73rd Hanoverian Fusiliers Guillemont

[uncle bill]

I am posting this for a Dutch friend who is writing a book on Junger's regiment. This is what he asked me

" I'm struggling about over the exact position of FR73 between 23 aug and 3 sept: I have trenchmaps, scetches etc but some are unclear or even contradictory, and written accounts don't help. The regimental history of FR73 is not that precise in its description and the map shown in the book appears to me optimistic (see my drawing in 3sepmap2a). I am aware circumstances around Guillemont were 'chaotic' and proper lines didn't really exist (more linked shell holes). I'm particularly interested in the left, southern bit, were there existed 2 sunkenroads: the most left one, which runs to Maltz horn farm and was incorperated in the german system atleast till mid aug, and the one besides that one, which also runs to hardecourt (often in uk reports there's talk of the guil-hardec road, but which one, there are 2...). A report of the 2nd Leins. 23 aug talks of troops lined up astride de G-Hardec. road (which one???), parralell to the sunkenroad (which one??) in front of Arrow head copse, which would put them in the german defensive system???? I suppose the most southern part of system was given up by sep, since the troops attacking on the 3rd breach the line near wedge wood...Help!!!!"

Any help would be appreciated

[Jack Sheldon]

Bill, or may I call you Uncle?

Let us begin with a couple of sketch maps. This first is from IR 73 and, presumably, is the one that is troubling your contact.

[Jack Sheldon]

I suspect that is a map like this one which is troubling him. This is a 27th Infantry Division map of teh August fighting showing the line pushed back tot he south of Guillemont

[Jack Sheldon]

Here is a third map showing the overall situation on the morning of the day the village finally fell. This comes from Guillemont by W Nau, which is Volume V of the Beitraege zur Geschichte des Regiments Hamburg [i.e. IR 76, which was also part of 111th Infantry Division. Note that it tends to confirm the IR 73 version of events.

[Jack Sheldon]

As always when this type of query crops up, the principal difficulty is the fact that the records of 111th Infantry Division went up in flames with the rest of the Prussian archives in April 1945. This forces us to fall back on either regimental histories (which, as he says, are often contradictory), or to attempt to use the surviving archives to fill in the gaps. August is relatively straightforward because 27th Infantry Division from Wuerttemberg held this sector for an extraordinary 25 days of intense fighting. As a result there are plenty of maps available for consultation in Stuttgart and it must be remembered that the fighting took place repeatedly over exactly the same ground, so the lines barely moved.

However it appears from the 27th Div map and part of its history that ground was definitely lost to the south of the village (at least temporarily) as a result of the battles from 16 - 18 Aug. IR 127 took the brunt of this and had to be relieved by elements of IR 124, who arrived with orders to retake the lost ground (regimental history p 57); the so-called Feldwachestellung. It seems that at least part of this was in Allied hands when forward elements of IR 124 arrived and, in extremely confused fighting, both sides became really entangled, though in places sub-units fought their way forward. 8th Coy, for example, broke through to its position and linked with the neighbouring Bavarians. There was then a period when sub-units of the regiment were defending forward but were cut off from the rear. Unfortunately the picture is incomplete, because many of the documents relating to IR 124 went missing during the confusion of the post-war period. It may be possible to make for some of this deficiency, because at one point elements of Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 1 both partly relieved and propped up IR 124. That being the case, there should be maps and information in Munich, though I have never checked it.

There is also a clear statement in the IR 124 history that during the night 17/18 August, '[Although] part of 7th Coy IR 124 was occupying scattered shell craters and the the commander could not direct their activities, part of it was occupying a sunken road running south from the village.' Presumably this is the one shown clearly on the IR 27 map above. During the next few days there seem to have been continual attempts to assert a grip on the these forward positions, but intense Allied artillery fire during daylight hours appears to have repeatedly thwarted these attempts and parties from the regiment were frequently out of contact with the rear.

This is the point when IR 73 enters the picture. Its history states explicitly that it inherited a position which was based around two sunken roads running out of Guillemont, that it occupied the more westerly one with three companies and that it was out of direct contact with the regiments to its left and right, but had visual contact by day and despatched patrols by night. Having thought about this, I believe the map in the IR 73 history to be correct, as far as it goes, but to feel that it portrays not the solid line of defence it suggests; rather it is a representation of an highly precarous position, which is perhaps better suggested by the IR 76 map (whose publication predates it by 12 years), which shows the gaps clearly.

I hope that this helps a bit.

Jack

[egbert]

For the Dutch friend:

[uncle bill]

many thanks Jack, thankyou for taking the time to post all this info. Thanks to Egbert for his usual aerial photo expertise.

[eparges]

Thanx for info (Jack), but things are not as clear to me (especially after reading carefulle the regimental history and a map showing the 12th kings at guillemont). I cannot find the description they occupied precisely those 2 'sunken roads': the KTK (Kampftruppenkommnadeur) was located in the sunken road Guinchy - Hardecourt: it's the 'first' sunken road Junger describes (RH 405-407) (and, unfortunately the 2nd regimental history leans heavely on Junger, the first, much shorter RH one by Cserzepanski (1923) is not very precise..(erinnerugnsblatter deutscher regimenter FR73). Jünger goes on the arrive in the 2nd sunken road, which takin things by the letter, would be the middle one...

