Independence Day 1918

[michaeldr]

Allenby in Jerusalem, celebrates the Independence Day of his new ally

While Wilson in Paris, struggles to balance the interests of the original members of the entente

Wilson to Allenby

"Versailles

4 July 1918

SECRET

I have just received your two letters of 5th and 15th June. I am back from Italy and on my way home got caught here for 5 or 6 days of Supreme Council Meetings! While I was in Italy the War Cabinet reversed the decision I got them to give me about the 54th Division. As you know I wanted to withdraw the 54th and also the Australian Mtd. Div. when I found I could get them, complete, to Amiens by the 17th and 21st of that month. I was allowed to bring the 54th but not the Australian, but now the 54th are to remain. When I get back I shall renew the attack if I can get the 54th back within a reasonable time, if not then I won't bother you any more. My wish and my hope is to reinforce you in the autumn after all anxiety here is past. As I often say at the War Cabinet it is a trifle to move 4 or 5 divisions from St Pol to Palestine nowadays compared to moving a few corps by march route [sic] 100 years ago from Madrid to Moscow. But I have difficulties the 'Little Corporal' never dreamt of! When in March, we appointed Foch, CinC. France, I urged strongly that we should agree but only on condition that we took over all the salt water and every theatre - ex. France and Italy - that lay across the salt water. I could not get L.G. or Milner to see the importance of this, and although I have repeatedly returned top the attack I have never had any success.

At the meetings now going on here this matter is being brought home to them because it is now clear that Clemenceau and Foch are going to make a bid to take over the whole war everywhere. They already issue orders in France, in Italy, in Salonika, and in Russia. And they are asking questions about Palestine and Persia! However yesterday I got L.G. to take a stand and we gave the little Frenchmen a good shaking. This was good and will have far reaching effect. At the same time I am in this difficulty that it will severely strain the Alliance if I withdraw divisions from France to send to you, and on the other hand we have no divisions anywhere else. I have skinned Home Defence down to boys under 18½ so there is nothing there. I don't think I can withdraw anything from Italy so that it is not easy to see what can be done.

We might send you out some battalions again and strengthen you in that way but whole divisions are, of course, what you want and I must try to get them.

You will have had my letter about the Japanese. They flatly refuse to come to Europe or even Mesopotamia and there will be great difficulty in getting them into Siberia even. You see my difficulties. You will help me much if you will let me know - by private letter - what is the minimum you require in men and material (quite round numbers of course) you require [sic] for a move such as you suggest in your letter i.e. - Meesandick Junction - Nablus. That sort of thing.

I must run off to a meeting. I hope you don't get much sickness from Malaria. I am sure you are doing everything possible.

The 'Affaire Maurice' really was amazing and there were many mixed up in it who ought to be ashamed of themselves.

By the way, could help you in training your Native Battalions if we sent you some officers."

photograph from a collection held at the LoC (USA)

letter from 'Allenby in Palestine - the middle east correspondence of Field Marshal Viscount Allenby' edited by Matthew Hughes, Army Records Society/Sutton Publishing, 2004

[armourersergeant]

Michael,

Not seen the picture before and the letter makes interesting reading. Many thanks.

I like especially the last three sentences where he manages to talk personal and military matter in a typical Wilson matter of fact jovial way.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

Michael,

Do you have this book?

I once scanned through it and saw a reference to Major-General Forestier-Walker. But when I looked at the quoted page it did not seem to be there! I was in the book shop at the time and the Wife was rushing me. Could you look for me and see if it says anything. FW and Allenby were good friends at Staff college I think, if I recall, that it was a personal letter, as FW was serving in Salonika at the time.

regards

Arm

[sjustice]

Amazing.

Any old fan of Giles will recognise the fearsome figure on the left.

Happy Fourth of July to anyone that celebrates the day.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

[Pete1052]

Guys, thanks for remembering our holiday.

[ulsterlad2]

Happy Fourth of July to anyone that celebrates the day.

Seconded.

I have such happy childhood memories of summers in New England: 4th of Julys in New Hampshire, peanut butter & jelly sandwiches

And I'll also have a special thought for the young men from the 33rd American Division who helped capture Le Hamel, 90 years ago today.

