Petain and the Chauchat

[centurion]

In 1917 Petain, having heard various rumblings about the Chauchat, ordered a major survey to discover what, if any, its problems were. Does any one know if and where a copy of the results might be (preferably translated in to English but I can manage French – albeit very slowly)?

I have seen reports that the amongst the main findings were that the gun would stop firing when it got hot (at about 300 rounds) and there would be a significant delay until it cooled down so firing could resume, but of course it would then soon get hot again! This was not the barrel getting too hot (as a spare barrel could be carried) but the main mechanism of the gun. It seems that this was the soldats’ main grumble. When used as a defensive weapon it could not be relied upon to deliver enough sustained fire to hold off a German counter attack. The other big problem was that dirt got in through the slots in the magazines causing jams – each time this happened the gun had to be stripped down. I’ve seen a mention that Petain’s survey found that about 30% of the guns jammed this way. Other complaints appear to have been that parts of the gun were assembled with screws with a very loose fit so that as the gun vibrated with firing these could work loose and bits would fall off and the magazines themselves were very poorly made and sometimes would not fit.

I would like to see Petain’s reaction in detail. What little reference I can find seems to suggest that he took the line that as the army had got so many of the things and there was no readily available replacement (Britain was already at max capacity with Lewis Gun production and had none to spare) they’d have to try and live with it. There seems to have been an instruction that it was only to be used as an assault weapon firing short bursts and then only when there were enough Hotckisses around to provide support and defence against a counter attack.

Anyone have any more info on the Petain survey and its aftermath?

[Hoplophile]

In their book on the Chauchat (Honour Bound, The Chauchat Machine Rifle), Yves Buffetaut and Gérard Demaison mention a pair of surveys, one from 1916 and one from 1917.

The 1916 survey included range trials aimed at determining the practical limits of sustained automatic fire. In these trials, which involved three separate weapons, the first stoppage took place after 300, 350 or 380 rounds of uninterrupted automatic fire. (Needless to say, firing was stopped so that the gunners could change magazines. I assume that the gunners were firing bursts of three to five rounds, rather than just pulling the trigger until each magazine was empty, but I do not know that for a fact.

The 1917 survery, encompassed a number of different infantry weapons, and had, indeed, been commissioned by Pétain. Instead of range trials, however, it was conducted by means of questionaires that were filled out by the commanders of infantry regiments, infantry brigades and infantry divisions. The chief complaints of the respondents were ill-fitting magazines and stoppages due to dirt getting into the mechanism. Complaints about overheating, however, were conspicuous by their absence. Indeed, some respondents were quite complimentary about the role that the Chauchat played in defending against German counterattacks where they 'effectively played the role of machineguns'. (One explanation for this was the lack of opportunities to fire 300 rounds without a break. Most of the German counterattacks faced by French troops in 1917 would not have presented the kind of targets that would have called for the uninterrupted firing of either Chauchats or machineguns. Rather, the targets, which would have consisted of squads breaking from cover for very short periods of time, would have been far too fleeting in nature.)

[Robert Dunlop]

There was an official recommendation that the Chauchat should be fired in semi-automatic mode. If used in full automatic mode, there was a likelihood of jamming after 3-400 rounds.

Robert

[TonyE]

I think the results of the various trials and surveys as indicated in Honour Bound justifies comments that although the 8mm version was not by any means a good or reliable weapon, neither was it as bad as it has been painted and it did serve its purpose.

Regards

TonyE

[centurion]

I did a bit of diging into some of this a years ago for another forum - I'll post what I found below. One thing to bear in mind is that the Chauchats abandoned by the Americans in France were not those reworked to take the American round but standard French 8mm models! I refer to this in the material below but I've since found extracts from in battle messages from American units asking for "more American and also Chauchat ammuntion" to be sent forward - indicating that their Chauchats were not firing US ammunition.

