EEF - Places

[ddycher]

All

Can anyone recommend a good references for what was actually at the Citadel in Cairo. Am looking at late 1915 / early 1916.

Regards

Dave

[rmcguirk]

Dave,

I can’t help you much with the references, but I know the Citadel was used then as a military prison, especially for Turks captured during their attack on the Suez Canal in February 1915. Also, Jafar al-Askari, the Ottoman commander of the Sanusi army (though he was an Arab from Mesopotamia) was sent to the Citadel – escaped – was recaptured – before he switched sides. The reference for Jafar I do have: A Soldier’s Story: The Memoirs of Jafar Pasha al-Askari.

I hope this helps.

Regards,

Russell

[ddycher]

Thanks Russell.

Am trying to get a clearer picture of events in Egypt, especially Cairo, during the Senussi uprising - every little helps put a better picture together. I understand the Egyptian Army Ordnance depot was also there (amongst alot of others) and that they played a big part in the re-arming of the Dardanelles army as it landed- lots more reading to do.

Regards

Dave..

[rmcguirk]

Dave,

Regarding what’s going on in Egypt during the campaign to push the Sanusi back into Libya, I’ve done some work on this – The Sanusi’s Little War (2007) – but, while it deals in some detail with Gen. Maxwell’s management of the campaign and with the workings of British Intelligence regarding the Sanusi before and after the invasion, it’s a bit broad stroke concerning that part of the British Army that was not directly involved in the campaign. It might be of interest to you, I don’t know...

I noticed your query a few weeks ago concerning Archibald Murray and Henry Horne. Did you know that Murray and his people – and in particular his CGS Lynden-Bell – had a very difficult relationship with Maxwell? In fact, L-B is positively scathing about Maxwell, Kitchener, the Intelligence Office in Cairo – about everything and everyone connected with the British Army Arabists and the ancien régime. I find Maxwell rather likeable. He made some bad mistakes, but at least he knew and loved Egypt and had a good rapport with its people, including the Turkish Egyptians, whom he managed very well even after the war started. When Maxwell left in March 1916 he simply couldn’t understand the vehemence of the feeling against him among the new lot that had arrived from Gallipoli.

Regards,

Russell

[ddycher]

Russell

Have been trying to patch together the activities around the western oases and particularly that of Southern Force. Interesting reading as most of the units came from the Dardanelles Army or recent arrivals from the UK rather than Maxwells established units. Only recently came across "The Sanusi’s Little War" and have ordered a copy out of the UK which has yet to arrive but I am looking forward to reading it.

As for Maxwell himself I am with you - I find him rather a enjoyable study. Tends to be two schools I find, those who had served with / for him for some time who tended to rate him highly and the new breed from Gallipoli who tended to denigrate him. Lynden-Bell I struggle more to be sympathetic with. Whilst not normally being a T.E. Lawrence fan his views on Murray and Lynden-Bell do tend to strike a chord with me. As you say Maxwell was alot more in tune with the people than Murray would ever be. I am trying to understand better the relationship between the two camps before the departure of Maxwell for England

With respect to Horne and Maxwell I found it interesting that these two were more in synch that what Murray and Horne would be subsequently. From everything I have read Horne could not get away fast enough.

Regards

Dave

[aconnolly]

Dave,

Regarding what’s going on in Egypt during the campaign to push the Sanusi back into Libya, I’ve done some work on this – The Sanusi’s Little War (2007) ......

Regards,

Russell

...Some work on this!

Too modest Russell - you wrote it!

Andrew

[rmcguirk]

Andrew, Dave, all...

Thanks, Andrew. You’re right – it was more than “some work”. More like I was totally obsessed by the subject for several years...

Like Dave, I’ve recently been focusing on the W Desert oases, but, specifically, trying to piece together the story of the origins and the patrol/exploration work of the Light Car Patrols. This project is a spin-off from the Sanusi book, and I’ll try to publish it as an article.

Regards,

Russell

[michaeldr]

This photograph is 'Cairo showing Citadel Hill'

However it is not of Great War vintage, but rather it is from 1936

Notwithstanding that caveat, it may still be of interest

It is from the Matson Collection at the Library of Congress, USA

Regarding Maxwell and Gallipoli; When Maxwell left in March 1916 he simply couldn’t understand the vehemence of the feeling against him among the new lot that had arrived from Gallipoli.

Maxwell worried incessantly that the campaign on Gallipoli was using resources which he thought should have been devoted to Egypt.

Kitchener's cable tried to reassure him

"Egypt is, perhaps, more than anywhere else concerned in the success of operations at the Dardanelles, and I feel sure that I can rely on you to give all possible assistance in the event of more troops being required, even if it should involve risk in Egypt."

