Artillery on the Somme

[Old Tom]

A recent thread on a different part of the forum stared with a question about artillery, staff BCs and BKs. It diverted to artillery advisors and arrived at the Somme. It revealed different opinions as to the quality of a (pair of) authors opinons on the handling of artillery. Before going further I must admit that my knowledge of the topic is all second hand i.e. by reading books which are, I suppose, are individual interpretations of original papers influenced by those who have tackled the topic before.

There seems to be little doubt that artillery in support of the first offensive did not achieve all that was expected. My appreciation is that this was because of many factors which I will try and outline, without any attempt to indicated relative importance, or to on whose work I base my thoughts.

Equipment - many pieces were old and worn - much ammunition had been produced by inexperienced factories and there were many failures - fuses suitable for wire cutting were not available.

Staff - many corps and divisional staff lacked experience and did not conform to what was emerging as best practice - creeping barrage etc

Capability - I think this was the point of issue in the thread I have referred to - there was insufficient artillery to sucessfully engage the 1st and 2nd German lines at the same time.

Training - many gunners had not been adequately trained before deployment to France and had not been there long enough to learn on the job.

This is pretty superficial, but may be sufficient to provoke discussion and input from those with deeper knowledge.

Old Tom

[phil andrade]

Woefully deficient in both quantitiy and quality. Compared with the French who were attacking to the South, the flaws in British artillery appear grotesque. The results of July 1st 1916 speak for themselves. Artillery is the common denominator. The proportion of "heavies" seems to be crucial here. The French had so much more reliance on weight of shell. Verdun taught them that. Forgive the generalisation - I have a sketchy knowledge. In artillery terms, the British were out of their depth....it seems blindingly obvious even to an ignoramus.

Phil

[Pete1052]

The applicable chapter of Sanders Marble's e-book The Infantry Cannot Do With a Gun Less is available by clicking here.

[truthergw]

This is a large subject and not one which will be answered in a short post. I think there are two main directions of thought here. The actual artillery which was available and how it was used.

As to amount, it was less than a year since Sir John French had raised the problem of lack of guns and lack of ammunition. The Battle of Loos had helped to underline the problem and it would be very unrealistic to think that all was well some 10 months later. The planning for the Somme was initiated at the end of 1915 and frontage would be settled by the following March. The guns would be allocated in the best way possible. An artillery plan for a battle of this magnitude is not scribbled on the back of a fag packet a few days before the firing starts. The artillery commanders drew up the plans for the available resources and then the plans were put into practice. That is weeks of road and rail building. Preparation of sites. Installation of railheads and ammunition dumps and so on. Guns brought from Britain and installed on levelled and accurately surveyed sites then registered on allocated targets. I think it can be assumed that the army command used all the guns they could properly make use of. There are many references to the amount of duds fired at the Somme. There is no doubt that the ammunition should have been of a lot higher quality. I doubt if we can blame that on the gunners, they fired what they were given.

As for the question of how the guns were used, I believe this was the last of the battles where the idea of destruction was still thought possible. Starting from Neuve Chapelle the previous Spring, the thought had always been that if only they had had more guns and heavier guns, they would have succeeded. The idea at the Somme was that a prolonged bombardment would destroy the enemy defences and leave the defending forces demoralised and much depleted. Deprived of food, water and rest for several days and their defences levelled, the infantry's task would relatively easy. The Somme demonstrated that that idea was without value. Something more than just more and bigger guns would have to be used. The lessons were learned on the Somme and some were being applied before that battle was over. As far as artillery was concerned, I think that it was here in Picardy that the idea that guns ruled the battlefield was really assimilated and what that meant. The primary target for the guns was not the enemy infantry but the enemy guns. Destroying trenches and wire was useless if the enemy could bring down a barrage on attacking troops.

Much more could be, and will be said but that will do for now.

[ianjonesncl]

Old Tom

A thought provoking topic.

