Pershing & the 100 days.Egoist,Pro or deranged?

[4thGordons]

Agreed, but I think more than just simple pride.

Given the contentious nature of the war prior to the declaration (less so after), outright opposition among various sizable constituencies (and large immigrant populations which would of necessity be involved in the draft - some of whom were at best lukewarm in their attitude towards Britain); an independent force was probably driven by more than just emotion but also the practicalities of mobilizing (politically and organizationally) so diverse a population.

I think it is important to distinguish between the independent organization of the US Forces as the AEF (rather subsumed under one or both of the Allies) and the performance of the AEF forces in battle. They are related but distinct questions in my mind. The independence of the AEF gave them the option of not learning the allies lessons , as it were. An option which it seems to me they too frequently (but by no means always) exercised, making their learning curve steep and painful. The question as to why they chose (or were unable) to learn some of the earlier lessons is intriguing.

I have just finished a block of reading about the formation of the US Air Service (in the context of this same debate) and the thing that struck me there - going through official documents and post war commentaries was how ,in that area (where the US was starting completely from zero), there was really very impressive coordination of training and supply amongst the allies. In this instance the US had no option of course if it wished to develop an air arm at all, but I have been struck by the number and complexity of training arrangements, personnel swaps, equipment transfers etc. Although I had a vague sense of this, reading through the material gave me a strong impression of a real "coalition" or multilateral effort which I at least associated with much more recent times.

Chris

[Pete1052]

The "Big Red One" is the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, not the First Army. The nickname comes from its insignia, a green shield with the red numeral one. Click here for a biographical sketch of Pershing. You have to click on continuation links at the bottom of the page to read the entire story.

[59165]

It wouldn't surprise me if much of the wartime and postwar opinion of British officers commenting upon American operations was influenced by the perception that the Allied cause would have been much better served had amalgamation instead of an independent AEF been put into effect.

I dont get that impression from the very few(1) books I've read,Pete but,it leads me to type the next question.one brought about by thinking of Bill's 1st response.

What is written in Haig's diaries about Pershing or his other commanders?

I know(& GAC told me that his statue paid heavily for this)that Haigs memoirs were quite /very critical of the French.What did he have to say about Black Jack?

Tom?You've read them,aint you?

[Pete1052]

I haven't read Haig's memoirs so I don't know what his opinions were regarding American troops. However, the amalgamation issue has come up previously on this forum, as shown below.

Shipping, or the lack of it, was also given as one of the reasons for the allies' preference that the US not send her troops to Europe as complete divisions, but rather as individual battalions.

[59165]

The "Big Red One" is the 1st U.S. Infantry Division, not the First Army. .

Pete,help me a bit.

It was a boss from the American Battle Monuments Commission who stated that the big red 1 was the 1st Army,Army that Jack took took to France.Easy enough to google but,I hate that.I'll learn from here as Wiki is so lame.

OK.The guy was not at all military,he was not a researcher nor historian either .Thats why I have been a bit critical of him here & on another thread.It's also why I have said that anything I quote from him is not gospel but,do I now need to phone St.Mihiel & say,'Bob,yer talkin Sheeit'?

Dont ever take this as a criticism of the Commision or Americans.I just know that even the French get wee facts like this right.

I was at St.Mihiel on a fact finder.I'm getting more facts from my American mates on here than I have so far gained from the agency I spoke with face to face.

[Pete1052]

After the war American veterans' organizations tended to exaggerate the importance of the St. Mihiel operation. In the overall context of the Great War it wasn't that huge an undertaking, but it was important to Americans because approximately half of it was the first exclusively all-American operation of the war. I believe I read somewhere that the Germans were in the process of withdrawing from the position when we attacked, so our main accomplishment there was to make the Germans pull back a little more quickly than they would have anyway.

[4thGordons]

From Dec 1919 National Geographic - a good compact source for US unit insignia and basic histories:

On St Mihiel: Bullard (in "American Soldiers also Fought") himself wrote:

"St Mihiel was given an importance which posterity will not concede it. Germany had begun to withdraw. She had her weaker divisions, young men and old and Austro-Hungarians. The operation fell short of expectations"

which is perhaps what Pete1052 was recalling.