But, "Maxwell was at the end of his tether as regards the constant drain on his resources posed by the Dardanelles force. He had already refused to send any more officers to Cox's Indian Brigade at the expense of his own Indian brigades, instead calling for Cox's force to be returned to Egypt. Now he told Kitchener that the Senussi, a Western Desert tribe, had been called to revolt by Islamic leaders and he couldn't release another man from his garrison. Hamilton would later pour scorn on the idea that this insignificant foe could apparently threaten the fabric of the British Empire whenever Egypt was asked to reinforce the MEF." (from John Lee's biography of Hamilton)

Perhaps the ex-MEF felt that they had not had the support from Maxwell which they should have had

Although it came to light much later, another interesting illustration of the relationship between Maxwell and the MEF is the curious case of the missing cable. It was from Kitchener, addressed to Maxwell, but with the request that he forward a copy to Hamilton; it never reached Sir Ian.

Again from Lee's book

"6th April

You should supply any troops in Egypt that can be spared, or even selected officers or men, that Sir Ian Hamilton may want for Gallipoli. You know that Peyton's Mounted Division is leaving for Egypt. This telegram should be communicated by you to Sir Ian Hamilton."

Hamilton knew nothing of this telegram until the 1920s! If he had known of it at the time of the landings then … … … … ? Who knows?

regards

Michael

[rmcguirk]

Dear Michael,

You raise some interesting points, but it was too easy for Hamilton and historian John Lee to dismiss the dangers to Egypt in 1915. The Germans and the Turks were trying to coordinate various elements of a plan that was aimed at getting at the British in Egypt. The following quote from “The Sanusi’s Little War” describes that plan.

Oppenheim’s memorandum on the fostering of Islamic revolution in the East was submitted to the German Foreign Office in October 1914. Largely concerned with Egypt, the document took as its premise that “all Egypt is anti-English” and that German diplomacy had “successfully united Enver Pasha, the Khedive, and the Egyptian nationalists”; and that with these three elements working together there was a realistic possibility that the British in Egypt could be defeated.

Briefly, the scenario he sketched for military action and revolution was as follows. The VIII Corps of the Turkish 4th Army (20,000 men), supported by countless irregulars from “Syria, the Hijaz, Central Arabia and Mesopotamia, as well as the Kurds”, should begin to cross Sinai in mid-November, led by the Khedive and a senior Turkish general. British warships in the Suez Canal were to be mined. When the Turks reached the Canal, Holy War would erupt in the Nile Valley. The people of Egypt would storm British arsenals and seize the weapons; British non-combatants would flee the country; and their soldiers would be massacred. In the Sudan, the British would “suffer the fate of Gordon Pasha”.

An important role in this macabre drama would be played by the Sanusi.

[Although] the Sanusi are only sparsely represented in Egypt ... in the oases and desert region of eastern Libya they constitute a most powerful presence and have at their disposal countless armed Bedouin ... from whom an invasion across the Western Frontier must, to the English, be a cause for great concern ... and Enver Pasha has already told the Grand Sanusi to prepare for war against England.

[end quote]

Maxwell had a friend in the Egyptian royal family named Prince Aziz, who was a general in the Turkish Army. When the Turks entered the war, Prince Aziz gave his word that he’d stay out of it, and was allowed to leave for Italy. When he came to say good-bye to Maxwell, he cheerily told him that this was what the Germans and Turks were planning: Turkish Army invades from the east – Sanusi invades from the west – Egyptians rise up in the Delta and Nile Valley.

It would be correct to say that by the start of the Gallipoli campaign Maxwell knew that the enemy would fail to coordinate the 3 elements of their plan, but the dangers to Egypt were still real after the Turkish attack on the Canal failed in February.

The majority of Egyptians were pro-Turk. When Italy invaded Libya in 1911, Egyptian support for the Turks was massive. Although Kitchener tried to close the western border, he failed. Weapons, Turkish soldiers, German soldiers – even a British volunteer! – easily got across the border. Indeed, they were often escorted across by Egyptian coastguards. And Egypt was still pro-Turk in 1915. An Egyptian uprising had always been considered a possibility going back to the start of the Occupation (1882).

As for the Sanusi, consider the following.

1. The Turks attack the Canal in February; it fails. The Sanusi is on the western border, but at this point he has good relations with the British. He’s not just pretending to be friendly: he argues with, and then arrests, the agent who’s been sent to get him to attack Egypt. (This is Suleiman al-Baruni, who was sent by Enver, who was coordinating with the Germans.)

2. In March/April the Allies attack Gallipoli, threatening Constantinople, the seat of the Caliphate. The Sanusi finally agrees to take gold, weapons and military advisers from the Turks. But he’s still not agreeing to attack Egypt.

3. In May Sanusi’s bitter enemy Italy joins the Allies, bringing further chill to the Sanusi’s relations with Britain. The Allies are now definitely looking weak from his point of view: they are in serious trouble in Gallipoli, just as they are in France.

4. For the rest of the year weapons and soldiers are smuggled into eastern Libya through the allied blockade. But the Sanusi is still sitting on the fence.

