Attack on Khuweilfe, Sheria Position

[PhilB]

The 1/6 & 1/7 RWF attacked side by side in this action. In "Hell in the Holy Land" (D R Woodward, p 120)) the future CO of the 1/6 RWF (Lt Col Evans) is very accusatory of the CO of the 1/7 RWF (Lt Col T H Harker) for bringing artillery fire down upon the 1/6th. The RWF history naturally skates over the incident rather lightly. Can anyone add anything?

[michaeldr]

Phil,

I am not familiar with this story, but this seems to be the incident as given in the OH

"The assembly close up to the positions was an affair of great difficulty. On the right was the 1/Hereford, the right of which was directed on Tell Khuweife; next came the 6/R. Welch fusiliers; then 7/R. Welch Fusiliers; and on the left the 4/R. Sussex. The 5/R. Welch Fusiliers was in reserve. The 3rd Battalion Camel Brigade was to follow the Hereford, take over Tell el Khuweilfe after its capture, and establish itself upon that commanding feature in order to fulfil its role of protecting the right flank.

The darkness in which the action began was followed by a dense mist; units in some cases were scattered in fierce and confusing fighting; and all the reports were written with reference to a faulty map. It is therefore no easy task to reconstruct the events of the early morning. It appears that the 6/R. Welch Fusiliers was a little late in starting and that the Hereford, feeling for touch on its left, swung slightly left-handed. The result was that its right company, closing towards its left, wheeled across the front of Tell Khuweilfe instead of straddling it and was raked with fearful effect by Turkish machine guns atop of it. Except at this point, however, there were few casualties as the infantry moved forward behind an excellent barrage. In the centre the left company of the Hereford and the 6/R. Welch Fusiliers carried their objectives with the bayonet; then pressing forward down the slope beyond, surprised and captured nine field guns with their detachments. But the companies which had made this advance were now far ahead of the troops on either flank, and, suddenly counter-attacked from three directions, were compelled to abandon the guns and withdraw to higher ground. To crown their misfortune they were mistaken in the mist for Turks and fired on by the British artillery, so that they fell back once more, portions of their line in some confusion. The Turks followed up quickly and captured some prisoners at this point before the troops were rallied and had taken up a new line, on which a company of the 5/R. Welch Fusiliers was moved up to support them. On the left the 7/R. Welch Fusiliers and 4/R. Sussex both captured their objectives, Hill 1706 and the spur to the west"

[PhilB]

Thanks, Michael. Evans seems anxious to lay the blame personally on Harker, though it is unclear on what evidence. As Harker continued as CO of the 1/7th, one assumes he was not held responsible by his seniors.

[clive_hughes]

I can't really add a lot to this, but it's worth noting from the 53rd Divisional History (which you appear to cite) that the confusion was blamed on a sudden fog which obscured the battlefield when the units had virtually achieved their objectives at dawn. The 7th's initial advance (supposed to be at 4:20am) was three minutes delayed, which may be what Col. Evans is referring to.

It does clearly state, however, that the 7th RWF mistook some advance troops of the 6th RWF and the Herefordshires for the enemy, they having overrun some Turkish guns, and called down the barrage. The units had to retire under its punishing fire, abandoning the guns. The Brigadier then halted all artillery fire until the mist cleared sufficiently, at 7am. Unfortunately they were then subjected to a series of counter-attacks for the rest of the day.

The first phase of the attack caused "trifling" losses only: by day's end the Brigade had lost 36 officers 584 Other Ranks. One was the 6th RWF's medical officer, Capt. Fox-Russell, who was mortally wounded but received the VC for his heroism.

I didn't really expect much difference between the Regt. history's account and that of the Division, and indeed they are almost carbon copies of each other - but then Maj. C.H.Dudley Ward was also the author of both volumes!

LST_164

[PhilB]

Thanks LST. It seems that Evans was making the assumption that the artillery must have been called in by Harker as he was the only man that could. That seems reasonable?

[michaeldr]

Yes Phil, it does come across that Evans wants to blame Harker, both for the delay at the start and for the friendly-fire incident

You will notice that the statement quoted by Woodward 'a certain amount of mixing of units and general confusion ensued' comes not from Evans but from Dudley-Ward's history of the 53rd Div. While the quotes from Evans which are used mention no extenuating circumstances like the mist, the maps, the open flanks or the counter attacks

If there was bad feeling then it's a good job that when there were amalgamations in the RWF in August 1918

the 1/6th joined, not the 1/7th, but the 1/5th (to form the 5/6th RWF)

It's also interesting that you say that you have this in "Hell in the Holy Land" D R Woodward, p 120. as I now realise that it is exactly the same as his 'Forgotten Soldiers of the First World War' p.156 (even the notations seem to have the same ref numbers)

sorry LST_164; crossed posts

[PhilB]

It may not have helped that Harker was a "blow in" from the KRRC (& not a territorial)!

[clive_hughes]

Just a guess, but perhaps Evans wanted to blame somebody and Harker - whether because of personal friction, or because he was the CO - just embodied his frustration following the incident.

Harker obviously was in command; but could he see the supposed "enemy" and so made a personal executive decision, or was he responding to a message from a subordinate who mistook what was going on? Or was it someone else with authority within the battn command structure who actually rang the alarm bells, so to speak? Probably we'll never know, unless someone from the 7th's letters/diary/memoirs come to light, or the relevant unit war diaries chronicle the matter.

LST_164

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

A more interesting account of this action is shown in the book "A Fighting Colonel of the Camel Corps" by Lt Col De Lancey Forth DSO & bar MC.

He commanded the 3rd Anzac Bn ICC (in reserve of this attack) and followed these British Bn's which got lost during the night advance and wondered off track into the wrong position.

The 3rd Bn ICC followed the right track (they found the British tapes vere off to the left and didn't follow them) and found them selves in front of the Turkish positions in the morning and had a hard two day fight repelling Turkish attacks which almost surounded them.

There is also the advance during the following day of the 2nd LH MGS to help the ICC and British Bns across the open ground and where they where chopped up.

There is a lot in this poorly planned operation. Like the British Bn's said they didn't get lost when they did and tried to cover up there part by claiming sucsess.

S.B

[PhilB]

Does De Lancey Forth lay the blame on Harker?

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

De Lancy-Forth talks about his interview with General Mott 53rd Div (page 111) who states (Gen Mott) its a "Bloody difficult task".

He then attened a conference at Brigadier Vernon 's HQ with the other Bn commanders for the attack, he makes the coment that since the ICC was in suport his views (of De Lancy-Forth ) on the attack were ignorded. He doesn't mention any of these commanders by name only as a group.

De Lancey-Forth was a British officer in the Manchester Regt attach to the ICC and even he was surprised by the other British officers coments in this operation and one gets the view that it was doomed to fail from the start?

What is also interesting ar his inclussion of five hand drawn maps by De Lancy-Forth of his advance and positions during this two day battle. But they don't show the other British Bn's, only there path of advance and there left turn away from the Turkish positions that first night.

S.B

[PhilB]

Thanks, gents. Maybe Grumpy (RWFologist) will know something when he gets back from down under. As Harter is a KRRC man, Grumpy won`t mind spilling any beans!