[59165]

Fits in perfectly with Black Jacks long term plan though?

As to Mihiel,it needs visiting,Pete.Something like 4153 of your troops there from the 1st war plus 284 missing.Not a measly sum to any General.

If that battle was necessary,it was to help bring about an end to the salient but,why do I get the feeling that it wasnt?After Mihiel/at the same time,there was Montsec that Colonel Patton took.It was in direct partnership with the French.Look at the link I posted on the 1st post.

Why a veterans assoc. would over play Mihiel over Montsec,I dont understand(ok,body count).Montsec must have been one of the hardest military strongholds for an untried/new army to take,yet they took it in a massive operation,bigger than Cambrai for tanks & planes(though most tanks were French propelled & none of the planes were American(using Bob again here).

Tired now.Must go do'do's

[4thGordons]

One final book suggestion: THE AMERICAN BATTLEFIELDS AND MONUMENTS COMMISSION " A GUIDE TO THE AMERICAN BATTLEFIELDS IN EUROPE" originally published 1927 but reprinted several times since (details HERE) The book and maps are very good. It is currently available on CD from the US Govt Printing Office direct along with a number of other volumes (inc those quoted from above) - for $32.00 plus P&P. It says not in stock bu I got a copy last week.

[Paul Hederer]

Pete,help me a bit.

It was a boss from the American Battle Monuments Commission who stated that the big red 1 was the 1st Army,Army that Jack took took to France.Easy enough to google but,I hate that.I'll learn from here as Wiki is so lame.

OK.The guy was not at all military,he was not a researcher nor historian either .Thats why I have been a bit critical of him here & on another thread.It's also why I have said that anything I quote from him is not gospel but,do I now need to phone St.Mihiel & say,'Bob,yer talkin Sheeit'?

Dont ever take this as a criticism of the Commision or Americans.I just know that even the French get wee facts like this right.

I was at St.Mihiel on a fact finder.I'm getting more facts from my American mates on here than I have so far gained from the agency I spoke with face to face.

Wow, that is surprising. The fact that the 1st Infantry Division was (and still is) known as the "Big Red One" would fall into the category of common knowledge. There was even a fairly well-known movie of the same name staring Lee Marvin back in the 1980's.

Paul

[River97]

Many of todays US Army Divisions are decendants of those who fought on the Western Front 90 years ago.

Elements of the 1st Infantry Division (Big Red One), 2nd Infantry Division (Indian Head), 3rd Infantry Division (the Marne Division), the 4th Infantry Division (Ivy Division) all took part in battles on the Western Front - they have and still are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another to be included in this is the All American Division - the 82 Division is still around with the added tittle of Airborne.

Cheers Andy

Original Patches if the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Infantry Divisions (Look remarkably the same today)

[Pete1052]

Fighting in and around Montsec is considered to have been part of the overall St. Mihiel operation. When the salient was seized the French and American line ran roughly from Haudiomont in the northwest to the outskirts of Pont-a-Mousson in the southeast; at its conclusion the American part of the line went from St. Benoit to near Pont-a-Mousson. The battle for St. Mihiel lasted for four days and erased a salient the Germans had held for four years. Twenty-six years later Patton was again in the area as commander of the Third Army.

[59165]

Wow, that is surprising. The fact that the 1st Infantry Division was (and still is) known as the "Big Red One" would fall into the category of common knowledge. There was even a fairly well-known movie of the same name staring Lee Marvin back in the 1980's.

Paul

Hiya Paul.

I rushed out to see the film as a kid as it was the 1st film Mark Hamill had starred in since Star Wars(cos I was a huge SW fan)so I kinda knew that the BR1 wasn't the 1st Army but,Bob wouldn't have any of that.

This will be my last post(!) on the man.I visited Mihiel with a head fresh with the limited knowledge gained from the recent TV shows & limited readings of yesteryear so I knew a little bit more than just a passing tourist but,I found that he was very anti Brit in a polite way which offended me.I shall be posting no more of Bobs 'facts' on here.