[michaeldr]

Arm,

Thanks for your comments

What a good memory you have!

I have just checked the index and you are right - there is a ref to Forestier-Walker, G. T., page 274. However, having reread this particular page several times just now, like you, I cannot find any mention. I have also checked the biographical notes where one would expect to find details of someone mentioned in the text, but there is nothing on F-W

I will read around a bit more but it looks neither promising, nor explicable

With his plans for the late summer advance, Allenby was very worried about the loss of his British divisions to France, and the fact that while supply for the Indians would be easier, their training would take some time. These matters crop-up regularly in the correspondence up to this point

eg: from Allenby to Wilson, 5th June 1918

"...I am planning a forward move; for the late Summer or Autumn; if I can get my Army into good form by then... ... ...

If I could have the Japanese Divisions, too, I could do big things. As I go forward, the Arabs will all rise; and the Turks will go back, most likely, to Beirut-Damascus or further. Think of it; and [...?] we have them! It would be a great help to the European campaign, if I could worry the Turk really well here. Liman von Sanders is, I fancy, a much better man than my old antagonist; Falkenhayn. He knows the Turk's nature, and can get more out of him. Someday he'll attack me; and I want to attack him, first. Odds and sods, like Jewish battalions and regiments of Hottentots, are useful in a way; but they won't win wars. Americans and lame French Territorials do not make an army; and are merely an encumbrance, if immobilized by lack of transport. Give me some fighting Japanese Divisions, and I'll give you a lot of help. We are all fit and cheerful and the army is happy and confident.

The Maurice incident was amazing! I have not heard a word of sympathy with him. ... ..."

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

quote: Any old fan of Giles will recognise the fearsome figure on the left

Simon,

I had not thought of that but you're absolutely right; a very Gilesian-grandma figure

Actually, the lady is (I think) Anna Spafford the matriarch of the American Colony who died in 1923

regards

Michael

[michaeldr]

Arm,

I think that I have found what you were looking for - the Index's ref should be page 284, and not 274 as shown in the book

extract from a typescript letter from Allenby to Kenyon

"The Residency Ramleh Egypt

11 August 1919

As regards Smith-Dorien [sic] & Le Gateau:- I went to see himat [sic] 1 a.m. & told him that unless his troops continued the retreat before daylight they could not get away, as the Germans were close on their billets and bivouacs. He consulted Hubert Hamilton & ForestierWalker [sic]: & they reported the troops unable to start before daylight, owing to fatigue. Smith-Dorrien, therefore, decided to fight; & I think that, under the circumstances, he could not have done otherwise."

Hughes includes after the above letter "a handwritten note as follows:

75 St. George's Road SW1

May 23. 1920

My Dear Fred,

Above is an extract I promised to read you. It is a private letter to myself and is an answer to a question I asked to his opinion. It seems to me to be a valuable piece of evidence, well worth preserving as the question of Le Gateau will be much discussed in years to come; but of course it cannot be published in Allenby's lifetime without his consent.

Your affectionate brother,

Edward R. Kenyon

The original is in my copy of French's Despatches 1914-16, opposite page 11."

I hope that this is of help

Regards

Michael

[4thGordons]

Seconded.

I have such happy childhood memories of summers in New England: 4th of Julys in New Hampshire, peanut butter & jelly sandwiches

And I'll also have a special thought for the young men from the 33rd American Division who helped capture Le Hamel, 90 years ago today.

33rd "Prairie Div" are my (adopted) local unit and I happended to be reading this yesterday:

