Sir Ian Hamilton

[Desmond7]

Having examined the poor treatment given to the 10th (Irish) Division at Gallipoli bySir Ian Hamilton, I am bound to ask - was he truly the donkey he has been painted in so many books?

Just looking for a fair analysis of the man.

[Mike_H]

Desmond

Suggest you get hold of a copy of "A Soldier's Life" John Lee's biography of Hamilton published by Macmillan in 2000 and since reissued in paperback, for a good balanced account of Hamilton's career.

Mike

[Desmond7]

Thanks for the pointer. Des

[michaeldr]

Des,

May I second Mike H’s recommendation of John Lee’s book on Ian Hamilton

Can I also mention that in his final despatch of 11th Dec 1915 Hamilton himself differentiates in his comments, between the quality of the troops and that of their commanders:

“The units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle when they leaped into the water to get more quickly to close quarters, or when they stormed Lala Baba in the darkness. They had shown their resolution later when they tackled the Chocolate Hills and drove the enemy from Hill 10 right back out of rifle range from the beaches.

Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior Commanders at Suvla had no personal experience of the new trench warfare; of the Turkish methods; of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied. These were the reasons which induced me, with your Lordship’s approval, to appoint Major-General H. de B. De Lisle to take over temporary command."

For more on Hamilton see here and here

Regards

Michael D.R.

[mcderms]

Hamiltons problem was the War Cabinets problem in that neither knew how to run a world war. Kitchener was completely out of his depth when not fighting local empire insurgencies and his acolytes suffered for it. Hamilton was a fine soldier whose own failings to demand the tools needed to do the job from the Kitchener god-head of 1914-15 resulted in the debacle at Galipolli. His essential weakness of character was that he was anice chap who didn't like confrontation. He had more in common with Rupert Brooke than Alexander the Great and it would have taken the drive and charisma of an Alexander to force the Dardanelles.

This was reflected in his choice of generals and div/corp commanders... He invariably chose between the extremes of complete wimps and the butchers like Hunter-Weston.

I'd advise checking out the 'Gallipoli' books by Mead and Carlyon as well as Sir Ians biog.

[michaeldr]

This was reflected in his choice of generals and div/corp commanders...

Mcderms,

Sorry about the name: for some reason this programme [MOW 2003] insists on a capital ‘M’

To the point: With all due respect, I think that the controversy here arises precisely because Kitchener did NOT allow Hamilton his choice of commander(s) at Suvla. Please see the first reference in my post above and in particular my post of 03rd Oct ‘03

“This is precisely the warning which that Hamilton had given Kitchener in such good time before the operation had begun. Now Kitchener was asking Sir John French to supply a corps commander and two divisional commanders from France - the very men that Hamilton had asked for by name and been refused."

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Desmond7]

The book I am reading at the moment insists that Hamilton had a 'personality clash'dating back to Boer War with Mahon of 10th Div. It puts forward the statement that Hamilton did not give due credit to the 10th Div for that reason.

I am really trying to get to the kernel of that alleged personaity clash.

[michaeldr]

Des,

You’re right; Hamilton’s problem with Mahon did date back to the Boer war and an incident there after which, Hamilton saw him as unreliable. He would have preferred that Kitchener did not force him to accept Mahon:

See my post of 03rd Oct ‘03

Kitchener refused to release to Hamilton any officer then serving on the WF

instead he put up three names including Mahon

according to John Lee's biography of Hamilton, 'A Soldier's Life' IH replied

"I will give Mahon every support and encouragement but remembering his condition when he disappointed you by returning to the Sudan when you offered him a Cavalry Brigade in South Africa, I fear he may not long stand the strain of this class of warfare."

As I mentioned earlier however, I think that Hamilton’s last despatch shows that he did not under value the troops [of 10th Div] themselves

Regards

Michael D.R.

[Desmond7]

Obliged - as you know I am going through Orange Green and Khaki with fine tooth comb. As a time-line it has proved invaluable to me!

des

[andigger]

Des,

I would recommend Alan Moorehead's book Gallipoli. Whereas it isnot specifically about Hamilton, I think it gives a great over view of the campaign and the personalities involved. I also think the descriptions of the personalities involved is also fairly balanced.

Andy

[Desmond7]

Have to admit that the whole bloody disaster can get to you. Such a small space and such awful topography - with hindsight.

[trooper]

Des

I have at present the good fortune, or otherwise, of engaging in researching the 10th (Irish) Division for my PhD on the subject. I would therefore give you a few quotes by Hamilton in his Gallipoli Diary on Mahon.

"My talk with Mahon made me happier. Here, at least, was someone who had an idea of what he was doing." (Vol 2 p75)

"Mahon’s seniority has been has been the root of this evil. K’s (Kitchener’s) conscience tells him so and therefore, he pricks his name now upon the fatal list. But he did not know, when he cabled, that Mahon had done well" (Vol. 2 p105).

I think the above shows that Hamilton had no real complaint against Mahon's actual performance and I agree that there is more likely a personality clash based on internal army factionalism (ie the Africans -v- the Indians). There is no evidence as far as I have been able to find that Mahon returned to the Sudan because he couldn't stand the strain which is what Hamilton implies in his correspondence with Kitchener. There is no doubt that the Division did not get get its just recognition for what it achieved at Gallipoli as reflected in correspondence between surviving officers and the official historian of the campaign. It is also notable that Hamilton based his despatch on the events at Chocolate Hill soley on the reports submitted by the 11th Division ignoring those of the 10th.

Happy to discuss any aspect of the 10th Division at anytime.

Trooper

[mcderms]

I still think that Hamiltons main problem was that he couldn't bring himself to ask Kitchener for what he really needed in terms of men and materials, including decent commanders. He accepted the dross he was given and never intervened even when he saw the disasters unfold first hand: he could have dismissed Hunter-Weston after any of the Krithia disasters but simply didn't have it in him to do this.

I may be wrong but can anyone name one of Kitcheners acolytes with the personality to stand up to him in life or suceed with him dead? Hamilton wasn't a bad person, soldier or officer but a living embodiment of nepotism combined with the Peter Principle and a chief who used bullying to account for his own short comings.

I know that this is all very Gallipoli focused but it's difficult to separate the two or even discuss Hamiltons pre-1915 career objectively because of the resounding and total balls-up he made of the Turkish campaign.

[Guest Desmond6]

Thanks to all - Trooper: be in touch - some interesting items you might be able to help with.

McD - read a very interesting essay/presentation on Hamilton's post-war life in a book called 'Facing Armageddon' - I have it at home and strongly recommend it.

Sorry for delay - have changed my ISP and things won't click in until weekend!

Des