Brigadier general Percy Crozier

[Beau Geste]

In another posting I tried to draw attention to the qualities that made Lt Col E T Sandys the man he was. I have to say that I was delighted at the response. Those of you who took the trouble to join in saw him as a man of great humility and sensitivity who chose death at his own hand rather than live with the thought that he had failed those he not only commanded but loved as well. The qualities of mind and spirit that colonel Sandys displayed before, during and after that fateful attack along Mash valley on 1st July 1916, were so important to men who were living like troglodytes and in constant fear of their lives. They loved him in return and in my research of this kindly man I have yet to find anyone who has criticised him for his decision to take what some have called, misguidedly I suggest, "the easy way out".

In juxtaposition of Sandys I offer you Brigadier General Percy Crozier, formerly Lt Col commanding the 9th battalion The Royal Irish Rifles. From what I've read about this officer, I have to admit that I am finding great difficulty "getting my head" around his quality as a person and his leadership style. I hasten to add here that I am not criticising his achievements or his courage under the most extreme circumstances, just his humanity. I'm also aware that there are a number of leadership styles and it is usually prudent to adopt the one that suits one's own personality and character. In other words, to be what one is rather that what one thinks others would prefer him to be. Crozier certainly did that and there was no way he was going to take "the easy way out" immaterial of the losses his units suffered.

Two illustrations might clarify what I'm trying to say here. The first was the well documented execution of James Crozier (same name, no relation) of the 9th RIR against the inside wall of the chateau at Mailly Mellet. Crozier was only 18 years of age and on enlistment in Sept 1914 there had been some confusion over his age. In Colonel Crozier's memoires, he admits that he had promised young Crozier's mother that "he would look after him". What is known for sure is that in January 1916, near Serre, the 18 year went absent and was court martialled. Young Crozier claimed that he hadn't known what he was doing and that he had been in great pain. Colonel Crozier's report to the court marshal was damning: "From a fighting point of view, this soldier is of no value. His behaviour has been that of a shirker for the past three months."

Young Crozier was, of course, 'shot at dawn.' His body lies in The Sucerie Cemetery, Colincamps.

The second illustration is perhaps even more illuminating.

In his memoires he draws attention to a scene near Gordon Castle on the morning of 1st July 1916. "....I glance to the right through a gap in the trees. I see the 10th Rifles plodding on and then my eyes are riveted on a sight I shall never see again. It is the 32nd Division at it's best. I see rows upon rows of British soldiers lying dead, dying or wounded in no man's land."

Perhaps I'm reading into this something that others don't see as significant but ..................

I really would appreciate your comments.

Harry

[susanhemmings]

Harry,

Good God. "At it's best"? What a strange comment to make.

I have no knowledge at all about how these chaps (those in command and those taking orders) may have been affected, nor do I profess to understand the reasons behind this comment. One can only surmise. And it is a very interesting subject for those that have that knowledge. I hope others join in to enlighten .......

Only my opionion (to be taken with a great heap of salt)......

It could be he was wrapped up in the glory of the 32nd Division galantry and heroics - "at it's best" -(see, there we go - my own thoughts) or maybe he simply did not like British soldiers... who knows - could be taken either way......(I am probably speaking way out of turn as I do not even know who the 32nd Division were - shame on me)...... but on that morning one thing is for sure - the total slaughter he seems to have witnessed was a sight that he never saw again (thank God)..

Sometimes everything seems black and white to us, but there are many shades of grey that would have affected day to day opinions, thoughts and actions then, just as they do today. I, for one, cannot imagine the pressure, fear, and every other emotion that would have occurred. It is humbling to be so in the dark and I feel it would be patronizing of me to even begin to guess (as I just am not knowlegeable enough). So I will keep my lip buttoned. !

Then, of course, whoever edits and finally publishes memoirs has his own slant on things. I wonder when his memoirs were published and whether they were taken from his memory, or his diary ..... very interesting....