Staff arrangements

According to Battle Tactics of the Western Front Paddy Griffith any Artillery above the 60 pounders was Army level RGA. According to Farndale - History of the Royal Artillery Western Front 1914-18, the only staff at Army level were a Brigade Major and a Staff Captain. At Corps level General Officer Commander Royal Artillery (Major General) and staff had been established. So who made the decision for the allocation of Artillery? And what were the criteria?

This may be partially answered by the fact that on the 1^st March 1916 the war office had moved against a recommendation that Corps commanders control Heavy Artillery allocated to them. Instead Lieutenant Colonels groups were established, two per Army and two per Corps. However, again how was that allocation made?

If these command relationships are correct, then at Army level the Brigade Major is co-ordinating six Major Generals, 12 Lieutenant Colonels Army Groups. I would suggest, if correct, this would be a difficult task to ensure that Artillery was allocated where it was needed the most, whatever the criteria used.

[ianjonesncl]

The primary target for the guns was not the enemy infantry but the enemy guns. Destroying trenches and wire was useless if the enemy could bring down a barrage on attacking troops.

The doctrine adopted in for the Boer War was a distinct phase which was to win the Artillery Duel, this moved in 1908 toward artillery being more directed toward increased co-operation with the infantry.

Farndale - History of the Royal Artillery Western Front 1914-18 states " Artillery commanders were obsessed with the need to keep fire immediately in front of the infantry. In doing so, they again allowed counter battery tasks , and ability to switch guns of the barrage to deal with the unexpected, to slip into second place".

Farndale goes on to say "But who could blame them -they were feeling their way with new doctrines and new techniques when their equipment was not up to it"

I would contend that they were having to re-learn the importance of counter battery fire as truthergw rightly states, but would also suggest they were starting to learn the requirement for simultaneity, the need to engage targets in support of the infantry, counter bombardment and other targets at the same time. My view is in 1916 neither the doctrine nor the command and control arrangements were robust enough to achieve that.

[phil andrade]

What astonishes me is the precedent that had been set at Neuve Chapelle : here the density of guns on the frontage attacked vastly exceeded that of the Somme. Why was the attack on the Somme - which was on an infinitely grander scale than that of March 1915 - not supported by a comparable weight per yardage of front ? Apparently, Haig, in a relatively local action, was able to marshall a much more effective ordnance programme than he was in the exponentially more grand affair in Picardy 15 months later.

Phil

[museumtom]

An eyewitness account in hospital of ther battle.

Previous to Saturday morning, the 1st July, you have read of the British bombardment along the whole front, which lasted for five or six days, during which time it was pretty hot, although there were hundreds of guns which never spoke until two hours previous to the charge. So on Saturday morning on the moment of 6.30 a.m. every British gun along the whole front started action and continued for two and a half hours. The first ten minutes the guns played on the German wire and front trenches, the next fifteen minutes on the second line, the next twenty-five on the third line, and the remainder of the time on the fourth line. The French 75’s too, were playing away, together with the new immense trench mortars which make such havoc with the trenches.

[bmac]

The doctrine adopted in for the Boer War was a distinct phase which was to win the Artillery Duel, this moved in 1908 toward artillery being more directed toward increased co-operation with the infantry.

Farndale - History of the Royal Artillery Western Front 1914-18 states " Artillery commanders were obsessed with the need to keep fire immediately in front of the infantry. In doing so, they again allowed counter battery tasks , and ability to switch guns of the barrage to deal with the unexpected, to slip into second place".

Farndale goes on to say "But who could blame them -they were feeling their way with new doctrines and new techniques when their equipment was not up to it"

I would contend that they were having to re-learn the importance of counter battery fire as truthergw rightly states, but would also suggest they were starting to learn the requirement for simultaneity, the need to engage targets in support of the infantry, counter bombardment and other targets at the same time. My view is in 1916 neither the doctrine nor the command and control arrangements were robust enough to achieve that.

A few thoughts.

