Kut-al-Amara

[Lighthorseman]

I have always wondered why the British Army took such a clobbering at Kut just when the whole Mesopotamian campaign seemed under control and about to turn into a Turkish rout.

Opinions anyone into what provoked such a sudden and marked turn of the wheel of fortune?

[John_Hartley]

why the British Army took such a clobbering at Kut just when the whole Mesopotamian campaign seemed under control and about to turn into a Turkish rout.

I suspect "seemed" is the operative word here.

Under-resourced, over-stretched lines of communication, disease, etc are also phrases that come to mind.

[Lighthorseman]

Logistics and sanitation caused the defeat?

[PhilB]

Perhaps JH meant that Townshend had placed them in a position where logistics and sanitation were unsurmountable problems!

[John_Hartley]

Logistics and sanitation caused the defeat?

Pretty much so, IMO.

[Lighthorseman]

Pretty much so, IMO.

IMO?

Now, was it then a problem of generalship, or regardless of the commander, the conditions would have eventually destroyed, or at least neutralized, the Indian divisions?

[per ardua per mare per terram]

IMO?

In My Opinion

From the limited reading that I have done, Townshend's generalship was a major factor, very briefly he was trying to emulate his earlier success as a siege 'hero.'

[Ron]

In My Opinion

From the limited reading that I have done, Townshend's generalship was a major factor, very briefly he was trying to emulate his earlier success as a siege 'hero.'

Read the book on the subject:

Ron Wilcox: Battles on the Tigris. Pen and Sword. (2006)

Ron

[Lighthorseman]

Townshend's generalship was a major factor, very briefly he was trying to emulate his earlier success as a siege 'hero.'

Do you mean that the British commander just downplayed Turkish capabilities, thinking that they would be as inefficient in the offensive as they had been on the defensive? Was he aware of his logistic shortcomings?

If this should be the case, it sounds to me like typical early days military thinking, based on the "superiority" of the white soldier over every one else.

[John(txic)]

I think Townshend was under a lot of pressure from higher-ups.

I would echo Ron's advice to get hold of "Battles on the Tigris"; before reading that, I was of the opinion that Townshend was a Grade 1 Donkey.

[Gibbo]

My impression of Townshend is that he was quite good at actually fighting the battles but lost his campaign for logistical reasons. His reputation is deservedly bad but that is more down to his behaviour in captivity, when he lived in comfort and appears to have made no attempt to find out what had happened to his men, who were treated appallingly.

As said in the original post, the early stages of the campaign went very well. It was, however an example of 'mission creep' where the capture of one place led to pushing on to the next one in order to secure the previous capture. As mentioned already, this led to the force over stretching its logistic resources and supply lines.

Indian Expeditionary Force D had been sent in November 1914 to secure Basra in order to protect Britain's traditional position in the Gulf and the new one in the Persian oilfields. Ottoman counter attacks in early 1915 made it apparent that Nasiriya on the Euphrates and Amara on the Tigris had to be taken in order to secure Basra and the oilfields. The new theatre commander, Nixon, was reinforced to 2 infantry divisions, including Townshend's 6th Poona, and a cavalry brigade under his command but didn't have the logistics, engineering, medical and artillery assets of a corps. The medical services proved to be particularly bad.

Townshend, leading from the front on a small flotilla of river gunboats, took Amara, and Nasiriya was also taken. At this point the objectives of securing Basra and the oilfields had been achieved so there was no need to advance further and insufficient resources were available to make doing so sensible. Nixon, however, wanted to press on and Townshend took Kut el-Amara. Supply problems were now evident and this would have been a good place to halt the advance. However, Nixon wanted to continue and there was a desire in London for a victory to make up for Gallipoli; there was also a line of command issue as this was an Indian Army operation with Nixon reporting to the C-in-C India rather than the CIGS. Townshend protested that his 6th Poona Division was not strong enough to advance on Baghdad and that the supply lines would be too stretched but his objections were over-ruled.

At the Battle of Ctestiphon Townshend actually forced the Ottoman troops to withdraw but his force suffered heavy casualties and had to retreat to Kut when Ottoman reinforcements appeared. He was asked how long his force could hold out at Kut and for some reason considered only the army's food supplies, ignoring the options of requisitioning civilian grain supplies and killing his pack animals for food. Both these measures were eventually taken, enabling 6th Poona Division to hold out for longer than Townshend had originally forecast. Had the relief force known how long it had to reach Kut, then it could have taken a more methodical approach and perhaps succeeded.

The links below to maps from West Point's website should make the campaign easier to understand:

Lower Mesopotamia 1914

Advance on Baghdad and Battles of Kut

[Neil Clark]

John Laffin's "Butchers and Bunglers of the Great War" is pretty accurate in terms of his chapter on Townshend!

Charles Townshend (Our Charlie) was described as a "Strutting Peacock" by many of his men.

