Corps performance on the Somme 1st July

[armourersergeant]

OK i know excuse the stipid bloke who did the poll wrong but you get the idea!!

I was wondering if any would care to vote their worst performing corps on 1st July, but more i would like to know why you think so.

I am thinking more from the preperation side of things rather than the end result, which may differ due to other factors.

regards

Arm.

I have edited the lead question due to the fact that some took offence to its wording and thus the meaning they took from it. I would reiterate that I am after a view in the main for the preperation that the corps took and how this impacted on the results, if it made any difference that is?

Edited 4 August , 2005 by armourersergeant

[armourersergeant]

We have three for Hunter Weston so far and one for Morlands Corps.

regards

Arm

[Desmond7]

Seeking clarification.

How can the Corps which had the deepest penetration by a formed unit on 1st July be lumped into 'poorest performing'?

At the risk of incurring wrath, I'd like to ask what 18th and 30th Division followers would say on the following train of thought. The success of the Corps at Montauban is clear ... but did Congreve fail to exploit further? COULD he have exploited further? If he COULD and DID NOT then I'd look seriously at an opportunity missed?

[armourersergeant]

I wondered as well!

Arm.

[KIRKY]

Hi

I find this a bit distasteful, what do others think? So much depended on support, orders, attitude of Officers, strength of Germans , distance to travel etc

Is it fair to do a Pop Idol type of item on this subject?

Tony

[Andrew Hesketh]

I must say that I share Tony's comments. It also seems a little unfair to include VII Corps who were given a virtually impossible task that was not expected to succeed in any case.

[John_Hartley]

I'm with Tony on this one and am not voting.

However, with regard to 30th Div, they fulfilled their orders. To the letter and on time. And held their position. There was no question within the planning that any further advance by the troops would be considered. Shame on you, Desmond, for suggesting otherwise.

I will grant that fact that there are reports (not all that well substantiated) that patrols from 17/Manchester pushed out and found Bernafray Wood empty. No advantage of this was taken - assuming it to be true.

John

[armourersergeant]

Tony, Andrew, John,

Oops, i seem to have offended.

Whilst i can see that my wording of the question was alittle crass and badly done for what i was after i have stated my intent in the opening post.

I was wondering if any would care to vote their worst performing corps on 1st July, but more i would like to know why you think so.

I am thinking more from the preperation side of things rather than the end result, which may differ due to other factors.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I am trying to ascertain peoples opinions on the preperation of the different corps and the impact it had on the subsequent events.

With regard to VII corps being included I would say that their inclusion is there for two reasons.

1) the impact if any that their actions had on other corps efforts and results.

2) the fact that VII corps commander,Snow, is someone I am researching.

I tried to use a poll to get a structure to the discussion, however that has obviously not happened.

My research is in high command and as such i am looking for command and control basic opinions not individual troop performances.

I will try and reword the question for future posters, if any choose to read.

regards

Arm

Slopes off to sulk in the dark

[Desmond7]

Arm ... Get back in the line that man ...

May I suggest the poll/question :-

'If you could make ONE change to any aspect of the Somme 1st July battle plan in order to achieve a higher degree of success with less casualties .... what would it be?'

Still in the realms of what ifs and time machines I know .. but I have one wee pet theory and I wanna see if anyone else touches on it.

On the other hand I may find out my pet theory is full of holes and then I will keep me gob firmly shut.

Des

.. Oi Hartley .. I thought you would have bitten big time

[Andrew Hesketh]

Arm - not offended! A 'who did best' poll would, I think, elicit more response.

[John_Hartley]

.. Oi Hartley .. I thought you would have bitten big time

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Now then, Blacky. That was my considered, moderate response.

"My lads" in 90th Brigade could not have been better prepared, trained or organised, IMO. Similarly their mates from the other end of the Ship Canal.

In this sector, enemy artillery does not appear to have been a great problem (at least not until after the capture of Montauban). Very many of the Division's casualties are believed to have been caused by a single machine gun post.

John

[Desmond7]

Harters .. On a totally different subject ... I must get the manners tape done!

Off to set up a poll.

[John_Hartley]

I must get the manners tape done!

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

This isnt going to be you singing solo - again - is it?

If so, I'm not sure I want a copy.

If it's the Ballymena Massive, that might be a different thing.

[Paul Reed]

Arm - I am not sure what you mean by 'prepared'. Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps was highly prepared, in terms of training, battle practice (most officers in this Corps wore Tommies tunics, and it was one of the few that sent advanced parties forward), and knowledge of its mission statement. However, like many Corps that day, the failure of the whole of Fourth Army to have any real power in its preparatory bombardment, and the depth of German dugouts on this part of the front, meant that any attack under these circumstances was doomed to failure. Preparation, lack of it or otherwise, was not a major contributing factor to casualties: well entrenched and untouched German infantry killed or wounded most men in this Corps just as they entered No Man's Land, especially on 29th Division front.

[PhilB]

Does that mean you`re putting the blame squarely on the shoulders of the staff, Paul, in all instances of corps failing to meet targets? Seems reasonable to me. Phil B

[Paul Reed]

Sorry - I don't understand that conclusion at all.

