Verdun : Reputations

[phil andrade]

Petain - the "Saviour of Verdun", Nivelle the man who claimed credit for a cheap and easy victory and used the formula to disastrous effect several months later. Is this fair ?

Petain organised a thorough and effective defense under terrific pressure, and husbanded French manpower by prudent use of reserves and proper deployment of artillery.

Nivelle, when the Germans were relatively weak at Verdun, having been bled white on the Somme and distracted by the Russian/Romanian onslaught, recaptured lost ground and thousands of prisoners in some dramatic counter attacks in autumn and winter. Nivelle is caricatured as a smooth talking salesman, who persuaded his bosses to endorse a chimera of victory based on methods that succeeded when the going was relatively easy.

Does this ignore the very hard fighting that Nivelle, as commander of 2nd army, had to contend with in the horrific fighting of May and June ? Are we doing him - and his subordinate Mangin - justice ?

Phil

[truthergw]

Nivelle allowed himself to be used in political maneouvring. In fact, he seems to have joined in, enthusiastically. He claimed to have evolved a system which was foolproof and led inevitably to victory. I believe his lack of reaction to the German retreat was a symptom of his realisation that being CiC was not simply being in command of a battle, writ large. He was well out of his depth as a commander. His appointment as Joffre's successor was not well received in all quarters and many senior French generals were dubious as to his plans for the Spring offensive. There was a meeting before the offensive was launched which made that opposition clear. The real blame for the situation lies at the feet of the politicians and military command who denied him support but did not cancel the offensive for fear of revealing their ineptitude. This is the worst example of the weaknesses of the military-political setup in France. Finally, the Poilus and the French people felt betrayed when he did not fulfill his promise to withdraw immediately if a breakthrough did not happen. So I would say that Nivelle took a lot of flak which should have been aimed at politicians, British and French, but that he had a vastly inflated view of his own ability and invited criticism by indulging in over optimism.

[phil andrade]

Tom, What my thread requests is views and info. regarding Verdun : in my simplistic assessment, Petain saves the day by instituting a competent and effective defence and when the Germans have been held, along comes this upstart who takes advantage of his predecessors work by gaining a dramatic and rather easy victory in October and December 1916. Horribly caricatured, of course....what I'm hoping to learn about is how Nivelle should be rated for his conduct of operations in the months of May and June 1916, when the battle raged at extreme intensity. Has he been given sufficient credit for his performance in this crucial stage of the battle ?

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

Nivelle has been given sufficient credit for May and June 1916. He performed competently, not better nor worse than his compatriots in the same situation. Nothing spectacular that should have warranted him being singled out.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Nivelle has been given sufficient credit for May and June 1916. He performed competently, not better nor worse than his compatriots in the same situation. Nothing spectacular that should have warranted him being singled out.

Robert

The German attacks at Verdun in May and June were very heavy, weren't they ? We tend to think of Nivelle as a man who preferred to attack. This was indeed apparent in that abortive counter attack against Fort Douamont in late May; but, apart from that, there was surely some defensive prowess revealed by Nivelle's command in those months. Hitherto I'd tended to "compartmentalise"

the story of Verdun : the consolidation of the defence under Petain; the successful counter offensive under Nivelle. Different personalites, different styles of fighting, makes for a good story. The very name Nivelle conjures up these images : his name is synonymous with fiasco. We should always beware of caricature in our assessment of generals, particularly in the Great War.

Phil

[truthergw]

Sorry, I thought you were asking for a verdict on Nivelle, overall. Ian Ousby suggests that Joffre overpraised Nivelle and Mangin in preference to Petain. Presumably this was the normal political infighting which surrounds all seats of high command. If so, it would appear that Papa Joffre was hoist by his own petard. It is some time since I read about the battle of Verdun, It will be interesting to have a review and see what the various authors thought of Nivelle and Mangin. In his book, " Prelude to Victory", Spears was quite scathing towards Nivelle and ' Butcher' Mangin.

Added.

I dug out a few books and reinforced my very poor memory. Completely unscientific but I did an index skim and quick look. Here are the results.

