Loos,25th September 1915

[andyelliman]

I have some of my Grandfather's signals from 7.53am until 9.10am on 25th September 1915.

He was a Rifleman in the Rifle Brigade of the 12th Service Battalion of the 20th (light) Division,60th Brigade

example.headed ZFZ advance 8.40am 'Liaison officer reports leading coys right BAREILLY BDE have reached position E to F on bareilly plan and are consolidating there AAA Right bn bareilly report germans massing on their front'

I am wondering if anyone has any further information about the supplementary attack towards Fromelles that morning.I think the Bareilly Bde were an Indian unit.

[stiletto_33853]

Max,

The 12th Rifle Brigade's War Diary reads as follows:-

25th.

4 a.m.

Coys stood to arms at 4 a.m. During the night the wind shifted to the S.W. At 4.30 a.m. a message was received stating that zero time, which was originally fixed at 4.50 a.m., was changed to 5.50 a.m.

It rained at intervals during the night + continued drizzling till about 4.30 a.m.

5.48 a.m.

A large mine was exploded in the enemy's salient at M.30.a.

5.50 a.m.

Intense Artillery bombardment commenced. The enemy replied feebly. The support trenches were shelled fairly heavily.

5.59 a.m.

Our artillery lifted 500 yards to German second line and positions, and Meerut Division on the right left our parapet and prepared to assault.

6.00 a.m.

Assault of Meerut Division commenced.

6.20 a.m.

Report received that Meerut Division had advanced as far as German third line trenches.

[stiletto_33853]

7.30 a.m.

Orders were received for the Battalion to advance and connect up with the left of the Meerut Division. D Coy were ordered to move up to the trench and prepare for assault and B & C Companies to support. Coys were to assault in lines of half companies. A Company were ordered to commence up the sap running out from our lines towards Point 76.

8.10 a.m.

Orders were sent to D Coy and assault commenced. Telephone Communication was bad and the orders were sent out by orderly.

8.25 a.m.

Orders were received by D Company and the assault commenced.

8.45 a.m.

Battalion Head Quarters moved into the front line trenches and were established at the head of Chaplin Street communication trench.

9.30 a.m.

D, C & B were all across by 9.30.

All Companies suffered very heavily while crossing No Man's Land by rifle and machine gun enfilade fire from the left. The attack was made between Point 76 and 61, but to the west of these points, from about Point 55, the enemy were in full force, and our artillery were apparently unable to silence them. This enfilade fire was at about 600 yards range.

Captain Oldfield was killed in our fire trench while preparing to leave with about one platoon. Major Lott was wounded in the head by a piece of shrapnel in the German trenches, soon after he got there.

[stiletto_33853]

9.45 a.m.

About 9.45 a.m. A Company of the 6th K.S.L.I. arrived and relieved A Company who were working in the sap. Very little progress had been made in this sap owing to the heavy surface fire to which they were subjected. It was practically impossible to work and the first two sections who commenced the work lost all of their men except 2.

Meanwhile a platoon of A Company under Lieut. L.C.B. Russell had got across to the German front line on the right of the salient and worked down to Point 76 where they commenced to sap back towards our sap head. This work however, was also found to be impossible. They broke through the German parapet and got about 6 or 8 yards out when all work was practically brought to a standstill owing to the heavy fire brought to bear on them from further down the enemy's line.

[stiletto_33853]

Max,

There is a lot more, but this fits within your timeframe. Hope it helps a little. If you need more or the Regimental account let me know.

Andy

[Tom A McCluskey]

Blue Max,

The Bareilly Brigade (part of the Meerut Division) was composed of the following on 25th of September:

The attack was made by the Meerut Division, with the Garhwal Brigade on the right and the Bareilly Brigade on the left, the Dehra Dun Brigade being in Divisional reserve. Each of the assaulting brigades had three battalions in the front line and two in reserve. The Bareilly Brigade was formed for attack with the 1/4th Black Watch on the right, 69th Punjabis in the centre, and 2nd Black Watch on the left. The 33rd Punjabis and 58th Rifles were in Brigade reserve.