The French had, though, learned many of these lessons and Gen Fayolle applied them ruthlessly during 6th Army's preparations for their attacks north and south of the river. Fayolle insisted to his Corps commanders, against some initial resistance, that the guns and howitzers available were to be used to either destroy or neutralise enemy batteries whenever the opportunity arose. Some German batteries were pulverised by thousands of heavy rounds. 4th Battery, 6th FAR reported 15000 rounds fell on or near the battery position during the bombardment. This compares to British batteries firing, at best, hundreds of shells at similar targets but often considerably fewer.

And all this in spite of the fact that, except for a few 105 and 155 mm guns and the 75 mm field guns, the French artillery was using equipment built in the 1870s and 1880s, some with no recoil system, and many taken from forts and coastal batteries and adapted for use in the field on rudimentary carriages. The British howitzers, in particular, were, in general, far more modern with the 6 in 26 cwt, 9.2, 12 and 15 in weapons all being of modern design.

But what the French lacked in quality they more than made up for in quantity and the intelligence of their application. The length and depth of their front was strictly dictated by the quantity and weight of guns and, particularly, howitzers available. As a result the French had a much higher concentration of firepower north and south of the Somme per yard of front than Rawlinson was allowed (but which the XIII Corps benefited from at Montauban). Their objectives were also much more limited and this allowed for a far greater weight of shell to fall on the German lines, communications and artillery. Their approach was more flexible with balloon observers able to call down guns and howitzers onto active enemy batteries as a priority over other targets. There was also a more flexible approach on the day of the attack with batteries being attached even down to regimental level with decision making much closer to the front thus allowing for a swifter response to calls for artillery support.

They had certain distinct advantages. The 75's instantaneous graze fuse, though rather temperamental, was very effective at clearing the German wire which almost ceased to exist in front of the initial objectives. The 75 mm guns were then free to fire large quantities of their new gas shells Nos 4 and 5 at German infantry and artillery positions, especially on the day of the attack. The destruction of the front line trenches was to a great extent left to the large numbers of new trench mortars, the Mortar 58 and the 240 mm mortars both of which could fire both HE and gas shells, and the combinations of these weapons made large parts of the German front two trenches uninhabitable. In places, French patrols were able to walk up to the German second trench without interference well before the attack took place.

Because of the strict limit given for the advance it was also possible for second battery positions to be constructed within the existing French lines to which batteries started to move on 1st July so that they would be able to cover the attack on the German 2nd position the following day. Had the British achieved some of their deeper objectives the moving of guns forward to new postions within the German lines and across severely damaged countyside would have been a major exercise (and was practised on several occasions).

The results of this planning were that, by the evening, when the village of Curlu fell, all objectives had been taken at a loss of c. 2500 killed, wounded and missing. Incursions into two villages due to be attacked on the second day had taken place, one being ejected by a German counter attack, the other being withdrawn so that the artillery preparation could take place before the attack took place on the 2nd.

Of course, south of the river, the French had the advantage of attacking two hours after the combined British/French attack on the north bank. By this time, some artillery was already moving away to the north and the artillery and infantry reserves had been previously weakened. Nonetheless, the attack south of the river was a complete success with very small casualties except outside Frise and Assevillers (and these were still tiny compared to events on the British front). But the delayed start time gave the French artillery another advantage. The Somme that summer was notorious for early morning mist which Haig described as having the advantage of concealing the infantry. It also, however, made aerial observation of German positions and batteries very difficult during the intensive bombardment prior to the attack. South of the river the French attacked in clearer conditions which allowed for good observation. They had lost the argument before the attack as to the best start time north of the river, the British, as senior partners numerically, having insisted on 7.30 a.m.

[truthergw]

What astonishes me is the precedent that had been set at Neuve Chapelle : here the density of guns on the frontage attacked vastly exceeded that of the Somme. Why was the attack on the Somme - which was on an infinitely grander scale than that of March 1915 - not supported by a comparable weight per yardage of front ? Apparently, Haig, in a relatively local action, was able to marshall a much more effective ordnance programme than he was in the exponentially more grand affair in Picardy 15 months later.