Pete,

taking Montsec has to be one of the greatest achievements of the 1st world war.I say that from the point of view of a tourist & not a historian of any kind.Newish troops attacking up a steep hill towards fortified positions that had had years to be suitably sighted to obtain maximum defensive ability.

Just looking at the size of the hill made my knees go on strike.

[Pete1052]

Reviewed in Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter '07-'08

The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I. By Mark Ethan Grotelueschen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 388 pages. $75.00.

Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II (LTC, USA Ret.), Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.

One prudent reviewer endorsed this book as “one of the most important works on the AEF, and indeed on the history of the modern US Army, to appear in the last twenty years.” There is considerable truth to that observation as the bulk of recent writings associated with the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I have focused at the personal or tactical level of warfare. While many of these works have been well received and informative, they have offered little beyond reaffirming what was already known. As much as this reviewer despises reviewing doctrine—“that stuff that seeps out under the windows and kills the grass around Bell Hall,” as he was once told at the Command and General Staff College—doctrine does reflect what an organization thinks it ought to be doing. US Army doctrine, insofar as it existed before and during WW I, was incredibly dry and limited, but it did indeed set forth, in approved minimalist style, the basics of the profession. That the profession did not, during this era, concern itself with strategic matters was a “correct” appreciation of the state of civil-military relationships.

Grotelueschen analyzes the state of doctrine at the beginning of the war and the underlying basis for its condition. He then leads the reader through the evolution of doctrine, finally contrasting it with the “ground-truth” of what was actually taking place in four representative divisions. This is, therefore, a doctrine-focused book. If the reader can put that fact aside, the extremely well-written narrative will provide a refreshing view of what is otherwise seen as an exercise in blood-letting.

In evaluating the evolution of the 1st Division’s combat experiences, a division led for the most part by Major General Charles P. Summerall, one may trace the fairly rapid shift from “approved doctrine” to something that particular officer knew or felt would be required. When Summerall arrived in France he was quick to note the extraordinary (by American standards) proportion of artillery support employed by both allies and adversaries alike. Summerall argued vigorously for equivalency, but was overruled by General John Pershing’s advisers and staff. Once in command, however, Summerall pursued methods that made up, in considerable degree, for the weakness of organic fire support. Grotelueschen describes Summerall’s methods as diverging markedly from established doctrine, but having salutary effects for the operations of the 1st Division.

The introduction to the 26th Division narrative touches on a sore subject demanding deeper investigation—the questionable performance of Regular officers, both within and at echelons above the division. This particular tale is muddied by the inherent Regular and National Guard prejudices recognized at every echelon. That aside, the picture the author paints of the 26th Division’s performance is not pretty, but Grotelueschen softens the depiction by noting that it had absolutely no “open warfare” training prior to being committed to battle. In evaluating the division’s performance, Grotelueschen relies upon the division commander’s observations more than recorded events or accomplishments. For example, while the commander saw a need for tank support and greater participation by the Air Service there is little to suggest he attempted to secure these tools, or, more importantly, to train soldiers for offensive maneuvers. This particular portion of the book is strengthened by materials indicating that the unit’s limited successes were not accomplished by the exercise of doctrine. Whether intended by the author or not, the division commander’s inability to keep his unit in hand, an impression shared by senior AEF staff members, comes through much more strongly than does his limited attempts to exercise his imagination. Grotelueschen also provides deserved swipes at higher headquarters, but the final impression that the reader is left with is that of a personally imaginative, perhaps cerebral, commander who wasn’t very good at the business of commanding. This account of the 26th Division is, therefore, less a tale of doctrine and more one of competency of command.

The section of the book on the 2d Division is replete with examples of successful nondoctrinal operations, adaptive leadership, and sound soldier skills. The initial stupidities of Belleau Wood quickly give way to the imperatives of reality and to the well-conducted attack on Vaux, demonstrating the division’s ability to learn and adapt by setting aside the impediment of official doctrine. The division’s participation in the Aisne-Marne operation was stylistically similar to the previous operations in the Belleau and Vaux battles, in that the unit was hurled into combat with minimal planning and only a portion of its equipment. The nature of the terrain, the strength and dispositions of the enemy, and the timing combined to create conditions of open warfare that AEF doctrine addressed, but the battle quickly stalled for lack of coordinated fire support. The division’s subsequent performance demonstrates that it had learned how to adapt, not just to do what was being presented in doctrinal sources. This is a solid chapter.