Anthony Clayton," Paths of Glory", agrees with Ousby that Joffre deliberately praised Nivelle and downplayed the part played by Petain. R. A. Doughty, " Pyrrhic Victory", Describes Petain as commander and mentions Nivelle and Mangin as leading very costly attacks. He mentions a failure by Mangin which cost him his command for a short while. Robert T. Foley, " German Strategy and the Path to Verdun", makes no mention of Nivelle in the index and I could not see a reference on a quick scan of the relevant passages. Another book from the German side, German Werth, " Verdun, der Schlacht und der Mythos", contains only 3 passing mentions of Nivelle and Mangin. Many passages referring to Petain.

It seems that Petain was the man who ought to have received more praise for Verdun instead of being booted upstairs. At the same time, perhaps Nivelle and Mangin were exactly the kind of commanders needed in that situation, did their jobs well and were then used by politicians both in and out of the army. Nivelle at least, seems to have welcomed his promotion and was in no way crippled by self doubt.

[phil andrade]

At the same time, perhaps Nivelle and Mangin were exactly the kind of commanders needed in that situation, did their jobs well and were then used by politicians both in and out of the army. Nivelle at least, seems to have welcomed his promotion and was in no way crippled by self doubt.

Thank you, Tom...that's a gratifying reply, in so far as you provide a historiographical insight which I was hoping for. Is this German Werth history available in English translation ? That's a book I very much want to read, even if it might be considered dated. When was it written, by the way ?

I reckon your right in your suggestion that Nivelle and Mangin may have been the right team to inject something extra into the French battle at Verdun. There was a third party to their team : a hauntingly thin, consumptive staff officer ( D'Alencon?) who fixated on winning the war before he died from his illness.

Nivelle, I venture to suggest, contributed a lot more to French success at Verdun than is generally allowed. If challenged to present evidence for this, I would struggle : it's just a hunch that I have. If I find out a lot more about Verdun, I might have to eat my words...but I'd like to run with this one for a while.

Phil

[truthergw]

Hi Phil. My copy was @ 1979. I am not aware of a translation. The author, German Werth, was a journalist and the book seems to have been the product of a personal interest in Verdun. he claims to have researched the book for ten years. One of its attractions for me is several unusual pictures. Some of our German pals may know more.

[Robert Dunlop]

Nivelle's rapid rise to supreme command should not be confused with his performances at Verdun. Joffre's 'promotion' was followed by Nivelle's. Both instances were highly political, not military, in their basis. It was Pétain (on the French side), not Nivelle or Mangin, who created the opportunity for Nivelle at Verdun. Nivelle was responsible for tactical and operational (when elevated to command Second Army) decisions in his particular sector of the Verdun battlefield. He was very competent in this respect. This was, however, a completely different, and lesser, perspective than Pétain's. The results that Nivelle achieved late on in the battle were conflated with a perceived desire for these results to be replicated at the strategic and operational levels. Many of Nivelle's contemporaries knew that he lacked this experience. Many suspected he lacked the ability. The politicians needed to believe he could, but this was not the primary reason Nivelle was chosen. It was because other better-qualified candidates were not deemed politically acceptable.

Pétain was not alone in creating the context for Nivelle to succeed tactically. Nivelle's successes in the last phase of Verdun were largely down to the Anglo-French campaign on the Somme. This closed down the German efforts to attack Verdun, and then drew defensive resources away from Verdun. The campaign waged by Haig and Foch set up the situation in which Nivelle was able to provide the denouement. I would urge caution in over-estimating Nivelle's contribution to Verdun. By the same token, we cannot dismiss his efforts. We should not deem them more important that they were, nor more important than the efforts of his colleagues (including the British).

Nivelle certainly thought highly of his ability. His manner with politicians was typically one of confidence, with no showing of self-doubt. Nivelle's manner with his subordinates, however, once elevated to the position of C-in-C, was very different. This first came to light when the German withdrawal started. It rapidly became clear that something significant was happening but Nivelle seemed to refuse to acknowledge the significance with respect to his plans. This behaviour typically reflects someone who is not as self-confident as he makes out.