But, when all is said and done it does seem a peculiar thing for him to have said. He may well have been misquoted. Even the omission of a comma changes the meaning of a sentence completely....... as does mis-spelling (which I am very quilty of).....

As for the young Crozier - that is a very sad tale and one that perhaps happened to many, many young, and not so young, men during the course of the conflict.

We only know those we are told about.

It's all very sad. The effects of that war had so many repercussions. So many lives completely shattered one way or another - even those who led, just as those who followed.

Thanks for posting Harry. Interesting thread.....

Susan.

[Black Watch]

Probably pondering his next promotion or medal, courtesy of these "dead, dying or wounded". It's surprising that he was close enough to the front to see them.

Another quote;

"The net result of the barren, glorious bloody battle of Thiepval is that over 700 men of the West Belfast battalion of the Royal Irish Rifles prove their ability to subordinate matter to mind. Intellectual discipline had triumphed."

Neil

[susanhemmings]

Neil. I am speechless. Probably just as well I am in the dark. I don't know what I expected, but that is criminal.

speechless......poor souls. So when you see photo's of those higher ranks with their medals splayed and shining across their breast.... at whose expense were they gained... so sad. so distressing for everyone.

[Beau Geste]

Thanks Susan for getting the ball rolling.

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Thanks Neil. In 1916 a lot of commanding officers (and he was a Lt Col at the time) led their men into battle and very often died with them.

Harry

[armourersergeant]

The second illustration is perhaps even more illuminating.

In his memoires he draws attention to a scene near Gordon Castle on the morning of 1st July 1916. "....I glance to the right through a gap in the trees. I see the 10th Rifles plodding on and then my eyes are riveted on a sight I shall never see again. It is the 32nd Division at it's best. I see rows upon rows of British soldiers lying dead, dying or wounded in no man's land."

Perhaps I'm reading into this something that others don't see as significant but ..................

I really would appreciate your comments.

Harry

For a man like Crozier, a soldier, hard nut etc, he would see this, much like say the rows of soldiers who stood their ground repelling the enemy, died doing their 'job' They did not flinch from the advance. He is perhaps not praising their death, but more their sacrifice, just not in the most understanable of ways.

Neil. I am speechless. Probably just as well I am in the dark. I don't know what I expected, but that is criminal.

speechless......poor souls. So when you see photo's of those higher ranks with their medals splayed and shining across their breast.... at whose expense were they gained... so sad. so distressing for everyone.

It is worth remembering that many of the Generals, earned the hard way some of the medals that adorned their chests. As an example, Lt-Gen. Snow served in the Zulu war as a sublatern, stood in a square at Ablu klea (1884-5 Sudan), when the Dervishers broke the square near his corner, was wounded the next day. They may have been old and ralatively comfortable in WW1, but they had stood the line and faced death in other wars. That does not mean of course that they did not have blood on their hands. But I am not aware of any General or commander who does not have blood on his hands.

regards

Arm

[susanhemmings]

Thinking about it Arm, that is very true. Thank you for the info. When I was typing the piece about medals on chests I was reminded within my brain of all those gallant commanding officers who actually died with and sometimes before their men. I think of those who went crazy at the futility of the war and those who probably did not even want their medals because of how and why they had been earned. We have no way of knowing what each and every one of them went through - only what is written about, and sometimes by, them. It is a fascinating subject - I am extremely interested in "what makes people tick" and, therefore, find it compelling....

It is so sad, but a fact of life I suppose that there is good and bad in every walk of life - commanding officers no exception.

This forum provides, for me, an education and insight into the Great War that I would never, ever have been capable of during my formative years. (not that we touched on the Great War in any great way). We learned more about ancient history - egypt, ziggurats come to mind.

I think today's generation is fortunate in learning about more (modern) history in that they, hopefully, will be better informed and able to form a better life as a result.

Thanks

Susan.

