The Pity of War

[DirtyDick]

I've just read Niall Ferguson's book of this title.

In essence, he argues, the Great War - as we know it- was entirely avoidable and was the biggest folly of the Twentieth Century for which we (the British) have the lion's share of responsibility, since we did not use our world power and influence to good effect in order to limit the damage caused by a future European war.

Rather than entering into a solid, binding military alliance to deter aggression - or rather than seeking better relations or an alliance with our then 'natural' ally of Germany, sections of the turn-of-the-century British Government sought to come to an understanding with our two principle competitors - France and Russia - in order to maintain the status quo. Once war looked inevitable, however, the divisions within the Govt. and wider society prevented the formalisation of a deterrent military alliance with France and Russia (both still very unpopular in GB); thus giving us the - at least moral - commitments of an alliance with none of the benefits, i.e. deterrence to prevent such an escalation of tensions.

The economic power and military potential of the Brit. Empire added to Fr. & Ru. , coupled with the inability to counter defensive weapons such as machine guns , ensured that once involved, a bloody, long drawn-out conflict was the inevitable result. Had Britain remained free from a vague commitment to France in the face of a German invasion; had she not sent troops to France but relied solely on the RN; or had she explicitly declared in June-July '14 that she would stand by France, then the subsequent fighting would either have been a replay of the Franco-Prussian War - since the French were engaged in the futile Plan XVII rather than adopting a near-impregnable defensive strategy - or a diplomatic climb-down from the brink of war following the Sarajevo assassinations as Germany reigned in her A-H ally.

Also has some good - if highly debatable - chapters on the fighting and reasons for its continuance despite the mass slaughter; and a counter-factual analysis of the establishment of a European 'Customs Union' by a victorious Germany.

What a lot of words!

[paul guthrie]

he makes interesting point that currency markets bet against Germany winning throughout the war. Very interesting book, have waded through it twice.

[Guest Pete Wood]

Some of the statistics are mind-boggling.

[Paul Hodges]

Absolutely agree that it is a fascinating, well-written and researched book.

However, on the main points summarised by Dick above, and despite the causes of the war being one of my many areas of low expertise, I never feel that Ferguson proves that:

a ) taking such actions would have kept Britain out of the war / contained the war

and b ) this would have been a 'good thing' for Britain and her Empire anyway

What do other people think?

By the way, although I greatly enjoy 'what if' / counter-factual history (of which Ferguson is one of the best proponents), I have to say I more or less wholly agreed with Tristam Hunt's criticism of it in the Guardian a few days ago, which is here. Probably could do with a whole new thread to discuss that one...

[DirtyDick]

I quite agree, racing teapots. My background is social rather than economic history; and although Ferguson's points are often new and interesting as historical evidence, for money makes the world go around, after all, it reminds me why I never took economics!

[DirtyDick]

There have been many criticisms of Ferguson's standpoint - and not just from other academics promoting their own points of view.That's a particular trouble with writing any alternative/counterfactual scenarios.

Also, as Paul states, I feel that a number of Ferguson's assertions regarding the pre-war world remain neatly unchallenged. I feel that Ferguson discounts the perceived threat posed to GB by Wilhemite Germany and its uncertain, capricious ambition, arguably making it prove attractive for Britain and France to reach an understanding to end the threat of war between themselves over peripheral issues - such as colonial demarcation and national honour - when faced with a strong neighbour who possessed the means - actual in the case of France and the potential in the case of Britain - to threaten their respective nation states' existence.

[DirtyDick]

Taking Paul Hodges's excellent idea, I'll post a counterfactual/alternative WW1 based topic board in the chit-chat column. What about: 'WW1...What if?'

How's about that then, guys and gals!

Richard

[AndyHollinger]

There's a word for "Counterfactual" history ... it's called fiction!

I find that these things are interesting to discuss and often, if one can keep it all in good fun, produce a great dialogue ... however, it involves massive subjective reasoning gaps ... and, of course, it, being ALL opinion, has a higher flame content than "merely" discussing history.

Example:

What's this percieved threat of Germany???? Somehow building a Navy dedicated to fighting in the North Sea doesn't take much perception to determine its target!

[DirtyDick]

Andy

Absolutely, one must bear in mind that no matter the concept of Free Will of individual statesmen or others in positions of authority, there are always imperatives and countless inponderables concerning their life experiences.

Additionally, I recognise your concerns regarding counterfactual history; I, too, share many of them: have you seen those web essays predicting alternative scenarios that - just - seem plausible, when little green men from Mars (perhaps also little green women from Venus?) turn up! However, free will and making a distinct decision does impact on the future turn of events, and when built on sound historical foundations (no aliens - well, perhaps Dr Who pays a visit!) it can be an interesting intellectual excercise. Obviously it has not happened in reality, and so future events - especially when predicted far into the future - can verge on pure fiction, as you rightly point out.

You raise an interesting point. With regard to my statement concerning the fact that Germany was in fact more a perceived threat than an actual threat in the eyes of successive British governments. Firstly, British defence was dominated by the Navy and public opinion would rapidly turn against a government that allowed the Royal Navy's supremacy to lag behind the next two - and then three - most powerful maritime nations; Britain also had a well-established shipbuilding industry that could sustain a long-term programme of naval expansion. By 1914 the number of British battleships in home waters had a clear edge over the Germans, and vessels then in the building yards would give them an even greater advantage as the war dragged on.

Germany, by contrast, had an inefficient method of taxation that did not make the most of its increasingly powerful economy; and could not afford to even come close to funding a navy - at least in terms of battleships, since politicians and admirals were preoccupied with such vessels, but if they had the foresight built more U-boats for use as commerce raiders... - that could challenge the Royal Navy's Home Fleet except in extremely favourable circumstances: vide the Germans' hopes that the Grand Fleet would be dispersed in penny packets on the East Coast after its lightening raids on seaside towns.