From F.L Huidekoper History of the 33rd Div AEF vol1

]uly 4 was the date selected for the attack which was

to be made by the 4th Australian Division and by the Ameri-

cans. The general plan was for the 4th Australian Brigade

to capture the Vaire and Hamel Woods and to consolidate

on the spur east of them, while the 6th Brigade on the right

j and the 11th Brigadezg on the left were to carry and to con-

solidate the positions on either Hank as far as the objective

designated.“ Beginning on the north the 42nd Battalion was

formed on the left and the 43rd on the right, followed by the

44th, while the 41st constituted the reserve of the 11th Aus-

tralian Brigade, its sphere of action being bounded on the

right by a line south of Hamel. On its right was the 4th

Australian Brigade, with the 15th, 16th, and 13th Battalions

in the front line and the 14th in reserve. The mission of the

15th Battalion was to attack north of the Hamel and Vaire

Woods, which were to be dealt with by the 16th, while the

13th attacked south of the Vaire Wood. Its right was

covered by the 6th Australian Brigade. The attack was to be

made in three waves, supported by a large number of tanks

and protected by a lifting barrage. This was to be reenforced

by trench mortars and machine guns, while 161 guns of the

Australian Corps devoted themselves to counterbattery work,

and the IIIrd Corps on the north and the French Corps on the

south cooperated with their heavy artillery.“

At 3:10 A.M. on july 4, the harassing Hre, which had

been in operation for eight minutes, changed to a barrage and

lifted for one hundred yards with the launching of the

attack. On the extreme left the 42nd Battalion met with

slight resistance until it reached the first objective, about

one thousand yards from the jumping-off line. South of it the

43rd Battalion, although subjected to some machine-gun fire,

successfully attained the western edge of Hamel, where con-

siderable opposition was encountered from the enemy in dug-

outs, but these were quickly mopped up. On its right the 6th

Brigade found the German wire only partially destroyed,

encountered stiffer resistance and heavier machine-gun fire,

and suffered a number of casualties from defective barrage."

The enemy in the Pear Trench fought with grim resolution

against the 15th Battalion and south of it the Vaire Trench

temporarily arrested the advance of the 16th Battalion, both

being additionally subjected to a heavy enfilade fire of

machine guns. Spirited rushes, coupled with vigorous use of

the bayonet and bombs, resulted in the capture of these two

positions and in the surrender of a large number of Germans.

The troops then pushed on to the first objective, where the

entire attacking force made a halt of ten minutes under cover

of a heavy smoke screen, the lines reformed, the tanks over-

took the infantry and, in the sector of the llth Brigade, the

44th Battalion leapfrogged into position ahead of the 43rd.

At 4:10 A. M. the advance was resumed but no deter-

mined resistance was offered by the enemy, although some

casualties were suffered until the machine guns at Hamel and

in the Hamel Wood were put out of action. At 5 A. M. the

final objective was reached and at this point the enemy, in

large numbers and from strong positions, made a determined

stand. Assisted by the tanks, assaults were promptly launched

against him, the strong points crushed, and his trenches

thoroughly mopped up. The infantry then began to dig in,

completing this operation about 7 A.M. but not without loss,

inasmuch as the cessation of the Australian barrage in the

rear of his trenches at 5:30 A. M. was the signal for the

resumption of activity on the part of snipers, machine guns,

and artillery, which maintained a lively fire throughout the

day. The morning was devoted to consolidating the positions

gained and during the afternoon some of the enemy’s posts

were rushed. At dusk the Germans retaliated by attacking

the 44th Battalion, but a counterattack, in which Company G,

, 132nd Infantry, participated, repulsed him with a loss of

about fifty prisoners.“

The aeroplanes on both sides were extremely active dur-

ing the main engagement, dropping bombs and using machine

guns against the positions of their adversaries. The Austra-

lian aeroplanes also brought up ammunition and wire, drop-

ping them by means of parachutes. Upon the cessation of the

protective barrage at 5:30 A. M., the Australian aeroplanes

flew over in large formations and retained command of the

air until noon, when thirty-five enemy planes appeared to dis-

pute their supremacy. Two of the Australian aircraft were

downed and thatnight the Germans bombed the Allied posi-

tions unmercifully.“‘

In the action at Hamel,“ three Australian brigades and

one thousand American troops were employed. Every objec-

tive was attained and the capture of these strong German

positions rid the Australian lines of the menace and annoy-

ance to which they had long been subjected. Forty-one Ger-

man officers and 1,431 men were made prisoners, and matéricl

was captured amounting to 171 machine guns, 26 trench

mortars, and two 77-millimeter pieces. The Australian

casualties were less than eight hundred,“ while the American

losses were confined to 24 enlisted men killed, 8 officers and

123 men wounded, and 21 men missing?"