[Beau Geste]

For a man like Crozier, a soldier, hard nut etc, he would see this, much like say the rows of soldiers who stood their ground repelling the enemy, died doing their 'job' They did not flinch from the advance. He is perhaps not praising their death, but more their sacrifice, just not in the most understanable of ways.

It is worth remembering that many of the Generals, earned the hard way some of the medals that adorned their chests. As an example, Lt-Gen. Snow served in the Zulu war as a sublatern, stood in a square at Ablu klea (1884-5 Sudan), when the Dervishers broke the square near his corner, was wounded the next day. They may have been old and ralatively comfortable in WW1, but they had stood the line and faced death in other wars. That does not mean of course that they did not have blood on their hands. But I am not aware of any General or commander who does not have blood on his hands.

regards

Arm

Hello Arm,

I entirely agree with your point.

I would like to add that I too am uncomfortable with criticisms that the generals were "butchers" with "blood on their hands" etc., etc., which suggest that they were either barbarians who didn't give a damn for those who died or that they were incompetent donkeys who should have known better.

What one has to remember is that The Great War was fought at the beginning of the 20th century, at a time when conflicts on that scale were unheard of. The experience of those who were senior officers in WW1 had been gained, mostly on horseback, in relatively small wars in different parts of The Empire.

I'm not making excuses for those who made mistakes. Mistakes were certainly made, but these people were thrust into a situation that was alien to them. They were, in a sense, on an extremely steep learning curve. They had to come to terms with the demands of trench warfare on a massive scale as well as a whole range of weapon systems that were either new, and therefore "a mystery" to them, or in alarmingly short supply.

The more I read about The Somme or Flanders and the more I visit these battlefields and study the ground over which the battles were fought, the more incredulous I become that somehow we managed to snatch victory out of defeat. In large part that was due, of course, to the magnificent performance of the soldiers who took part and in so many cases paid the ultimate price. But it was also due to the overall performance of those who conducted that war and had to learn new skills as they went along.

Harry

[Beau Geste]

Hear! hear! Susan

harry

[Desmond7]

This is what the IMHO obnoxious Perce wrote at the actual time

12 noon

Information not having come through from the front, two Intelligence Scouts were sent out to report on the situation but these men never returned.

12.30 pm

Right Company and men from several Battalions retired to line C6 – C7 – C8 – B14, this line was consolidated so as to form a defensive flank.

The line B16 – B14 – B13 – and 100 yards South of CRUCIFIX was at this time being consolidated by mixed troops under Major Gaffikin, Major Peacock, 9th Inniskilling Fusiliers, was also in the vicinity. Left Company had not dug in between ‘C’ and ‘D’ line but at this time had taken up a position between C9 and B16 (inclusive). This position proved to be a very bad one as the field of fire towards ‘D’ line was interrupted by large mounds of excavated earth thrown up from the trench and on the East side of it; it was also badly enfiladed from D10 – D11 by machine gun fire.

12.50 pm

Major Gaffikin sent for Captain Montgomery and they jointly surveyed the line in process of consolidation; they also inspected the line B14 – B15 – B17 – B18 – and 200 yards north towards C11.

The line C11 – C12 was found to be in the process of consolidation by our troops.

It became apparent that THIEPVAL, not haviing been taken, was the crux of the situation; a report to this effect was received at Battalion Hd. Qrs. By a runner.

1.30 pm

Runner arrived from Major Gaffikin asking for grenades and SAA; these were sent up to B17.

1.45 pm

A runner was depatched to Battalion Hd. Qrs. By Major Gaffikin stating that his Right flank was in the air and that his left flank almost so, but this runner was wounded and delivered the message late at night.

2 pm

The two remaining Company Commanders (Major Gaffikin and Captain Montgomery came to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to give orders to hang on to what they had got and to send back for a large supply of grenades and SAA.

The chief difficulty and this period and onwards was that runners could not get through, telephonic communication was cut and visual communication was impossible.