When you look in detail at Nivelle, you will find that he deserves his current reputation. Most people know him for his failure on the Chemin des Dames. This is mainly because they only know about the battle that took place there. The root causes for that failure lay not on the battlefield but in the preparation. Nivelle's behaviours during the preparatory phase can never be erased, and will stand forever as an example of what happens when a person thinks too highly of his capability. He could not transition from a competent Army Commander who had achieved success on the back of Haig and Foch.

I have posted material on d'Alenson, starting here. The information was derived from several sources. D'Alenson was not the reason for Nivelle's problems in the lead up to the Chemin des Dames offensive. Nivelle chose to place d'Alenson into the unusual Staff post that he held.

Robert

[truthergw]

Very good summary, Robert. I think it was Spears who emphasised that the biggest single mistake that Nivelle made was to allow the Germans time. Joffre and Haig had planned to keep as great pressure on the Germans throughout the winter season as they could and then carry on with the battle of the Somme in a two pronged attack as soon as possible in early spring. The retreat to the Hindenburg line would not have been so easy as it was under that idea. The Germans would have been pushed back, not allowed to withdraw into fully prepared positions. There might well have been less devastation carried out as they fell back. As far as the French offensive went, what Nivelle came up against were problems of scale. Operations which work at one scale do not always succeed at another. We are familiar with that concept but 1916/17 was prior to the discipline of operations analysis which came in round two.

[bob lembke]

Thank you, Tom...that's a gratifying reply, in so far as you provide a historiographical insight which I was hoping for. Is this German Werth history available in English translation ? That's a book I very much want to read, even if it might be considered dated. When was it written, by the way ?

Phil

Phil;

Another similar book is Paul Ettighoffer, Verdun - Das Grosse Gericht . I have a couple of editions, one dated 1985, one 1996, while there is a Forward by the author dated from 1975. I classified it as a secondary source, but then realized that Ettighoffer was a "Shock Troop Leader" in the battle. In my 1996 edition, (Universitas Verlag, Augsburg) at page 96 there is a photo of a very handsome Ettighoffer with his Stosstrupp just before an attack. So I am torn between considering it a secondary source or a primary source (It really is the former, due to the scope of what he is describing.) I also have Werth's book.

I can't recall an English edition of either. A quick search on abebooks.com on the authors' names, neither of which is especially common, should quickly establish if there is an English edition of either.

Another similar book from a French source is Georges Blond, Verdun. I think that it may have been published in English. I think that the book is used in German school systems.

Bob Lembke

[phil andrade]

About one third of all the casualties suffered by the French in the battle of Verdun were incurred in the two months of May and June 1916. The Germans suffered commensurately. This coincides with the period of Nivelle assuming command there. I infer from this that he had to deal with fighting of the utmost intensity. Isn't it strange that he is not associated much with this deadly episode of the battle ? Perhaps Petain had established the routine, and Nivelle just had to hold things together - although, it must be said, "just holding things together" was a pretty awful assignement considering the violence of the German onslaughts on Cote 304, Morte Homme and the phosgene backed attacks of later June. Yet if Nivelle is mentioned in connection with this phase of the battle, it is usually in association with the failed counter attack conducted by Mangin in May. He seems typecast in the role of the prodigal apostle of the attack : but his role in May and June 1916 was predominantly a defensive one, surely ?

Phil

[Robert Dunlop]

FWIIW, I think it as 'strange' that Nivelle is not mentioned for the May/June fighting as it is for lack of mention of other French generals. Few British readers know about Pétain's roles in the 1914 and 1915 battles, for example. There is a dearth of information available in English upon which you can make informed judgements about Nivelle's performance in May/June. Casualty rates are a minor part of the story. I don't disagree with your point that more information should be made available about Nivelle. My only slight difference of opinion is that Nivelle should be singled out.