Phil

You imply that a choice was made to limit the number of guns and restrict the mix of calibres. I believe that the battle was fought on a given front with the available artillery. That is the sole resemblance between Neuve Chapelle and the Somme. In the company of a couple of forumites, I have walked all over the N C field in less than a day. I spent days walking parts of the northern half of the Somme battleground. Neuve Chapelle was fought by some 350 guns and howitzers of all calibres in support of 4 divisions. ( Figures from the OH). I don't have the OH volumes for the Somme but the amount of resources employed was vastly in excess of that amount.

The original plan for the Somme, as drawn up by Rawlinson, was to attack and occupy the opposing trenches on a broad front. Consolidate, then repeat. His so called ' bite and hold' method. Haig demanded a more ambitious target. The reason the battle had been brought forward to such an early date was to draw resources from the Germans at Verdun. Only a threatened breakthrough would have that result so the depth of the assault was increased. There was a problem of contradictory requirements which was not solved at the Somme nor at N.C. To give real depth and the required density to an artillery attack, it was required to concentrate on a narrow front. That however left the flanks untouched and able to direct fire on the attacking force from 3 sides simultaneously. To lessen this effect of flanking fire, it was necessary to broaden the attack front as wide as possible. This left the centre free from enfilade and had the added advantage of disconnecting the wings of the defence. These two conflicting aims and requirements had to be balanced as best they could. This dilemma and the fact which I mentioned earlier, that not enough weight was given to counter battery fire were large contributers to the heavy losses on the first day.

[johnreed]

This is an extract from an article first published in 1924 by Lt Col A.F. Brooke D.S.O. in which he goes into great depth in "The Evolution of Artillery in the Great War" this about "The Somme"

BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

With five months of continuous operations, the Battle of the Somme provided suitable conditions for trying out some of the tactical ideas which had resulted from the last year's fighting. We have seen in a previous article that the organisation of the artillery had made distinct strides during the winter months preceding this offensive. We were now provided with artillery capable of exercising a marked influence in the field of battle. Certain refinements in its organisation, and reinforcements to its strength were still required to bring it up to the standard which it reached during the latter part of the war, yet it had attained its early, manhood, and its actions at this period are consequently of particular interest to us.

The policy of destruction received a free rein, both tactical and strategical surprise was entirely sacrificed, the four days' preliminary bombardment of Loos was replaced by one of seven days. We endeavoured to destroy all the wire covering the front system of defences, all fire trenches, strong points, and main communication trenches, whilst the early stage of development of our counterbattery methods prevented us from also including the hostile batteries in our scheme of destruction. Trench mortars were now available in sufficient numbers to be entrusted with the destruction of the front line of wire entanglements. All other wire defences were engaged with 18 pounders firing shrapnel since no efficient wire cutting H.E. Shell was available at that date. The trench destruction was entrusted to the Corps heavy artillery. The decision as to the degree of destruction required was transferred to the actual infantry units destined to carry out the attack. Such a procedure may at first strike one as logical. The individual destined to carry out an assault over a given trench system should be the best judge as to the degree of destruction required to ensure success to his undertaking. On closer examination the procedure presents certain aspects which alter the case. Destruction can only be obtained by protracted methods and by the creation of shell torn areas obstructing forward communication. Yet neither of these factors affected the enterprise of the unit to which a limited objective had been allotted, they only concerned the higher formations, but certainly exercised a vital influence on the operation as a whole. The result of such a decision could only lead to longer periods of preliminary destruction, and greater obstruction through shell torn areas.

