Was the German learning process quicker than the British?

[Jonathan Saunders]

An argument regularly put forward to explain the enormous casualty lists in the Somme battles and those that followed is the “learning process”, that it is say the experience the British army had to go through to learn how to fight against Germany. A large part of the argument is based on the senior command, men such as Haig, Rawlinson, Gough etc., who were exposed to a new kind, and multiple forms, of warfare and had to adapt and learn.

Due to participation in another thread I have recently looked again at the series of 1916 Somme battles and concluded that the overall German learning process was somewhat quicker and led to more efficient fighting strategies than the British process, or more specifically that lessons were analysed, reviewed and actioned at high command level in the German army more efficiently than at the same command level of the British army.

With this in mind I wondered what Pals views were as to whether the British learning process was slower than the German learning process and how we can account for this. I am specifically thinking of the learning process before the Last 100 days so as to avoid the “we won and Haig was the last man standing” scenarios.

Thanks and regards,

Jon S

[Stebie9173]

Jon,

Would we be comparing like with like, i.e. German offensive operations at Verdun to British (and Empire) offensive operations at Loos and the Somme, or the generally defensive nature of the German operations on the Somme?

Steve.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon,

Would we be comparing like with like, i.e. German offensive operations at Verdun to British (and Empire) offensive operations at Loos and the Somme, or the generally defensive nature of the German operations on the Somme?

Steve.

Steve,

I think the point I am trying to get at is did the pursuit of the learning process by the British actually assist and result in lessons being learnt by the Germans at a much faster level. If so, does this indicate the British operational war was mismanaged in giving an advantage to the enemy?

Sorry I am still not sure if I have explained myself. Did the British learning process hinder and compromise British battle tactics ... something along that thought process.

With regard to Verdun then I was thinking more of German defensive tactics as Germany was for the most part pursuing a policy of defensive action rather than being on the offensive. With specific regard to Verdun, then von Falkenhynn did not plan for a break-through battle but a battle of attrition and I am not sure you can compare this with, say the Somme battles, which were fought by the British as a break-through.

Regards,

Jon ... and I am sorry I am still not clear. I think there is an important question in there somewhere!

[squirrel]

Not entirely sure I have understood the question either.

However, the Germans chose the ground they were defending and fortified and armed it with a will. The attitude was a sort of "move us if you can".

The Allies only recourse, apart from the blockade, was to attack and the casualty rate for attack versus defence is about 4 to 1 minimum and usually higher.

The Allies, having not fought a war of this kind, it did take time to design and manufacture suitable weapons in addition to what they already had and find out what methods would work. And this while using a mainly"citizen" army after mid 1915 and training this, at all levels, while fighting.

I still think that the learning curve could and should have been much sharper though.

[Take on me]

It might have been.

The Germans certainly evolved better defensive tactics through battles such as the Somme and Third Ypres. although British Offensive tactics were certainly far better by the end of the war, British tactics certainly improved notably between the Somme and Arras, and from Arras to the Hundred Days (the problem with the German March Offensives in this respect is that I do not see them as sustainable, while the Allied offensives were). The German Army was a central part of Germany itself at the time, quite unlike Britain. It was a conscript Army that had been developing in a big way for many decades, it would stand to reason that their methods of learning tactical lessons were more efficient than the small peacetime British Army.

What do you think?

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

However, the Germans chose the ground they were defending and fortified and armed it with a will. The attitude was a sort of "move us if you can".

But you see that is not strictly true. The Germans learnt it was better to have a weakly held front line and then a series of much stronger defensive lines behind that. It could be expected the Allies would take the first line (and the German guns would pound the old NML which they knew the following waves had to cross) whilst those troops ongoing to the second German line and beyond would expend themselves against well prepared positions. Once the Allies were exhausted, cut-off etc, the Germans counter-attack in force and take back their old line and possibly, as in the case of Cambrai for example, make incursions into what was previously Allied held territory. This they learnt from examining what had happened at Loos, Somme etc.

The Germans tactics evolved but we were seemingly continuing to make the same errors (Gough at Bullecourt for example).