The action at Hamel, while of minor importance from a

military standpoint, exercised an incalculable influence.“

Amiens was generally considered at that time to be the

danger spot on the entire western front. All signs indicated

that the great German drive, which was expected at almost

any moment, would be aimed at England by way of Amiens

and the valley of the Somme to the Channel. It has since

been discovered that such was the German plan at that time.

The action at Hamel took place on the Fourth of ]uly, a date

particularly full of significance to Americans. It was the first

time that Amercan troops had cooperated with troops of the

British Empire in a battle of any magnitude, and it demon-

strated to the British and French that in all the American

troops-National Guard and National Army as well as Regu-

lars—they possessed allies upon whom they could depend in

any military operation, no matter how diHicult.3"

That very day the Division Commander received from

General Sir Henry Rawlinson the following telegram:

]uly 4, 1918.

33RD AMERICAN Division

I have much pleasure in forwarding the following mes-.

sage just received from the Commander-in-Chief, Begins:

"Will you please to convey to Lt. Gen. Sir ]. Monash and all

ranks under his command including the tanks and the detach-

ment of the 33rd American Division my warm congratula-

tions on the success which attended the operation carried out

this morning and on the skill and gallantry with which it was

conducted.

Douglas Ham.

From General RAWLINSON.

On the following day the Commander of the Fourth

British Army telegraphed:

GENERAL BELL, 33rd Illinois Division.

July 5, 1918.

Am anxious to express to you, General Bell, and to all

ranks of the 33rd (Illinois) Division, my warm thanks for the

gallant part taken by portions of your division in the attack at

Hamel and Vaire Wood on Independence Day. I hear

nothing but praise of the manner in which your units fought

the enemy and my only regret is that I was not permitted to

employ a larger portion of your fine division. Perhaps later

on there may be another opportunity.

General RAWLINSON.

That same day came the following letter:

AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

CORPS HEADQUARTERS,

5th Iuly, 1918.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I desire to take the opportunity of tendering to you, as

their immediate Commander, my earnest thanks for the

assistance and services of the four Companies of Infantry who

participated in yesterday’s brilliant operations.

The dash, gallantry and efficiency of these American

Troops left nothing to be desired, and my Australian Soldiers

speak in the very highest terms in praise of them. That Sol-

diers of the United States and of Australia should have

been associated for the first time in such close co-operation on

the battlefield, is an historic [event] of such significance that

it will live forever in the annals of our respective Nations.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN MONASH,

Lieut.-General,

Commanding Australian Corps.

[michaeldr]

Ulsterlad2 & 4thGordons,

Many thanks for reminding us of the action that day 90 years ago

best regards

Michael

[armourersergeant]

I hope that this is of help

It is another brick in the wall. In FW's obit Edmonds maintains that SD asked Fw for his advice and he said you must stand. This was the job obviously to advise his Chief. I have never been able to get any other proof of this actually happening, though I assumed it did. This is the proof, many thanks.

I am surprised that Wilson and Allenby write of the Maurice affair in a negative way! Though I guess both Allenby and Wilson were 'cool' with Haig and may have looked on it with a different stand. As I write it also occurs to me that Allenby may have seen it as another thing to draw away troops from his theatre!

Very helpful and interesting thread for me, many thanks again

regards

Arm

[michaeldr]

quote: I am surprised that Wilson and Allenby write of the Maurice affair in a negative way!

That struck me too Arm, though I put it down to the professional soldier's disdain for getting mixed up in politics. I had not thought of Allenby's concerns over his manpower situation as colouring his view on this, but you may be right.

Glad to have been able to help with F-W

Regards

Michael

[sjustice]

It would have been political suicide for Wilson, as CIGS, to support Maurice, and the master-intriguer was outraged at the breaking of ranks.

Allenby was the beneficiary of Lloyd-George's incredible drive to send a division and material to Palestine, so would be unlikely to defend Maurice, LGs vehement critic.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

...

I am surprised that Wilson and Allenby write of the Maurice affair in a negative way!

...

Arm