After some digging I've come the following conclusions

1. The 'American' version was never used on active service. There are a number of references to it being dumped after trials.

"The American Expeditionary Force, awaiting delivery of their intended primary weapon, the Browning M1917 machine gun, intended to adopt the Chauchat as an interim measure, purchasing 34,000 in 1917. In order to make the transition to the Browning easier the Chauchat was modified to use 0.30 inch ammunition. However the French manufacturers used incorrect chamber measurements with the result that the weapons performed poorly.

In the event the AEF largely used French, i.e. unmodified, versions of the Chauchat rather than the U.S. model until the Browning became available."

http://chauchat.biography.ms/

"but when the Americans realized how deficient the M1917 .30-06 Chauchat was, it was unceremoniously dumped. The AEF used the French M1915 for the rest of the war."

2. That the Chauchat was abandoned after jamming is clear.

History of The 353rd Infantry Regiment

"Chauchats were issued instead of Browning automatic rifles and so on down the line. But with typical Yankee ingenuity, we proceeded to do the best we could with what we had at hand.

As soon as a Chauchat jammed, it was left behind for the pioneers to salvage."

3. References to US troops throwing jammed Chauchats therefore refer to the French nodel

4. The French offloaded the Chauchat on a number of countries

http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/LMG2.htm

Small number (15 or so) of Chauchat light machineguns had cumulated to hands of Finnish Armed Forces by end of Finnish Civil War in 1918. Certain photograph suggests that they may have been captured from the Russians, but some the Finns might have also received some from the Germans. At that time Finnish military wasn't terribly interested about them and year 1937 they were sold abroad. During Winter War Finnish military equipment shortage led to second coming of these dubious weapons, as France "generously donated" some 5,000 Chauchat light machineguns and 10 million rounds of ammunition for them to Finland. The weapons were delivered to Finland in February - March of 1940. This was so late that Chauchat were not issued to Finnish troops during Winter War, but during early part of Continuation War even some unfortunate front-line units got these issued as their light machineguns. At earliest possible moment they were replaced with captured Soviet light machineguns and were soon only used by home-front units and some field artillery units. After World War 2 Chauchat light machineguns remained warehoused until 1955 when selling them abroad begun, the last ones were sold to Interarmco in 1959 - 1960.

I have seen references to some Chauchats popping up in Vietnam so one wonders who Interarmco's customers were

5. Jamming wasn't the weapons only problem

History of The 353rd Infantry Regiment

"No one was able to make high score with the Chauchat. The targets looked like they had been hit by fragments of a shell; yet the men insisted they had aimed and held the same for each shot. The French instructors contended that the effect of this dispersion was even more destructive to the morale of the enemy than direct hits, but the American soldiers were never satisfied with the result on the range and distrusted the Chauchat in campaigns. "

6. There are suspicions that there was something iffy about the American adoption of the Chauchat.

There are various (unsubstantiated) references to it being due to political considerations. The most serious being:

http://www.specialoperations.com

"During WWI, American troopers were issued a French light, automatic rifle, as part of an economic sweetheart deal with the French. The gun, called the CSRG (Chauchat), was notoriously unreliable, and that fact was well known by Americans and French alike. But, it was issued anyway, and we will never know how many Americans were needlessly killed as a result."

7. The Chauchat seems to fully deserve the title of worst machine gun

[Robert Dunlop]

Pétain's survey was conducted in May 1917. Questionnaires were sent out to all French units. The weapons covered included: M1907 St-Etienne MG, M1914 Hotchkiss MG, M1915 Chauchat, Modèle 1917 RSC autoloading rifle, the V-B rifle grenade, hand grenades, and the 37mm Puteaux cannon.

The responses on the Chauchat included:

"16th Infantry Regiment:

...The CSRGs have been used to defend conquered trenches and have made a major contribution in breaking counter-attacks; walking fire was not used.

Several guns functioned normally and gave excellent service; a few had stoppages what were nearly all caused by deformations of the magazines at the lips.