There is no doubt, however, that Pétain set the context within which Nivelle was able to operate. Pétain ensured that the Verdun campaign was managed with appropriate levels of troop rotation, etc. He had to work hard to get these concessions from Joffre, so all credit there IMHO.

Robert

[truthergw]

I have never associated Nivelle with Verdun but rather with his time as French CiC. That could reflect a gap in my reading but I think is rather a reflection on how he is seen by the main authors. Part of the reason his plans for 1917 were not accepted by his fellow French generals was a resentment at him being singled out for promotion on political grounds, not military prowess. He did what he had to do with the resources made available at the time. He is generally seen as an artillerist with Mangin being the infantry leader. He and Mangin evolved a method of attack which was successful but also saw soldiers openly defying orders to go to the front and Mangin certainly did not belie his reputation. A foreshadow of what was to come after Chemin des Dames.

I have not yet seen anything to make me think that Nivelle was a better leader than we supposed or that he ought to have received more praise than he did. Verdun was a failure for the Germans if their aim was to bleed the French white while suffering relatively few losses themselves. But they did make the French bleed. The failure if any was in suffering comparable losses for little or no territorial gain. A charitable view of the French performance at Verdun would call it a very bloody draw. Hardly the obvious scenario from which to pluck a general and promote him over the heads of many others at least as capable as he. I'd need to see some very convincing evidence that Nivelle got a raw deal over his performance at Verdun.

[Paul Hederer]

Hi Phil. My copy was @ 1979. I am not aware of a translation. The author, German Werth, was a journalist and the book seems to have been the product of a personal interest in Verdun. he claims to have researched the book for ten years. One of its attractions for me is several unusual pictures. Some of our German pals may know more.

Werth's book is unique--he interviewed a good number of German Verdun veterans--thus he has some very interesting material. He taped all the interviews, but unfortunately the tapes seem to have dissapeared--a real loss. There is not an English translation.

Paul

[phil andrade]

Many thanks for all these replies. There is, I want to say, a dearth of hard info. on this battle available to British readers. Alistair Horn's book stands supreme as the English layman's guide to the battle. There is a tremendous amount of "empathetic" stuff available - particularly on the short documentaries you see on TV or on the web : the same old things about the frightful experiences of the soldiers, but just not enough on deployment and chronology. I know that you have conducted enormous research into this battle, Paul, and i can't wait to see it published !

Phil

[Paul Hederer]

Many thanks for all these replies. There is, I want to say, a dearth of hard info. on this battle available to British readers. Alistair Horn's book stands supreme as the English layman's guide to the battle. There is a tremendous amount of "empathetic" stuff available - particularly on the short documentaries you see on TV or on the web : the same old things about the frightful experiences of the soldiers, but just not enough on deployment and chronology. I know that you have conducted enormous research into this battle, Paul, and i can't wait to see it published !

Phil

Phil,

Thanks for the kind words. I'm taking a break right now, as a matter of fact--my brain is scrambled after working on this stuff all day.

Verdun is a fascinating subject. There is still a lot to be examined and written, for both sides. The more I study the battle, the more I'm impressed at just how hard the French fought.

I'm concerntrating on the tactical procedures of the the 5th Army during the offensive phase of the battle. It's a very mixed picture. You had infantry units attacking in straight pre-war fashion--let's forum up three lines, Schützenlinie and Unterstützungen and head towards the enemy--others were on the cusp of using much more advanced tactics, such as Stosstrupps. I'm talking about regular infantry, and not Rohr's unit. The artillery is equally as interesting! So much to discuss.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil

Re Alistair Horne's book, are you referring to 'Price of Glory: Verdun 1916'?

Robert

[phil andrade]

Phil

Re Alistair Horne's book, are you referring to 'Price of Glory: Verdun 1916'?

Robert

Oh yes, Robert, oh yes !

I read the book in 1969 - I remember the date becasue I was on holiday in Italy - and it made the most terrific impression on me.

Phil

[phil andrade]

Verdun is a fascinating subject. There is still a lot to be examined and written, for both sides. The more I study the battle, the more I'm impressed at just how hard the French fought.

