First use of HE Ammunition in 18 Pdr in action

[johnreed]

H.E. FIRST USED BY EIGHTEEN POUNDERS

First Battle of Ypres

On October 31^st, 1914, the 70^th Battery, 34^th Brigade, R.F.A., commanded by Major H.C. Stanley-Clarke, R.F.A. was in action in close support of 6^th Infantry Brigade holding a pronounced salient along the eastern and southern edges of a large wood to the east of Passchendaele-Bercelare road and bending back across this road south-west to Reutel.

The battery was disposed as follows:

Four guns (right and centre sections), south-west of the village of Molenaarelshoek (sometimes known as Nord Westhoek) and just clear of the north-east corner of the Polygon de Zonnebeke.

Two guns (left section) in an orchard in the village of Molenaarelshoek

The centre line of fire was in the direction of Kieberg-Waterdamhoek. The main

Observing station was in a house near the Passchendaele –Bercelare road, with a forward observing station in the trenches of the 2^nd South Staffordshire Regiment.

About 9 a.m. Lieutenant Maitland-Dougall, R.F.A., the forward observing Officer of the 50^th Battery, R.F.A., which together with the 22^nd Battery, R.F.A., was in action behind the 70^th Battery, came to the observing station of 70^th Battery and reported that an enemy gun was in action just behind the German trenches on the southern side of the salient.

Major Stanley-Clarke, having communicated with the infantry, ordered Second Lieutenant T.J. Moss R.F.A., commanding the left section in the village, to go up with Lieutenant Maitland-Dougall and reconnoitre with a view to taking a gun forward and, if possible, knocking out the gun at close range. Orders were sent at the same timeto the Wagon Lines in Polygon Wood to send up the gun team and limber of “E” sub-section and to fill the limber entirely with the twenty-four rounds H.E. which had just been issued to the Battery.

Second Lieutenant Moss, who had come out with the battery in August as Battery Quartermaster-Sergeant and had been given a commission on October 1^st and remained with the battery as a section commander, returned from his reconnaissance and reported that he could take a gun team forward to the Passchendaele-Bercelare road and thence man-handle the gun down the road till he got within less than 500 yards of the German gun, which was plainly visible.

By this time “E” sub-section limber and team had arrived, and Second Lieutenant Moss led it forward and unhooked the team on reaching the road. The gun and limber were then man-handled to the spot which had been selected. The muzzle was poked through the hedge and Second Lieutenant Moss, carrying a reaping-hook, crept on all fours through some grass to another hedge where he cut a hole in ditect line between his 18-pounder and the German gun.

Meanwhile his detachment had got the gun ready for action, had hidden the limber close by, and brought up all H.E. ammunition handy. On his return Second Lieutenant Moss took the place of the layer, laid his gun over the open sights, and was just about to pull the firing lever when he noticed movement in the trenches near the enemy’s gun. He accordingly waited a moment and then saw a party of fifteen or twenty Germans with fixed bayonets jump out of their trench all round the gun. He pulled the firing lever, observed his shell hit the gun fair and square and detonate on it, and saw the party of Germans collapse in three heaps in front of it. He then fired several more rounds at the hostile gun to complete its destruction, and also at the trenches and neighbouring houses suspected to containing machine guns. Having expended the whole of his ammunition he withdrew his detachment to the shelter of a house close by. For the remainder of the day the vicinity of the 18-pounder was subject to continuous and very heavy rifle and machine-gun fire.

Second Lieutenant Moss returned to the battery observing station and reported the result of his shooting to his battery commander, who went forward with him to see the effect. The German gun could be seen lying on its side---wrecked; and three heaps of dead Germans in front of the trench. At dusk the eighteen-pounder was taken back to its old position in the orchard.

The next day the Germans “crumped” the position where the eighteen-pounder had been the previous day with heavy howitzers for over an hour, and no doubt flattered themselves that they, in their turn, had knocked it out.

Taken from The Royal Artillery War Commemoration Book Page 30-31

[delta]

Good job it arrived,

Otherwise the Germans would have taken Ypres

[Old Tom]

Nice story, I had not realised HE had become available as early as that. I suppose that the single gun action was in line with accepted RFA tactics prior to WW1 and wonder how often that sort of action was repeated. I am aware of an example in the 18th Division where an 18 pr was deployed to a pre dug position in the front line in order to knock out a machine gun.

Old Tom

[Ian Riley]

I am sure that I have seen several instances of a single gun being brought up in the 55th Division (and other divisions) in 1916 and beyond including the 100 Days advance. References? Mmmmm. It will just have to go down as an 'I think .... ' at the moment.

Presumably the effect on the infantry was caused by the shell bursting above ground level when it struck the gun.

How flat would the trajectory be at 500 yards. Presumably liitle elevation is required?

Ian

[Thunderbox]

Good shooting to hit a field gun at 500 yards over open sights. Must have been a good gun tube with recent calibration in the sights.

[nigelfe]

Good shooting to hit a field gun at 500 yards over open sights. Must have been a good gun tube with recent calibration in the sights.

Noooo, calibration has little if anything to do with it and at that range a worn barrel wouldn't have been a significant concern. Let me give a short lecture.

The key issue in direct fire is range estimation - precision direct fire has been greatly enhanced by laser range finders (some really good long range direct shooting by UK 105s in Afg). However, 18pr was relatively high velocity and at 500 yards the trajectory would have been fairly flat, greatly reducing the sensitivity to error in range estimation.

Calibration is about determing as muzzle velocity, and at 500yds indifferent accuracy MV wouldn't be a big problem. What would have been more important would be accurate alignment of the axis of the bore with the sights. This was a matter for sight testing. Quick Sight Tests probably done daily and whenever deemed necessary and Full Sight Test done less frequently iaw the maintenance schedule.

QSL involved putting string or whatever cross hairs across the muzzle (held in place with dabs of grease) and removing the firing mechanism (to give an aperture into the bore), then aiming through the bore at a distant object. Next set the sights to zero (not really needed with a Direct Fire Tele or open sight) and seeing if the sight is pointing accurately at the distant object, if not adjust the sights.

What would have been important in the situation would have been fast laying to enable a rapid rate of accurate fire.

[daggers]

Two less technical points. All the handling of gun and limber must have been done very quietly to avoid detection. Who, these days, would recognise a reaping hook, apart from those antiques experts on TV?

There is no mention in that account of any award for thevaction.

D