[chris mccarthy]

I agree with JGM. Both sides were learning different things, one to attack and one to defend. This is graphically shown in 1918 when the British were forced to defend in March / April, well they did, just! On the other side the Germans attack in the same period lost it's way but it's fighting retreat was all that they could desire.

I think by 1918 all armies bore little or no resemblance to their pre war heritage the troops of both sides were inexperienced but far better trained than in the early years.

[Chris Henschke]

On the face of it, the learning process and dissemination of information seems to show that lessons learnt were widely distributed, as soon as possible. This is certainly the case in the last year of the war.

I think the reality was quite different.

In a lot of cases, the information given seems to concentrate on good points rather than addressing problems.

G.H.Q. issued SS119, 'Preliminary Notes on the Tactical Lessons of the Recent Operations' in July, 1916. It starts with, (what must be now in hindsight appear as a great understatement);

"The recent operations confirm the necessity for the infantry assault to enter the objective to be assaulted with the shortest possible interval of time after the lifting of our artillery fire, so that the enemy is given no time to man his defences or bring machine guns into action."

The winter of 1916/1917 seems to be the time when real progress was made in developing new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and with the emergence of manuals like SS143 in February 1917, an attempt to set a common standard to promote interoperabability. Even then, I have read memo's berating commanders that even though that particular manual had been widely distributed, Officers and men were attending schools either never having heard of it, or had never seen it.

As far as I have read, the centralisation of training in that middle period of the war never went higher than Corps or Army schools. The different standards in the training of officers is an example. I know that there was a healthy exchange of information regarding TTPs between the AIF and CEF, but that was not until the middle of 1917.

In my notes that cover the development of tactics within the AIF, there was clearly a never ending attempt to gain ideas about techniques and organisation and exchange them within Divisions, but it wasn't until early 1918 that a more centralised approach (based on GHQ doctrine) was made, when the Australian Corps was formed.

I assume the German Army had a more centralised approach to training.

[Old Tom]

Hello,

A factor detirmining who fast the BEF learnt was its expansion. The Germans and the French fielded 50 or 60 divisions each in 1914 the BEF 4 or 5. By 1916 the BEF had increased to some 50. The raising of the 'new armies' was a tremendous achievment but it included forming 5 Army, 10, or so, Corps, 50 Division and 150 Brigade HQs. That required lots of generals and even more staff officers. I think this means that while the soldiers learnt quickly, command and staff had a lot more to learn. The result was that the BEF lagged behind the German army for some time. I'm inclined to think that was inevitable.

Old Tom

[Paul Hederer]

I agree with JGM. Both sides were learning different things, one to attack and one to defend. This is graphically shown in 1918 when the British were forced to defend in March / April, well they did, just! On the other side the Germans attack in the same period lost it's way but it's fighting retreat was all that they could desire.

I think by 1918 all armies bore little or no resemblance to their pre war heritage the troops of both sides were inexperienced but far better trained than in the early years.

This statment (again--this seems to be my topic of the day) implies the German army was a static entity, which only knew how to defend--that is not correct.

The Germans were also well advanced in their offensive tactics. At Verdun, and remember this was early 1916, they employed dispersed firing lines, and troops armed with mostly grenades, as well as assault troops and flame-throwers, which broke points of resistance and moved on to let the following waves of infantry clean up. At Verdun full strength specialized assault units were deployed. The attack of the 3rd Jaeger Battalion (which later became an assault unit), which overran French artillery positions, was the result of advanced tactics trained at behind the lines.

The Germans learned a lot from the French and applied generally more sophisticated attack techniques much more early in the war than the British.

Paul

[bob lembke]

I second Paul's comments.

It does seem that the Germans seemed to usually "learn more quickly" that, for example, the Brits. An example is the nature of the fighting, the balance between the offence and defense, and, specifically, the bayonet.

The Germans seemed to have figured out within weeks of the onset of the war that the MG and quick-firing field guns had radically changed the balance between the attack and the defense. I have seen mention of memos to this question being circulated within weeks of the onset of the war. I get the impression that it took the Brits a couple of years to effectively figure out some of this. A problem the Germans had early in the war was that elite units, Guards, going over to the bayonet charge even though warned not to do so, out of excessive zeal and elan.