Paul

Which do you reckon gets more engaged when you reflect on Verdun, Paul - your intellect or your emotions ?

For us Brits, of course, the Somme stands pre-eminent as the national Calvary, with Passchendaele standing very close behind. But neither of these can compare with Verdun. It just isn't the same, because neither of these battles were fought on home soil.

How much do German people consider Verdun worthy of nightmare status, after the experiences that followed a generation later ?

Phil

[truthergw]

It is often referred to as the tragedy or the trial.

[Robert Dunlop]

Horne's book was a very important contribution. I was re-reading it again recently. It is somewhat dated now, in light of work by Robert Foley, Robert Doughty, and others. Even with these works taken into account, there is a desparate need to have a definitive account in English. Take care of yourself, Paul. It would be great if you could fill the gap.

Robert

[truthergw]

I am disappointed that I can not find a really good French treatment. Plenty of Poilu reminiscences, some very good but I'd love a French equivalent of Foley's book on Verdun.

[bob lembke]

Horne's book was a very important contribution. I was re-reading it again recently. It is somewhat dated now, in light of work by Robert Foley, Robert Doughty, and others. Even with these works taken into account, there is a desparate need to have a definitive account in English. Take care of yourself, Paul. It would be great if you could fill the gap.

Robert

Quite an important book in its day, and very well written, but quite flawed when looked at critically today. In my own area of particular interest, flame-throwers, and also on their tactical impact, he is very wide off the map. On one page, he goes on how the weapon was quite useless, a suicide weapon, and then put down a dramatically-written picture of a flame-thrower operator being hit, his device exploding, and the operator twisting and burning to death (I have been working for years with the very complete death roll of the flame regiment, and have detailed, organized information on most of the German flame attacks of the war, and have read many hundreds of books from all sides seeking details on these engagements, and I have only found two or three examples of these devices catching fire, and not a single verifiable instance of an operator killed in such an incident. Allied flame-throwers, of different and much more careless design, often tended to catch fire, even spontaneously.).

On the next page Horne relates a mystery of the battle; how an entire French brigade collapsed and was taken. The answer to the puzzle was that the Bavarian troops attacking the French brigade were led by 63 flame-throwers, and in a brief engagement almost 3000 French soldiers were captured, including 58 officers, including the entirity of the three regimental and brigade headquarters. Supposedly the brigade was only able to get out a one sentence phone call: "The Germans are here!" 25 MGs, 12 cannon, and 18 mortars were also taken. The number of flame pioneers lost? Four. Useless weapon indeed.

(The above narration is from memory, but I believe substantially accurate.)

One of my two copies of Horne, both bought many years ago (I was interested in Verdun long before I developed a more general interest in the Great War, as I knew that my father was wounded there twice, and I possessed a fragment of his left arm bone knocked off there by a French shell fragment.), which I bought for $3, includes an autograph letter of Horne's to the previous owner of the book, a local lawyer, and the letter mentions flame-throwers, so, thereby emboldened, I wrote Horne a few years ago, as politely as I could, asking him basically how he had gotten it so wrong, but I, not surprisingly, did not receive a reply. I imagine that the very question, however politely stated, was inherently impolite.

Horne's book has a very important place in the literature of Verdun, but please do not use it today as a central guide to the battle.

Bob Lembke

[phil andrade]

The more I study the battle, the more I'm impressed at just how hard the French fought.

Paul

Do you think Falkenhayn was gratified or dismayed by this ?

This book by Foley : does it contain much info. on the battle itself, or is it more a study of German military doctrine ? It's clear from the posts of Bob and others that it's high time that I divested myself of Horne's The Price of Glory, and got more up to date material. The trouble is, every time I encounter another account of Verdun, it's a "touchy feely" account of what it was like to be a poilu marching up La Voie Sacree...not that I'm disdainful of such writing ; I just want a narrative, with dates, facts and figures, order of battle etc.

Horne's book is a tad too journalistic perhaps, but what a splendid bit of writing it is !

Phil