Hope this helps

Aye

Tom McC

[Tom A McCluskey]

Blue Max,

Here is the map:

Aye

Tom McC

[6th Shropshires]

Just to add to Andy's and Tom's posts. Two and half companies of the 6th K.S.L.I. were ordered to advance and join the 12th R.B. At 11.30, just as the leading company reached the captured line, forming the north face of the small salient, the Bareilly Brigade started to retire under a strong German counter-attack (I persum that the Garhwal Brigade did like wise but do not know for sure). The second K.S.L.I. company were forced to take cover in a ditch as it was crossing, where it was pinned down. The 12th R.B. were now left with both flanks in the air, they held on until their bombs ran out, they were then forced to retire. The K.S.L.I. company and some men of the R.B. held their ground for a short time, under difficult conditions shooting down many of the attacking Germans. At about 12.30 p.m. they were forced to retire, this withdrawl was covered by detachments of the K.S.L.I. and R.B. from the reverse slope of the German parapet, these men held until the Germans were only yards away, they got back by working along ditches which ran by the side of Winchester road. The sap was also used by the retire troops, and help reduce casualties. Major Wood of the 6th K.S.L.I., who spoke Hindustani, managed to ralley some 300 men of the Indian Division.

Annette

[andyelliman]

Just to add to Andy's and Tom's posts. Two and half companies of the 6th K.S.L.I. were ordered to advance and join the 12th R.B. At 11.30, just as the leading company reached the captured line, forming the north face of the small salient, the Bareilly Brigade started to retire under a strong German counter-attack (I persum that the Garhwal Brigade did like wise but do not know for sure). The second K.S.L.I. company were forced to take cover in a ditch as it crossing, where it was pinned down. The 12th R.B. were now left with both flanks in the air, they held on until their bombs ran out, they were then forced to retire. The K.S.L.I. company and some men of the R.B. held their ground for a short time, under difficult conditions shooting down many of the attacking Germans. At about 12.30 p.m. they were forced to retire, this withdrawl was covered by detachments of the K.S.L.I. and R.B. from the reverse slope of the German parapet, these men held until the Germans were only yards away, they got back by working along ditches which ran by the side of Winchester road. The sap was also used by the retire troops, and help reduce casualties. Major Wood of the 6th K.S.L.I., who spoke Hindustani, manged to ralley some 300 men of the Indian Division.

Annette

[PhilB]

I have items to a Canadian casualty of 25/9/15, a Pte in 7th Can Inf. He`s buried at Ploegsteert, victim of a feint Canadian gas attack which drew artillery fire from the Germans, on the wing of the Loos offensive. I suspect the feint attacks to Loos may be more extensive than most think. Phil B

[andyelliman]

It all fits with the data I have.

7.50am MOVE

8.42am No4 Battalion has advanced

9.02am First coy 60 Bde across

I imagine 'across' is the bridge Annette mentions.

Any more info on 12th Rifle Brigade is most welcome.

Max

[Tom A McCluskey]

Blue Max,

Here are 2 more maps showing the attack

hope this helps

Aye

Tom McC

[stiletto_33853]

Max,

What extra do you want on the 12th RB ?? as I have quite a lot regarding the 12th.

Andy

[Tom A McCluskey]

The account of the 2nd Bn Black Watch:

1a & b

[Tom A McCluskey]

Here is more

2 a & B

[Tom A McCluskey]

Page 3

[Tom A McCluskey]

Don't forget the 4th Black Watch attacked with 20 officers & 420 men as that was the bayonet strength left after Neuve Chappelle and Aubers Ridge. 19 Officers and 230 men were killed and wounded. This was a diversionary attack for the main event down at the mining town of Loos itself.

Anyway 3b

[Tom A McCluskey]

Page 4

[Tom A McCluskey]

I forgot to mentiojn the 4th Bn BW were also at Festubert, which again depleted manpower.