19th Infantry Regiment:

...The CSRG has been used in the offensive, where its handling is difficult, and in the defensive where it very effectively played the role of machine guns.

...Obtained results were very satisfactory, particularly in the defensive. Observed problems: when it is raining and the terrain is muddy, the CSRG becomes dirty and fouled and a certain number of these guns are put out of action.

34th and 49th Regiments:

...After having given excellent results during the actions of May 4 and 5, by intense flanking fire, these weapons were less effective because of stoppages, in spite of all the precautions. It is necessary that this weapon should be cleaned and oiled during combat...

Also, since the Assistant Gunners are overloaded, one of the riflemen should help transport the ammunition.

62nd Infantry Regiment:

The CSRG teams are overloaded; the men have difficulty keeping up. The Backpacks and the ammunition should be carried by carts or mules.

The CSRGs magazine is not solid enough and often malfunctions.

64th Infantry Regiment:

Very effective in the defensive, for flanking and direct fire.

In the offensive, walking fire is used in approaching the position.

The weapon has given entire satisfaction; several thousand rounds have been fired between April 19 and 30, 1917.

The following two problems have been observed: the lips of the magazine become deformed, giving feeding stoppages, and the cartridge guide rod breaks at its rear extremity.

65th Infantry Regiment

...The magazine spring often fails... A protection system is needed to keep dirt out of the radiator ventilation holes on the barrel housing.

The current gun cover does not protect the gun sufficiently against rain and dust.

93rd Infantry Regiment

Excellent weapon in the hands of well-trained men. Nevertheless the magazines need to be improved, for the lips are too weak and are the source of stoppages.

98th Infantry Regiment

It has been used by the assault companies during the April 13 attack. A company that progressed through the hamlet of La Biette brought down a lot of the enemy while firing on the walk...

105th Infantry Regiment:

These weapons gave full satisfaction. Only the magazines are defective.

116th Infantry Regiment:

They are only exceptionally to be used as offensive weapons, but present considerable advantages for the stabilization of new lines that have just been conquered.

Too many stoppages during walking fire.

Carrying the CSRG and its Backpack are the source of much suffering by the men...

137th Infantry Regiment:

The CSRGs expand the action of the machinegun sections; they must be pushed forward as much as possible. Their deployment in combination with groups of V-B rifle and hand grenadiers, which provide them with cover, have given excellent results.

From the material viewpoint, necessity of great care and cleanliness and of oiling after 5 or 6 magazines.

9th Infantry Division:

Results: the CSRG has excelled in all circumstances of combat.

Disadvantages: becomes fouled and prone to stoppages in contact with mud and dirt projections.

12th Infantry Division:

Excellent results were obtained. The fire of the CSRGs during the night counter-attack of May 5-6 has contributed to a large degree to the failure of the German assault.

All were convinved after repeatedly seeing whole enemy ranks brought down in front of our trenches by the fire of the CSRGs."

Forgive me for not quoting more. The remaining quotes are very similar. The material is from Demaison and Buffetaut's book, which is mentioned above. The authors went on to note:

"It is not our intent to discuss in this volume the rest of the armament covered in General Pétain's masterful combat survey of 1917, but it will suffice to say that the heavy machine guns also came in for their share of criticism due to problems experienced in the seasonally muddy and/or dusty conditions of Western Front battlefields.

General Headquarters transmitted summary reports... to the War Ministry. The following problems were addressed: magazine quality; protection against mud; standardization of the flash hider; equipment for walking fire; overloading of the Gunner and Carriers; and standardization of ammunition, which was fitted with stiffer, crimped-in primers to prevent 'popped' primers on automatic fire."

Robert

[Pete1052]

I have seen references to some Chauchats popping up in Vietnam so one wonders who Interarmco's customers were.

Let me get this straight--some Great War French machine guns are found in the former French colony of Indochina, therefore an American arms firm well connected with the U.S. Government is to blame?

