Germany's intentions

[Jon Miller]

I imagine that my understanding of the situation could well be clouded by so many historical myths, so please feel free to put me right wherever.

This is how it has seemed to me...........Austria decide to destroy Serbia, but call on the support of Germany, who have been looking for a dust-up in Europe for several years. Germanic help is needed because Serbia will be backed up by Russia. Germany knows that not only will she have to fight Russia, she will have to fight France, Russia's ally. So the Schlieffen plan is attempted, so France can be knocked out before full attention is given to Russia.

I have two queries/points about this.

Although the Western Front became the main stage, in the beginning, it seems that knocking out France first was only a step to dealing with Russia.

In supporting Austria, Germany seems to have lost some control of exactly how she wished to go about making long-awaited war.

My real question is........in taking part in a European War, what did Germany wish to achieve? If I'm right in thinking that beating France was of secondary importance, was the defeat and subsequent take-over of Russian territory what Germany really desired? Was she coveting oil fields, or Black Sea ports, that sort of thing?

I look forward to finding out what it was all about from Germany's point of view.

[RodB]

From what I've read, Germany had 2 politico-economic aims :-

In Europe - total domination (at very least eliminate all threats).

Internationally : parity with the British empire.

I think the confused way they went about this (making enemies of all the strong countries, choosing weak countries as allies, really offending important neutral countries) showed their lack of experience of world politics. Britain, France, Russia had been playing this game for centuries.

Also it is an example of what happens when the military start running the show instead of politicians and diplomats. e.g. the German ambassador to Britain was very upset about the way his government rejected Britain's offer to negotiate a way out of the whole mess in July - August - he knew what was coming.

These are just my theories here - any experts out there ?

[johng]

I'm definitely NOT an expert,

I am attempting to understand the sequence of events leading to the start of the war.

I have obtained some publications from the 1912-1915 period, and am coming to the conclusion that there were several major influences which forced the governments of the time into intransigent positions.

A major factor was the strong opinions of some Ambassadors and their influence on Sir Edward Grey. He seems to have been balancing the advice of the Foreign Office Staff (most vociferous was Erye Crowe). and his of his cabinet, which was not convinced that there was any immediate threat to England.

I think Eyre Crowe's analysis of the effects of inactivity were very persuasive.:

A/. The German/Austrian grouping win, crush France and humiliate Russia. With the French Fleet gone. Germany will occupy the Channel coast (with the willing or unwilling co-operation of Holland and Belgium). What then would be the position of a friendless England?

B/. France and Russia win. What then would be their attitude towards England?

What would happen in India and the Mediterran?

Remember that England, France and Russia were in an alliance.

(continues on next post)

[Guest Weldboy]

Like previous posts I will start by apoligizing for my lack of expertise. I know there are others here whose knowledge of the First World War is far greater than mine.

That being said, my own gut feeling regarding the real root cause of the war is this- simply pecking order. Just like today the international politics of 1914 were fundamentally nothing more than what you see in every schoolyard on any given day. Kids trying to establish dominance through alliances, bullying, and/or schemes. You have those who want to play, those caught in the mix and those just wanting to stay out of the way of the "players".

Germany was the kid who used to be kicked around but was recently growing fast and had won a couple scuffles- one impressive one against the top dog Francois. He was ready to make its move to the Alpha position.

Francois, full of resentment for his recent embarrassment was drooling for a chance to show this new kid Hans his true place in the scheme of things.

Britain had kind of liked Hans but now the latter was making eyes at the girl which Britain had determined was for him only (Oceania herself remained aloof).

Britain now feared and somewhat resented this new pretender.

Ivan was a mystery. Outwardly simple, he was a walking contradiction. Somehow backwards and brillant at the same time. His ambitions stifled by apparently internal demons and a solitary nature. In any case he was much too large to be ignored and was coveted as an ally by those jockeying for postion.

A.H. had always been a "player". He was the kid who had grown early but now other kids were outsizing him. He could not recognize or admit to himself that his days as a "player" were quickly coming to a close. Showing signs of fading into the background of schoolyard politics he was in any case Han's cousin. Despite the fact they had fought among themselves many times they would fight still harder for one another.

Regardless that this is reducing an immense historical event to the level of "Mother Goose" I truely do believe that at real bottom WW1 and much (maybe most) of history is just this simple. It wasn't a matter of need-it was a matter of desire.The desire that nature puts into its creatures to establish themselves at the top of the social ladder amongst those like themselves. It is in the nature of the beast- and in that sense WW1 was unavoidable.

[Guest Biplane pilot]

It's instructive to recall that most of an entire generation went to war with a degree of enthusiasm that seems incredible today, especially given the horrific results. Apparently the average John/Jacque/Joachim on the street/boulevard/strasse accepted his government's version of events uncritically. Whatever the true war aims, repeated statements about The Cause proved ample to draw millions of willing participants, including those from far-flung empires. Politicians and recruiters rely heavily upon that sentiment 90 years later.