[eparges]

[eparges]

And I'd like to add, looking at the map of IR76, would position 2.,3. and 4.K of FR73 more along the 'middle' sunken road, away from the Guillemont -Hardecourt road...(IR164 reg.history shows a similar map)

[Mike McCarthy]

As part of my battle tour of Guillemont I have pondered this a fair bit.

My research on Junger clearly places him in the first (western) sunken lane mentioned by Jack. The second sunken lane (or defile as it is described in SoS) is no longer there, having been reclaimed by farming but it is clear today where it was.

Jack is correct that the British had infiltrated behind the German positions to the South.

Hitchcock mentions that at this time one of his outposts was positioned about 150 yards from the German positions and out of sight of his other Companies (which were in the general area between Arrow Head Copse and the sunken lane). He tells us it was “the worst detached post I ever came across in the war-absolutely in the blue. In fact the enemy had a post between us and the right flank of the Company”. The ground where the sunken lane ends (and which was barricaded) slopes down towards the South East and Hitchcock’s description exactly matches the ground. Hitchcock continues “All the torn up ground around us was lined with dead. We had no barbed wire, and we were not visible from any other point in our line” Likewise Junger’s description is exactly matched by the ground today. It was the western sunken lane that was lost by Junger’s company on 3rd September, and its importance to the Southern defence of Guillemont is clear.

I stand there and think of Junger’s description of that sunken lane: “As the storm raged around us I walked up and down my sector. The men had fixed bayonets. They stood stony and motionless, rifle in hand, on the front edge of the dip, gazing into the field. Now and then, by the light of a flare, I saw steel helmet by steel helmet, blade by glinting blade, and I was overcome by a feeling of invulnerability. We might be crushed, but surely we could not be conquered”.

Difficult to see how this magnificent paragraph can be bettered.

I am back in Guillemont on 27/28 Jan on a recce to try and resolve Junger’s route out of Combles to the sunken lane. If some photos are needed let me know.

[Jack Sheldon]

I suppose that one of the good features of this type of discussion is the fact that it forces us to pool our knowledge and really try to cut through the clutter in order to move towards an honest approximation of the original truth. This map is one of those in the history of IR 164. It positively identifies the Braune Linie [brown Line] and I take that to be the the line of the obvious trench running back towards the KTK and shown on the 27th Inf Div map. On p 277 of 'The German Army on the Somme' I quote Vizefeldwebel Warneke of FR 73, who stated that on 3 September he was 'captured in a hopeless depth position [in einer hoffnungslosen ruckwaertigen Stellung (1./73)]held by 1st Coy' From all the references that we have shared, that must refer to the Braune Linie. He then goes on to talk about being led across a craterfield to the sunken lane which had been defended to the death by 2nd, 3rd and 4th Coys. In view of German doctrine it would only be meaningful for him to mention a depth position if the other companies were located distinctly forward of it.

I simply do not have Mike's specialised and detailed knowledge of the ground, but I still feel that the balance of probability, based on the various descriptions and the sketch maps we have found, puts them in the more westerly of the possible locations. Inherent military probability might come to our aid here, if Mike can give us an idea about what can be seen from ground level at the likely site. If it was not geographically advantageous to the defence, it is hard to see why the Germans tried so hard to hang on to it, or were so effective when fighting from its cover.

Jack

[Retrac]

The period under discussion is towards the end of the time I've been looking at, although my research does cover the 17/18 August advance by the 24th Div towards Guillemont. I've been researching from the perspective of Machine Gunners supporting the British 73rd Brigade, part of 24th Div. (The presence of two opposing Units both numbered 73 did give some preliminary confusion when looking at sketch maps). The War Diaries for 2nd Leinster, 9th R Sussex and 7th Northants are quite detailed and contain some sketch plans and grid references which may help locate the sunken roads and other details. I seem to recall from my notes that Leinsters had a major action on 2nd Sept involving the area around Orchard Trench.

Hope this is of some help

David

[Retrac]

For the Dutch friend:

Egbert

Just to clarify, in your aerial photograph is the feature you mark as 'sand pit' the one marked as quarry on the maps? It seems to be in the right position. It's important to my story as the quarry was marking the position held by my grandfather's machine gun team until it got destroyed on 18th August.

Thanks

David

[Mike McCarthy]

Regrettably my scanning software has gone ga-ga otherwise I could send some pictures. I’ll get it fixed asap.

Meanwhile taking Jack’s point about inherent military probability, the importance if the sunken lane is clear on the ground. Firstly it occupies rising ground and has excellent enfilade potential to the North, which basically means that the ‘bowl’ between Trones Wood and the village is covered. Because it is not (and was not) straight the angles of fire are quite wide. Also as importantly, the gap between the lane and the ‘fortress’ (the elevated area between the Montauban-Guillemont Road and the Quarries) is covered. This open and exposed area between the lane and the fortress was not occupied, it holding no protective options and being just too dangerous. Hitchcock mentions that previous attacks on this axis of advance had been destroyed by MG’s in the sunken lane. So the key is the enfilade field of fire to the North. Junger mentions with great frustration that he can see through field glasses British troops (possibly 7/SLI) moving back from the exposed British front line in front of the Station, moving almost unmolested by German artillery.