The 77th Division was a National Army division and trained almost exclusively in the United States. Draftees made up the bulk of its manpower, boasting some 43 languages. “Open warfare” training never appears on the unit’s training schedules. Upon arrival in France, the division came under British control, eventually shaking free only to fall under the tutelage of a French division. When it was finally assigned to an American organization, American III Corps, it immediately replaced the 4th Division and remained in combat or enroute from one combat zone to another until war’s end. As a consequence of these assignments, the division received no open warfare training, something that was reflected in its early actions. At this point it is worth noting that Grotelueschen concludes that General Summerall was right; the success of the infantry was directly proportional to the weight and skill of the artillery supporting it. Commanders quickly learned that any doctrine that did not rely on the employment of large quantities of indirect fire, properly directed and massed, was too costly in terms of lives lost to be valid.

The account of both the 26th and 77th Divisions’ experiences suffer from a problem of focus. The author spends too much ink on the division commanders. In both cases the commanders are difficult individuals; ironically, with totally opposite approaches to AEF doctrine. In both narratives, however, these two officers receive more attention than their units. In both cases the division commanders leave it to their subordinates to deal with the realities of combat, it is at this level of command and not at division that the deviation and innovation takes place. Because of the focus on the division commanders the reader is left with an odd sense of only half a picture.

There are, however, a number of lessons to be derived from this work: the ability of the American soldier and his leaders to adapt to the changing tactical situation; and the truism so deftly articulated by Sir Michael Howard, that it doesn’t matter what doctrine you begin with, it will most likely be wrong; what really matters is how long it will take you to get it right. The book dutifully raises the age-old question of how an army must go about evaluating and validating its doctrine.

[4thGordons]

Thanks for posting that Pete.

I suspect it is one for Inter-Library loan rather than purchase for me.

Chris

[dutchbarge]

My interpretation of the American response to the amalgamation proposal is that it evolved from a curt "no" in April 1917 to "not only no but damned no" as the idea was repeatedly raised. It was a matter of American national pride that there would be an independent AEF under American command. It wouldn't surprise me if much of the wartime and postwar opinion of British officers commenting upon American operations was influenced by the perception that the Allied cause would have been better served had amalgamation instead of an independent AEF been put into effect.

Hello Pete,

In January of 1918 Lloyd George cabled Colonel House (Pres. Wilson's advisor) in DC warning that the Western Front was about to become "exceedingly serious" demanding an "immediate decision" on amalgamating US troops into British units lest the Allies be on the receiving end of a "knockout blow". House, Wilson and Baker (Sec. of War) were leaning towards amalgamation but decided to first solicite Pershing's opinion. Baker cabled Pershing that while any decision depended upon his judgement, the "loss of identity of our forces" was secondary to meeting the emergency that the British seemed to think was developing (Britian claimed that Russia's surrender would soon change the manpower balance on the WF to 250 German divisions versus 93 French and 54 British). Pershing replied "Do not think emergency exists that would warrant putting companies or battalions into British or French divisions". "Wully" Robertson approached Pershing with a proposition for partial Amalgamation requesting 150 American battalions be brought to France immediately for insertion into British regiments. Britian had been telling Pershing that if he insisted on transporting full US divisions to France he would have to supply his own shipping as the British merchant marine simply could simply not handle the job. Yet now they were prepared to ship over 150,000 US troops. Pershing smelled a double cross but in mid January nonetheless cabled Robertson his approval to allow a partial amalgamation as a "temporary measure" provided it did not interfere with his plans to ship enough US divisions to France to form an independent US Army. Pershing had been hearing rumors that LG was holding back as many as 1.5 million soldiers in Britian to restrain Haig from another offensive. He also knew that Britian had another 1.2 million soldiers in other threatres of operaton. He had also heard from the French that the British were exagerating their manpower problems. The French thought that at most the Germans might muster 190, not 250 divisions and that the troops from Russia would not be first class as the Germans had been skimming the best units from the Eastern Front for years. The French also claimed the British shipping shortage was bunk (especially with the US Navy now participating in a convoy system). On the basis of this information Pershing informed Robertson that he had changed his mind and that if the British could transport 150,000 unattached US troops, they should be able to transport the six complete US divisions Pershing wanted and he demanded that they do so immediately. Pershing agreed to let those six US divisions train with the British and if an emergency actually arose he'd allow Haig to use them. After several days of heated arguments the British finally agreed to Pershing's demands.