I grew up in Alexandria, Virginia, where Interarmco, later named Interarms, had its headquarters. Its founder, former CIA man Sam Cummings, died in Monaco about ten years ago and since then the company has gone out of business. When I was in high school my best friend was the son of a gun dealer in Alexandria who was a major buyer from Interarms. Eight years ago I bought a used Walther PPK in .32 caliber from my friend that had been part of the deceased Sam Cummings' personal collection.

[Robert Dunlop]

Demaison and Buffetaut further note that:

"[American] interest in the CRSG had already been initiated in February, 1917 by a Major Hillman of the US Ordnance Department, who was stationed in Paris. The CSRG was then tested, apparently successfully at Springfield Armory in June, 1917 under the supervision of Captain Hatcher"

At this point, the authors attached a footnote:

"In response to the authors' repeated enquiries concerning the whereabouts of a copy of this test report, the US National Archives reported on November 8, 1994 as follows: '...we did not locate the test reports for the Chauchat automatic rifle. If the test reports are still extant, they would likely be included among the Springfield [Armory] files in record Group 156. However, we have been informed by individuals familiar with the Springfield records that most of them were destroyed or lost before transfer to the National Archives...'"

The story resumes:

"On July 7, 1917 the Munitions Board enquired if the rate of fire of the Chauchat could be increased, and whether the gun could be converted to fire the US regulation 0.30-'06 cartridge. From his Paris office, General Pershing reported the situation to the Adjutant General in Washington as follows:

'Paris, July 26, 1917

Benét [Mercié] machineguns with bipod mounts have been thoroughly tested in war by the French and discarded as being unsuitable for use as machinegun proper. Much of the machinegun equipment for first division shipped from all parts of the United States and Canal Zone did not arrive in Hoboken in time to be loaded on first convoy. Examination of guns indicates that none are fit for issue until they have been overhauled except those received from the Ordnance Department. First Division is now in billets and training must commence at once. An emergency might arise at any time in American zone requiring immediate entrance into active service. To meet this possibility and provide guns for training have ordered from French government 700 Hotchkiss machineguns with equipment complete and 20,000 rounds per gun; also 1,720 Chauchat automatic rifles with equipment complete and 3,000 rounds per gun. This with the understanding that it is impossible to provide these arms from United States without considerable delay, and advice that orders had to be placed at once here to ensure early delivery. Both Hotchkiss machineguns and Chauchat rifles use French ammunition. Equipment of each infantry company with 16 Chauchat automatic rifles contemplated as per [Pétains] new organisation. Hotchkiss machineguns and Chauchat rifles use the same ammunition. Under the conditions of ammunition supply in practice here no difficulty is anticipated as French have two kinds of ammunition. Further French ammunition for Hotchkiss and Chauchat must come from United States. Western Cartridge Company and Remington have made it for France and should at once commence manufacture. Shall purchase 100 additional Hotchkiss machineguns on antiaircraft mounts and ammunition that may be obtainable. Hotchkiss machineguns and Chauchat automatic rifles purchased will equip first 2 provisional divisions and provide a reserve of 30 per cent. The question of further supplies of Chauchat automatic rifles is now under consideration with French Government. An automatic rifle firing American ammunition is imperative for equipment of later divisions. All machinegun companies of divisions after the first 2 should be equipped with Vickers machineguns.

Pershing'

Not only did General Pershing again dismiss the option of using the 670 Benét-Mercié Model 1909 machine rifles the US Army had in stock, but in early August, he also turned down an option to take delivery of 20,000 Lewis guns before June 1918. Instead, he cabled the Adjutant General on August 5,

'...Arrangements completed to equip first two divisions with Hotchkiss machineguns and Chauchat automatic rifles. Subsequent divisions should be equipped in the same manner until Vickers machineguns and a successful automatic rifle [are] furnished by the Ordnance Department... We recommend Lewis machine guns are used for airplanes.'"