The Germans seemed to quickly figure out that the bayonet was not that effective. My father's storm unit in 1916 seemed to carry no rifles and only a few carbines. I have read that the Brits compiled rough field autopsy reports on 200,000 dead, and only 0.3% of the dead seemed to be killed by bayonets, or possibly all cutting instruments. Supposedly the Brits reacted to this by intensifying their bayonet drill! Anyone know details about this? Heared of another Allied study that said that it was 1.5%.

I have seen lots of stuff about the "cold steel" and other "push of pike" stuff from the Brits, French, and the US, some of it from 1918. Almost never see that stuff in German sources, although I did see one example in the last day or so, about Jaegers clearing out some buildings. Have heard of Brit or Commonwealth troops ordered not to fire in an attack, and even of Maori troops being told to charge without loaded rifles to make sure that they did not fire in the attack. I think that the concept was that the bayonet, not the rifle, was the ultimate weapon.

Incidentally, about centralization, at least at the beginning, each of the 25 German army corps had their own training regime, and the corps commander reported directly to the Kaiser. As the war went on I think that this wore down and centralization increased. This seemingly helped foster innovation.

Bob Lembke

[Jonathan Saunders]

The Germans learned a lot from the French and applied generally more sophisticated attack techniques much more early in the war than the British.

Hi Paul - a small clarifcation please. Do you think the German army were copying French offensive tactics or analysing French attack patterns and developing certain components they considered superior for attack? Also do you consider that the Germans were using this analysis to prepare their defensive tactics? I am trying to gauge how deliberate the German learning process was.

Finally are you aware of any influence from the more fluid Eastern Front that the Germans were able to use on the Western Front?

Thanks,

Jon

Thanks to all who have responded to date. Your comments are appreciated.

Regards,

Jon

[Paul Hederer]

Hi Paul - a small clarifcation please. Do you think the German army were copying French offensive tactics or analysing French attack patterns and developing certain components they considered superior for attack? Also do you consider that the Germans were using this analysis to prepare their defensive tactics? I am trying to gauge how deliberate the German learning process was.

Finally are you aware of any influence from the more fluid Eastern Front that the Germans were able to use on the Western Front?

Thanks,

Jon

Thanks to all who have responded to date. Your comments are appreciated.

Regards,

Jon

Jon,

I know the Germans translated and studied French tactical writings and were influenced by the ideas they found there. They also had their own independent development of thought, to be sure.

A lot of the artillery theories used at Verdun were first tried at Gorlice-Tarnow and that campaign--concentration of fire in a short bombardment, and the like. Infantry tactics--whew, that's a good question. Many of the conditions were vastly different from the East to the West. My impression is that most of the innovative thought came from efforts to try and keep men alive in the concentrated fire that dominated the Western battlefields.

There is an excellent resource on-line: "The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in GermanTactical Doctrine During the First World War," which you can read or download for free.

Dynamics

Well worth a read.

Paul

[Jonathan Saunders]

Paul - thanks for the link. A quick look suggests this is pretty good. I will print off and read it more fully.

Regards,

Jon

[bob lembke]

Jon;

We have hit upon two or three persistant myths on the origins of the development of the innovative German offensive tactics.

One is that the Germans found a pamphlet written by a French officer in a trench raid, decided it was revealed truth, and based their infiltration tactics, storm tactics, on this wisdom. Two problems. One is that the date that is given for this pamphlet was about a year after the Germans had set up their first two storm units, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) u. Sturm=Bataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), both of which were set up as experimental units to develop and test new weapons and tactics. As of the time of the supposed discovery of this pamphlet, these two units had already carried out about 100 storm attacks, mostly successful.

The other part of this story which shoots this theory down was the fact that, supposedly, this pamphlet said little that was innovative; I have not read it or seen it, but someone that I respect (I think it was the awsome Bruce G.) says that it only suggests attacking in fixed rows, but more space between advancing soldiers, etc. Anyone have a precice citation or source for this pamphlet? It is frequently mentioned.