I would draw your attention to the fact that after the fall of Kut many thousands of British and Indian soldiers were force marched back to Turkey on foot and that most died en route - if the march didn't get em the lack of food and brutal treatment did. Many (including me) think that this was even worse than the fall of Singapore during WW2. The fall of Kut was the consequence of a vain man's attempt at currying favour with his superiors...

I came to those conclusions after carrying out my own research (5th Buffs were in Tigris Corps and 2nd West Kent's were trapped in Kut).

[Lighthorseman]

Interesting discussion we have here...

If you don´t mind me taking the freedom of combining several of the opinions already expressed, this whole affair looks to me like a top brass bungle-up, the kind that so usually happens when you combine armchair generals full of misconceptions about the tactical situation, "leading" from the extreme rear, with battlefield commanders with a thirst for glory that nullifies their judgment and makes them use their units as steps in their path to promotions. Add to the mix a couple of inept politicians, and the cauldron for disaster is about to boil.

The mention of Townshend´s post-capture behaviour (sort of like von Paulus at Stalingrad) leads me to think that all he cared for was his own interest, while Nixon´s insistence - on behalf of London - of pushing ever forward, knowing that the logistic train was already beyond its capabilites, supports the first half of my statement.

Finally, aren´t there a lot of striking similarities between Kut and Singapore? If we should look for reasons in both cases, the end result, IMO, would be the same: Poor quality leadership, a logistical nightmare and the dark hand of politics.

[Neil Clark]

Just found this supremely BRILLIANT download - everything we all want and need -

It was written by a soldier who was on that awful forced march from Kut to Turkey. He managed to survive it but most died en route...

http://www.archive.org/details/akutprisoner00bishuoft

[Anthony Gorst]

Just found this supremely BRILLIANT download - everything we all want and need -

It was written by a soldier who was on that awful forced march from Kut to Turkey. He managed to survive it but most died en route...

http://www.archive.org/details/akutprisoner00bishuoft

That is one great website - I've been looking for Chesney's Battle of Dorking for ages, and there it is....

I can see myself spending too much time rummaging around in there

[Neil Clark]

Glad you found it handy Tony.

[Lighthorseman]

Just found this supremely BRILLIANT download - everything we all want and need -

It was written by a soldier who was on that awful forced march from Kut to Turkey. He managed to survive it but most died en route...

http://www.archive.org/details/akutprisoner00bishuoft

The site as a whole is an AMAZING tool! Thanks for the discovery, almost as good as Van Persie´s two goals against Chelsea...

[bob lembke]

Interesting discussion we have here...

The mention of Townshend´s post-capture behaviour (sort of like von Paulus at Stalingrad) leads me to think that all he cared for was his own interest, while Nixon´s insistence - on behalf of London - of pushing ever forward, knowing that the logistic train was already beyond its capabilites, supports the first half of my statement.

I think that Townshend had a villa on one of the islands in the Sea of Mamora (sp?) near Istanbul, but a German or Austrian source that I read (probably Pomiankowski, a great source) recently mentioned him cutting quite a figure in the finest restaurants of Istanbul, which he was free to frequent. Feldmarchalleutnant Pomiankowski did not approve, I believe, and I think (if memory serves) that he complained to the Turks and the Turks clipped Townshend's wings a bit. I think he also went hunting with high-ranking Turkish officers. Some British officers captured at Kut insisted on marching with their men. My wife was reading a source by a Turkish family of the period and their middle-class father was drafted, given a terribly ill-fitting pair of boots, and marched toward Gallipoli as a reenforcement till his shoes killed him on the road. The Turks treated their own men very badly often, and the Anatolian peasant was usually a very tough customer, and what rightly seemed like very bad treatment to a westener might seem like business as usual to the Turks. Enver Pascha, in the beginning of the war, marched an army into the mountains on the Russian border in winter without logistics (to the horror of his German advisors) and almost the entire army froze to death. But I am not trying to minimize incidents of brutality on the march in question, a topic about which I have little information.

Bob Lembke

[James A Pratt III]

Note: Paulus was NOT a von.

It should be pointed out the Nixon refused Townsends request to retreat from Kut before he was surrounded. It should also be pointed out that the relief force commanders proved to be inept. Look at what happened at the Dujaila redoubt attack in March 1916. Kut could have and should have relieved.

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I also have the imression that the campaigning in Mesopotamia shared a feature with that of Gallipoli: a lack of detailed maps.

[johncamel]

I also have the imression that the campaigning in Mesopotamia shared a feature with that of Gallipoli: a lack of detailed maps.

Townshend it should be remembered was involved as commander of the besieged garrison at Chitral in 1895 and was confident that he would be relieved at Kut up until the failure of the last attempt. Perhaps a case of overconfidence as few if any attempts were made to break out!