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

For anyone who is interested, there is some information, and a photo, about the US version of the Benét-Mercié automatic rifle here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss_M19...cie_machine_gun

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Demaison and Buffetaut examined the contemporary US literature for references to the Chauchat. Their conclusions and some of the quotes are reproduced below:

"There is an interesting contrast between the routine disparagement of the Chauchat rifle in modern times and the dearth of negative comment in vintage American military literature.

There are very many Chauchat rifle references sprinkled through virtually all World War I US Divisional Histories, and in veterans' memoirs. However, in none of these is to be found a reference derogatory to the 8mm Chauchat.

To the combat veteran writing his memoirs in the postwar 1920s or 30s, the Chauchat was a familiar fixture that helped him to get the job done.

Naturally, when the BAR appeared in limited numbers during September, 1918 it was preferred by the few who used it. Nevertheless, the 8mm M1915 'Chau-Chau', as the Doughboys called it, was a familiar presence everywhere in the AEF Infantry and Marine divisions in France, during 12 months of warfare.

The following excerpts are quoted from the History of the 26th Division:

..April 29, near Secheprey: McMahon, an automatic rifleman, stood off many attempts at the wire on his front. When he finally ran out of ammunition the wire was hung with dead Boches... Ryan fed an automatic rifle till every other man of the team had been killed, and then fought out his own way to the Company...

..June 1918, near Chateau Thierry: Alfred Hall, of Hingham, armed with an automatic rifle, stood on the railway track. He was a fair mark for the Boche snipers on the hill and their bullets kept singing around him, but they never got him. As the Boches ran out of the railway station, Hall would line them up as on running rabbits. His automatic rifle would briefly remark 'pup-pup-pup' and Mr Boche would go down.

On the same battlefield, Lawrence Stallings' Doughboys also describes the actions of Colonel McAlexander's 38th Regiment, 3rd Division, which gained the name 'Rock of the Marne' by successfully defending the river crossing at Mezy, east of Chateau Thierry, on July 15, 1918:

..Corporal Connors with his squad of two Chauchat teams and their buddies from three companies killed twenty boatloads of the boys in the new leather belts before all but Connors were killed or wounded. Connors had no more clips for his hiccupping Chauchats, but there were still some grenades...

Several further Chauchat testimonies can be found in Fixed Bayonets, written in 1925 by US Marine Captain W J Thomason Jr. The longest one recalls an event which took place near Belleau Wood in July, 1918:

..One lieutenant found himself behind a woodpile with a big auto rifleman. Just across from them, very near, a German machine gun behind another woodpile, was searching for them. He picked up the Chauchat [when the gunner was killed]... laid the gun across the woodpile and sighted three Boches... He gave them the whole clip and they appeared to wilt.

Incidents quoted from the History of the 42nd Division...

July 16, 1918: Pvt Michael Toody, automatic gunner, shot down an enemy plane later that afternoon.

Eight of the enemy approached a post which was occupied by Private Thomas Mead, who was alone. They approached with their hands up. Seeing that Mead was alone, one of the enemy reached for and threw a potato-masher [grenade] which overshot its mark. Mead opened up with his Chauchat and cleaned out the lot.

July 28: My attention was attacted by the reports of rapid fire on the left flank. It was one of C Company boys with a French chau-chau who had tumbled a German with a light Maxim...

Another quote, this time from the 28th Division:

July 28, 1918 near Sergy, north of Chateau Thierry: After an unsuccessful attack on Bois des Grimpettes, Mechanic Beer went out alone in front of our line, in plain view of the enemy, under heavy machinegun fire from the front and flank, and gathered up the Chauchat rifles and Musette Bags of ammunition that been abandoned by the men. He made several trips, distributing the badly needed equipment to the advanced elements of our line.