4b

[Tom A McCluskey]

Page 5

[Tom A McCluskey]

5b

[Tom A McCluskey]

Page 6

[Tom A McCluskey]

& finally 6b

[Tom A McCluskey]

Blue Max,

Hopefully you can gleam from this some aspects of the attack which still were not dealt with properly by the 4th Army, on the first day of the Somme.

1. Defending with flanks exposed is very difficult and costly.

2. Reserves need to be deployed rapidly to hold captured enemy trenches, and renew offensive operations from attacking troops who have been successful.

3. The use of sufficient ‘moppers up’ to clear existing trenches and dugouts, this prevents being shot from behind, which happened on numerous areas of the Somme battlefield.

Hope this information is useful for your research into 12th Service Bn Rifle Bde, the Bareilly Brigade and the Battle of Loos.

If you need the full account of the 2nd Bn Black Watch and the 4th Bn Black Watch please PM me and I will email you a copy.

Yours Aye

Tom McC

[FredJCarss]

Here is the War Diary entry covering part of the 25th for the 2nd B.W.

Regards

Fred

7.a.m.

Part of No.3 and No.2 Coys. under Captains DENISON and PARK in organised parties, captured the several enemy trenches and drove the enemy back on M, K, J. with bomb and bayonet.

No.1 Coy. had performed its task and captured enemy firing line from ELM TREE SALIENT to the re-entrant, and were now moving up towards ROAD BEND.

Half of No.4 Coy. and some of No.1 Coy. under Capt. BUCHAN, finding slight resistance, about D & D2 were following up the enemy towards the MOULIN de PIETRE.

Brigadier informed of this advance and asked to send 60th Brigade to hold left flank.

Information received later, that a Bn. was being sent for this purpose.

(Major WAUCHOPE before 7.a.m. had informed the Brigade that the left flank though secure in the enemies firing line was most dangerously exposed for a distance of 600 yards.)

69th. Punjabis coming on well on right and some 58th. soon appeared, part of one Coy. going to our left flank about J, the bulk pushing on towards MOULIN.

Capt. BUCHAN's party pressed forward and captured enemies reserve trench, opposite and to right of MOULIN.(This party was divided in 2, the leading under Sgt. EASTON & later Mr BALFOUR-MELVILLE captured a trench: Major Wauchope seeing this ordered the 2nd. under Capt. BUCHAN to support this attack.)

Other regiments following immediately on their right and later on after Left Flank ordered to consolidate. This done successfully (in the face of severe and continuous resistance) from M3, k2 and some of 58th Rifles holding on near J. Blocks being formed all well ahead of line originally told to occupy.

Owing to success obtained by Capt. BUCHAN'S party, and knowing the Generals wish that 2nd. line in front of MOULIN, should be held, O.C. collected 4 reserve platoons and details of other Coys. and ordered them forward in support of Capt. BUCHAN, who now rushed the enemies 2nd. line opposite the MOULIN.

The supporting line, together with the 58th & 69th pushed forward on our right , without delay & in face of heavy rifle fire from the MOULIN itself, and right front, captured and held all enemy 2nd Line to right of MOULIN, and linked up with Capt. BUCHAN's right.

Four telephones had all broken down (of the 2 telephone parties arranged to advance with C.O. all were

gassed and unable to cross our parapet), but runners were able to keep up communication between enemies 2nd line and Adv. Bde. H.Q. By this means the artillery (44th Battery) were kept informed of events, and asked to "lift" off 2nd line on to the MOULIN, which was done with promptness and exactness.

More troops to secure left flank were now asked for.

Casualties up till now were 12 Officers out of 20 and many men.

As events had progressed well so far, C.O. pushed forward to our extreme left where Capt. BUCHAN established a "block" in enemy's 2nd line, 200 Yards to left of MOULIN.

From this point, back to our left company consolidated at K2 and J, was a gap of about 600 yards, which now became the C.O.'s main idea to close.

C.O. ordered Subadar TICKLA KHAN of 58th Rifles to take his double Coy. out of 2nd line, which was now overcrowded, and form along natural ditch that runs back from enemys 2nd line at 2. This was done in soldierly manner.