However, since the British viewed any foreign naval expansion as a threat - if only in the case of 'Continental Alliance' of Fr, Ger, and Russia (the latter pre-1905 war with Japan) - with almost paranoid zeal, Germany's ultimately flawed naval battleship programme coupled with Wilhelm's inconsistency, and not forgetting the future perils presented to Britain's ostensible mastery of the seas if a victorious Germany then chose to create a vast navy.

Yes, given the world situation in 1914, I believe that Britain could do no other than to side with France and Russia, whatever their misgivings, for the indeterminate threat posed to the security of British interests by a victorious Germany would be too much of a gamble.

Cheers

Richard

[DirtyDick]

Just a few other points to mention:

1) Germany was in an invidious position if she seriously reckoned to challenge the RN, even though their was more of a level playing field with regard to capital ship numbers following the introduction of the dreadnought class. She simply could not afford to follow such a policy for the reasons outlined above, as well as maintaining a credible Army strength against the growing Russian military and the perennial threat of a two-front war. It was perhaps, aside from the oft-talked of desire to impress the British with their naval strength to lead to either an understanding/alliance with Germany, or to provide a sufficient deterrent to the then non-aligned British to remain neutral in any future Franco-German conflict (especially if Belgian neutrality was to be ignored a la Schlieffen Plan).

2) The British with worldwide naval commitments, would be most annoyed at having to place more battleships in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean (against France and policing the Bosphorus) and across the globe. Although defence expenditure was, by today's standards, very low (c.3-3.5% GDP), this was in the days of limited government and relatively low personal taxation. This, arguably, had more to do with the perceived menace of a larger German Navy

than its actual war-fighting abilities (which man-for-man and ship-for-ship were most impressive).

Equally significant, the United States Navy became the second largest in 1908, following the belated recognition that the US needed to protect its shores and influence in the Americas and the Pacific. This would have had the effect of making the British spend more on its Navy in any event if it were to maintain its lead as a precautionary measure, even if the British withdrew what capital ships patrolled the American seaboard in order to reduce chances of conflict. Although greater distances are involved and thus the dangers were more remote, Anglo-Amercan tensions never reached such heights in the early years of the 20th C. purely for reasons of US naval expansion and its possible threat to the British Empire.

Richard

[Guest woodyudet]

The Pity of War isn't a counter-factual book!

it provides a useful economic view of WW1 [the amount spent to kill each soldier is particularly interesting]. Its a fascinating insight into some of the areas of WW1 that are often neglected in either 'military' or 'social' histories.

History books often tell you more about their authors than the history; Ferguson is definitely an 'atlantacist' rather than a 'pro-european'. From an historiographical perspective, it is interesting to contrast books written after 1989 with those written during the cold war [e.g. AJP Taylor and Keegan] or the inter-war period. This doesn't detract from the core research which is perhaps the most interesting part of the book.

[DirtyDick]

Never said it was; the book only made reference to alternative routes/events that Fergusson deemed viable at the time, and as usual the thread drifted from that to a discussion of the counterfactual, which may be why you gained that impression.

As for Fergusson being an Atlanticist, he is a raver, as most evident in his recent work regarding the American Empire (which he believes will fail in the coming decades due to a costly aged population and a lethargic, capricious and obese working age population). I become an Atlanticist on occasion when seeing the inner workings of the EU administration (single issues, pigs and troughs and gravy train come to mind), although not anti-EU by nature.

I wonder whether his praise for the USA means that his work will ever be shown in France...

Richard

[Clive Maier]

Is the research that good? For myself I don't know but it is a criticism made of Niall Ferguson that he seems to have given up archival research, and that The Pity of War was written entirely from secondary sources.

There is a very interesting article on Ferguson in Washington Monthly.

[DirtyDick]

It's interesting, in that as woodyudet says there are some interesting economic tales being told; however, some of his non-economic (perhaps also economic, but I do not know enough about the intricacies of the World monetary markets of a century ago) conclusions are debatable and require further qualification, which is sadly lacking.

Quite an intense read - unless you dig economics - at times, but on the whole he comes up with some nice ideas. As to his current research techniques, I couldn't say, but if true he wouldn't be the first t.v. historian to stop going to the bare bones and become reliant on previous research or secondary sources in order to script a programme or meet a commercial publisher's deadline.

Richard

[Guest woodyudet]

I wouldn't say that Ferguson is a 'TV Historian'. He was lecturing at Cambridge prior to being on TV. He is still in academia.

If he plagiarised secondary sources, it be interesting to find out who from! I've never come across such a detailed economic view of the war [apart from marxist nonsense - WW1 an agrarian interpretation, Lenin etc etc].

A lot of the economic data would be in the public domain - market data, currency fluctuations, govt expenditure etc - its having the understanding to piece it together which is key. Unfortunately most WW1 histories seem to pay little attention to the economic side which is utterly crazy.

You wouldn't want to interpret the colonial wars of the 18th Century without placing economics at the centre of any investigation, and i can't see why WW1 should be any different. Poetry has a lot to answer for ...

[Clive Maier]

Nobody mentioned plagiarism.

The charge is that he added nothing new from primary sources but relied entirely on matter already known from secondary sources. Presumably those sources are recorded in notes and a bibliography. Ferguson of course placed his own interpretation on that known matter, and that is an entirely proper thing for him to do. Ferguson himself is reported to have said that he wants to get back to archival research.

[ianw]

I have to say that I found "The Pity of War" fascinating. As has been said the economic history of the Great war is much ignored and sheds new light on many areas. Almost by definition the writing of economic history at such a distance in time will include a lot of dusting off and interpretation of past statistics.