Other examples, from the 3rd Division, are reported by Colonel Butts in his famous account The Keypoint at the Marne. In July, 1918,

...Lieutenant Savage, a man among men, who had in an unusual degree the desire to serve his country, died at one end of the bridge, firing a Chauchat rifle after the Gunners were killed.

...The automatic rifle squads were making their Chauchats rattle like machineguns. Gunner Parson, when he could no longer see the enemy from the trench, climbed up on the parapet and fired his heavy Chauchat from his shoulder.

...On our side it was strictly rifles and Chauchat fire; machineguns were used by the Germans..."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

7. The Chauchat seems to fully deserve the title of worst machine gun

Just a minor point of correction. The Chauchat was not a machine gun. It was an automatic rifle.

[moved] we will never know how many Americans were needlessly killed as a result."

Conversely, we will never know who many, many more American lives were saved because the French were able to supply an automatic rifle at a time with the AEF had no other means of providing the equivalent increase in firepower afforded by the Chauchat in the French, the Lewis gun in the British (seemingly turned down as an option by Pershing), and the MG08/15 in the German Armies.

Robert

[centurion]

Just a minor point of correction. The Chauchat was not a machine gun. It was an automatic rifle.

Conversely, we will never know who many, many more American lives were saved because the French were able to supply an automatic rifle at a time with the AEF had no other means of providing the equivalent increase in firepower afforded by the Chauchat in the French, the Lewis gun in the British (seemingly turned down as an option by Pershing), and the MG08/15 in the German Armies.

Robert

I would disagree it was certainly 'sold' to the Americans as a light machine gun in which role they tried to use it.

The US Marines actually arived in France armed (and trained) with the Lewis gun only to have it taken away and replaced with the Chauchat - they were not happy campers.

It wasn't Pershing but the US General responsible for specifying armaments for the US army as a whole who rejected the Lewis (apparently on entirely personal grounds - he had had a long running feud with Lewis since their West Point days) So (deservedly) obscure is this gentleman that I can't recall his name but I'll look it up. I wonder how many American lives were lost because of his decision that left them to go into battle with an inadequate weapon when a tried and tested (and American) gun was readily available. Although BSA were at full sretch producing the Lewis in Birmingham there was an underutilised Lewis gun factory in the USA quite capable of expanding its production. In this light it seems faintly ridiculous to suggest that the Chauchat saved lives

[centurion]

"There is an interesting contrast between the routine disparagement of the Chauchat rifle in modern times and the dearth of negative comment in vintage American military literature."

There's plenty of adverse comment in contemporary US literature, especially that published just post war (it would have been an offence to publish such criticism during the war). - I included some of this in my previous posting.

[Robert Dunlop]

I would disagree it was certainly 'sold' to the Americans as a light machine gun in which role they tried to use it.

Centurion, assuming that this observation is correct, it does not mean that the Chauchat was a light machine gun. With respect, however, the quotes presented above demonstrate that the Chauchat was evaluated by the US Ordnance Department and following that evaluation, and the testing at the Springfield Armory, Pershing specifically referred to the Chauchat as an automatic rifle.

In this light it seems faintly ridiculous to suggest that the Chauchat saved lives

I have posted a series of quotes that illustrate how the 8mm Chauchat could be a very effective weapon, both in the hands of the French and the Americans. To that extent, I respectfully submit that the Chauchat, like its automatic rifle and light machine gun counterparts, saved lives. You might argue that the issuing of Lewis guns would have saved more lives. My point was contrasting the use of the Chauchat with the option of not having any such source of additional firepower.

Robert

[DBAR1918]

Apples and oranges, pears and persimmons. The best weapon that a Soldier has is the one within reach. The principal weapon system of the infantry is the SOLDIER. You can issue him the jawbone of an ass, or a SA-85, and he'll get the job done.