As you suggest, and as US combat efficiency proved, fortifying the already trained/seasoned British and French formations with US troops might well have proved a faster means of victory over Germany than waiting for the US to build up an independent US Army. However military necessity was only part of the equation.

Cheers, Bill

[Pete1052]

As a former U.S. Army guy my instinct is to defend the reputation of the institution; on the amalgamation issue I'm inclined to side with Pershing's rejection of the proposal. Regarding the performance of the AEF in combat, my impression is that it was neither a brilliant feat of arms nor an ignominious failure, but rather shades of gray in between. I wish I had more books on the AEF so I could discuss the subject in more detail.

[dutchbarge]

I didn't know Mrs.Pershing had Washington ties.Why was Wilson such a backer of Pershing?

Dave.

Hey Dave,

Some feel that the most likely candidate to head the AEF was actually Major General Leonard Wood. However Wood had pissed off President Wilson by siding with Teddy Roosevelt (Wilson's arch rival) in Roosevelt's campaign to get the US ready for war while Wilson was determined to keep the US neutral. Wilson told Baker (sec of war) that he had "no confidence in General Wood's discretion or loyalty to his superiors". Pershing was a friend of Roosevelts also. They fought together on San Juan Hill. It was Roosevelt (as president) who promoted Pershing to the rank of brigider general ahead of more than 800 more senior officers. Pershing's wife was Helen Warren, whose father was Senator Francis Warren, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. At the time Roosevelt commented something along the lines of "while it might be outrageous to promote someone because their wife's father is a US senator, it would be equally outrageous to not promote him for the same reason". Pershing headed up Wilson's Punitive Expedition to Mexico. Pershing was unhappy with Wilson for not allowing him to follow Pancho Villa all the way to Mexico City if needs be but his outbursts were curbed by a warning from Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott and I don't believe they ever reached Wilson. At any rate Pershing lobbied hard for the job writing to both the Chief of Staff and Sec. of War informing them that he was 'prepared for the duties of this hour". While his father in law almost certainly lobbied for him, Pershing had behind him an impressive military record. Indian fighting, San Juan Hill, pacifying the Phillipine island of Mindinao and the Punitive Expedition to Mexico (flawed campaign but spun to his and Wilson's credit). Cheers, Bill

[dutchbarge]

As a former U.S. Army guy my instinct is to defend the reputation of the institution; on the issue of amalgamation I'm inclined to side with Pershing's rejection of the proposal. Regarding the performance of the AEF in combat, my impression is that it was neither a brilliant feat of arms nor an ignominious failure, but rather shades of gray in between. I wish I had more books on the AEF so I could discuss the subject in more detail.

Hello Pete,

There are just so many levels to this issue. Wilson declared the US would go to war to "make the world safe for democracy" however once we were officially in the war Balfour informed Wilson of the secret treaties the Allies had made. Russia to get Constantinople, France to get Alsace Lorraine, the Saar, half of Turkey's Mediterranian empire and Germany's African colonies, Italy to get South Tyrol, Triest and the Dalmatian Coast........on and on. Wilson was mortified that behind his crusade for democracy the same old game of European real politik was being carried on. At the beginning Wilson thought the US could get away with only sending only token force to France. Afterall the British and French had been assuring him that they were close to victory. The second shock to Wilson was being informed by the Allies that instead of being close to victory they were actually in desperate straights. This information disabused him of the notion that a small force would suffice. Twice screwed. It is hard to concieve of a politician so naive as Wilson, especially when many senators and congressmen had been shouting daily that the war was almost certainly the result of financial entanglements which were about to go south with impending Allied defeat. At any rate it has been surmised that Wilson thought he could ultimately redeem his crusade (and place in the history books) if, following defeat of Germany, the US could successfully negotiate a magnimous peace. Wilson thought the only way the US could get the leverage to do this was for the US Army to prove itself equal to the French and British armies on the battlefield. Thus the Allies had to wait for Pershing to build up a credible US Army before prosecuting the war against Germany. How much of Wilson's determination was motivated by his humanitarianism or his personal ambiton is often disputed. In the event much of what the doughboys died for was repudiated at Versailles and in time the US public turned it's back on Wilson's League of Nations. After humilitating Wilson and his 14 points the Allies went on to default on their war debts. In the end it was the US taxpayer, not the Allies, who saw to it that the US bankers and war profiteers were made whole.