2.45 pm

The first signs of the enemy advancing in small bodies at wide intervals observed. Two men were seen to jump into a trench and immediately afterwards wave a white rectangular board, white on the enemy side and of a neutral tint facing us which they then planted on the parados.

This suspicious movement was reported by three different runners to Battalion Hd. Qrs. But none of the messages got through.

3.15 pm

A patrol under 2/Lieut. Campbell previously detailed by Captain Montgomery to reconnoitre down to the trench at B12 returned, and reported having got almost to B12 from which place the Germans were seen firing on the firestep towards THIEPVAL WOOD; rapid fire was opened on these men and this had the effect of causing some confusion and consternation as the burst of fire was one of surprise.

3.45 pm

Some sand bags were observed being thrown up by the enemy at B16; very heavy bombing had been heard from this direction just previous to this; it was evident that they were endeavouring to make a barricade. Fire was immediately opened on this point by our sentries at barricade at B14. This was the beginning of the German bombing counter-attack, well planned and standing out as an example of what can be done in the attack by mutual support. At a point 70 yards east of B14 we had established a blocking post in the line B14 – C8; this point was forced mainly due to the Germans out throwing our men with hand grenades.

It is important to remember that a block of 50 yards at least is required to stop enemy bombing parties armed with hand grenades and it appears that our bombers were out ranged, possibly owing to many of the men throwing their grenades instead of bowling them, they thus got easily tired.

At this juncture a catapult did good work and demonstrated the usefulness of this weapon; without which no Company should be without as a portion of its equipment and I am sure if the men were taught to look after the catapult in the same way as they look after their Lewis gun great good would come out of it.

4 pm

During this period and onwards the Lewis guns and gun teams came into their own and proved that they are a most useful weapon in attack as well as defence, especially in trench fighting of this description.

Whatever the men dropped they hung on to their magazines. Magazines were refilled in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ lines under arrangements which had been made by Captain Montgomery.

4.15 pm

To return to the actual trench fighting, the enemy was prevented from adding to his barricade at B16 for some time owing to the action of the Lewis gun team but subsequently this Lewis gun was knocked out, and the barricade was rebuilt very cleverly a little further away by throwing the bags round a corner. Immediately this was seen 2/Lieut. Smeeth was sent with 4 men over out barricade at B14 with orders to go up the trench and bomb the enemy away from their sand bags and hold the corner; a small party being told off to support him.

This party went forward most gallantly and got about half way down the trench when they themselves were bombed most unexpectedly either from a dug-out or recess, or some such place. 2/Lieut. Smeeth and one man were wounded but brought in and the whole re-crossed our barricade.

4.30 pm

The enemy now started a long burst of machine gun fire from B16 down the trench to B14 and drilled a hole through our sand bags killing a Lewis gunner and destroying the loophole. This long burst of fire appears to have been the signal for a determined attack from North, South and East, the whole converging on B14.

It was at this point that the news came to hand that about 15 minutes previous Lieut. Saunderson 107th Brigade Machine Gun Company and his party had been wiped out, fighting hard to the end at C7. He had previously, with a very few men, reconnoitred down MOUQUET SWITCH to apoint between C4 and C2, which he reported clear as far as he got.

At this point 2/Lieut. Harding Battalion Intelligence Officer, had proceeded alone to the front line to make a personal reconnaissance as news was not coming in either often or quick enough and it was impossible at this time to tell in any way accurately at Battalion Hd. Qrs. What was going on.

2/Lieut. Harding returned about 4.15 pm and said that German bombing attacks were going on, that he had seen Major Gaffikin and Captain Montgomery but that, providing the supply of hand grenades kept up, the situation should not become critical, but he pointed out that machine gun fire from THIEPVAL had made the position which was being held by the Battalion an impossible one; he proceeded to Brigade Hd. Qrs. To personally report.