Turning to the artillery support during the initial attack and the subsequent operations of the prolonged struggle, we observe distinct progress in the artillery tactics. We had failed to appreciate the paralyzing effects possible in preparatory bombardments but we were beginning to realise the neutralising possibilities in the support, of the actual attack. The germ of the new "rolling" or "creeping" barrage had, as we have already seen, been evident at Loos. The battle opened with the attack of July lst still supported by a system of "lifts" from trench to trench regulated by a pre-arranged time programme. The whole object of this method, being to prevent the defenders manning their trenches until such time as the assault¬ing troops were sufficiently close to them to admit of the trench being rushed before its fire power could be re-established. The Germans were quick to realise that the only method of avoiding such neutralisation of the fire power of the defence lay in siting a proportion of automatic weapons in the space intervening between the trenches. It therefore became necessary to sweep the ground in advance of the attack, irrespective of all visible defences. We produced a curtain of fire moving in advance of the assaulting troops, regulated by a time table based on the predicted rate of advance of the infantry. By a process of trial and error we arrived at the required density of this fire, and the distance of each lift necessary to cover all the ground. With a maximum rate of fire of four rounds per gun per minute we found that one 18 pdr. Per 25 yds. of front would provide a sufficient maximum volume of fire, whilst variations in the density of this fire could be regulated by reduc¬tions in the rates of fire. To ensure that all ground should be covered by our curtain of fire in its forward movement, we decided that lifts of 100 yards would meet requirements. During the course of the attack definite pauses were arranged conforming to the capture of the various objectives and providing the protection required by the infantry against hostile counter-attacks. As the battle progressed our curtain of fire was found to be lacking in sufficient depth. Casualties were suffered from hostile fire origin¬ating in advance of the zone covered by the barrage. This fault was remedied by additional curtains of fire from 18 pdrs., 4.5in hows. and medium artillery in advance of the initial line.

The parent of the rolling barrage, namely the trench to trench lifts, had left an unfortunate legacy to its offspring in the shape of unnecessary complications. The attacking infantry, used to definite lifts from one trench to another, whilst approving of the inter¬vening ground being covered, insisted on the curtain of fire being built tip on each successive trench. Had all trenches been parallel to each other and to the front of attack complications would not have arisen, this was not the case, as a result barrages were attempted necessitating intricate evolutions of fire which were neither possible nor necessary, and calculated to introduce serious errors.

Our tactical conceptions of artillery support in the attack had by now altered materially from those held in 1914. The "accessory" role of the artillery was now left far behind, the days were gone of attacks planned by infantry with artillery requested to co-operate to the best of its ability. The infantry, deprived of its mobility through the hostile fire power, now required a combined plan of attack to regain its power of movement through the proper applica¬tion of the available artillery power. This degree of mobility had, however, only been regained through the sacrifice of the power of manoeuvre in the attack. Our plans of attack were assuming a rigidity which required considerable re-adjustment in our tactical ideas.

The long drawn out nature of the Somme battle provided suit¬able conditions for further developments in our systems of harassing fire, which had already been in evidence during the previous year's fighting. We realised that the efficiency of such fire was dependent on the accuracy of the available intelligence and the care with which programmes of harassing fire were produced.

Our lack of faith in the efficiency of our methods of counterbattery work is well exemplified by the massive gun emplacements constructed to support the initial attack. Gradually the lessons we had learnt in 1915, combined with our daily increasing experience, resulted in the adoption of improvised methods in an endeavour to co-ordinate the various existing counter-battery efforts. A Heavy Artillery Group H.Q. was selected in each Corps, and made responsible for counter-battery work, the commanding officer of the group becoming to all intents and purposes the counter-battery officer of the future. Although at that date still unofficially recognised, this new system at once produced marked improvements in our counter-battery methods. Hostile artillery intelligence now became systematically collected and collated, the work of survey sections was developed and turned to good use, methods of engaging hostile batteries became standardised, and last but not least, the ca-operation of artillery and aircraft was directed into proper channels.

John

[truthergw]

Interesting article John. Thanks for posting it. Among other things, it highlights the struggle between attacker and defender. How each advance in attack was met by a defensive measure requiring another advance and so on. I hadn't realised that German defenders were using shell holes between the trenches on the Somme. I associated that with late 1917.

[Old Tom]

Some interesting comments, many thanks.

As to the numbers of howitzers, can bmac comment on the numbers of 9.2" 12" and 15" available and perhaps their ammunition supply. The heavy howitzers were the only weapons capable of disrupting or blocking deep dug outs; but then only if their fire was sufficiently accurate. I have the impression that the days of precise firing had not arrived in July 16.