As an American soldier, Pershing made the right choice. As an Allied soldier IMHO he made the wrong choice. If US troops were amalgamated earlier the British and French might well have ended the war sooner. Without US forces having proved themselves Wilson certainly could not have done any worse at Versailles.

Regarding US combat efficieny IMHO the victories won by US troops were done so by the courage and fighting spirit of local commanders and troops, not by skilled staff work. US forces suffered losses proportionate to the French and British. Think of Belleau Woods, the Argonne and Bony. The amazing thing is that despite poor logistics and staff work the troops actually accomplished what was asked of them. And they did make a considerable contribution to victory. Whether or not their contribution might have better served the Allied cause had they been amalgamated is a question which will be debated for a long time to come.

Cheers, BIll

[dutchbarge]

Twenty-six years later Patton was again in the area as commander of the Third Army.

Less well known was that Patton was Pershing's aide during the Punitive Expedition to Mexico. Thought 27 years his junior, Patton's sister Anne had a liasion with Pershing following the death of his wife (herself 22 years younger than Pershing). Black Jack's mistress during WW1, Micheline, was over 30 years his junior. When he was promoted over the heads of more senior officers it was whispered that he had fathered several illegitimate children in the Phillipines, a charge which cost him the appointment of superintentent of West Point.

Cheers, Bill

[Pete1052]

I'm not convinced that President Wilson's plans for remaking postwar Europe were a determining factor in the size and structure of the AEF. In his book Over Here: The First World War and American Society, David M. Kennedy says Pershing was the most implacable opponent of the amalgamation idea. Writes Kennedy:

In the highest circles of the Wilson administration considerable confusion and irresolution surrounded the issue of amalgamation. [secretary of War] Baker remained committed to a separate American force, but Wilson seemed to waver, so that the Secretary, concludes his biographer, "often was not sure what the President was doing or wanted to have done." Tasker Bliss, American military representative on the Supreme War Council, infected by the gloom of the Allied military men, inclined toward accepting some form of amalgamation. But standing resolutely against all such proposals was the Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Force, General John J. Pershing.

[Al Parsons]

In the end it was the US taxpayer, not the Allies, who saw to it that the US bankers and war profiteers were made whole. Cheers, BIll

Gee, the more things change, the more they stay the same.

Sorry folks, just couldn't resist the reference to today's shenanigans.

Great thread. Now, back to our regular programming.

[CSMMo]

American involvement in the First World War is a complex issue, made more so by the fact that knowledge of the area is not as commonplace here in the US as it is in the UK.

Remember that Wilson was elected with a platform of NOT getting involved in "the European War". It was the sinking of the Lusitania by the German Navy that aroused the American public and caused the remarkable turnabout President Wilson took to sponsor a Declaration of War (only authorized by Congress in the US) and further support of it. Naive, possibly, but still a politician.

One of the popular songs of the day, "Over There" indicated an American attitude that we were going "over there" to end the stalemated war. ("...and we won't be home 'til it's over over there.")