Another myth is that the new offensive tactics were brought to the West Front in early 1918 (usually stated as by Gen. Huiter) after being developed on the East Front, say at Riga. These tactics were developed by the two above units (my father was a menber of one, and frequently fought with the other) years before, and in fact when the forces in the East had a serious storm attack need G=R=P=R units were sent to the East to carry out these attacks, and in fact the G=R=P=R sent units to carry out a critical roll in the Riga battle. The units in the East were technically backward and had to be retrained when sent to the West in late 1917 and early 1918.

The one thing that was developed in the East and exported to the West was the refined artillery techniques of "Break-through" Bruchmueller.

One example of how refined tactics from the West were used in the East was the largest FW attack in history (my own computer is down and I can't dig up the specifics), with 154 FW, was carried out in Russia by three companies of FW sent to Russia; the CO of the flame regiment, Major Dr. Reddemann, directed the attack with air observation, two way radio contact, and the air observers he was in touch with dropping his messages with tactical commands to the attacking lead FW squads. This attack captured about a square mile of Russian concrete fortifications that previous more conventional attacks had failed to reduce. (I have a letter of my father to his father reporting on that success; Major Dr. Reddemann sent a telegram reporting the major success from Russia to my father's company in France, and my father repeated the info in his letter to his staff-officer father.) When these attacks failed the G=R=P=R and its FW were sent for. This and about three other large FW attacks in the east, performed by FW troops sent from France, captured critical terrain and took about 20,000 POWs and hundreds each of cannon and MGs. (Again, the specifics are locked in my computer.)

Bob Lembke

[RodB]

I'm interested in WWI from the political perspective more than the purely military. The evidence does seem to indicate that the German military was more innovative and seemed to learn quicker than the British. But I've wondered whether they were learning the correct lessons in the broader field. Such as where the battle should be fought, on which front. The British shut down Gallipoli and determined the war had to be won on the Western front. It seems to me that from then on it became a political war, with Haig in the position of Ike in WWII, a political general. I've wondered whether what was happening was a partially illusory irresistable force building up and being seen to be winning. The reality on the ground appears to have been that in most battles German forces were a step ahead tactically. But at the highest levels the allies seemed to be thinking more deeply, with the aim being to build up economic pressure and suck in as many allies as possible, at which point it was game over.

I suppose what i'm trying to say was, maybe the reality on the ground was less important than what the folks in the capitals thought, and all Haig had to keep doing was not be seen to be losing.

[Jonathan Saunders]

But at the highest levels the allies seemed to be thinking more deeply, with the aim being to build up economic pressure and suck in as many allies as possible, at which point it was game over.

I suppose what i'm trying to say was, maybe the reality on the ground was less important than what the folks in the capitals thought, and all Haig had to keep doing was not be seen to be losing.

I think you definitely have a point as far as the wider political thought process but I am not convinced Haig was aware of this, or at least, I am not convinced the manner in which he fought his offensive campaign supports this view. If he did, then Laffin was right.

[Paul Hederer]

I'm interested in WWI from the political perspective more than the purely military. The evidence does seem to indicate that the German military was more innovative and seemed to learn quicker than the British. But I've wondered whether they were learning the correct lessons in the broader field. Such as where the battle should be fought, on which front. The British shut down Gallipoli and determined the war had to be won on the Western front. It seems to me that from then on it became a political war, with Haig in the position of Ike in WWII, a political general. I've wondered whether what was happening was a partially illusory irresistable force building up and being seen to be winning. The reality on the ground appears to have been that in most battles German forces were a step ahead tactically. But at the highest levels the allies seemed to be thinking more deeply, with the aim being to build up economic pressure and suck in as many allies as possible, at which point it was game over.

I suppose what i'm trying to say was, maybe the reality on the ground was less important than what the folks in the capitals thought, and all Haig had to keep doing was not be seen to be losing.

You've hit the nail on the head. The Germans, and more importantly, the Central Powers, seemed to lack any overall strategy focus.

For some good sources see Holger Herwig, "The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918," and Robert Foley's, "German strategy and the path to Verdun." The latter has a good discussion of the political/diplomatic background of the 1915 German offensive in the East.

