Dawn vs. afternoon attacks?

[Cynthia]

When I began researching my soldier, Robert Stark, I saw that he was involved in the attack on the Schwaben Redoubt that began at 1:00 PM. At that time I had mainly read about attacks at dawn, so I wondered who gave the order and why.

Last year I was reading "Far from a Donkey" about Ivor Maxse, and came across this quotation:

"Throughout the war, he (Ivor Maxse) persistently stuck to his theory that (afternoons) were a better time to start an attack than dawn starts. He believed that the dawn alternative had two serious disadvantages. First, that the troops reached their objectives a few hours after dawn, and then had to hold on under artillery fire for the remainder of the day, much of it without support. The enemy was given plenty of time to locate the British positions in daylight, and then to plan counter-attacks. His second objection was that the men got no proper sleep or food during the night before the assault, and set off from the start line more or less exhausted from the night march up to it. The consequence was that they were too tired to consolidate properly on their objectives, or to deal with enemy counter-attacks."

I have paraphrased a bit of the above, but my question is: was this idea accepted by Haig and others? It seems most attacks still started at dawn, but I am no expert on this. I would like to have the opinions of the real experts on the Forum! What would you say: dawn attacks or afternoon attacks?

Cynthia

[Paul Reed]

I think both, depending on the circumstances!

1st July would probably have had the same results with a 1pm attack instead of 7.30am; when you look at most fighting on the Somme in 1916 the attacks went in a little before dawn, so that they were screened by darkness - the largest and most successful example of this being 14th July along the Bazentin Ridge.

Commanders have to be flexible; and I think Maxse was too - he was far more like a commander of the Second World War, and many of his ideas reappeared a generation later.

[Alan Lines]

Cynthia

From what I have read the General Staff still preferred to attack in the mornings right through to the end of the War. This doesn't necessarily mean it was the best option because with the odd notable exception like Ivor Maxse the majority of them were in way over their heads.

Personally I think as Paul says it would depend on the circumstances, but there was obviously a case for mixing it up a bit more than they did.

[Guest CJC]

Just to confuse matters attacks also took place at night.

At the Battle of Festubert the attack was started at 2330 on 15th May 1915 by 10,000 men of the 5th, 6th and Garhwal Brigades.

Field Service Regulations state that:

"Success in all night operations depends on a thorough reconnaissance by day and, when possible, by night, on simplicity of plan, security from hostile air observation and attack and on minute preliminary preparations by commanders and staffs concerned."

At Festubert the 6th Brigade reached the German front line trenches without a shot being fired.

The 5th and Garhwal Brigades fared badly. On their sector the Germans were alerted to the attack by rifle and machine gun fire and illuminated no mans land enabling them to bring their srtillery and machine guns to bear.

The fact that 433 guns and howitzers had fired 101,000 shells at them non stop over the previous 48 hours may also have alerted them to an attack.

Chris

[Cynthia]

That is interesting about night attacks, because one of the reasons I had read about the afternoon attack being preferable was that 'virgin' soldiers tended to get lost in the dark! Not sure if there was any evidence to back this up, even though there are certainly cases where battalions did get off course. Surprisingly, the 7th Queens did veer off course, even during the afternoon attack on 28/9. I suppose that with enough shellfire the atmosphere would be thick enough to prevent seeing where you were going even if it was broad daylight, and if it was the first time over the top for most of the boys, that would add to the confusion.

As Paul said, it probably depended highly on the individual situation. I don't recall seeing too many other jumping off times during the afternoon, except for the battle proceeding the Schwaben at Thiepval on 25/9/16. Were there many others? How successful were they overall? The Queens lost 95 dead or missing on that day, but not sure about wounded. Of course, we know the Schwaben still resisted being taken well into October.

Cynthia

[Guest Michael Orr]

The views of Maj Gen Sir Archibald Montgomery, chief of staff of Fourth Army in the Hundred Days are of interest. In his book "The Story of the Fourth Army", vol 1 page 268, he says:

"The most effective hour at which to attack was also the subject of much discussion before and after August 8th. The question of surprise is a most important factor in this problem, and, when the various pros and cons are discussed, it must always be taken into consideration. To carry out a surprise attack in daylight in these days of aeroplanes is almost impossible except in bad weather, and it was found that the choice usually lay between "dawn" and "night" attacks. The advantage of constantly varying the hour of attack is obvious, but it may be found that....other considerations will over-rule the advantage that might be gained by a variation of the hour. It was generally considered that that for large forces night attacks, unless made in bright moonlight, are best avoided altogether, as their disadvantages greatly outweigh their advantages, especially as it was found that tanks in a night attack were of little assistance, even in moonlight. The almost unanimous opinion...was that an hour before sunrise, just as the first streaks of light were showing in the sky, was the best time, and nearly every attack in Fourth Army was made at that time."

He notes that there were several successful moonlight attacks, but they were not so strikingly successful as to change the general opinion that the best time for zero was an hour before dawn. This allowed the infantry to form up on the start line without being observed but within a few moments of the attack starting, they had enough light to see their way & shoot. He also notes the care that was taken to pick the exact zero hour, observing the exact amount of light at different times &c.

No doubt Maxse's ideas were sound in 1916, but the factors were obviously different in 1918, when Maxse was not involved in the offensives as a commander.

Michael Orr

[charlesmessenger]

Yes, command and control was very much more difficult at night. Furthermore, another advantage of a dawn attack was that it gave the maximum amount of daylight in which to exploit success.

Charles M