America had been an isolated, primarily agricultural/rural country and was still primarily that way in 1917. Our biggest war had been a war we fought with our own secedng states. We had not ventured into (many) foreign adventures with our Army/Navy/Marines except in a limited way. The Spanish American War was to avenge what was thought to be the bombing of The USS Maine in Havana Harbor. The Mexican Punitive Expedition was retaliation for the raids and killings in US territory by Pancho Villa, et al. We had developed some confidence from these actions as well as some US Marine activity in Central America, but we had experienced nothing of the size of what was going on in Europe and elsewhere. There was clearly agitation within the US to join the World War, but the diversity of our population had to make that confusing. Which side to take? In the popular mind, Germany decided that for us with the sinking of the Lusitania. I don't know the demographic ratios of German heritage citizens vs. those of UK/French/Italian/Russian nation's heritage, but I imagine that may have had an influence as well as the ratio of American business involvement in the various countries.

To get an interesting perspective on the whole operation, read "The Patton Papers", by Martin Blumenson (1972) ISBN 0-395-12706-8. It consists of Pattons' letters, etc. along with a historical dialogue by Blumenson to put it all in context. Volume One covers the period 1885 to 1940. Patton had to lobby hard to become Pershing's aide in the Punitive Expedition as a very junior Cavalry officer. He subtly set Pershing up with his sister and what appears to have been a very comfortable (and proper) relationship developed between his sister and General Pershing. Next year, Patton also lobbied to be included as HQ Commandant of the AEF (as a Captain) to get "over there" and then further lobbied to get himself assigned to (command) the first American Tank School in France. In the area of tanks, we were entirely dependent on the French (primarily) and the British for materiel, training and tactics. He rose to the temporary rank of Colonel and led a Brigade of tanks in the final battles, suffering a wound in action.

"American Caesar" by William Manchester (1978) ISBN 0-316-54498-1, is a biography of Douglas MacArthur and tells the tale of how he (and his mother) lobbied for his rise to Brigadier General with the 42nd (Rainbow) Division and his mother's lobbying for a Congressional Medal of Honor, as well as the evolution of his eccentricities in combat. His father, Arthur MacArthur had been a prominent General in the US Army and his widow (Douglas' mother) knew the right people to talk to. (This is not meant to take away from his abilities and achievements, just gives some insight to how his assignments were influenced.)

The Americans had to remain independent. National identity (which was in the formative stage) demanded it, the reality of the long drawn-out stalemate and a desire to avoid that demanded it and the mandate to bring as many back alive as possible mandated it. In retrospect, it might not seem like the best use of American forces, but it has to be viewed in the context of the times. As has been stated, we were just 100 years from the last British invasion of our sovereign soil (they burned the White House!) and many of the ex-pats from England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales weren't terribly warm about the UK, although this involvement in the First World War brought us closer together in many ways. These sentiments aside, we were rather isolated and self absorbed when The Great War began.

The battles of the Great War established identities for many Army and Marine units. Divisions created for this mobilization exist today and their heritages were strengthened by operations in the second World War and beyond. The whole area is probably under-researched in this country as it is overshadowed by what happened in the second war which began with a deliberate military attack on our territory (67 years ago today!) and in which were more heavily involved. It seems that we, in the US forget our history rather quickly. We seem to have mostly forgotten what happened here 7 years ago! So, it isn't surprising that there is no great body of research on WW1. It does open up wonderful areas for research today, however.

I hope this is helpful.

Mike Morrison

[59165]

it was whispered that he had fathered several illegitimate children in the Phillipines, a charge which cost him the appointment of superintentent of West Point.

Cheers, Bill

Hi Bill,

who did get the job & do you think that appointment affected officer training during the period leading uo to WW2(just wondering if Jack was in charge,his will may have led to a more gung ho approach by WW2 officers,if you follow)?

[59165]

Pete,thanks for the input.

Mike,there's a little bit in your post that I remember covering in school,funnily enough.

I myself am of 2 minds about Black Jack.It would be too easy to put him in the 'Donkey/Butcher' bracket but,the more I read the less I believe this.Jury's still out on that one.

I do feel that the loss of his family would heve affected him more than stated but thats just a personal thing.Did I really gather from a couple of things mentioned here that Patton played match maker with his sister & Jack? I know Pattons another thread altogether but I wouldn't mind hearing more of him on here.

Here's Jack

c/o www.cresskillboro.com

& with Foch.Same source.

Dave.