John's post adds a well informed view, Lt Col A Brook, well known in WW2, was BMRA in the 18th Div on the Somme; one of the divisions on the right that made significant advances. Albeit, not exploited.

May I re-direct the thrush of the thread? I would welcome views of the relative quality of the treatment of artillery by the authors who have written about the Somme campaign. I have a soft spot for Prior and Wilson, perhaps because it was of the first books I read which dealt with the conduct of operations. I have also read General Farndale's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery on the Western Front 14 – 18, The Somme by Gary Sheffield and have noted comments on artillery on the Somme in several other books. What are members favorites?

Old Tom

[bmac]

A few quick comments.

The number of howitzers available, according to the BOH, was:

6in (old and new pattern) 104

8in 64

9.2in 60

12in 11

15in 6

220 mm French 16 (very elderly).

Shells available were (as of 15th June):

6in 100000

8 & 9,2in 60000

12in & 15in 3000

Not all of these shells were available for use as some had to be retained for subsequent operations. These were to cover targets in an area 20,000 yards by between 2 and 3,000 yards

The figures for shells for all gun types was:

18 pounder 2600000

4.5 inch howitzer 260000

4.7 inch and 60 pounder 156000

6 inch howitzer 100000

8 inch and 9.2 inch howitzer 60000

12 and 15 inch howitzers 3000

6 inch guns 14000

9.2 inch and 12 inch guns 750

3 inch Stokes mortars 800000

2 inch mortars ?? (but described as 'as required')

240 mm mortars 6000

1.7 million shells were fired up to the end of 1st July and so a fairly small proportion of all shells fired came, therefore, from the medium and heavy howitzers. Keegan in 'The Face of Battle' estimates the howitzers fired 130,000 of the 1.5 million shells fired before Z Day, about 9%. The 18 pdrs fired 1 million shells.

Their effectiveness of the heavies was progressively diluted by:

1. The softness of the ground;

2. Poor weather and, therefore, poor visibility;

3. Barrel wear (even though howitzers have a much longer life span than guns the rate of fire was unprecedented);

4. An existing pre-'wear' aiming error of at least 25 yards; and

5. The inexperience of many of the gunners, a large number of which had only recently arrived from the UK (several were also firing different types of guns from the ones on which they trained).

The supply of shells, though far greater than ever before, was in no way unlimited and conservation of stocks became an issue well before Z Day. In addition, numerous guns of all natures were out of action because of wear and tear during the bombardment and on Z Day. The 9.2 in shells had the worst reputation for 'blinds' though the post-attack study (by Birch?) of the ground taken at the southern end of the battlefield reported very few. This does not coincide with accounts on the ground by other ranks. Shells were also reported to be of variable size and weight which made their flight and accuracy highly variable.

[ianjonesncl]

There have been a number of good points made about the amount of Artillery available and the amount of ammunition used. From Bmacs comments it would seem that the French had a higher density of howitzers and that the amount of ammunition fired was in thousands for a battery not hundreds.

Focusing on the task of destroying trenches and the use of Howitzers. A few thoughts;

The use of Howitzers per yard for destroying trenches seems to have been the main planning factor for the British. According to Farndale - History of the Royal Artillery Western Front 1914-18 the Somme frontage was 25,000 yards. The high level planning which Brigadier Birch outlined in his Report on the Somme Bombardment was 50 yards per howitzer 6 and above. This would make a requirement of 500 howitzers. The number of Howitzers available:

6in (old and new pattern) 104

8in 64

9.2in 60

12in 11

15in 6

Total 245 Howitzers 1 to 102 yards (Farndale has 1 to 58 yards but this includes all heavy guns / howitzers)

The planning is crude, the figures may not be entirely accurate, the key point at this early stage it is highlighting that there is not enough Artillery.

The weight of fire being brought down is also an important point. If the howitzer fire was intended to destroy trenches, then it would follow that once one sector was destroyed, fire could be switched to another sector. Therefore the key element is ammunition, as this is the real weapon of the artillery.

