disturbing book. Personally, I found it so interesting that I could not put it down. I think there are holes in the work and assumptions that 'feel' less credible. But it is a book that should be read by anyone with a strong interest in this era.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

Thanks for the vast and comprehensive list of sources used by Gardner, I think what was implied to me about the book was not the use of sources but more the conclusions made from the eveidence was not well thought out. Mind you have to realise that this was someone who was pro the opposite assumption.

Travers book plays heavily on the inter rivalry of the Generals and asks some big questions that need further investigation on my part, but I do feel he goes alittle far in some respects. That is the image i was left with is a bunch of men all jockying for dominance regardless of those below and around them. Whilst I am willing to admit that this was to some extent true I can not yet or may never bring myself to believe that this was fully the case.

I am intersted in what you say regards Edmonds about the knew staff as they included Montgomery who would become CIGS one day though not before 4th Armies COS on the Somme. Also Burnett-Hitchcock (later LT-Gen)and then a lowly Captain Elles who exchanged horses for a metal box and Milne who would be CIGS for two terms, via Salonika.

It has surprised me that Edmonds memoirs have never been written up in full as he seems to have much to say on all areas.

thanks again,

Arm.

[Robert Dunlop]

Arm

Gardner's book would be difficult for someone who favours the opposite assumption. However, he does not portray 'a bunch of men all jockeying for dominance'. The analysis of the key players is much more multi-dimensional than that. This is all set in context by the title: 'Trial by fire'. None of the BEF commanders or senior staff officers had any experience of war on the scale heralded by August 1914. Their reactions depended on their personalities, as you would expect, and on how they believed or wanted themselves to be perceived, particularly if things did not go as expected. These reactions could, and did, get in the way of the performance of the BEF.

It would be interesting to speculate what might have happened if Falkenhyn has not taken his foot off the pedal on the Western Front in 1915. By focusing on the Eastern Front, he gave the BEF High Command time to ease into a more effective functional unit.

Robert

[andigger]

I wanted to bring this thread back up to see what others have to say. Its been some time, but I am trying to catch up on reading about the early stages of the war. Andy