The Marne

[andigger]

The other night at our book discussion forum one of the people asked me what I thought the biggest mistake on each side was regarding the battle and the events leading up to it. Of course there is an argument that going to war in the first place was the biggest mistake for each side, but assuming that is the only given what are some other opinions?

I answered that the mistakes the Germans made were in planning and expectations. It was a mistake to expect a fighting army (von Kluck) to cover the distances from Liege and initially the western areas of Paris in such a short time, especially with out train movements.

Based on some recent research I would make the argument that it was not a big mistake for Moltke not to move forward with the advancing armies. His uncle had allowed great freedom of local command to his generals in 1870 and that had proved successful.

I think one of the bigger mistakes the French made was attacking into Alsace as soon as the war broke out. Perhaps if the generals had given more credance to the anticipated German move through Belgium and massed a divideable and mobile army in Verdun they could have used trains in a rapid response to meet the threat on the Vosges and Ardennes. Joffre was a logistics and transportant leader, I don't think this could have been beyond his skill level.

Andy

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi Andy

May be the French trusted too much that the Germans would stick to the treaty making Belgium a Neutral country and would not enter it.

Annette

[Thomas]

Moltke continually weakend the right wing of the German lunge in to Belgium and Northern France. He sent 180,000 men to the eastern front, from the right wing armies. By the time they reached eastern Prussia they were not needed. The French invaded Alsace, following their Plan 17. But they were stopped and forced to retire. Moltke then decided to send 100,000 men, who could of been used in the north but sent to the south to the Grand Couronne. Where the Germans were basically massacred from the French who were entrenched on commanding ridges.

Germany had lost the battle of the Grand Couronne, if it had succeded then Paris would have fallen, but on September 10 Joffre moved divisions from the Couronne to the Marne where they could tip the scale against Germany. Had Moltke not moved the men in reserve and from the right wing to the left, then Germany probably could have won the Marne and captured Paris.

From,

Thomas McCall.

[Robert Dunlop]

The problem was that the political implications of Slavic invaders despoiling German soil were too great for Moltke. I am not surprised that forces were transferred to the Eastern Front. It would have been almost impossible not to do otherwise IMHO, though as you say, not from military perspective.

As for the French reaction, I have read that the French were aware of the German plan to hook round behind Paris. Their gamble was that all-out attack on the right and then against the centre would isolate the German right. Sadly, the offensive tactics were outmoded and the French losses were appalling, as we know.

[Dikke Bertha]

Hello

I don't know if the French were aware of the proposal to hook around Paris but they certainly aware of the proposal to invade via Belgium. I think they wanted to believe that the Germans would not operate west of the Meuse. Even when Liege fell the French persuaded themselves that this was just a precaution by the Germans to protect their right flank.

The invasion of Alsace and Lorraine were political necessities.

I agree that the Schlieffen Plan had expectations beyond the abilities of 1914 armies. Their poor military intelligence and the absence of good channels of communication between the indiviual army commanders and Von Moltke and between each other was a major weakness.

Another factor was the virtual independence of the individual German commanders Had this system applied on the allied side then Lanrezac would have invaded Belgium, the battle of Guise St. Quentin would not have taken place, Sir John French would have evacuated the continent and Gallieni would have attacked the German First Army before the other armies were ready.

Ultimately the numbers were against the Germans. From Paris to the Swiss border the Germans had a total of 9 cavalry divisions to 13 allied and 68 infantry divisions to 76 allied.

The result of the Marne cannot be attributed entirely to German shortcomings. After the battle of the frontiers Joffre successfully withdrew 7 armies susbsequently abolishing two of them and creating two more from a north/south axis and held them together for two weeks until he had them in place on an east/west axis and all this in the face of a very formidable enemy. The counterstroke when it came was not a desperate impulse to avoid disaster but a well thought out and maturing plan whcih slowly fell into place so that when the opportunity presented itself it could be assessed and then exploited.

That is not to say that Joffree planned the battle of the Marne weeks in advance or that he lead the Germans on into a gigantic trap but then again neither was the position of his forces a coincidental stoke of luck but rather the logical reaction to the developing movements of the German forces.

Never again during the next four years did large forces operate with such unfettered mobility for such high stakes.

Incidentally I do not think that Von Kluck made a mistake turning south east before Paris given the circumstances AS HE SAW THEM. Turning around Paris would have been a bigger mistake as he would have cut himself off from the II Army, exposed his Line of Communications and ended up isolated on the wrong side of Paris subject to attack from the Paris garrison plus the BEF (who would not have been needed to operate against the exposed flank of the II Army).

I also do not think that Gallieni deserves the credit he gets for his part in the battle.

Sorry I have wandered off topic a little.

[Annette Burgoyne]

"the Schlieffen Plan had expectations beyond the abilities of 1914 armies"

Makes me think, why did the Germans think they would be able to pull it off, the French Army was large (ok not as efficient as the German Army but still capable of taking on the Germans), they must have known the British would come in too and that they would have to face a large Russian Army as well, I know the latter was not a great fighting force but still a force that would have to be dealt with. Just what made the German High Command pre 1914 think that they had a cats chance in hell to defeat France. Did they truly think that their Army was so good that it could really take on bigger forces themselfs.

Annette

[Robert Dunlop]

Annette

I think the simple answer is the Franco-Prussian War. That was all over, bar the siege of Paris, in the sort of timescale that the Schlieffen Plan espoused. There is more to it that this but memories of previous wars play a large part in the planning for future wars - witness the mistaken assumptions about the recent invasion of Iraq based on the performance of the Iraqi army in the First Gulf War.

Also, the Germans HAD to believe they could do it. Otherwise, the war was lost in their minds before it started. Not the attitude of what had been, up until then, the invincible modern Prussian/German military.

[andigger]

I would have to agree with Robert. Perception is often reality for a lot of mindset.... individual and collective. Three books I have read recentl really compliment each other on this topic specifically. Michael Howard's Franco-Prussian War, The Marne, and Charles DeGaulle's Enemy's House Divided. Combined they draw a picture of an invicible German military mindset based on the 3 wars in the 1860s and also a macro management style that allowed Moltke the Elder to give greater leeway to his army generals to great success. When Moltke the Younger employeed the same management style errors were made, like von Klucks turn starting the battle of the Marne.