Foch as supreme commander.

[Justin Moretti]

I would have thought: "Because he will not lose his nerve in the darkest hour."

I've always thought this most curious. The British had always seemed to suffer due to the French being the dominant partner (Haig's offensives being modified by the need to support the French at Verdun, after the Nivelle failure, etc). What would Haig have had to gain from having yet another French general over him, as well as one fighting alongside him and technically the "dominant" part of the relationship? Or did he choose Foch as the French general whose ideas most fitted his own at this stage of the game, and who could be most relied upon to keep Petain from doing something silly under pressure?

Quite a few authors have commented upon Haig's reputation as a 'fearsome climber,' intimating that he desired supreme command as an end in itself, not thinking about whether he was competent to hold it. One can understand on a realistic basis that he couldn't hope to be Generalissimo himself: the French probably would not have stood for it. I hear nothing from the Anti-Haig brigade (and in fact I'd like to) to indicate that he desired the top job. If he got it, however, someone would have had to replace him as CinC BEF. I don't see that there was anyone among the British who would realistically have been more likely to get it.

I have certainly heard a rumour that Monash was considered as CinC BEF in the grimmest part of the Ludendorff offensive. As proud as this makes me (being an Aussie), I don't think it would have been a good idea. All agree that Monash was one of the better generals of the First World War, but I'm not sure he could have gone successfully from being a General in charge of a corps to the full command of the British and Empire armies. Sure, that's what happened to Haig, but the British forces in the field were nowhere near as numerous when he replaced French, and he would have had time to be acclimatised to the growth of the forces under his command. Next best would probably be someone like Plumer, who had the confidence of at least his own Army group.

Smith-Dorrien will always remain (for me) one of the great maybes.

[armourersergeant]

I think that Haig was aware that any combined commander had to be French much the same way that Eisenehower was in WW2, the dominent army had to command. Haig was a climber and a political though many say he hated politicians, he probably did but he knew how to be political and used it when he needed to. He was if nothing else committed to winning the war and I beleive not an idiot, he would have realised the serious of the situation and acted in the best interests of the army and the cause and of course himself. A combined command was the way foward and he knew he would not get the job!

I do not beleive that Monash was a serious contender for CIC and also have some doubts as to his effectivness at top level. Plummer also causes me some concern as to SD I beleive he was a good oppotunity that went missing , but then he was never really tested on the offensive only on the defensive and as such he just may have been saved from the test that many failed.

Still in my book I would have liked to have seen Smith-Dorrien and Robertson as well as Macdonagh and Maurice used far more than they were in theatre of operations. I am convinced that Haig let French manouver SD home so as to clear the path for himself and Robertson was a rising influence and though again not tested in battle I do beleive that had he remained in France he would have come to prominence. Going home as CIGS got him out the way.

I do not beleive that one single man makes the difference. it is a combination of commander and CoS etc. Plummer was certainly bettered when he had a knew MGGS (Harington?) assinged to him. A good general is in some respects only as good as the staff he has. In 1913/14 General Snow of 4th Division had a good reputation and was a foward thinker on tactical doctrine. His reputation has suffered in regards to WW1 but he was one of the few in 1914 to practice against CIGS wishes a retreat and other inovitive things like cammoufladge. I wonder if this was his planning or his GSO1 Edmonds work? Or as Snow himself said he was the 'ginger to Edmonds brains'

regards

Arm.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I agree with most of Arm's first paragraph. Also was there any serious likelihood of Haig being recalled in the period shortly after the Michael offensive? Is it possible that Haig was pragmatic both professionally and personally in offering to be a junior partner under Foch - professionally the alternative was very probably to lose the war but also if DH knew his own position was in danger from the British government, to what extent would that have driven Haig to believe he could safeguard his own position as British C-in-C under Foch?

[PhilB]

I`ve often read that the British Army at the outbreak of WW1 was officered by "Third class degree men", mainly from Oxford. And the higher ranks seem to have been selected from the best connected of those. This at a time when it was difficult not to get a third - known as a gentleman`s degree. I now find (in Gary Sheffield`s book) that Haig didn`t leave Oxford with any degree at all, allegedly due to illness. Did any of the generals show evidence of being intellectually gifted? If I had to be spirited back into the PBI of WW1 I think I`d want Monash up there. Phil B

[andigger]

I can only add very little to this discussion, but I thought Foch getting selected over Haig had a lot to do with the animosity between Lloyd George and Haig as military skill.

Also to share a 'fact' I came across while reading The Defeat of Imperial Germany, and in response to ARM's quote "I think that Haig was aware that any combined commander had to be French much the same way that Eisenehower was in WW2, the dominent army had to command." The numbers of arriving US troops in the summer of 1918 would have made Pershing the commander of the dominant army, but certainly would not have been considered a Supreme Commander candidate had the war continued. Andy

[AndyHollinger]

I don't think Pershing was ever a contender ... remember the US troops were green and unproven ... plus the US was an Associated Power, not an ally

[Desmond7]

I honestly don't think Haig had any choice to make. It was Foch or disaster. Haig did the right thing for eventual allied victory. It cannot have been easy for him but he did not shirk the task.

[andigger]

Andy - I don't think Pershing was an option either. I was just drawing a link between Justin's statement and the size of the AEF by late summer 1918. Andy