Gough again

[Jonathan Saunders]

Just building on the thread by Tommy Atkins entitled Sir Herbert Gough. That thread doesn’t really answer the question “what did Gough do in March 1918?”

A month or so ago Martin Kitchen’s The German Offensives of 1918 was recommended to me via the Forum. I had a perusal last night to see what great achievement Gough was responsible for in the Michael offensive and how he saved the Fifth Army from complete annihilation against overwhelming odds. I’ve picked out a few points that Kitchen makes:

Gough originally argued the point to Haig that he had too few men to defend his Line. He was also aware that many of the defensive positions if he had to withdraw were deficient and would necessitate falling back much further than would be expected.

Gough's battle strategy was to defend in depth: forward zone to hold enemy and these men were ordered not to retire; battle zone where most of the fighting was to take place; and rear zone.

Strangely Gough then appears to give orders that placed a heavy body of men in forward positions at strong points ie. not in a line. Infact five of Gough’s divisions were in the forward zone and only one division was in the actual declared battle zone. I think he had one or two cavalry divisions in the rear zones.

Result was that the Germans isolated the strong points and went round them. According to Kitchen many men in the forward zone took the non-retire order as an opportunity to surrender, and I assume they were in a hopeless position. Kitchen also states that the defensive positions taken up under the instruction of Haig and gough were very poor and susceptible to German attacks.

In initial reports back to Haig on 21 March, Gough gave an over-optimistic picture of the fighting. Subsequently Gough did not wish to retract this and so he did not update the true position to HQ.

Gough also gave orders to Corps commanders that if the Germans were to break through (I assume the battle zone?) that they were to withdraw to the frontline part of the rear zone. Any withdrawal was to be at the discretion of each of the Corps commanders. This led to Corps commanders acting independently and leaving the neighbouring flank exposed.

My previous understanding is that the withdrawal was chaotic and in bad order and I've always failed to understand how Gough could be congratulated on that. Also my understanding has been that rear guard actions were made at the initiative of individuals who stepped up to the plate so to speak, when the chips were down. So all in all I am still at a loss as to what Gough did that led to accusations that he was badly treated and merited recognition at the end of the war.

I’d be grateful if anyone can critique the points above from the viewpoint of other historians, or tell me if I have misunderstood Kitchen (I haven’t read the book but just used the index to pick things out).

Many thanks,

Jon S

[Desmond7]

MY view would be somewhat similar.

Agreed on points about Gough's pre-offensive warnings on the untenable nature of line/lack of troops etc.

Given that these factors were obvious to all, it would have been a matter for deep surprise if Gough had not made these comments.

Thus - it took no great perception on his part to point these out to 'on high'.

I have already given an example of Gough ordering two divisions to 'sort out their deployments' between themselves.

I am at work, so I can't remember the other Div. BUT (you guessed it) it was the CO of Ulster Division who complained that the adjacent Div had too many men in the forward line. A ruling was asked for at a conference - Gough basically left it up to them. What overall effect that had on the battle? I don't know but one asks ... if the policy was defence in depth, why not issue strict instructions that the forward zone was NOT to be overmanned?

Once battle commences, I think it is fair to say that Gough's command structure was placed in a position where it was literally every man for himself. His ability to implement any great measure of 'command and control' would have been severely restricted.

I think Gough gets the 'poor chap' treatment on this occasion (in historical terms) because of Haig's famous 'scapegoa' quote.

AND because Haig had been badly let down by LG's policy of holding men back from F&F.

I think you make a totally valid point about the units in the forward zones.

And I dare say that they were the men who got really ticked off by the treatment Gough received ... NOT (IMHO) because of any great love for Gough BUT because they perceived that the way he (Gough) was treated was a reflection on themselves. And quite rightly they were not too chuffed with that at all.

Thus formation of 5th Army Association/inverse snobbery about their role.

In short, and from my reading, I venture that a great many of the men you refer to in the forward zone knew fine well that their number was up once the Germans 'came over' - as a psyschological basis for a defensive action, it wasn't a great boost to morale.

Sorry for ramble.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Des - perfect. It was the sort of answer I was expecting. Agree about reflection on the men at the sharp end ... this point had already crossed my mind.

Many thanks,

Jon S

[Desmond7]

One qualification in fairness to Gough ...

I think it also merits asking - given the circumstances of March 21 1918 (before and immediately after) does anyone have a candidate who could have done much better?

Is it possible to ask that anyone answering or wishing to take part in this thread should make comments on Jonathon's primary question FIRST before passing on (should they wish) to mine?

Cheers all Des

[squirrel]

1) Well done Jonathan and Des, that's about the score as I understand it.

2) Who would have done it differently - Plumer, Maxse?

[armourersergeant]

I think Jon, that its a matter of Gough having not deserved to be sacked as he did little worse than other army commanders around him. Did Byng do better? I feel sure Gough blamed 3rd army for exposing him during 21st, seem to recall reading this in FH's 'Goughie'

Absolutely the 5th army thing was transfered to Gough as its figurehead not because he was loved, it then I think becomes a he's one of us type syndrome, that British people seem to love as the years progressed.

In 'Killing Ground' by Tim Travers there is an account of Gough's headquarters by a chap called Sandilands (I think, not near book at moment!) where he gives an impression of dis-organisation and miscomprehension of 5th army knowing what was happening. Though it is fair to say this was probably the same to some extent all along the line and at GHQ.

I would not hold up March as Gough's finest hour, just not his worst.

Tubby

[Jonathan Saunders]

I think Jon, that its a matter of Gough having not deserved to be sacked as he did little worse than other army commanders around him.

I think the point is that Gough probably deserved to be sacked before 21 March. That is certainly the opinion of Kitchen who states Lloyd-George wanted Haig to sack Gough before 21 March.

Also I dont hold with the holding back of men theory. I think if more men had been available in F&F then a lot of them would have been situated so as to protect the channel ports. Someone else on another thread yesterday put forward the Winter argument that Haig only riased the lack of men issue after the March offensive and that up until then he thought he had enough men to cope with the coming German offensive. Was Lloyd-George any more responsible for holding back men than Haig for having wasted lives on the Somme and in the Salient?

[armourersergeant]

I think the point is that Gough probably deserved to be sacked before 21 March.

Thats a different question completely!

regards

Arm