Artillery Support in Palestine

[ddycher]

Have been pulling together a better understanding of the artillery support available to the front line troops during the 1917/18 advance and am trying to understand better the role of the Forward Observation Officer (FOO). Have searched the forum and gleaned what I can from there and that has been a big help. However can anybody add further clarification on how the Great War FOO's differed from their WW2 or modern day counterparts - specificaly in Palestine ?

I am currently assuming this a small group led by probably a Capt (this a WW2 ref although I have seen WW1 ref's for both Lieut's and 2nd Lieut's.) that was assigned by the Bde artillery to the Bn. The Bn CO would have had two or three such Forward Observation Posts led by FOO at the sub-section HQ at his disposal.

Some initial queries :

1. How many people in a FOO's team ? How many Signaller's (linesmen) in an observation post ? There is a seperate thread on the forum with a photo of an OP with apparently six people in it (plus the photographer). Would this have been typical in Palestine ? Alternitive ref I have is for the FOO plus two signallers.

2. What fire orders would have been available to the FOO in Palestine early 1918 ? Am assuming upto the Bde level - is this correct ?

3. How did the FOO report up ? Was the FOO in contact with the Artillery Liaison Officer ? I am assuming the Artillery Liaison Officer was assigned to each Bn ? Again pure speculation.

Would seem that in the campaign advances quickly oustripped the reach of the FOO's who communicated back to the Bde R.F.A via field telephone. When this occured I understand the FOO resorted to flares to call in artillery support via an SOS plan agreed in advance. Did the FOO ever resort to runners ? I ask this as I am exploring an example where no FOO went forward with the infantry because no cabling was available. This does not make any sense to me.

I am struggling to find any WW1 references but as normal could be (probably am) just looking in the wrong place.

Regards

Dave

[paul leeson]

Dave

Not sure if this help you much but it proves there was a system and it did work.

The following is a true story.

Gnr Oscar Roland Berry (145655).

Oscar was a gun layer (aimer) in the Royal Field Artillery (RFA) and served in Palestine during the First World War. My Dad remembers a tale he told that one day front line spotters called for a single shot to be fired from a single gun. Berry laid the gun and the shot was fired. A loan Turk in ‘no mans land’ was killed. Later an Officer called the gun crews together. Officer - ‘Who laid that gun.’ Berry - ‘Me sir.’ Officer - ‘Berry, you’re a murderer !’. I often wonder if this was this a case of bored Officers having a bit of target practice.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Dave, I have not come across any specific information for the Egypt/Palestine theatre. There are several books, however, that describe the variety of ways in which FOOs worked on the Western Front. "Field Guns in France" by Fraser-Tytler immediately springs to mind. P.J. Campbell's books are good, as is Behrend's book 'As from Kemmel Hill'. Talbot-Kelly gives some vivid descriptions of his time as a FO in Third Ypres, in his book 'A Subaltern's Odyssey'. A variety of visual signalling methods were used if telephone cables could not be laid or did not survive. I am very surprised that a FO would not go forward if cable was not available. Perhaps other factors were at play.

In the early days of the war, FOOs were linked to individual brigades or even just batteries. As Fraser-Tytler illustrates, by 1916 the telephone networks could be very extensive. Farndale's books on the Royal Regiment of Artillery describe how some WW2 practices were honed in WW1. This is not my area of expertise though.

Robert

[ddycher]

Gents

Many thanks for this.

Paul - interesting snapshot

Robert - will try to locate copy of Fraser-Tytlers book. Agree with you at possible other factors at play but currently have multiple refs that stipulate this due to lack of cabling - determined to find out more though.

Regards

Dave

[Pete1052]

The following explanation of forward observation during the Great War was given on the Uniforms, Arms, Insignia, Equipment and Medals forum some months back. The procedures I learned in the U.S. Army field artillery 30 years ago and those which we used in World War II were considerably different. The specific questions in the initial message ought to be asked in a general Artillery Support thread on the Uniforms, Arms, Etc forum.

In the UK system the man at the front had authority and gave orders to the guns, none of the requesting nonsense. Basically the BC [battery commander] was at the front, although in the trenches all the bty offrs (well perhaps not always the Captain) took turns as the observing officer, if they saw a target in their zone they ordered fire at it, no FDC [fire direction center] BS. Of course oppórtunity targets were fairly few and far between in trench warfare. Fraser-Tytler's 'Gamebook of German Casualties' in his 'Field Guns in France' for 6 months in 1917 is revealing as to how little shooting he did, although he claims to have bagged 412 Huns.

They basically only used predicted fire methods for targets that were unobserved or in fireplans. Of course predicted fire methods were basically invented by the British (the French might quibble a bit about that). Observed fire meant getting rounds on the ground ASAP so the observer orded map firing data, which basically went straight onto the guns' sights, as did the corrections the observer ordered. This was a very fast method of shooting which is why UK hung on to it thru WW2, albeit with other options particularly for regt, div, corps tgts.

Of course this method of gunnery meant the observer had to be able to visualise his battery's line of fire in its zone, to this end it was fairly usual to range on the battery zero point at least soon after deploying. Of course if the zero point was accurately known (eg fixed by intersection from surveyed points, then it had other uses as well.

[ddycher]

Thanks Pete

Have confirming ref's now that the Officers in the Bde rotated the OP duties. Also starting to gleam a better picture on what the OP involved.

Thanks again

Dave