Using SS139/4, Artillery in Offensive Operations, March 1917 and the weight of fire tables which now focus on the rounds per yard the figures for the total destruction of trenches are:

6" or 8" 4 rounds per yard

9.2" 3 rounds per yard

Planning on the use of the 6", 8" and 9.2" and using a planning figure of 4 rounds per yard, the requirement would be 100,000 rounds – availability 190,000. (And some of that was require for subsequent phases). However, to achieve 100,000 rounds on target, firing at rate 2 (2 rounds per minute), requires 833 hours of firing, which with 245 Howitzers would take 35 days continuous fire (ignores gun maintenance, crew fatigue, hot guns). So even if this data had been available, and the planning was more effective, it would seem there was still a shortage of Howitzers.

In both instances some of the logic and figures can be challenged, however I would contend it would have to be wildly out (indeed it maybe !)not to conclude that the crude planning criteria in 1916, and with hindsight in 1917, meant insufficient Howitzers were available for the preliminary bombardment. I believe more detailed staff work would not have provided a different conclusion.

[bmac]

Re: your point of rounds per yard of trench, it should be remembered that the German fisrt position consisted of three lines (sometimes more) of trenches and that also, between Serre and Pozieres, the German second line was to be taken as well with the necessity for preparation by the artillery (wire, here, being cut as far as possible by the 60 pounders). Also, some howitzers were allocated to counter battery work from time to time. Thus the number of rounds possible per yard of trench was far more diluted than even your already unsatisfactory totals conclude.

[ianjonesncl]

Bill

I have just being looking at your excellent site and looking at the information you have on the bombardment.

"Heavy artillery - start to bombard strong points, trenches and rear villages"

In Birch's Report on the Bombardment of the Somme he stated that "the greater part of the Artillery [was] massed on salients and the intervening spaces neglected" This would indicate the lack of Artillery was being overcome by what would now be termed "Targeting" - not a blanket of fire but specific targets - which requires good intelligence.

Do we know how good that intelligence was ?

If the Artillery fire is to be"Targeted", then an assessment of which trenches to bombard, which strong points to be hit, and what was in the rear villages would ensure maximum effect is achieved. Certainly in The Story of the Tyneside Scottish Brigadier Ternan states "

Certain objectives in the Hun lines and in the rear were singled out for special attention"

It also raises the question as to how accurate those locations were known. I have been looking at Haig's Artillery maps for the Somme, and trenches are well defined, but what about locations of strong points? And did they know how strong they were ? The latter point would dictate how much ammunition would be needed to be effective.

I am also mindful of what Ternan later wrote in the "Story of the Tyneside Scottish", While the enemy's Artillery caused us heavy losses, our casualties were mainly due to the intensity of the enemy's machine gun fire. In addition to the guns in the trenches many others were placed cunningly places in carefully hidden positions on the slopes of Sausage and Mash valleys North and South of La Boiselle. He goes onto describe the method of concealment and "these [machine] guns were never fired till 1st July, and even our Areoplanes failed to detect their presence"

Ternan's observation was the same as Birch's "Our Artillery bombardment had paid no particular attention to the open spaces". The conclusion I believe they are making is that a blanket approach to the use of Artillery is required, thus reducing the effect of problems where specific targets have not been identified.

[truthergw]

The problem of silent guns which only opened fire in case of a major advance was a lesson well learned. One answer was ' chinese' attacks when efforts were made to persuade the Germans that the attack had started in order to spot these guns. The oft quoted debate between Haig and Plumer as to whether the mines at Messines should be sprung early was in fact suggested as a means to get the silent guns to reveal themselves. After consultation, it was decided that they were best used to spearhead the attack. Good CB work needed good spotting, ranging and accurate maps from which to work. These would have been spread unevenly along the front on the run up to 1st July.

[Old Tom]

Rate of fire is obviously a factor in the sort of calculation ianjones has presented. Two rounds per minute seems a bit high for ammunition that has to be handled with a hoist of some sort.

Old Tom

[Old Tom]

I'm not trying to rack up my score, but would like to express thanks to bmac and ianjones for drawing my attention to the wealth of information on the former's web site.