O.C. 58th (Col. HOUSTON) was informed of this and he added more men, thus closing about a 150 yards of the gap.

C.O. (Maj. WAUCHOPE D.S.O.) moved to right to see how that flank progressed, and found Col. RIDGEWAY (33rd Punjabis) & Col. WALKER (1/4th Black Watch) there.

Part of 4th B.W. also charged the 2nd line on our right, but their right flank was entirely exposed.

It was here decided, that unless the Garwal Bde. succeeded in pushing forward, the 4th. B.W. would be unable to hold our right flank, but seeing a few 2/8 Gurkhas (Part of Garwal Brigade) on right at X, it was hoped that the right was secure.

Col. WALKER agreed not to push on but do his upmost to protect the right, and for this purpose, kept his Bn. mostly in trench about G.

Major WAUCHOPE asked Col. RIDGEWAY to keep his Bn. where they were, as a central reserve, in case enemy attacked from either flank.

The 69th. Punjabis were all in enemy 2nd line, about opposite the chimney, and Capt. HUTCHISON with 50 men left as a support, in case enemy pushed in from either flank.

O.C. (Major WAUCHOPE. D.S.O.) informed other Bn. commanders that he would return to left flank at K2 and direct 60th Bde. to move in and secure left flank from K2 towards the MOULIN.

Situation between 10 and 11.a.m.

The K.R.R. were arriving about M. 100 men on left of 2nd. B.W. held M² M³ K² & J:

Capt. BUCHAN and some 80 men held enemy 2nd line opposite MOULIN, and had blocked this.

200 men of 58th. Rifles held 200 yards from enemy 2nd line towards Y.

A mixture of 58th, 69th & 33rd in this order held enemy 2nd. line to right of Capt. BUCHAN's party to about 2; some of 2/8th. Gurkhas held it about X; Capt. Hutchison was in support about 2, and most of 4th B.W. were between 2 and G.

Enemy shell and rifle fire very severe.

O.C. Bn. moved back to Electric Power Stn. where Capt. COCHRANE had established 2 machine guns (1 a German gun) and occasional communication 44th By. & Brigade H.Q.

A message explaining immediate success but emphasising danger to left flank, sent to Bde.

About 11.a.m. first contact with 60th Bde. obtained by O.C.

Orders had been correctly carried out, and taken over from Capt. PARK, the blocks M2, M3, & K2.

O.C. directed 3 Officers of 60th, and an R.E. Officer to extend towards MOULIN, and hold this flank to where they would meet 58th and 2nd. B.W. about Y and enemy 2nd. line near MOULIN.

Shell and rifle fire heavy.

O.C. placed 1 Coy.(60th Bde.) in natural ditch which runs from Ê towards MOULIN, but their other Coys. never advanced so far as this before 12 noon, where their retirement began.

Capt. PARK withdrew without difficulty from left flank between C & P and reorganised before advancing to Road Bend. He reached Electric Power Stn. about 12 noon, from where he saw the retirement of the Brigade from the trenches in front of the MOULIN.

The first was chiefly the 69th. & 33rd, rather from the right of MOULIN» the next included many of the 4th. B.W. and 58th and some 2nd. B. Watch» the last was wholly 2nd. Black Watch.

This retirement from the trenches in front of MOULIN was due to two distinct causes:

Cause of retirement.

1. The left of the line was blocked by Capt. BUCHAN's men, but on his rear there was no natural feature to give protection and the Germans pressed through on his left rear about noon.

2. The right of the Brigade was also unguarded except for a few of the 2/¸ Gurkhas who had most gallantly fought their way to the right of the MOULIN and to the right front of the 69th.

A little after 11.a.m. they were forced out of this trench, and the 4th. B.W. & 33rd. had their right exposed.

Lack of Officers made re-organisation difficult, and rifle fire & bombing rendered the taking up of a new position immediately in rear almost impossible.

About 11.30 this right flank gave way, the Germans constantly bombing and pressing in from the right.