Lieut. Finlay Battalion Bombing Officer, at this stage collected odd men together and sent them up to the ‘B’ line by the less exposed route, though somewhat longer, under command of Sergeant Cully, the provost sergeant, who was the most dependable NCO I could put my hand on at the time; shortly after this Lieut. Finlay was himself wounded by shrapnel. These grenades were dumped at B17 and Sergeant Cully reported afterwards.

The buried cable at Brigade Hd. Qrs. Was cut but I was in hopes that the report which 2/Lieut. Harding would be able to give would lucidate the situation better than I could ever write second hand.

4.45 pm

B14 was forced after fierce fighting; this post was held by 10 men from ‘A’ Company but none returned.

6 pm

No news was coming through from the front, so 15 men belonging to the Battalion and Stokes Battery were sent up under Rifleman Martin (CO’s orderly) each man carrying 10 bandoliers of SAA but for some unknown reason they were turned off their objective by a Major of another Corps.

6.30 pm

Trench mortars were very active from THIEPVAL at this period and the front l9ine trench was also shelled, I surmised that the enemy were preventing the arrival of reinforcements.

2/Lieut. Harding returned from Brigade Hd. Qrs. And informed me that two companies 4th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment were on their way up to reinforce the front line; but I had previously been informed by Brigade that reinforcements were coming up and this information had been sent on to the senior officer present in the firing line, by three different runners, but as a matter of fact Captain Montgomery did not receive this message till 9 pm.

7 pm

2/Lieut. Harding again went up to the firing line with orders to intercept the two companies 4th West Yorks and guide them to the best place. Captain Montgomery states that he never saw these men but 2/Lieut. Harding actually put them into ‘B’ line, it is quite possible however that they may have been missed but they undoubtedly were fighting.

9.40 pm

2/Lieut. Harding returned at 9.40 pm and although he stated that heavy grenade fighting was in progress he did not convey the impression that the men were in any way at their last gasp, but however he emphasised the importance of sending up water and ammunitioon to ‘B’ line as soon as possible and for this purpose Lieut. Garner organised a carrying party of 20 men which he took charge of himself and conducted to ‘B’ line by the less exposed way; as the water had to be got from SPEYSIDE it never got further than ‘A’ line but 10,000 rounds got to B17.

2/Lieut. Harding brought back word that Major Gaffikin had been hit and that Captain Montgomery was in command.

At this time 2/Lieut. Harding turned in to have a sleep having arranged to guide me up to the ‘B’ line after dark.

At about this time four reinforcing columns of Germans were seen by Captain Montgomery from B15 advancing from the direction of FARM DE MOUQUET, Lewis guns were turned on them and they scattered and loss was inflicted thereby.

The German bombing parties were now converging steadily on to B15 and the men were very much fatigued, so much so in fact that in many instances they were unable to do anything.

At B15 2/Lieut. Campbell was hit by a hand grenade where he died.

Reinforcement officers were sent up to the senior officer present at the front and of these 2/Lieut. Richardson was killed in ‘B’ line and Lieut. Hone, who had taken a small party to endeavour to bomb from B15 to B14, had not been since seen.

9.45 pm

Somebody on the left shouted at this time “They are on us from the left” and the men remaining in ‘B’ line got into ‘A’ line. Major Peacock 9th Inniskilling Fusiliers, and Captain Montgomery of the Battalion under my command, were at the time consulting together, the former shouted to the latter pointing to the right “Try and rally those men there”; Captain Montgomery did succeed in rallying a few remnants but the men were absolutely done and had they stayed there would have been useless for defence so they returned to our lines.

Captain Montgomery reported to me at 10 pm in a state of collapse, I sent him on down to Brigade and he was evacuated, the wound on his head was not so serious as at first thought, his life undoubtedly being saved by his steel helmet, he was labelled for England, but rallying, prevailed on the medical officer to allow him to return to the Battalion where he arrived on the night of the 3rd July.