I'm noticing a trend in this thread of unvarnished primary sources opposed to a lot of oft-repeated group-think repeated in the literature and by academic talking heads on popular television shows for a generation. Forming an opinion in a comfy chair is not as effective as interviewing veterans, looking through original records, and firing and disassembling original examples. I shake my head when I read or see the discussion of weapons using 20/20 hindsight and comparison with other very different tools.

I have a live CSRG 1915 in8mm Lebel and a Winchester "Browning Machine Rifle" made in 1918. In a few months, my Mark I Lewis will pass through transfer. I've enjoyed restoring and firing these and many other weapons over the years, as well as pestering old men to tell me painful stories of using them in their stolen youth. Each nation in the Great War fought for different reasons, developed unique tactical styles, and struggled to produce weapons in a sufficient quality and quantity for four long years. All weapons jam because of poor conditions, deferred maintainance, a lack of training, and abject wear. A determined man will make a weapon work to its limits, and his. He uses it to save lives, and to take lives.

An oft-disparaged Italian M1891 Carcano Carbine, purchased through the mail by a dissaffected former US Marine, killed President John F. Kennedy and badly wounded Governer Connelly in a moving car from a window. Was that as effective a tool as a Chauchat?

Dave Stieghan

AKA, dbar1918

[bmg17a1]

DBAR1918 writes:

".....a trend in this thread of unvarnished primary sources opposed to a lot of oft-repeated group-think repeated in the literature and by academic talking heads on popular television shows for a generation. Forming an opinion in a comfy chair is not as effective as interviewing veterans, looking through original records, and firing and disassembling original examples. I shake my head when I read or see the discussion of weapons using 20/20 hindsight and comparison with other very different tools."

Couldn't agree more! This auto rifle is virtually always discussed out of the context of the political, tactical, as well as industrial and environmental conditions under which it was manufactured and fielded as if it existed within a vacuum, uninfluenced by immeasureable uncontrollable and variable factors. In my opinion, there is no possible way to compare it to any other firearm simply because it was the only firearm of its type available and used, so there is no other equivalent. One factor entirely in its favor, which is a factor common to many other small arms as well as other types of military equipment, is that it was made and issued in incredible numbers. With over 250,000 supplied, just the overwhelming numbers tipped the balance in favor of its use compared to the consequences if it had not been available. The sheer numbers of any type of materiel in wartime will, over time, create a positive effect.

My experience with the Chau-Chau consists of reactivating and restoring to firing condition at least twenty of them over a period of ten plus years. Have two awaiting in my shop this process as I write. Even a reasonablly well setup Chau-Chau, with well used parts and barrel, is perfectly capable of sufficient reliability for many rounds. The slow full-auto fire is compelling and allows for very accurate fire within several hundred yeards or so, and the guns are light and quite manueverable, and in the hands of well trained troops, which the French gunners were, it would have been quite successful within the limits of its anticipated use. The atrocious conditions of combat didn't single out the Chau-Chau, but every small arm used suffered. Not a small number of Croix de Guerre medals were awarded to Chau-Chau gunners and there are many very grateful testimonies from soldiers accounts that support the Chau-Chau as an effective weapon. Obviously it had many drawbacks, even disregarding that it was fundementally a necessary experiment iin its day, and the first of its type and a firearm for which the tactical role was not even understood very well. Even tried and true weapons systems of relatively recent design and manufacture have come under intense scrutiny and criticism for failures in the field. Even the Lewis is an extremely finicky weapon and was widely regarded as having all sorts of faults, many of which I have personally experienced shooting them myself. One of the manuals claimed that the gun was subject to a "bewildering array of malfunctions".

In my view, the Chau-Chau is very unfairly reviled, mostly by authors and people who have never handled or maintained one, much less fired one and who don't care to research and understand the complexities of its design and place in history.

One of the most important aspects of the widespread experience with MGs owned and maintained by US collectors and shooters is that many of the myths perpetrated by poorly informed writers and MG 'experts' of the past are being relegated to the junkyard replaced by hands on experience and familiarity with these fascinating weapons. The chau-Chau is one of these weapons that has been derided and despised way beyond the truth of its service, which hopefully is changing.