What is Maxwell supposed to do? British Intelligence in Egypt consider another Turkish attack from the east a possibility; Gallipoli is a lost cause; and the threat on the Western Frontier is now real. But Maxwell and Kitchener, afraid of pushing the Sanusi off the fence, judge that they should not yet send troops to the Western Frontier – and this is where they fail.

In fact, the Sanusi never did decide to invade. By October/November he lost control of his soldiers, who were by then sniping down on Sollum (the Egyptian border town). The British and the Egyptians pulled out of Sollum and Sidi Barani. The whole Sanusi army just marched in – and only at this point does their leader think that it’s a good idea.

Fast forward to the first battle with the Turco-Sanusi army 11+ 13 December 1915 (Wadi Senab). The British column is caught by surprise, and only narrowly misses getting wiped out. Only on Christmas Day do the British make a good showing against the Sanusi, and by then the Gallipoli Campaign is virtually over.

I conclude from all this that Maxwell really was stretched to the limit – as it was, he fought the Sanusi largely with Territorials; that British Intelligence over-estimated the threat of a second Turkish attack on the Canal, which led to a miscalculation of what to do on the west; and that Maxwell should indeed have sent troops to Sollum in the summer/early autumn of 1915, which doubtless would have prevented the Sanusi invasion. As for the threat of an uprising in Egypt – was it real? Who knows? Perhaps the Germans were right that it was only likely to happen if Egypt were attacked on both sides simultaneously.

Regards,

Russell

[michaeldr]

Russel,

Many thanks for that detailed reply

In my previous post I was trying to explain how the situation came about which you mentioned ie; When Maxwell left in March 1916 he simply couldn’t understand the vehemence of the feeling against him among the new lot that had arrived from Gallipoli.

Everyone sees things from things their own angle and no doubt after the hardships of the campaign some directly involved there may have thought that Maxwell could have done more to help

On the whole I think that Maxwell has had a fair crack of the whip from the Gallipoli historians.

John Lee was very fair in his biography of Hamilton, even acknowledging the possibility that the infamous telegram may have been accidentally mislaid. Whatever the truth though, to my mind it still casts a shadow

A further example (of the fairness) is Col Michael Hickey in his 'Gallipoli 1915' He refers to Maxwell growing 'daily more confused by the telegrams streaming from the War Office' being told one thing one day and another the next. Finally, "Maxwell, exasperated and baffled, signalled back that he was 'considerably in the dark, as I have no knowledge of the deep study which must have been made of the whole question of the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Imperial General Staff and the Navy for many years, the result of which must be in the War Office and resume of which I would much like'." On this point Maxwell was certainly right and the question arises why no one else was looking at this document in more detail

best regards

Michael

[rmcguirk]

Michael,

Thanks for that. I know I didn’t answer all the good points you raised, but my reply re the situation in Egypt got so long I simply stopped.

When I referred to the vehemence of the feeling against Maxwell, I really meant the personal and bitter attacks by generals other than Hamilton, as referred to earlier in these exchanges. Whatever the professional differences between Maxwell and Hamilton I imagine they got along.

There was an amusing incident in late March 1915 when Hamilton first arrived in Egypt to assume command of the MEF, having just witnessed the Navy’s failure to get through the Dardenelles. Reading The Egyptian Gazette one morning, he came upon an article that openly discussed his plans for attacking Gallipoli. He protested to British High Commissioner McMahon only to be told by the latter that he couldn’t be responsible for what the Gazette said – Egypt was neutral and there was no point in picking a quarrel! Hamilton obviously wasn’t happy with this state of affairs, but he wasn’t at all unpleasant. (By the way, in the early ‘70s I worked for The Egyptian Gazette, and there was considerably more censorship in Egypt when I was there!)

You’re absolutely right about the telegrams from the WO to Maxwell changing demands from one day to another. But the telegram that wasn’t forwarded to Hamilton does say that “any troops that can be spared” should be released for Gallipoli, and that message was repeated over and over, so I don’t read anything sinister or underhanded in the one telegram going missing. Kitchener was in a position to demand any troops he wanted for either Gallipoli or the Western Front, but he too worried about the state of Egyptian security.

Regards,

Russell

[kevan darby]

post card showing entrance to the citadel

[michaeldr]

When I referred to the vehemence of the feeling against Maxwell, I really meant the personal and bitter attacks by generals other than Hamilton, as referred to earlier in these exchanges.

Russel,

There is an interesting anecdote told by Compton Mackenzie in his Gallipoli Memories, where he is dining in the mess at GHQ MEF and he over hears two senior officers discussing the recent award of a very good gong to a fellow general. The pettiness of one of the remarks was a great relief to Mackenzie, who from then on understood that he was dealing here with ordinary mortals, none too different from actors gossiping behind the stage.

regards

Michael

[ddycher]

Kevin

Late getting back to this one but thanks for the postcard.

Regards

Dave