10.30 pm

Nothing now remained to be done save to organise the defence of our own fire trench which was done.

7th July 1916

P Crozier

Lieut Colonel

Commdg 9th Bn Royal Irish Rifles.

[ianw]

I have little doubt that Crozier was a deeply unpleasant man but I think his personal bravery is not in doubt. I think he probably did not feel fear at all but had no compassion for or understanding of the 99.999% of humanity that do. He is a warrior and therefore enjoys war. He is probably very similar in psychology to Patton. Quite how useful in battle men like this are, is a matter of debate. They may be respected but seldom liked.

His autobiography is an extraordinary revealing and sometimes repellent book.

[Beau Geste]

I have little doubt that Crozier was a deeply unpleasant man but I think his personal bravery is not in doubt. I think he probably did not feel fear at all but had no compassion for or understanding of the 99.999% of humanity that do. He is a warrior and therefore enjoys war. He is probably very similar in psychology to Patton. Quite how useful in battle men like this are, is a matter of debate. They may be respected but seldom liked.

His autobiography is an extraordinary revealing and sometimes repellent book.

I think you are probably right Ian and your opinion of his autobiography parallels my own.

There are some highly relevant comments in Michael Stedman's Battlefield Europe book "Thiepval" that support your view that he was a deeply unpleasant man. "In the twenty years before the Great War Percy Crozier had been something of a colonial adventurer. During this period he had both established and cured a drink problem..........In 1912 he became active in the UVF in West Belfast......and then the 9th RIR. He approached his work with a hugely energetic zeal. We concentrate on two things (he said) 'knocking the beer and politics out of all ranks and building an esprit de corps in its place'.......He regarded it as axiomatic that all soldiers should have the kindly streak of civilised behaviour removed".

In your posting Ian you say that he had "no compassion for or understanding of......99.999% of humanity" I agree. Earlier, I drew attention to the execution of Rifleman Crozier in the chateau grounds in Mailly-Maillet. As Michael Stedman points out: "His (Lt Col Crozier's) account (of the shooting) is a graphic and wretched indictment of humanity. 'The victim is carried to the stake. He is far too drunk to walk. He is out of view save for myself as I stand on a mound near the wall. As he is produced I see that he is practically lifeless and quite unconscious. He has already been bound with ropes. There are hooks on the post; we always do things thoroughly in the Rifles. He is hooked on like dead meat in the butcher's shop.....This is war."

Crozier's philosophy might shock but, like you Ian, I'm sure it wasn't unique at that time. Perhaps what makes Crozier different was his willingness to articulate his nastiness in so many ways. He seemed to enjoy shocking people but perhaps that too was premeditated: he undoubtedly used fear in a conscious way to get the level of obedience he demanded from his men.

It has to be remembered though that during the Great War soldiers were sometimes under immense pressure and in these awful moments it was the discipline that he was obviously determined to instil in his men that kept them strong both individually and as a unit.

The question surely is at what cost ?

Harry

[ianw]

Harry - yes, psychopaths can be useful in war and Crozier types would have been found at all levels, I am sure. I know that some battalions kept select groups of men for raiding who actively enjoyed these sorts of activities and were much more effective as a result. They were excused some of the drudgery of normal soldiering.

Did Crozier indeed "only" get to Brigadier General? If so, perhaps his character kept him from further promotion. I think Bridadiers are almost expected to be mad!

[Jerrymurland]

Crozier's infamy continued after the war, after the Armistice he helped organise the Lithuanian army against the Bolsheviks and then returned to command the British 'auxillery' forces in Ireland, resigning later over his disapproval of the reprisals he was ordered to carry out - strangely out of character with his war time record! His politics seemed to sway between Irish nationalism, facism and pacifism. His book, 'Men I Killed' was said by Orr to be one of the most tasteless book titles in English literary history. His time with the 36th Division ended when he was promoted and went off to command the 119th Brigade in 1916. Orr describes him as a callous and overbearing martinet in 'The Road to the Somme', which is well worth a read if you are interested in the 36th Division.