Old Tom

[bmac]

I have the details for rates of fire and numbers of rounds fired for most of the artillery on 1st July (where records survived) plus some for the French too. I will try to dig it out and distil it at some point.

[ianjonesncl]

Rate of fire is obviously a factor in the sort of calculation ianjones has presented. Two rounds per minute seems a bit high for ammunition that has to be handled with a hoist of some sort.

Old Tom

Old Tom

Definitely generous. Closer to a modern artillery gun with hydraulic assistance and ignores hot gun, crew fatigue, maintenance etc., particularly over a period of days.

Even my generous SWAG does not stand up to scrutiny - which I believe casts further doubts on the amount of artillery and ammunition that would have been required.

Ian

[ianjonesncl]

I have also read General Farndale's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery on the Western Front 14 – 18.

It is interesting you mention Farndale as I often use it as a reference.

Farndale writes the book from the position of having been Major General Royal Artillery , Commander BAOR and Army Group North. I think he is able to use this experience to bring out points into the command and control of massed Artillery. The book I find informative as a record of events with in the Royal Artillery. I think his statement in the epilogue on the principles of war and the the way artillery can be used to achieve them is very good.

Being new to the study of WW1, I suppose I accepted some of the statements Farndale made, particularly as he was such a major figure within the Royal Artillery. However I think his message is inconsistent.

He states (and it answers one of my questions that there was an Army level MGRA) that "To support the plan [Rawlinson's plan], the MGRA produced the first ever Army Artillery Operation Order. It was issued on 5th June 1916, and it was a masterpiece"

Whilst accepting this was a major achievement in terms of the actual planning and organisation, basic staff checks on the ammunition required, using contemporary planning criteria, I believe casts doubts on the basis of the plan, and whether it was a masterpiece.

In another statement he outlines that in terms of the plan... "proportions of guns to tasks, the tasks themselves, fire plans, observations and deployment, were quite rightly, left to GOCRA's at Corps HQ". Whilst accepting some delegation as being correct, was the initial allocation of Artillery correct to the Corps? On describing the events of 1st July "By chance to the enemy artillery was very strong opposite VII Corps" Therefore the allocation of our own artillery should have been greater, or more time given to CB, and the tasks of counter-bombardment clearly stated when allocating that artillery /ammunition to a Corps.

He later states that "by last light on the 1st July, where it was used, the creeping barrage was a success" and acknowledges "The Artillery Commanders understood what was wanted [creeping barrage], but in a number of cases could not convince divisional commanders of it's merits and remained un-convinced" I know you have raised the point about differing practices, so should the Army level direction been more prescriptive by stating guns and tasks. I believe this challenges the "quite rightly" statement

In the epilogue lessons for 1916 include - "Army HQ must lay down the Army objectives - if this is not done, great variations could occur in different parts of the battle. In essence, this meant allocating of priorities and resources at divisional level and above" To my mind that means that proportions of guns to tasks, the tasks themselves observations and deployments can not be entirely delegated at Army level.

As pals bring more and more of their in depth knowledge to this post, the more and more it challenges some of Farndales opinions. I have highlighted only a couple of points. I still would commend it to anyone as an important source for WW1 Artillery.

[Old Tom]

Ian I answered your pm before reading your latest here.

I do not have a copy of Farndales book - I read a library copy - but seem to remember that in the introduction he refers to his role as as author in having another officers work published.

Variation in enemy strength along the attack frontage is a factor that has, at least in my reading, receives little attention. The decision to attack at all points of the line at the same time seems questionable. The Thiepval position with the Schwaben redoubt nearby with a HQ at Mouquet Farm was very strong and should not have been the objective of a frontal attack. It was only taken in September with what on 1st July would have been a flanking attack.

Old Tom

[ianjonesncl]

Tom Rutherford sums up Farndale very well on another post:

" History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Western Front 1914 - 18", General Sir Martin Farndale, KCB. The foundation of all artillery studies for the Western Front. Very partial, you wonder at times why the infantry bothered to turn up but an essential read.