This flank giving way, was the first of the 3 retirements noticed by Capt. PARK, when at the Power Station.

The centre of the troops opposite the Moulin found the Germans on their right rear and left rear threatened by parties of Germans, consequently each section was forced back or there would have been no line of retreat left open.

The final retirement from the left being due to the gap on our left, between MOULIN & J never having being filled, and a gap on our right being caused as explained above in (1) & (2).

The Officers present, found the men most ready to make a series of stands during the retirement. When such stands were prolonged, Germans came bombing up, from trenches on either flank.

11-­12 Noon. Left flank.

All efforts of O.C. Bn. to close gap on left about J. were unsuccessful.

The Bareilly Brigade Bombers, were never found all day, nor 1/2 Coy. 60th Bde. Bombers.

The 2 Coys. Rifle Brigade apparently relied on their Bde. Bombers, both for Bombers and Bombs and when pressed by enemy Bombing Parties were unable to resist them, on account of lack of trained Bombers or Bombs.

They were driven back from the blocks taken over at M2, M3 & K2.

The Coy. placed by O.C. of B.W. in ditch in the direction of Y was forced back towards C / B.

Situation about noon.

The situation now was, that on the right of German line in front of MOULIN, about X & 2 no troops remained, they had been forced far back, if not into our own lines, at least out of the fighting zone.

Those in the centre, opposite the chimney were being forced back with their right rear threatened.

The troops on left, opposite the MOULIN, mostly 2nd. B.W. were still holding on, but Germans were firing heavily from trenches in their left rear.

12.30.p.m.

By 12.30 they were forced back and to their right, both flanks being "en l'air", and direct retreat being cut by 60th Bde. being forced back from M2 M3 K2 past M,K,J.

(The retirement was jointly ordered and carried out by Col. HOUSTON 58th Rifles & Capt. BUCHAN 2 B.W.)

1.p.m.

By 1.30 they had effected an orderly and steady retirement under several Officers, halting and firing at different places past Power Station & thence mostly in the open on both sides of Winchester Road.

About half an hour later the last of the 2nd. B.W. men with the O.C. (about 6 in all) followed the Rifle Brigade to A, closely pursued by bombs and heavy rifle fire from C, K, M. At A, Germans were seen at S and further delay being useless, the party crossed over to the British lines about the Tweed.

Summary.

Much confusion was caused from the start by the effects of gas, on all leaders.

The left flank was consolidated as ordered.

The 2nd & 3rd lines passed forward to the Moulin, under orders to keep pressing on from one line to another if resistance was not too severe. Had Garwal Bde. been able to make good the ground on our right, no

retirement of the Bareilly Bde. would have taken place, thus giving more time and more men from the 60th Bde. to fill up the gap on left flank of 2nd Black Watch.

The 2nd. B.W. first gained a frontage of enemy trench of some 120 yards to left of Winchester Road, and 100 yards to the right.

The former was extended to M2, a distance of about 350 yards from mine crater, & from S to K2 an equal distance, also about 150 yards from C to J; a total length gained by bombing of over 800 yards.

On the right of the road, the Bn. gained a frontage of about 100 from M to S and 100 yards from S to ELM TREE, making a total length of enemy firing line captured 550 yards.

In its subsequent advance, the Bn. captured 4 lines of enemy trenches and advanced to within 80 yards of the MOULIN; an advance of about 750 yards.

Enemy Casualties in Killed.

From the entirely different methods the enemy losses in killed, on the frontage penetrated by 2/B.W. is estimated at 240, this includes 20 Officers. No enemy wounded were left behind.

Bn. Casualties.

The 2nd. B.W. lost 140 in killed & missing, which means practically 140 killed.

Our heaviest losses were incurred in the first 15 minutes, after that it was the other way.

It was the Bombing Parties who drove the enemy back, & it is the successful not the defeated Bombing Parties who inflict the losses.

As they were driven from one line to another, many Germans were killed at close range by rifle fire, and many bayoneted.

None of the 2nd. B.W. were bayoneted.