Ironically the field of fire to the West (ie in front of the lane) is not that good as there is a clear rise that restricts the killing ground to about 50-70 metres in places. This becomes important on 3rd Sept when the British quickly overwhelm the lane. I think that is because the Germans have been pounded by artillery and are less effective, and because the covering potential from the fortress and from the ruins of the village has been removed by the surge of 16th Division through the village. (The divisional dividing line was the Montauban-Guillemont road). Basically the lane became isolated and fell.

The ground to the South East is extremely strong against frontal attack, being based on Falfemont Farm, however once the Sunken lane and its support defile are taken, that is unhinged from the North and explains the rapid collapse of the whole Guillemont system.

The OH (opp P.251) gives an excellent map identifying the exposed German position in the sunken lane and the defensive line (isolated shellholes) thrown back on the Maurepas Road and held on 3 Sept by 6/164 which again tallies with Junger’s description. With the additional evidence that Jack has offered it makes Junger’s position even more certain.

The ground tells us that the sunken lane was vital to the defence of the whole Guillemont sector and explains why excellent German units were rotated into it at great loss.

As ever, remembering to get your head down to ground level, the fall of ground in front of the flank defence running from the top of the Sunken Lane towards the Maurepas Road confirms that the Leinsters were towards the end of August in that isolated and exposed outpost in front of it, and that FR73 was virtually surrounded.

Brendon Moorhouse in his book on 7th SLI (P.69) mentions that 7/SLI crossed the sunken road (from the direction of Arrow Head Copse) that had been the German front line and that in the road are many dead Germans as well as KRRC & RB. This is the reverse journey of Vizefeldwebel Warneke of FR 73.

I'll try and get some pics posted which will make it clear.

[6th Shropshires]

Hi

Here is the objective map (part of) for the British 20th Division for their attack of 3rd Sept. The chap who drew it got a little mix up, as you can see that he as had to go over red trench line with black. And he as a very small bit of German line marked wrongly in black (the very small bit that runs from the sunken road to the top of the letter T), I have other situation maps from the 20th Division, and the captured German trenches are clearly marked in purple on one map and red on others.

Its hard for me to tell from the German maps but it looks to me that the 73rd Hanoverian Fusiliers hold both the line opposite right half of the 20th Division + the left half of 5th Division, who were on the right of the 20th Div.

[Mike McCarthy]

Photo from 'Jungers Lane' looking North towards the site of Guillemont Station. Junger's men were facing generally left. The bend further down the lane would seem to be the logical location for the MG's that stopped the Leinster's earlier advance. You get a slight hint of the ground in front of Junger being convex. See the slope of the ploughed field towards the top of the Calvary (the white arrow shape). The line of trees apparently at the end of the lane is marking the area of the 'fortress' with the Quarry just beyond. Clearly any frontal attack on the village would have suffered enfilade fire from Junger's Lane.

[Jack Sheldon]

Thanks for your contributions Mike. I feel almost 100% sure that we are now on the right lines. I shall go and take a close look at the ground myself when I am next up at the Somme.

Jack

[Mike McCarthy]

I have this picture of Guillemont. It was taken in September 1916. After hours with a magnifying glass I am quite certain that it is the same location as the previous picture posted.

That being the case now go read Storm of Steel pages 97-98 etc (Hofmann's translation 203, Penguin) and compare. The main text is

“The defile proved to be little more than a series of enormous craters full of pieces of uniform, weapons and dead bodies. The country around, so far as the eye could see, had been completely ploughed by heavy shells. Not a single blade of grass showed itself. The churned up field was gruesome. In among the living defenders lay the dead. When we dug foxholes we realised that they were stacked in layers. One company after another, pressed together in the drumfire, had been mown down, then the bodies buried under showers of earth sent up by the shells, and then the relief company had taken their predecessors place. And now it was our turn”

Any thoughts on my interpretation welcome.

[uncle bill]

Thanks to all who have made this most instructive thread.

[Jack Sheldon]

Here, for what it is worth, is a sunken road picture taken at Guillemont by a German photographer in summer 1916. I am afraid I do not know exactly where it was taken

Jack

[Jack Sheldon]

I think that this one is of the Kiesgrube [Gravel Pit] position just north of the village.

Jack

[Jack Sheldon]

This is thought to be a view from the edge of Guillemont in the direction of Delville Wood

Jack

[egbert]

Egbert

Just to clarify, in your aerial photograph is the feature you mark as 'sand pit' the one marked as quarry on the maps? It seems to be in the right position. It's important to my story as the quarry was marking the position held by my grandfather's machine gun team until it got destroyed on 18th August.

Thanks

David

Yes indeed its the Kiesgrube!

[egbert]

....