[Robert Dunlop]

This is how it has seemed to me...........Austria decide to destroy Serbia, but call on the support of Germany, who have been looking for a dust-up in Europe for several years. Germanic help is needed because Serbia will be backed up by Russia. Germany knows that not only will she have to fight Russia, she will have to fight France, Russia's ally. So the Schlieffen plan is attempted, so France can be knocked out before full attention is given to Russia.

I have two queries/points about this.

Although the Western Front became the main stage, in the beginning, it seems that knocking out France first was only a step to dealing with Russia.

In supporting Austria, Germany seems to have lost some control of exactly how she wished to go about making long-awaited war.

Serbia offered the excuse to start the war. But what if Franz Joseph had not been assassinated? The answer/s to this question might get closer to Germany's motivation - perhaps.

The growth in German naval strength, acquisition of new colonies, and other 'expansionist' policies all point to the high likelihood of some confrontation at some point. The 'threat' of France and Russia had long exercised German military planners. The origins of this date back to Napoleonic times and earlier (Frederick the Great, etc). In some ways, the situation was analagous to the military situation confronting Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars - no room to manouvere if attacked, therefore strike first. Thus, the Schlieffen Plan had been developed long before the start of the war and the Germans had constantly revised it in the light of military intelligence about the French plans and the mobilization capabilities of the Russians. Previous history suggested that if the Germans could attack first then they could achieve the aims of taking out both enemies. France was not a lesser priority. The Germans knew they could and would attack first, being closer and able to mobilise more quickly. Russia would take longer (much longer was the expectation) to mobilise and therefore could be kept at bay while the French were taken out.

It is important to note that Germany did not occupy all of France after the Franco-Prussian War (FPW). The retention of Alsace and Lorraine provided a buffer zone. When the Germans failed to knock France out, they mainly planned to occupy as much of the north of France as possible. This would have increased the buffer, while at the same time depriving France of much of her industrial heartland. This is like the attempts that Germany made to destroy France's military capability after the FPW.

[duckman]

Serbia offered the excuse to start the war.  But what if Franz Joseph had not been assassinated?  The answer/s to this question might get closer to Germany's motivation - perhaps.

*snip*

It is important to note that Germany did not occupy all of France after the Franco-Prussian War (FPW).  The retention of Alsace and Lorraine provided a buffer zone.  When the Germans failed to knock France out, they mainly planned to occupy as much of the north of France as possible.  This would have increased the buffer, while at the same time depriving France of much of her industrial heartland.  This is like the attempts that Germany made to destroy France's military capability after the FPW.

That'll be Franz Ferdinand, of course Princip vs Hapsburg was just the trigger. Tensions had been rising for decades, and it seems to me that war was inevitable. It was just a matter of what would set light to the fuse. Several of the protagonists thought that a war was the best way to resolve their differences, and with people on both sides actively seeking a military decision, bloodshed is inevitable.

Robert, your point about the French territory raises an interesting (to me) question.

I have seen maps showing Germany's war aims which basically cover the whole of the area they actually occupied in 1914, plus what became the BEF's theatre of operations, up to the Channel coast. What I am curious about is when and to what extent did Germany start destroying industrial capability in that zone? Obviously most damage was done when sections wree being abandoned by the German army, but my impression is that some damage was done well before any prospect of having to abandon it was evident. It raises the question, was the idea of this strip (apart from giving Germany Channel ports) to increase German industrial muscle, or simply to deny it to the French?

[Guest]

There are probably thousands of different answers to this one. My amateur theory is that Germany sensed the inherent weakness in Russia (possible better than they assesed the decline in Austria) and felt that their best chance lay in beating them first. There was always the possibility that they assumed the Schleiffen plan would yield 1870 like results in a real hurry too.

What were they after - my theory is :

1. the industrial heartland of France, making Alsace Lorraine safer;

2. a buffer in the east; and

3. an "honourable" peace with Britain. One that would guarantee their navy survived along with their burgeoining empire, especially in Africa. In the years leading up to the war the Brits were getting very nervous about the German's naval build up.

I have always wondered whether they took as a serious possibility the fact that Britain would fight them over Poland's neutrality. I suspect (pure supposition this) that Germany secretly felt that Britain would stand aside.

[Robert Dunlop]

That'll be Franz Ferdinand, of course

Thanks very much for that correction!

I cannot answer your question about the destruction in northern France with much confidence. So far, my impression has been that the industrial (and agricultural) capabilities were maintained till well near the end. I don't know if Germany started the war thinking that they might just get rid of as much industrial capability as they did not want if they won but the I would think that the terrible effects of the British blockade would have forced a reconsideration of this as time went on. The coal fields, forced labour and industrial complexes would have become increasingly important.