Jerry

[auchonvillerssomme]

Good old Percy, always gets some interesting responses. its worthwhile searching him on other threads.

Mick

[Beau Geste]

Good old Percy, always gets some interesting responses. its worthwhile searching him on other threads.

Mick

Hello Mick,

I want to respond to several points that have been brought up today by Ian and Jerry but I'm on a tight schedule !!!!! However I had to comment on your posting Mick, the photo of Percy that is reproduced in Michael Stedman's "Thiepval". When I saw it for the first time I have to admit to experiencing negative vibes. He looked like a "pompous little man" (please don't take that as an insult if you are under 5'6") who had to 'exert' himself to be noticed. Ian uses the term "only" (I know Ian you didn't mean it as a derogatory term) when he states that Crozier "only" reached the rank of brigadier. Well, to reach the rank of lieutenant colonel is a real achievement believe me and to reach the rank of brigadier is well beyond most. So Crozier must have had something going for him. Nevertheless, he does come across as a pompous little man who felt that he "needed to shout really loud (or act abominally) to be heard".

I wonder if this was a factor in the sort of man he was.

Harry

[susanhemmings]

Facinating stuff. Thanks Des and everyone for the ongoing stuff.

Funilly enough, his pic above is very similar to how I had imagined him to look. I am not sure if he is puffing out his chest or trying to hold his stomach in.

Susan.

My post has crossed with the one above: I think it's called a "Napoleonic" personality (in the dog world at least)....whatever that means.

[auchonvillerssomme]

Heres a pic not often seen. Lieutenant FP Crozier 2nd West African Frontier Force in 1902.

Mick

[Beau Geste]

Heres a pic not often seen. Lieutenant FP Crozier 2nd West African Frontier Force in 1902.

Mick

Hi Mick.

Fabulous photo. It leaves me feeling puzzled. As a young man he's not at all like the Lt Col / Brigadier he was to become. As I've said above, at that point he looked pomposity personified. Your photo though is of an intelligent, handsome young man who has an air of confidence about him but no indication of the sort of person he was to become. I think I might have liked Crozier as a younger, newly commissioned officer. If I'm right and believe me there's no guarantee that that is the case, he seems no different to the many young officers I taught as an officers' tutor during my time in the RAEC. I find myself asking the question what made him change ? Or am I completely off the mark and is there something in his photograph that I have missed ? Have you anything, Mick, that offers us an insight into this metamorphosis ?

Harry

[armourersergeant]

As for me, when I look at that photo I see a young man with a lower chin and set mouth of pure arrogance, but then I am perhaps being led by the facts I know. He does also remind me of an old Prussian officer, all he needs is the duelling scar on the cheek!

regards

Arm

[susanhemmings]

That's a smashing photo of him in his youth.

He does look quite aloof, even then. He looks as if he believes he has it all, with an "inborn" air of superiority already.

Again, it makes me wonder what happened along the way to make him into the man he became. Perhaps he had a troubled personal life, coupled with a desire to claw his way upwards no matter whom he trod on to get there.

I know nothing of his autobiography, so all this input is fascinating.

Thank you all.

[Jerrymurland]

You are all being too kind! I'm not sure I can read all these sentiments from the two pictures of him, I still like martinet and callous and that's got nothing to do with his jaw line!

jerry

[susanhemmings]

[Desmond7]

Someone on this forum will have access to the diaries of his long term servant Davy Starret, an Ulsterman who served with hm in the original division and then moved to subsequent postings (I believe).

Starret echoes the 'no fear' aspect of Crozier's personality.

I have no doubt about Percy's ablity in the military sense nor do I have any real doubts about his bravery. I do find him a most unlikeable human being (from what I have gleaned about him through reading mind you!).

He was also a brilliant self publicist.