Paul

[Chris Henschke]

Jon;

Another myth is that the new offensive tactics were brought to the West Front in early 1918 (usually stated as by Gen. Huiter) after being developed on the East Front, say at Riga. These tactics were developed by the two above units (my father was a menber of one, and frequently fought with the other) years before, and in fact when the forces in the East had a serious storm attack need G=R=P=R units were sent to the East to carry out these attacks, and in fact the G=R=P=R sent units to carry out a critical roll in the Riga battle. The units in the East were technically backward and had to be retrained when sent to the West in late 1917 and early 1918.

Bob Lembke

The new German Tactics in the Attack were not purely based around special assault detachments. It was also to do with the method of employing Corps and Divisions in the Attack. The attached image shows that it was the opinion of the General Staff in their “Notes on Recent Fighting – No. 13.”, dated 4th of June, 1918, that these tactics at Divisional level of the deployment of assaulting troops were “very similar to those employed “ at Riga.

By “recent fighting’ the notes concentrate on the tactics in the attack during March. 1918.

Chris Henschke

[bob lembke]

I agree with Chris. My special focus are the storm formations, so naturally I run on about them, but they actually had a relatively small role in the actual fighting. After all, there only was one storm battalion per army, plus 12 companies of FW for the entire army of some 250-odd divisions. Their more important role was developing and teaching advanced battlefield tactics and weaponry. It was planned to let them wither away once they had trained enough soldiers in the techniques that they had pioneered.

Chris is also correct that, probably mostly since the eastern fighting was more open and less static, there was a better scope for developing better division and corps-level fluid tactics. But, using Riga as an example, they used FW troops trained and based in the West to crack open the static situation and allow the development of the war of manuver on the divisional and corps level. Riga was an important FW battle. (I don't have the details to review now, as my computer is still in "lockdown".) There were lots of engagements where FW were used and collapsed the front locally, allowing spectacular results, and most accounts of these engagements do not even mention the role of the FW. (Yes, I know, I am a FW nut.)

What I am stressing is that the many statements that the whole new methods of assault and mobile warfare was developed in the east and brought to the west front with the troops transferred west after the east front armistice are quite wrong. The newer methods of higher-level manuver were able to be tried out in the east, due to the more fluid and less fortified front.

What General Staff did those comments come from? Can I assume the British?

Bob Lembke

[Pete1052]

I did some Google searches on Gen. Oskar von Hutier that led me to a site which stated that he did not personally invent infiltration tactics--rather, he was in command at Riga when those tactics were successfully used. The site further stated that it was British and French officers who linked the Hutier name to sturm tactics when they were used on the Western Front. Although I trust books more than unattributed statements on the internet as sources for accurate information, that seems to back up what Bob is saying. Hutier or perhaps one of his military kinsmen must have been held in high esteem because there is a kaserne bearing his name in Hanau.

[Robert Dunlop]

Check out Bruce Gudmundsson's book 'Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918' (ISBN 0275933288). Bruce gives a very clear account of the development of assault tactics.

Robert

[Pete1052]

The author Bruce Gudmundsson goes by the name "Hoplophile" on these forums. I don't know what a Hoplophile is, but I speculate that Hoplophilia might be one of those dreaded tropical diseases that U.S. Marines are prone to getting while they're tramping around in the jungle!

[Borys]

Ahoj!

Your speculation is off the mark

Borys

[Pete1052]

Ahoj, Borys!

Speculation is only speculation, nothing more or less. Could be true, maybe not. As we say, I'm trying to jerk his chain.

Part of my family lived in Danzig until the middle 1700s, then we moved to Stockholm. Given how things turned out later, moving away was probably a good idea!

We were cabinet makers, and in the royal palace in Stockholm is a piece of furniture made by my ancestor, Johann Jacob Eisenbladder (1732-1813). The family in Stockholm stayed ethnically German, intermarrying with other Germans in Stockholm.

The move to America was in 1850, to San Francisco shortly before California became a state of the U.S. My first ancestor from Stockholm was the architect who designed and built the first "lunatic asylum" (mental hospital) for the state of California in the 1870s. Even back then they saw the need....

The first Eisen to come to America married a girl who was the daughter of a Hessian army officer from Wetzlar. Her maiden name resembles that of a Hessian leutnant of grenadiers with a "von" in his name who fought (on the wrong side) in the American Revolution. That certainly opens up a whole new line of inquiry!

Pete Eisen