[Guest Evans of the Broke]

Nice one

Arm - I am not sure what you mean by 'prepared'. Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps was highly prepared, in terms of training, battle practice (most officers in this Corps wore Tommies tunics, and it was one of the few that sent advanced parties forward), and knowledge of its mission statement. However, like many Corps that day, the failure of the whole of Fourth Army to have any real power in its preparatory bombardment, and the depth of German dugouts on this part of the front, meant that any attack under these circumstances was doomed to failure. Preparation, lack of it or otherwise, was not a major contributing factor to casualties: well entrenched and untouched German infantry killed or wounded most men in this Corps just as they entered No Man's Land, especially on 29th Division front.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

And Haig lamented the inexperience of men and Officers as another crucial factor during the engagement. And that it was hugely difficult changing things once a large offensive on that scale had commenced.

[PhilB]

Sorry - I don't understand that conclusion at all.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I don`t mean to put words into your mouth - I thought that`s what you were implying. But, if many of your men are killed or wounded by untouched German infantry, who has made a mistake? Since that wasn`t the plan, someone must have got it wrong. If not the staff, then who? Phil B

[SOMMESOLDIER]

I don`t mean to put words into your mouth - I thought that`s what you were implying. But, if many of your men are killed or wounded by untouched German infantry, who has made a mistake? Since that wasn`t the plan, someone must have got it wrong. If not the staff, then who? Phil B

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Hi Phil,

I don't think Paul is suggesting a mistake, what I think he is saying is, that well dug in forces and a lack of an effective barrage ( not the right type of shells e.t.c) doomed the attacking forces on that July morning !

So not a mistake, just a combination of factors that conspired against us.

Cheers

Tim.

[squirrel]

At Neuve -Chapelle they had an artillery plan that did so much damage that they captured the front line German trenches. Didn't have a plan for much else afterwards though as secondary objectives were not bombarded and the German artillery stopped any further attacks as they had not been shelled.

At Loos they had an artillery plan but the front of the attack was so long and the guns and ammunition so sparse that destruction of the front line trenches was not achieved with the inevitable result. German artillery was virtually untouched by the bombardment. The ratio of shells to targets was about half that of Neuve-Chapelle

On the Somme the front was bigger again and although they had more guns and large supplies of ammunition the bombardments were insufficient as they had far more designated targets. The ratio of shells to targets was about the same if not slighly less than Loos.

[PhilB]

So not a mistake, just a combination of factors that conspired against us.

Cheers

Tim.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

But if a "combination of factors" appears that hadn`t been foreseen and which slaughters your men, surely a mistake somewhere? Phil B

[squirrel]

Too many secondary objectives and too great a planned penetration with no apparent "plan B" when things went pear shaped.

Lack of experience among some of the Officers and no previous encouragement to show initiative in the junior Officers and NCO's didn't help either.

Also the "push on at all costs" mentality seemed to be fairly widespread.

Inexperience of an undertaking of this size at all levels in the vast majority of units seems to be the case. IMHO.

[armourersergeant]

Arm - not offended! A 'who did best' poll would, I think, elicit more response.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

thats possibly correct but i am after seeing who is persived the worst prepared the consequences from there.

It is interesting to see paul Reed say that Hunter Weston was well prepared given that in the poll it is he who is top by far. this seems to imply that most would judge the resulting attack as a reflection of the preperation put in. This is the sort of deduction i am after, if it infact be the case.

regards

Arm.

[armourersergeant]

Arm - I am not sure what you mean by 'prepared'. Hunter-Weston's VIII Corps was highly prepared, in terms of training, battle practice (most officers in this Corps wore Tommies tunics, and it was one of the few that sent advanced parties forward), and knowledge of its mission statement. However, like many Corps that day, the failure of the whole of Fourth Army to have any real power in its preparatory bombardment, and the depth of German dugouts on this part of the front, meant that any attack under these circumstances was doomed to failure. Preparation, lack of it or otherwise, was not a major contributing factor to casualties: well entrenched and untouched German infantry killed or wounded most men in this Corps just as they entered No Man's Land, especially on 29th Division front.

<{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Paul,

Would you then say that regardless of the plans that corps commanders made the result was always going to be out of their hands?

If that is the case could we then say for instance that the results of 18th division were not down to Maxse and his preperation? For it is my understanding that he prepared his attack well!

I tend to agree with some of what you say. but surely the preperation of the plan must have played a part in the end result. For otherwise do we say that the gains were all down to how well or bad the German defences were and how the artillery fell in that area?

regards

Arm

[Paul Reed]

I am not sure it is as simple as having a good plan or not, and I think each Corps area has to be looked at seperately. The problems facing Hunter-Weston's Corps was not the same as Congreve's: the defences between Mametz and Montauban were not as formidable as at Beaumont-Hamel, and arguably the ground was better for an attack. Remember it was also not all plain sailing in Congreve's area; more than 10% of the overall casualties on 1st July were suffered here (18 and 30 Div combined), and that on 18 Div front some units struggled to achieve their final objectives, and lost heavily.

If we had been able to conduct the sort of artillery shoot we were able to do from Cambrai onwards on 1st July, the outcome might have been very different. No matter how formidable the defences, if the defenders are killed by the barrage, success will be possible. If the barrage destroys the defences, but the defenders survive (as happened on some parts of the front on 1st July), then failure is almost guarenteed.

Everyone from Private to Field Marshall placed ultimate faith in the power of the bombardment: indeed, the 'Battle of the Somme' film was made to celebrate this power. But as historians we now know this faith was misplaced; the bombardment was not capable of everything everyone expected it to be, and in no small part this led to the outcome on 1st July.

That we learnt from this, and the use of artillery changed within days of 1st July, and continued to change thereafter, should be a credit to the much maligned staff, but it rarely is.