Bob Naess

Black River Militaria CII

USA

[Mk VII]

The official [uS] history of smallarms ammunition production in the war notes:

Harbord, S 283. October 17, 1918. Our monthly requirements from United States now are 25,000,000 each for October, November, December, January. These. amounts cover expenditure only and do not provide reserve. This is based on use of 8mm anti-aircraft guns on account of shortage of caliber .30 machine guns, and 8mm rifles due to shortage of caliber .30 automatic rifles. Will endeavor to equip all divisions possible with caliber .30 machine guns and automatic rifles, starting January 1. French requested this change and also requested that we obtain all 8mm. service from United States, starting January 1, on account of their serious shortage in this ammunition; We are endeavoring to get special ammunition from French. Request largest proportion 8mm. be of Western manufacture. Only ammunition of this manufacture has been released for combat.

There were several difficulties encountered in the manufacture of this ammunition, resulting from the complications arising from working with foreign specifications. For instance, it was found that the 8mm of American make had a shorter range than the French ammunition, thus causing considerable difficulty in barrage fire where both types were used. This was accounted for by the fact that the French specifications were rather loosely worded, and in a literal translation made by a French inspector at Swanton the velocity of not less than 680 meters was mistaken to mean as nearly 680 meters at the muzzle as possible. This error was immediately corrected upon complaint from the A.E.F., and on July 1 the specifications were changed, increasing the mean velocity from 680 meters to not less than 692 at 25 meters from. the muzzle.. Another problem encountered was the discovery, the latter part of July, that the Remington product gave serious malfunctions in the Chauchat automatic rifle. This was due to our use of the old French specifications for French rifle ammunition prior to the development of the Chauchat automatic rifle; later, when this was developed, the specifications were changed to allow for higher pressure and velocity necessary for satisfactory operation in this rifle. On receipt of this complaint from the A.E.F., Western and Remington were instructed to immediately load all 8mm. cartridges to give a mean velocity of not less than 700 meters per second at 25 meters from the muzzle.

Again, on August 13, 1918, the following cable was received from overseas:

S 8-3 B. Remington developed following defects not shown in French under the same conditions: 23 complete and 46 partial ruptures, usually ⅝ inch from head; 98 per cent cases swelled slightly.

This defect was remedied by thicker walls for the case.

During the war about 365,000,000 rounds were obtained abroad; 10,000,000 of American manufacture were kept here for practice with the 8mm Chauchat rifles in the hands of troops in this country

[Guest]

Found this, it may be of interest?

Provisional Instruction on the Automatic Rifle, Model 1915 (Chauchat

Mike

[bob lembke]

My father's unit at Verdun, 2. Kompagnie, Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) , used the Chauchat in combat at Verdun during the second half of 1916. The German Army allocated two MG08/15s per company to Flammenwerfer companies, but they wanted two LMGs or automatic weapons (take your pick) per platoon (Zug), so they used the Chauchat, picked up on the battlefield. (For each Chauchat brought in by men of the company the company's welfare fund received a sum of money.) I assume that these were test-fired, cleaned carefully, and since the company was in a French barracks say 20 miles behind the lines, with equipment under tarps on trucks parked at the barracks, and the men were only rolled up for an attack or counter-attack, they could keep the guns quite clean and in good order. My father told me that they were fired from the waist on the walk during attacks, hung from the shoulder with two rifle slings clipped together.

This to me suggests that the weapon, while it could be described as a piece of junk as to manufacture and perhaps design, usually was somewhat reliable if clean, oiled, and undamaged. An advantage to German storm troops was that in an attack more ammunition could be found in the captured French trenches, and sometimes magazines as well. The MG 08/15 weighed about 60 lbs., the Chauchat about 20 lbs., I think.

Bob Lembke